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1 Translating agency reform 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 The experience of the last two decades would suggest that a 
new international reform category has emerged, the agency. Al-
though not always consistent with local titles, the agency label 
has been associated with public sector arrangements observed 
in countries as diverse as England (O’Toole and Jordan, 1995), 
Sweden (Fortin,1996; Gustafsson and Rhodes, 1989), Portugal, 
Japan (Oliver 2000), The Netherlands (Ter Bogt, 1999; Van der 
Knaap et al., 1997), Latvia (Pollitt et al., 2001; Pollitt, 2002), 
New Zealand (Boston et al., 1996), Canada (Aucoin, 1996), and 
Australia (Armstrong, 1998; Rowlands, 2002) - to name just a 
few examples. With endorsement from international organiza-
tions such as the OECD and World Bank, agencies have also 
been enforced upon developing countries such as Ghana and 
Tanzania as a condition for financial aid (Talbot and Caulfield, 
2002; Minogue et al., 1999). Their spread has been the conse-
quence of seeming universal agreement that they are a good 
thing. This has been reflected in OECD reports which have 
recognized the  “greater use of agencies or their equivalents 
…(for) purposes that include better service, greater efficiency, a 
focus on results, as well as clearer accountability relationships 
between the institution and government” (OECD, 1997a:19). 
Agencies have not only been deemed appropriate reform acces-
sories for all kinds of political administrative contexts, but they 
have apparently also been able to bring about a range of bene-
fits in these different circumstances.  
More recently, there seems to have been a pendulum swing 
in the agency fashion whereby features, such as their autonomy, 
initially regarded as part of the solution, have come to be seen as 
a problem for accountability and for joining up government 
(James, 2004; Smullen, 2004). This research seeks to investigate 
the way that the international fashion of agency reform has at-
tained its credibility in different national contexts and the ar-
guments that have propelled its rise, as well as to some extent, 
its fall in official national talk. Its empirical focus is official ac-
counts of agency reform at the national or federal level in The 
Netherlands, Sweden and Australia.  
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1.2 The object of study: agency 
 
Broadly speaking, the idea of agencies has been characterized 
by three features: their structural dis-aggregation from central 
departments, management autonomy and performance con-
tracting (Talbot, 2004:6). A more detailed definition is provided 
in chapter 4. Often contrasted with the monolithic bureaucratic 
units of the welfare state in the post war period, agencies are at 
arms length from departments but still remain part of the central 
core of government (Talbot, 2004:8). Within the international 
community, the identification of agencies has also occurred 
through mutual recognition, whereby reforms introduced in 
one country such as The Netherlands, are presented as follow-
ing from agency initiatives in other countries such as the UK 
(Ministerie van Financiën, 1991:30-33) which in turn are said to 
have been inspired by Swedish agencies (Fulton Committee, 
1968), and so on. These instances, which are numerous, point 
to the symbolic features of the agency phenomena and its fash-
ionable status. The object of this study has therefore also been 
defined by national or international recognition of membership 
to the agency way.  
 
1.3 A word on convergence 
 
Agencies, as a public management fashion, have appeared dur-
ing a period when there has been a wider debate about the con-
vergence of public management reform trajectories in the west-
ern world. They can be interpreted as a corollary of the New 
Public Management (NPM) agenda since many of the features 
associated with NPM, such as management autonomy and a fo-
cus upon outputs or results, have also been ascribed to agencies 
(Hood, 1991, 1996; Osbourne and Gaebler, 1992; James, 2003). 
The spread of apparently similar kinds of reforms and ideas has 
raised questions as to the extent to which convergence in public 
management reform has taken place (Pollitt, 2001a, 2001b). 
While some commentators emphasize striking similarities, oth-
ers stress durable differences (Pollitt, 2001b). In particular, 
many have noted similar kinds of public management themes 
and labels appearing in both the international arena, as well as 
in a number of political administrative contexts (Sahlin-
Andersson, 1996; Power, 1997), while others have shown im-
portant differences in the content of reforms and the way they 
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have been implemented (Greves, 2000; Pollitt and Talbot, 2004; 
Pollitt et al., 2004; Pollitt, Van Thiel and Homburg, 2006). It 
has been suggested that there may have been convergence in 
public management reform talk, but convergence in reform 
practice and results is much more unlikely (Pollitt, 2001a). Such 
diagnoses are drawn from institutional perspectives that em-
phasize the durable contextual features of political administra-
tive contexts, which have their own starting points and trajecto-
ries for reform. Talk, on the other hand, is conceived of as 
something more mobile that is able to travel and be translated 
to different contexts with fewer constraints. By analyzing agen-
cy official accounts this study seeks to investigate the extent to 
which management reform talk has actually converged across 
national and linguistic contexts. This also has implications for 
the kinds of meanings ascribed to agencies in different contexts, 
since different uses of agency terminology, as well as different 
actual practices would suggest that reforms such as agencies 
have attained entirely different meanings. In addition, this study 
also seeks to identify reasons for similarities and differences in 
talk. Against this background, the central research question is: 
 
How has agency reform been constructed in the official accounts presented in 
different cultural political administrative contexts and why have there been 
similarities and differences in the accounts? 
 
1.4 Previous research on agencies and reform talk 
 
This research develops both a growing body of academic 
knowledge about agency reform, as well as studies about rheto-
ric and discourses in public administration. With the rise of 
agencies as an international fashion, and as a significant reform 
initiative in many national contexts, academic endeavour on this 
topic has also proceeded. To date, research about agencies has 
generally concentrated upon the results of the reform (James, 
2003; Ter Bogt, 1999), the relationship between agencies and 
departments (Gains, 2000), and the effect of institutional ar-
rangements upon the contents of the reform (Sundström, 2003; 
Rowlands, 2002; Pollitt et al., 2004). In the UK, the Next Steps 
program has been examined by many including James (2003) 
who has investigated the causes of the reform, its development 
and results. He has found that although agency reform was trig-
gered by the desires of politicians to improve management, the 
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choice for agency reform came from high civil servants who 
preferred policy rather than implementation tasks (James, 
2003:68). To this extent, agency reform was not necessarily 
about promoting efficiency or performance at all, although 
James found that reductions in costs could be observed (James, 
2003:105-106). In The Netherlands, Ter Bogt (1999), found no 
evidence of efficiency improvements from agency reform and 
instead discovered efficiency reductions. Despite the popularity 
of agency reform, evidence of the effects of agency reform re-
main scanty and limited (Pollitt, 2001, 2003).  
In her study of the nature of relationships between depart-
ments and agencies in the UK, Gains (2000) found that re-
source dependencies encouraged shared goals and tended to 
promote better working relationships within the administration. 
Finally, in studies of the institutional influences upon the con-
tent of reforms, Pollitt et al. (2004) have shown in their four 
country comparison that the performance management systems 
of agencies had not converged and were influenced by agency 
function, as well as, politico- administrative traditions and cul-
ture. Indeed, nowhere among their case studies were they able 
to identify agency practice that corresponded with international 
rhetoric (Pollitt et al., 2004:246). Similarly, in both Sweden 
(Sundström, 2003) and Australia (Rowlands, 2002), academic 
research has focused upon the unique national, historical and 
contextual arrangements that preceded respectively the intro-
duction of results management to existing agencies in Sweden 
and the creation of Centrelink in Australia. As James (2003) 
also noted, they have shown how the content of agency re-
forms satisfied the interests of some civil servants and the in-
formation resources they had available to them. Rowlands 
(2002) has also shown how the rhetoric of the Australian 
agency Centrelink actually followed its creation and has at times 
been incompatible with the government decisions made about 
it. Unlike many of these studies, it is not the intention of this 
research to compare the rhetoric of agency reform with its 
practice but to assess convergence in national agency accounts 
and understand why it has appeared in the form that it has in 
different contexts. 
This research also follows earlier studies of rhetoric and dis-
courses in public management (Hood and Jackson, 1991; Hood, 
2003; Summa, 1990, 1992, 1993; Van Twist, 1995; Clarke and 
Newman, 1997), as well as discourses in policy making more 
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generally (Fischer and Forester, 1993; Hajer, 1995). It is particu-
larly the studies of rhetoric and their analysis of knowledge in 
public management that have provided the greatest buttress for 
this study. In 1991 Hood and Jackson published their encyclo-
paedia of administrative doctrines deployed throughout the his-
tory of Anglophone public management (Hood and Jackson, 
1991). They demonstrated that the arguments in public man-
agement were finite and had their own counter doctrines which, 
despite being presented as new, tended to recur and supersede 
one another over time. While providing international compara-
tive examples of administrative doctrines and rhetorical tech-
niques, however, the primary focus upon the content and struc-
ture of arguments (logos) did not allow for detailed discussion of 
the role that context has had upon influencing which arguments 
appear in different contexts over time, or which kinds of speak-
ers are allowed to speak.  
Similarly, in Hood’s more recent work which has sought to 
combine Grid Group Cultural Theory (GGCT) with rhetoric, 
the role of national cultural context has received only cursory 
attention, with much of the empirical analysis again seeking to 
demonstrate the way that arguments in public management 
comply to the GGCT’s four ways of life (Hood, 2003). As will 
be discussed in chapter 3, Hood’s categorization of public man-
agement arguments using GGCT has been integral to the pre-
sent study. Summa’s work has also been influential because of 
the focus upon housing planning documents over time and her 
application of the New Rhetoric. This theory is also used in the 
present study. Much more than Hood, Summa’s work locates 
rhetoric in a particular institutional context and examines the 
role of the speaker (ethos), not just the logos, of the rhetoric. 
Finally, Van Twist (1995) has identified some of the metaphors 
that have played a central role in administrative science theories 
and perspectives. He has also examined the construction of 
administrative reform through text and has argued that the 
spread of such texts has the consequence of bringing about the 
disappearance of the author and enabling practitioners to inter-
pret meaning in their own con-texts. He identifies the need for 
more inspiring speakers within public administration in order to 
aid managers in their own constructions of practice. While it is 
not the primary goal of this research to identify the relationship 
between rhetoric and practice, like the work of Van Twist, the 
empirical focus of this study does provide the opportunity to 
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reflect upon the kind of knowledge and roles that official 
speakers impart to practitioners, and indeed the users of public 
services.  
 
1.5 Research question and techniques 
 
The central research question for this study has been posed 
against the background of debates about convergence in public 
management reforms. More specifically, it is focused upon the 
symbolic features of agency reform and its construction in the 
official accounts produced in different cultural and political-
administrative contexts. This allows for variety in the meanings 
attributed to agency reform in different countries to also be ex-
amined. The research seeks to demonstrate how agency reform 
has been constructed in official talk, and both identify and 
compare the way such constructions relate to the cultural, po-
litical and administrative contexts in which they are produced. 
By doing so, it can contribute to discussions of convergence in 
public management and demonstrate the extent to which this 
has occurred at the level of talk about agency reform. It can 
also provide insight into the culturally prescribed rules of speak-
ing about management reforms and the audiences being spoken 
to in particular national contexts. This is an important contrast 
to the existing explanations of totalizing discourses and argu-
ments that have been offered by proponents of NPM (see Os-
bourne and Gaebler, 1992).  
In order to answer the research question it has been neces-
sary to identify the official documents in The Netherlands, 
Sweden and Australia that have either described or initiated 
their national agency reforms. These documents have been se-
lected on the basis of advice from experts in each of the coun-
tries under study and have included examples over an extended 
period of time. The technique of rhetorical analysis has been 
used to identify the constructions of agency reform in the dif-
ferent contexts and has also provided theoretical categories for 
comparing descriptions of agency reform. In addition, secon-
dary literature and interview material has been used to recon-
struct the scenes of use in which agency accounts have been pro-
duced. This material has been gathered from comparative and 
national academic research in political science, public admini-
stration, history and sociology. On the basis of both accounts 
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of agency reform and of the contexts in which they have been 
produced, it is possible to make conclusions about: 
• The correspondence between national official ac-
counts and the cultural political-administrative con-
text in which it has been produced 
• The similarities and differences in the official ac-
counts produced across different cultural, political 
and administrative contexts 
• The roles that national styles of speaking, as well as 
the stories about agency reform themselves, have 
played in the construction of agency reform across 
the countries. 
Given that official agency accounts in both The Netherlands 
and Sweden have been produced in languages other than Eng-
lish, it has also been necessary to translate the statements in 
these countries about agency reform to English. I am able to 
read accounts of agency reform in both Dutch and Swedish and 
have thus conducted rhetorical analyses of documents in these 
countries in the original language. For the reporting of findings 
about this rhetoric, however, I have translated the material to 
English in this study. This has sometimes occurred after consul-
tation with native speakers. It is a unique contribution of this 
study that it seeks to uncover and analyze the official accounts 
produced, not only in different countries and administrative 
traditions, but also in different languages.  
 
1.6 Theoretical perspective 
 
The theoretical approach adopted in this research can be classi-
fied as social constructivist. It has been inspired by philosophi-
cal figures such as Wittgenstein, Austen and Foucault, who 
have focused upon the way that language creates reality rather 
than just representing it. From this perspective the object of 
agency reform is not understood as a practice out there, but 
rather is conceived of as all that has been said about it in a spe-
cific context. Wittgenstein and Foucault, in particular, have ar-
gued that the construction of objects takes place in a language 
game, or discourse, which has its own rules about who is qualified 
to speak, from which institutions they speak, and, how to speak. From 
this perspective statements about agencies in different contexts 
will have also been governed by certain rules. The study of 
rhetoric provides theoretical concepts for analyzing official ac-
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counts of agency reform and the rules that have governed their 
production. It has been defined as the art of using language 
persuasively and has its own toolkit for assessing the character 
of speakers (ethos) and their techniques for constructing ob-
jects (pathos and logos). Underlying these categories of rhetoric 
is the relationship of the speaker with an audience. The rules of 
speaking are always the outcome of a particular contextual 
situation. In this study, the New Rhetoric of Perelman and Ol-
brechts-Tyteca (2003) has been applied to assess the construc-
tion of agency reform across the countries under study and 
their rules of speaking. This is a theory of rhetoric derived from 
Aristotle’s own treatise. The theoretical categories it provides 
enable the researcher to compare constructions in different 
countries. In considering and comparing the relationships be-
tween national context and official accounts, the New Rhetoric 
is particularly useful because of the distinctions it makes be-
tween universal and particular audiences. This distinction makes 
it possible to observe convergence in appeals to a particular 
management audience for example, while at the same time not-
ing differences in the way the broader argumentative appeal of 
accounts are obtained in a particular cultural political adminis-
trative context.  
A second theoretical perspective that is adopted in this re-
search originates from sociology and is Grid Group Cultural 
Theory (GGCT). This theory is also consistent with a social 
constructivist perspective although it proposes that regularities 
in the meanings attached to social phenomenon can be broadly 
associated with four basic ways of life or a combination of these 
(Thompson et al., 1997: 1-2). Derived from the dimensions of 
grid and group (described in chapter 3), GGC theorists identify 
individualism, fatalism, hierarchy, and, egalitarianism as ways of 
life that consist of mutually supportive values and attitudes, as 
well as patterns of social relations. GGCT is an appealing 
framework for international comparative research because it 
enables the analysis and comparison of objects such as agencies, 
even when they have been constructed from entirely different 
knowledge bases. It provides a means for sorting accounts of 
agency reforms and the argumentative themes that have charac-
terized them. Christopher Hood (2000) has described a number 
of themes and arguments in public management that are consis-
tent with the four ways of life and I have used these to catego-
rize official accounts of agency reform. Together with the New 
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Rhetoric, rules of speaking about these different ways of life can 
also be compared enabling an assessment of the extent to 
which agency stories themselves require certain ways of speak-
ing and thinking. In addition, GGCT is attractive to this study 
because it can be applied to different levels of analysis including 
official accounts, as well as the level of national context. This 
enables a diagnosis to be made of different cultural contexts 
and provides an alternative explanation for the official accounts 
that are produced in those contexts. In combination, the New 
Rhetoric and GGCT provide a way to assess and compare the 
rules of speaking in different cultural contexts, as well as the 
rules of speaking about culturally tinted themes and arguments. 
They enable conclusions to be made about the extent of con-
vergence or divergence in agency talk, as well as competing rea-
sons, eg. cultural context or the story itself, for this convergence or 
divergence.  
 
1.7 The outline of the thesis 
 
In the remainder of this thesis I will elaborate upon the themes 
briefly mentioned in this introduction, as well as present my re-
search methods, empirical findings, comparative analysis and 
conclusions. In chapter 2, a more detailed account of the inter-
national fashion of agency reform is presented and some of the 
features of the discourse at the level of the international com-
munity will be described. In chapter 3, the philosophical origins 
for conceiving of language as a form of action that creates real-
ity will be briefly reviewed, followed by a more detailed descrip-
tion of the theories being applied in this study. The theoretical 
categories from both the New Rhetoric and GGCT will be 
mapped out for the analysis that proceeds. In chapter 4, the de-
sign of the research is presented including the selection of 
documents and countries. An account is given of the way in 
which the rhetorical analysis has been conducted in this study, 
and the methods for diagnosing the cultural character of each 
of the countries are described.   
In chapters 5 to 7, the empirical findings of this research are 
presented for each of the three countries under study. The cul-
tural, political-administrative contexts or rather scenes of use, to-
gether with the contours of agency reform and national official 
accounts are described according to the theoretical framework 
developed in chapter 3. The rules of speaking in different con-
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texts, as well as the cultural character of national official agency 
accounts are presented respectively for the Dutch case in chap-
ter 5, for Sweden in chapter 6 and for Australia in chapter 7. In 
chapter 8, it is then possible to compare the various statements 
and arguments espoused about agency reform in the different 
countries and their rules of speaking. The extent to which conver-
gence in official agency talk has occurred will be assessed and 
the respective roles that the cultural political-administrative 
context, national styles or rules of speaking, and, the rules of 
speaking in culturally tinted ways, have played in accounting for 
similarities and differences in agency accounts will be described. 
Finally, in chapter 9 the conclusion to this research will be pre-
sented with the findings to my research question and a reflec-
tion upon the kind of contributions this type of research can 
make to knowledge in public management. 
 2 The international fashion of  agency re-
form 
 
A number of countries have seen merit in the agency model (OECD, 
1995:32). 
 
Increasing autonomy and flexibility in resource use is fundamental to devel-
oping a performance orientated  culture (OECD, 1995:8) 
 
(M)anaging from a distance had created specific accountability and control 
issues (OECD, 2001:6) 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a more detailed account of the emergence 
of the international fashion of agency reform. While it is recog-
nized that arrangements to put organizations at arms length from 
departments has long been a practice of governments (Greve, 
Flinders & Van Thiel, 1999), it is argued that the emergence of 
agencies in the last two decades has had an international charac-
ter and following that is distinct from their use in previous pe-
riods. The kinds of benefits that agency reform is supposed to 
bring about will be described and a correlation will be drawn 
between the rise of agencies and descriptions of New Public 
Management (NPM) more generally. Both as practice and as a 
story, agencies have inspired much from NPM. Like NPM, the 
spread of agencies raises questions for comparative research 
about the convergence of national reforms, with some suggest-
ing that convergence has occurred primarily in talk (Pollitt, 
2001b). This is to be further investigated in this study, but first 
I will describe recent shifts in the agency story away from 
NPM. 
This chapter will begin with an overview of various agency 
reform initiatives across the globe and the international charac-
ter of the reform in section 2.2. In section 2.3 I will describe the 
practices and benefits of agencies and the similarities between 
agency reform and the NPM agenda more generally. In section 
2.4 I will consider the matter of international convergence and 
the various comparative research agendas it has inspired. Then, 
before concluding the chapter in section 2.6, I will first describe 
in section 2.5 some recent changes in the international story 
about agencies. 
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2.2 The international rise of agencies1 
 
The diagnosis of agencies as an international fashion can be 
supported by the empirical observation, over a short period of 
time, of a number of national initiatives to create organizations 
at arms length from departments, while still including them 
within the central core of government (Pollitt et al., 2001; Pollitt 
and Talbot, 2002; Pollitt et al., 2004). This has sometimes oc-
curred in the form of a national program in which numerous 
departmental units have been given a separate organizational 
identity (UK, The Netherlands, Japan) or as single or multiple 
national initiatives occurring outside of an umbrella program 
(Australia, Italy). Related to this, though not necessarily so, is 
that agencies have comprised of both very significant arrange-
ments implicating large areas of national public sectors (Swe-
den), to the extent that they have colonized the organizational 
possibilities in different national contexts, or been more mar-
ginal arrangements in the national scheme of things (Australia, 
The Netherlands). Furthermore, there have been countries such 
as Sweden where agency arrangements have long characterized 
the public domain although these arrangements themselves 
have been subject to modernization initiatives in recent years, 
making them also affiliates of the agency fashion. Some na-
tional examples of agency initiatives can demonstrate their 
global spread and significance.  
Beginning with Anglo- Saxon countries, perhaps one of the 
most widely cited agency programs has been the UK Next 
Steps initiative in 1988 which led to the creation of some 136 
agencies and the employment of approximately 81% of all UK 
civil servants in these organizations (Cabinet Office, 1999). This 
was closely followed by the introduction of Crown Entities in 
New Zealand in 1989, which were initially part of a very rigor-
ous program of contracts and performance reporting (Boston et 
al., 1996:chapter 4). In Canada, agency creation began in 1993 
with the creation of 15 ‘Special Operating Agencies’ (SOAs) 
(Aucoin, 1996); which were supplemented in 1999 with the 
creation of a further 3 SOAs (OECD, 2000; Prince, 2000). De-
spite rejecting the separation of agency operations from de-
partmental policy making in the 1980s, by 1996 Australia had 
                                                 
1 Ideas in parts of this section 2.2 and 2.3 have already been published in 
Pollitt, C., Bathgate, K., Caulfield, J., Smullen, A., & Talbot, C. (2001).  
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also created an enormous Service Delivery Agency, Centrelink, 
which was described as following arrangements in New Zea-
land and the UK (Newman, 1997; Rowlands, 2003). This was 
supplemented by the creation of executive agencies in the Austra-
lian Public Service Act of 1999, which enabled ministers to ap-
point Directors of special purpose agencies at arms length from 
their departments. Furthermore, there have also been some 
agency initiatives in Australian states (Armstrong, 1998). 
In Europe, agencies have also been newly created in The 
Netherlands, Denmark and Italy. In 1993, the Dutch initiated 
their program of agentschappen, which has since lead to the crea-
tion of in excess of 30 agencies. These now constitute more 
than 30% of the Dutch civil service and are expected to in-
crease. The Danes have established contracts for a number of 
their agencies in the 1990s (Greves, 2000; Beck Jorgensen, 
1995) and in Italy, the Ministry of Finance has been observed to 
have organized the task of tax collection in separate organiza-
tional units (Cerase and De Vivo, 2000). Even the European 
Commission, under pressure to reform, has established a num-
ber of semi-autonomous organizations such as the Environ-
mental Agency, and, the Food and Safety Authority to support 
their policy making activities (Vos, 2003). Moving to Japan, 
there was a program of Independent Administrative Corpora-
tions (IACs) initiated in 1998, which has since lead to 84 IACs, 
with more anticipated (Yamamoto, 2000; James, 1999).  
Even in developing countries there is evidence to suggest 
that the idea of agency has become a recognizable instrument 
for reforming their public sectors. This has been promoted by 
the activities of international organizations like the World Bank 
and the IMF who have shown official support for decentraliz-
ing the provision of public services and have made aid, in some 
instances, conditional on reforms like agencification (Larbi, 
1998). Countries where agencies have been created or reformed 
with the assistance of financial aid include Ghana (17 state 
owned enterprises, SOEs) (Larbi, 1998), Thailand (5 agencies 
created in 1999) (Bowornwathana, 2004), Tanzania (7 created 
by mid 2000 with more than 30 envisaged), Jamaica (11-13 
agencies envisaged in 1996) and Latvia, where 138 agencies 
have been created (Pollitt and Talbot, 2004).   
 Furthermore, in countries where an agency tradition of 
arms length government was already an established part of na-
tional administrative arrangements, there has also been some 
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modernization of these agency arrangements. This has occurred 
with greater attention for steering these agencies, and, has in-
cluded the introduction in 1994 of results indicators for agen-
cies in Finland (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004), and, changes to 
myndighet reporting arrangements in Sweden (OECD, 1998; 
Fortin, 1996). American agencies were also given stimulus for 
reinvigoration with Al Gore’s National Performance Review of 
1998, which identified a number of performance based agencies 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). And the list could go on.  
In contrast to previous periods, when agency-like arrange-
ments undoubtedly existed in various countries, it is the organ-
ized nature of this global shift towards agencies that gives it a 
fashion status. Agencies have become a recognized reform 
category and label by international organizations such as the 
OECD (OECD, 2000, 1997a, 1997, 1995; Common, 1998), 
which have also played a role in documenting and reporting 
upon its presence in a number of countries.  This often includes 
the presentation of reforms in English, which have originally 
been initiated in another language, and, where agency has an-
other title.  The very recognition of agencies as something good 
to have, and which various other countries are also doing, 
brings with it an impetus for reformers to include agencies 
within their reform package. There has also been the activity of 
visiting one another’s countries to learn about agencies, such as 
the UK visit to Sweden (Fulton Committee, 1968), or of citing 
overseas initiatives as inspirations for one’s own agency reforms 
(Ministerie van Financiën, 1991). All of this contributes to the 
view that countries are indeed busy with the same kind of ac-
tivities, even though, it may be only a label that is traveling 
(Sahlin-Andersson, 2001). Irrespective of practice, it can be said 
that this symbolic recognition of one another’s reforms across 
the globe constitutes a discourse community about the agency fash-
ion.  
 
2.3 Practice and benefits: agency reform and NPM 
 
Accompanying the spread of agency reform have been various 
ideas about its practice and the benefits that will ensue. In both 
cases, correspondence can be found between agency reform 
and the menu of arrangements defined as New Public Man-
agement (NPM). Hood (1991, 1996) described NPM by doc-
trinal components, including greater management freedoms in 
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exchange for their responsibility, emphasis on output control, 
explicit standards of measures of performance, and, a shift to 
dis-aggregation of units in the public sector. Pollitt (1993) has 
added to this list a greater orientation towards user or cus-
tomer-based services. Similarly, as noted in the introduction to 
this study, agency reform has been broadly characterized by 
delegating more management decision-making autonomy to 
managers, by structural dis-aggregation and performance con-
tracting. The correspondence is important because it has been 
noted that while NPM doctrines have been adopted in various 
contexts, different selections of the doctrines have been imple-
mented and to different degrees (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). 
Such diversity in application can also be expected in the spread 
of agency reforms to different contexts and has already been 
observed in at least one study (Pollitt et al., 2004). 
Leaving aside likely differences in NPM practice, and 
thereby in the practice of agencies, it is also noteworthy that 
these arrangements have been interpreted as emulations of 
business practices. This is because many of the NPM doctrines 
reject bureaucracy in one way or another. They are to create a 
culture of performance, where this has generally been defined 
as increasing efficiency and reducing costs, while at the same 
time promoting quality and responsiveness to both politicians 
and customers. Indeed, various academic commentators have 
argued that NPM practices have been inspired by somewhat 
contrary theories in economics and business management 
(Aucoin, 1990; Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; Pollitt, 2003). On 
the one hand, new institutional economics has been argued to 
inspire reform activity that concentrates upon introducing con-
tracts, contestability and focusing upon incentives. This relies 
upon theories that show politicians to be captured by the bu-
reaucracy and where arrangements such as contracts will ensure 
that bureaucrats comply to government intentions (Aucoin, 
1990:116-117). Its goal is to centralize and control. On the 
other hand, managerialism has been associated with arguments 
about the specialization of functions (steering not rowing), and 
management autonomy, ensuring a more professional and crea-
tive approach to management (Aucoin, 1990:118). It has been 
concerned with decentralization and delegation. Contradictions 
in these different theories are significant because they provide 
further scope for contextual difference, in terms of the way 
contradictions are managed in practice. In addition, they raise 
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questions about the ability of such reforms to bring about the 
various benefits ascribed to them, not just because of the ten-
sions between the different theories, but also because their ap-
plicability to government activities has been frequently ques-
tioned (Pollitt et al., 2001:278).  
With regards to the benefits agencies are to bring about, 
there are numerous returns that have been identified. These in-
clude more efficiency, more results, flexibility, greater staff mo-
tivation, transparency and accountability, improved quality and 
customer service, as well as less rules and greater professionali-
zation of the public sector (Pollitt et al., 2001). To this extent, 
agencies really have been considered an all purpose salve for 
public management woes. Once again, similarities can be drawn 
with NPM tracts such as Osbourne and Gaebler’s Reinventing 
Government which also identified these kinds of goals and values. 
Irrespective of the tensions in some of the benefits ascribed to 
agencies and NPM (Pollitt et al., 2001; Pollitt and Talbot, 2002), 
this has not mitigated the emergence of a common story and 
vocabulary about agencies within the international context.  
This has featured terms such as autonomy, efficiency, results, contracts 
and transparency (Smullen, 2004). It can be said that not only has 
there been an international discourse community wherein agen-
cies are identified but also where their purposes and accessories 
have become broadly agreed upon.  
 
2.4 Convergence and trajectories of reform 
 
Associating agency reform with NPM locates it within academic 
debates about the extent to which convergence in management 
reforms have actually taken place. This idea of convergence can 
be found in accounts by the likes of Osborne and Gaebler 
which have argued that there is a global imperative for govern-
ment’s to introduce similar reforms, such as agencies, in order 
to survive within the international economy (Pollitt, 2001; Pol-
litt, 2006). Theirs is an instrumental argument whereby gov-
ernments have had to adopt the same kind of NPM arrange-
ments because the benefits they bring, such as efficiency, are 
necessary for international competitiveness. To some extent, 
this thesis has already been disproved with many comparative 
researchers already demonstrating persistent diversity in the re-
forms that have been pursued in different countries (Pollitt and 
Summa, 1997a, 1997b; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Hood, et al., 
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2004). Indeed, different administrative traditions have been 
shown to have their own trajectory of reforms, with different 
starting points and thereby different possibilities and prefer-
ences for the shape of reform (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Pol-
litt, Van Thiel and Homburg, 2006). In Europe, the rejection of 
NPM as an explanation for convergence has also been ex-
pressed with observations of a particular Anglo-American bias 
in accounts of the idea of convergence (Premfors, 1998; Kick-
ert, 1997; Pollitt, Van Thiel and Homburg, 2006).  More re-
cently, some international comparative research into agencies 
has demonstrated important cultural political-administrative in-
fluences upon the practice of agency reform, which have pre-
served not reduced diversity (Pollitt et al., 2004). Evidence of 
the effects or benefits of these reforms, let alone the conver-
gence in benefits, have, however, remained scanty, limited and 
sometimes disproved (Pollitt, 2000, 2001; Van Thiel, 2000, Ter 
Bogt, 1999). 
Following from studies by Brunsson (1989), Pollitt (2001) 
has suggested an alternative conceptualization of convergence 
that distinguishes between convergence in NPM practice and 
convergence in NPM talk. This could account for the apparent 
verbal agreement about the benefits of reforms such as agencies 
within the international community, while leaving intact obser-
vations of distinct national reform trajectories. After all “talk 
has a life of its own” (Brunsson, 1989; Pollitt, 2001), and many 
of the buzzwords associated with agency reforms are of them-
selves ambiguous and applicable to a range of situations 
(Smullen, 2004). The notion of convergence in talk, but not in 
practice, also has special resonance for the international arena 
in which reforms are discussed and exchanged. This is because, 
as mentioned above, the language of exchange has been Eng-
lish, thereby exacerbating the concealment of distinct local vo-
cabularies and enforcing compliance to an international way of 
speaking (Sahlin-Andersson, 2001). Convergence in talk, while 
practices diverge, can also be expressed with relation to mean-
ing, since clearly the similar words being used are to describe 
different administrative arrangements and activities. Particularly 
with respect to the activity of following reform activities noted 
in other countries, Sahlin-Andersson has used the term transla-
tion to describe the way reform stories travel from country to 
country or from the international community to a national con-
text (Sahlin-Andersson, 2001). The differences in the way these 
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terms are applied would point not only in differences in prac-
tices of apparently similar reforms but also in their meanings. 
Against the background of a growing body of academic 
knowledge illustrating the diversity in reform trajectories and 
the spread of such labels as agencies or autonomy, a distinction be-
tween practice and talk is useful in understanding international 
management phenomena. There has, however, been little re-
search to verify the extent to which convergence in national 
management reform talk has actually taken place or the signifi-
cance of particular arguments for the ascendance of certain re-
forms in different contexts. Like the practice of many NPM re-
forms, it is possible that national talk has also been selective 
about the kinds of benefits, themes and arguments adopted to 
promote these reforms. Furthermore, differences in national 
cultures, political styles and administrative systems are likely to 
have implications for arguments, the kinds of meanings as-
cribed to different themes and arguments, the style of speaking 
and the actual speakers themselves. This said, some research in 
administrative argument also suggests that there are a limited 
number of major doctrines that apply to the field of public ad-
ministration and that these recur over time (Hood and Jackson, 
1991). This is the idea that rhetoric and arguments react against 
themselves and have their own rules about what can be said 
(Hood and Jackson, 1991; Hirschman, 1991; Foucault, 1972). 
The recognition of patterns and regulated structure in talk, to-
gether with the rise of an international management fashion, 
provide a rationale for convergence. In this research, the con-
vergence in talk about agency reform will be analyzed in depth. 
But first, it is useful to briefly map out the international argu-
ments that have been used in accounts of agency reform and 
NPM more generally, as well as the way they have most recently 
become the problems for new international solutions like 
joined-up government. 
 
2.5 The changing international story about agencies2 
 
A review of two OECD reports from both the 1990s and more 
recently in 2002 can provide an illustration of the kinds of ar-
guments that have been integral to the rise of agency reform 
within the international community, as well as the reactions to 
                                                 
2 Ideas in this section have already been published in Smullen (2003). 
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these arguments that have appeared in more recent years. In 
1995 the OECD published a report Governance in Transition in 
which it was recognized that “A number of countries have seen 
merit in the agency model” (OECD, 1995:32).  Autonomy was 
presented as one of the central features of agency reform and 
other kinds of solutions, which together provided “a new para-
digm for public management……aimed at fostering a perform-
ance–orientated culture in a less centralized public sector” 
(OECD, 1995:7). Indeed, “(I)ncreasing autonomy and flexibility 
in resource use” was described as “fundamental to developing a 
performance-orientated culture” (OECD, 1995:8) and getting 
“results”. It was something that we could not get enough of in 
public management and acted as a node bringing about a range 
of benefits. Relationships between the idea of more autonomy 
and other desirable effects such as responsibility, responsive-
ness and flexibility were constructed.  The arguments were that 
more autonomy to managers, through arrangements such as 
agencies, would encourage them to take more responsibility and 
give them the flexibility to be responsive to both citizens and 
politicians. Another claim was that by granting more autonomy, 
together with performance targets, it would also be possible to 
make politicians and managers more accountable. This was the 
idea that agency arrangements could promote transparency and 
clarify expectations because of the existence of a performance 
contract.  
The report was unequivocal about these various effects of 
arrangements such as agencies and it was stated that: 
 
(D)evolution…. has been largely successful. It allows departments to adopt 
practices best suited to their individual business and needs. It has served to 
increase the responsibility and accountability of managers, and has contrib-
uted toward a sharper focus on results and a better use of resources” 
(OECD, 1995:9).  
 
Notably, however, the solution of more autonomy was also part 
of a story about departing from outdated institutions. It was ar-
gued, that “more of the same was inappropriate” and that 
 
(I)f the public sector is to remain responsive to the needs of those it serves, 
governments must foster the development of organisations that perpetually 
adapt and reshape themselves to meet changing client needs, and that de-
velop new ways to cope with the changing world (OECD, 1995:6). 
 
Given this description of the public management predicament, 
the idea of semi- autonomous agencies was a useful solution 
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that could be made to fit with the articulated need for an adapt-
able and responsive public sector. It was a problem that relied 
upon terms like “highly centralized, rule bound and inflexible 
organizations” and called for solutions such as agencies which 
were described as flexible, autonomous and responsive. 
By 2002 the international story had changed significantly. 
Following from an international gathering of experts from 
OECD member countries, a preliminary report had been pub-
lished describing and classifying autonomous bodies against the 
background of the “accelerated trend” of “giving autonomy” to 
public organizations in the 1980s and 90s (OECD, 2001:6). It 
noted that this trend had led to a “realisation within many gov-
ernments that managing from a distance had created specific 
accountability and control issues” and that “improving the gov-
ernance of these newly autonomous bodies” was a priority 
(OECD, 2001:6; OECD, 2002:10). In the final report of the 
working group entitled Distributed Public Governance: Agencies, au-
thorities and other government bodies it was also stated that “priorities 
have moved away from the need to create new separate bodies 
to the challenge of finding the right balance between account-
ability and autonomy, openness, performance management, as 
well strengthening the steering capacity of central ministries…” 
.”whole of government” issues such as how to ensure policy 
coherence or a coherent public service, or how to maintain the 
clarity of the administrative organisational system have also 
arisen as crucial issues” (OECD, 2002:22). Autonomy, and with 
it features of agency reform, was no longer a central public 
management solution, but now part of some of the problems to 
be addressed and considered. 
Instead of praising the capacity to foster new types of or-
ganizations, as in the earlier OECD report, this report was of a 
different hue, and focused upon identifying and defining clear 
classifications of existing independent or autonomous organiza-
tional types. “Understanding the scope of distributed public 
governance” was now on the public management agenda 
(OECD, 2002:10). In contrast, to earlier claims that semi-
autonomous agency arrangements would promote accountabil-
ity, there was now concern that new roles had not been clearly 
defined, making accountability arrangements unclear and the 
capacity for control limited (OECD, 2002:25-26). There was a 
need for reassertion of political control from both ministers 
and parliament. In addition, the challenges of governance also re-
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quired maintaining coherence and ensuring that service delivery 
was being performed in concert with the broader goals of gov-
ernment policy. Again, while less explicitly stated, the risks of 
creating arms length organizations for ensuring coherence of 
government policy and coordination throughout the 
administration were the new kinds of effects being associated 
with agency reform.  There had been a shift in their status as an 
all purpose solution to becoming a common international 
problem for institutional clarity, capacity and coordination. 
Irrespective of what had been happening in practice, such a 
shift in the international story had only been made possible by 
earlier agreement that agencies did have autonomy and were 
numerous.   
2.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have documented the growth of agencies in a 
number of countries. I have also discussed the associations of 
agency reform with NPM and its menu of items which allows 
for much variety in reform selection and arrangement. This has 
provided a wealth of material for comparative research in re-
form initiatives which have been pursued against the back-
ground of debates about convergence. While many, though not 
all, comparative researchers have tended to favor accounts of 
NPM reforms that demonstrate their practice as dependent 
upon particular administrative traditions that are divergent, 
there is as yet little knowledge about the talk of agency reform. 
Indeed, it has been proposed that a common (international) vo-
cabulary about reforms such as agencies, which itself has been 
changing, has concealed some of the important national differ-
ences in practice. An appearance of convergence has also pos-
sibly been exacerbated by the international character of the 
public management community and the tendency to exchange 
information about national reforms (which have been initiated 
in different native languages) in English. The degree of conver-
gence in national agency talk has however, not as yet, been in-
vestigated. This has provided the impetus to conduct an in-
depth analysis of national agency talk and its production in con-
texts where there are different native languages and cultural po-
litical-administrative arrangements. In the coming chapters I 
will present my analyses of national official agency accounts in 
The Netherlands, Sweden and Australia, but first it is necessary 
to describe the theoretical framework that has supported this 
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investigation (the following chapter 3) and my research design 
(chapter 4).  
 3 Theoretical concepts and tools: rhetoric 
and culture 
 
The limits of my language are the limits of my world (Wittgenstein in Mon-
togomery et al., 2000:145). 
 
The same language is often natural when used by one speaker, foolish in the 
mouth of another, and arrogant in that of the third (Quintillian). 
 
Each society has its own regime of truth, its “general politics” of truth: that 
is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true, the 
mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish between true and 
false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and 
procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth, the status of those 
who are charged with saying what counts as true (Foucault in Rabinow, 
1984:73) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The spread of agencies to a range of national contexts has con-
stituted an international public management fashion in which 
there would appear to be a great deal of international agreement 
regarding their benefits (Pollitt et al., 2001; Pollitt and Talbot, 
2004; Smullen 2004). There has been convergence on the view 
that agencies are a good thing, and an array of terminology and 
arguments has featured in the international common knowledge 
about this solution. Far from some fixed entity, agencies, if we 
are to believe these accounts, are a solvent to a realm of woes 
and situations. The variety in talk, and thereby also the mean-
ings, that agencies have been able to sustain in official national 
agency accounts will be researched in this study. In this chapter, 
the theoretical concepts and analytical tools for analyzing na-
tional agency initiatives in different contexts will be presented. 
Given the intention to investigate similarities and differences in 
agency talk, this research requires heuristic tools capable of ex-
amining the equivocal character of language. While more tradi-
tional approaches to social science assume that meaning is held 
constant, social constructivist approaches, and, more specifi-
cally discourse theories, prioritize the possibilities for meaning. 
The picture theory of meaning, where words are said to corre-
late with a possible state in the world, is discarded for one 
where words contribute to the construction of facts, or rather 
in this case, agencies, in the world (Wittgenstein, 1961, 1972). 
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In section 3.2, I will briefly describe the social constructivist 
perspective adopted in this research and some of the philoso-
phical ideas that have informed it. From this perspective, the 
meanings of terms (such as agencies) can be derived by focus-
ing upon their use in language. Furthermore, the philosophical 
contributions of Austen and Foucault will be discussed in order 
to identify some of the features of language that are important 
when analyzing the construction of meaning and language in 
use. In section 3.3 the field of rhetorical inquiry will be de-
scribed as a discourse theory that provides clear categories and 
techniques for analyzing language in use and the way that ideas 
such as agencies are made to appear credible. More specifically, 
the New Rhetoric of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca will be 
described in section 3.4. In section 3.5, the discussion will shift 
from rhetoric to cultural context, or rather, the scenes of use in 
which rhetoric has been produced. Grid Group Cultural Theory 
(GGCT) will be identified as an appropriate theoretical frame-
work for characterizing both context and talk. Finally, in section 
3.6 Christopher Hood's application of GGCT to public man-
agement will be described as his analysis will be used in this 
study to evaluate the cultural character of national agency ac-
counts. 
 
3.2 Meaning, social construction and discourse 
  
An investigation into the way that talk varies thrusts one quickly 
into the realm of philosophy since meaning has generally been 
assumed to be irrelevant to positivistic social science research. 
Indeed, in order to conduct a social science that emulates the 
scientific it has been argued that meaning must be held constant 
(Popper, 1992). Alternatively, developments in philosophy dur-
ing the last century have offered a number of perspectives that 
would suggest that language and meaning are important areas of 
research for the social scientist. They propose that meaning can 
be studied empirically by focusing upon the use of words and 
language in the contexts in which they are produced. Such fig-
ures as (the later) Wittgenstein (1972), Austen (1962) and Fou-
cault (1972, 1977, 1994) have stimulated a research agenda that 
focuses upon how the representation of things in the world af-
fect the understanding of those things (Potter, 1996). Broadly 
speaking this approach to research has been labeled social con-
structivism, though it should be noted that not all social con-
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structivist research is focused upon the analysis of language 
(Berger and Luckman, 1966; Burr, 1995; Potter, 1996; Smith, 
2001). Some characteristics of the social constructivist approach 
include: the insistence that we take a critical stance towards 
taken-for-granted ways of understanding; that the categories we 
use are culturally and historically specific (and not universal); 
that knowledge is sustained through processes and interaction; 
and that constructions of the world inform action (Burr, 1995). 
The analysis of language and the application of discourse theo-
ries are most prominent in the research activities of social con-
structivists. Given their influential role in informing how the 
use of language acts to create meaning and construct objects in 
the world, some of the most relevant insights of Wittgenstein, 
Austen and Foucault will be quickly presented in the following 
paragraphs. 
In the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein began a decon-
struction of his earlier work and the picture theory of meaning 
more generally. 3 He argued that there was no subliminal rela-
tionship between a word and a thing and that uncovering the 
meaning of a term required no more than the analysis of its use. 
He writes, “Let the use of words teach you their meaning” 
(Wittgenstein, 1972:220). This view of language conceived of 
meaning occurring within particular contexts and practices or 
what Wittgenstein called language games. "The term language 
game is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speak-
ing of language is part of an activity, or a form of life” (Wittgen-
stein, 1972:11). Wittgenstein noted that to play a role in a lan-
guage game participants were required to follow and know cer-
tain rules, or have certain assumptions, even if they were not 
conscious of them. By illustrating a variety of language games 
and words in use, Wittgenstein observed that the meanings of the 
same terms varied but were also related. He wrote of the vari-
ous uses of the term game or number and referred to their simi-
larities as family resemblances. Such recognition of kinship might 
also be applied to the uses of the term agency, results or autonomy 
in public management (Smullen, 2004). For Wittgenstein the 
various uses of the same concepts were extended like “a spin-
ning thread’ where we “twist fiber on fiber”. He wrote, “And 
                                                 
3 This was described in the Tractatus logico-philosophicus and rests on the 
view that structure of reality determines the structure of language or rather 
that language should simply mirror reality (as opposed to constructing it).  
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the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some 
one fiber runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping 
of many fibers” (Wittgenstein, 1972:32). From this perspective 
there is no essence to particular words, only kinship between 
their various uses. Aside from his emphasis upon meaning as 
use, another contribution of Wittgenstein to social constructiv-
ism was his focus upon context.4 It was his view that in “order 
to present the sense of words we must present the scenes of 
their use; and these scenes are themselves presented in words” 
(Staten, 1984:26).   
In the philosophical project of John Austin we find the ar-
gument that language is used to do things and is not merely a 
description of reality. In a series of lectures How to do things with 
words Austin describes a range of statements that perform ac-
tions. Among these performative utterances Austin pointed to 
the statements “I promise” or “I name the ship Stalin” and 
noted that saying these things also constituted the act of doing 
them. He also argued that while the appropriateness of these 
kinds of statements may be challenged they are not true or false 
because they are actually deeds or practice. He writes: 
None of the utterances cited is either true or false. I assert this is obvious 
and do not argue it. It needs argument no more than that “damn” is not true 
or false……When I say, before the register or alter etc., ‘I do’, I am not re-
porting on a marriage: I am indulging in it (Austin, 1975:6). 
 
For social constructivists, Austin is often credited with moving 
concern away from the truth value of statements and focusing 
instead upon the practical nature of language and its effects. He 
also identifies towards the end of his lectures the importance of 
the total speech act and the relation between the speech perform-
ance and the settings where they take place. 
The work of Michel Foucault has also had a significant in-
fluence upon social constructivist research, and has extended 
the above listed characteristics of social constructivism to in-
clude an analysis of power. Foucault’s work is extensive and 
varied and he refused to be situated on the philosophical spec-
trum, so I can hardly claim to represent his work completely or 
                                                 
4 “Ask yourself: On what occasion, for what purpose, do we say this? What 
kind of action accompany these words (Think of a greeting.) In what scenes 
will they be used and what for? (Wittgenstein, 1972:137). 
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without controversy here.5 Nevertheless, it is useful to focus 
upon those aspects of his work concerned with the production 
of objects and the relationship between power and knowledge. 
Like Austin, Foucault was also interested in speech acts, al-
though his focus was upon those serious speech acts where au-
thorities or professionals made a claim to truth. Some examples 
of the serious speech acts that Foucault has analyzed include 
psychiatry’s constitution of madness or criminality. The way 
that reforms are described in official accounts by politicians, 
civil servants or academics can be interpreted as serious speech 
acts. For Foucault, these speech acts, or rather in his vocabu-
lary, effective statements, and the relations between them, act to 
constitute the objects of knowledge available for classification 
and limitation. They are “practices that systematically form the 
objects of which they speak” (Foucault, 1972:49). From this 
perspective: 
(M)ental illness was constituted by all that was said in all the statements that 
named it, divided it up, described it, explained it, traced its developments, 
indicated its various correlations, judged it, and possibly gave it speech by ar-
ticulating, in its name, discourses that were to be taken as its own (Foucault, 
1972:32). 
 
It was, in other words, to be understood by the way it had been 
represented in the discursive formation, which comprised of the 
range of effective statements that had been made about it. This is 
because the discursive formation comprised what had been said 
about madness and limited the horizon, or rather limits, of what 
truths could be known about it.  
Like Wittgenstein, Foucault6 was also interested in the way 
rules operated to police the uttering of statements, and thus the 
constitution of objects. In his Archaeology of Knowledge he wished 
to identify a method that could illustrate the conditions that 
made the appearance of statements possible, or more specifi-
cally, “how is it that one statement rather than another comes 
to be uttered” (Foucault, 1972:27). In order to do this, Foucault 
proposed that the archaeologist map the surface of what has been 
                                                 
5 Foucault’s intention to avoid being positioned or labelled is illustrated by 
the following lines at the conclusion of his Archaeology of Knowledge: 
“Don’t ask me who I am…..?” 
6 There is a difference between the conceptualization of rules in Foucault’s 
early work eg Archaeology and Wittgenstein’s concern with rules, since Witt-
genstein did not believe that these rules could be made explicit while this is a 
widely criticized claim in Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge. 
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said, establish the correlation between statements and show 
how these exclude other forms of statements about certain ob-
jects (Foucault, 1972:27). In public management, it can be ar-
gued that the object bureaucracy has been constituted exclusively 
by statements of disdain in recent years (see Du Gay, 2000), 
making the credibility of any positive appraisals rather difficult.   
Among the rules that make the constitution of certain ob-
jects possible, Foucault also pointed attention to “who is quali-
fied to speak?” (Foucault, 1972:50-51), “from which institutions 
they can speak?” and “how they should speak?” (Foucault, 
1972: 56-57). By describing these different aspects of discourse 
the archaeologist is able to show which subjects are privileged in 
generating knowledge and truths, who is excluded from naming 
objects and the limitations upon the forms that speech can take 
in order to be credible in certain fields or contexts. Foucault 
showed for example how the medical gaze was privileged in de-
fining madness while the voice of the madman was considered 
“null and void, without truth or significance” (Foucault, 
1965:217). By making explicit these various elements of the 
truths that are produced in discourse, and the regularities that 
characterize these truths, Foucault argued that archaeological 
description enables us to specify explicitly certain domains of 
knowledge, and thereby disturb and question these. In his later 
work, known as his genealogy, he went on to link the production 
of truths with power, and to understand truths as an effect of 
power struggles, since he argued power and knowledge are 
brought together in discourses. 
Following from the preceding discussion, it goes almost 
without saying that language is one of the primary ways that we 
construct the world, and thereby produce knowledge about it. 
With respect to the various statements and uses of terminology 
associated with agency reform, these philosophical contribu-
tions also provide perspectives and concepts for understanding 
and analyzing distinctions in national agency initiatives. State-
ments about agencies can be observed as action creating an ob-
ject and the family resemblances of specific agency arrangements 
can be categorized and distinguished according to the uses 
these arrangements have had in national agency talk. Further-
more, one is alerted to the kinds of rules that characterize differ-
ent constructions of agency reform since according to both 
Wittgenstein and Foucault these will be reflected and reinforced 
in statements about agencies. More specifically, the rules about 
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agency construction can be derived from the kinds of limits or 
blind spots in what is said about agencies in different contexts, 
as well as with the respect to the ways of speaking, and, kinds 
of speakers that are privileged in the statements made about 
agencies. The focus upon such rules and how to make them 
visible has been the primary area of study and research for the 
field of discourse theories and analysis.  
Although the term discourse has already been smuggled into 
this discussion in the presentation of some of Foucault's ideas 
above, it is fair to say that it has had a rather variable and con-
tested existence in the social sciences (see for example Mac-
Donnell, 986; Van Dijk, 1985; Laclau and Mouffe, 1987; Mills, 
1997; Torfing, 1999; Howarth, 2000; Faiclough, 2001). This is 
reflected in studies from formal linguistics which define dis-
courses as structures above the level of the sentence that are 
implicitly recognized by hearers and speakers in particular con-
texts (Mill, 1997:134), to the view that everything is text or rather 
that discourse is everything that has meaning (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1994). In this study, the application of the term dis-
course will be somewhat limited by the data that will be used to 
analyze statements about agencies, since only statements in 
texts will be observed as discourses (see chapter 4). In addition, 
discourse is used in this study to apply to a particular view of 
language as action and rule governed. Finally, discourse is also 
used in a more general way in this study to point to a particular 
theme or genre, so that one may point to the discourse of mad-
ness, or rather in this study, of agency reform. Consistent with 
these views of discourse and the constructivist view of language 
more generally, the tradition of rhetoric provides clearly defined 
concepts and techniques for applying the philosophical ideas of 
language in use and uncovering the rules  being applied to make 
statements credible (see Summa, 1991:200). These concepts 
which are described below, ethos, pathos and logos, can be consid-
ered the rules of speaking that have been used to make agency re-
form appear credible across and within different contexts. In-
deed, where similar kinds of rhetorical features or rules are 
found to exist across countries that participate within the same 
discourse community, these can be considered exemplary of 
what has become credible to say about the object of agency as a 
fashion. Furthermore, given its concern for how language can 
be used to incite action through persuasion, rhetoric is particu-
larly relevant to the production of statements about public 
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management reform, since so much of what is said in this realm 
is concerned to argue what should be done (See Summa, 1992: 
135-136). In the following section I will describe more fully the 
tradition of rhetoric and its concepts which are to be used in 
this study to identify both national styles of speaking and rules of 
telling different kinds of reform stories. The theory the New 
Rhetoric, described further below, has been selected because, 
unlike many discourse theories (see Howarth, 2000), it provides 
a range of pre-defined categories that can be applied directly to 
data.  
 
3.3 The study of rhetoric  
  
Rhetoric has been defined as the art of using language effec-
tively. In Ancient Greece it developed into an area of study 
concerned with identifying how one could successfully per-
suade. Among the most famous tracts emerging from this dis-
cipline is Aristotle’s Art of Persuasion. This work was written as a 
manual for how to be persuasive and laid out a number of 
foundations for conceptualizing and analyzing rhetoric which 
continue to be relevant to rhetoric today. At the most rudimen-
tary level the focus on rhetoric has required an assessment of 
the respective roles of the audience, the speaker and the argu-
mentative message being relayed. Three interconnected Aristo-
telian concepts depicting this relationship between the speaker 
and audience - ethos, pathos and logos - have survived, not only as 
important notions for the orator wishing to be effectively per-
suasive, but also for the rhetorician seeking to evaluate argu-
mentation (Summa, 1990). The first two of these dimensions – 
ethos and pathos - have to do with the character of the relation-
ship between the author and the audience. Although they do 
not refer to the basic content of the argumentation, they are 
"connected to the forms that arguments take as they actually 
occur in (particular) human contexts" (Edmondson, 1984:15). 
Logos, by contrast, refers to the “abstract intellectual structure of 
the argument itself” (Edmondson, 1984:15). It is useful to de-
scribe these three dimensions of rhetoric in more depth since 
all three aspects will be present in any form of verbal communi-
cation which aims at convincing or persuading action. 
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Ethos refers to the character of the speaker or addresser and the 
way that she projects herself upon the audience. Central to this 
dimension of persuasion is how the speaker shows herself to be 
trustworthy, knowledgeable and speaking for the interests of 
the audience. Aristotle explains the relationship between ethos 
and effective persuasion in the following way: 
 
this appearance of the speaker to be of a certain kind and his making the au-
dience suppose that he is disposed in a certain way towards them, (and 
thus)…the condition that they are themselves disposed in a certain way to 
him (Aristotle, 1991:140). 
 
The ethos of a text will be revealed in the kinds of aims, moral-
ity and voice of authority, which the speaker will amplify in ad-
dressing the audience, and this in turn is informed by what the 
speaker believes to be persuasive for an audience.  
Pathos is the dimension of persuasion concerned with the 
way the speaker moves the audience. Hood (2000) has referred 
to it as the mood music that is adopted to encourage a state of 
mind receptive to the arguments being projected and 
Edmondson (1984) calls it sensitization. Both Plato and Aristotle 
drew attention to pathos out of the recognition that anyone who 
wishes to communicate effectively must do more than argue 
logically. They must also understand the emotions 
(Edmondson, 1984:18; Aristotle, 1991:139). Pathos refers to the 
way the speaker goes about preparing or sensitizing the audi-
ence for the logical content of an argument in order to make it 
appear favorable. 
Finally the dimension of logos points to a focus upon the 
logic of the argument and the actual subject matter that is being 
discussed. It is the argument itself and a focus upon the steps 
that have been made to demonstrate the validity of the argu-
ment. It has been suggested that “it is not enough that the audi-
ence be moved at hearing the rhetorician’s speech….their deci-
sive judgements must be sufficiently stable to guide actions” 
(Oskenberg Rorty, 1996:20-21). Alternatively, even if the “ar-
gumentation is developed through reason or logos and appeals 
to the reason of the audience, in convincing the audience the 
other aspects of communication are also inevitable” (Summa, 
1990:186). Both observations point to the importance of the in-
terconnections between ethos, pathos, logos, when attempting 
to argue successfully. 
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Broadly speaking studies of rhetoric - given their concern with 
identifying the means to persuade - can and have been identi-
fied by some commentators as theories (Van Eemeren et al., 
1987; Perelman, 1969). They are theories in the sense that they 
offer a range of concepts - such as ethos, pathos and logos - 
and other tools (discussed below) that maybe applied to empiri-
cal data in order to interpret that information from a rhetorical 
perspective. However, like constructivist theories more gener-
ally, it is not a theoretical approach that seeks to make broad 
generalizations, but instead can be seen as a flexible toolkit for 
applying to the case at hand. In Aristotle's scheme of science, 
rhetoric was referred to as techne because it was concerned to 
prescribe for various types of productive activities and required 
the skill or art of knowing which rule or technique to apply in 
order to be effective in satisfying a particular argument. The 
rhetorical tool kit has not been designed to offer universal 
knowledge but rather it is to be applied with reference to the 
particular circumstances of a case. These circumstances include, 
for example, the occasion, audience beliefs and values and the 
unique array of available facts (Jost and Hyde, 1997:11). From a 
rhetorical point of view the question is not “What is abstractly 
true or right?” but “what is true or right or good in this unique 
case?”(Jost and Hyde, 1997:11). 
A second feature that Aristotle attributed to rhetoric was 
that it is not characterized by proofs of certainty like demon-
strative logic but instead is applied to situations in which scien-
tific truths are more difficult to reveal and subject to practical 
deliberation (Aristotle, 1991:264). Rhetoric is primarily con-
cerned with the kinds of arguments that lead to generally ac-
cepted opinion, as opposed to arguments that are designed to 
achieve absolute certainty (Van Eemeren, 1987:58-59; Foss et 
al., 1985:2). In this respect argumentation moves in the world 
of probabilities where both the basis and rules of reasoning can 
be questioned at any time (Summa, 1993:221).  
 
3.4 The New Rhetoric  
 
Aristotle’s manual of persuasion was revived by Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, who have adapted it to develop a description 
of reasoning based upon value judgements, as opposed to for-
mal logic (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2003). In their book 
The New Rhetoric, they identify a framework for analyzing ar-
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gumentation, which they claim is relevant to a range of subject 
matter and is applicable to both written, as well as oral forms of 
argumentation. Unlike a number of other theories of rhetoric, 
their framework is concerned with argumentation in colloquial 
language and does not impose norms from outside to indicate 
what ought to happen in argumentation (Van Eemeren et al., 
1987). Instead their criterion for persuasive argumentation, is 
the effect upon the audience for whom it is intended, or rather, 
the judgement of the community of minds to which the argu-
ment is directed (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2000:14). To 
this extent, their framework is applicable to the empirical analy-
sis of argumentation that has already been used in public man-
agement to introduce reforms such as agencies. Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca identify three main categories for analyzing 
and describing argumentation, including the construction of the 
audience, the starting points of argumentation and the argu-
mentative schemes or techniques. These categories can be lik-
ened to ethos, pathos and logos. 
In the following sections, each of the New Rhetoric's three 
main categories is described with their respective concepts and 
argumentative types. It needs to be noted, however, that the 
sheer quantity of argumentative tools identified in the New 
Rhetoric, defies application in just one study.7 Therefore, I lim-
ited my presentation to some of the more common techniques 
identified in rhetorical analyses, as well as those tools thought 
to be most useful to the analysis of agency reform. 
3.4.1 The construction of the audience 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca define the audience “as the en-
semble of those whom the speaker wishes to influence by his 
argumentation” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2003:19; Foss 
et al., 1985:124). It is a construction of the speaker's mind re-
garding the persons or people she wishes to persuade and the 
associated opinions that the speaker deems to be acceptable to 
this audience. According to Perelman and Olbrechts- Tyteca, 
the speaker will try to play on the opinions of the audience and 
give the argumentation a character that accords with these opin-
ions. In order to be persuasive, however, Perelman and Ol-
                                                 
7 Excluding the construction of the audience and premises of argumentation, 
there are some 45 types of associative argumentative techniques (Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2000:viii-x)! 
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brechts-Tyteca argue that there does have to be some correla-
tion between the speaker’s construct of the audience and reality 
(Van Eemeren et al., 1984:216). They write: 
 
Every social circle or milieu is distinguishable in terms of its dominant opin-
ions and unquestioned beliefs, of the premises that it takes for granted with-
out hesitation: these views form an integral part of its culture, and an orator 
wishing to persuade a particular audience must of necessity adapt himself to 
it (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2003:20-21).  
 
It follows that by analyzing argumentation that has been used 
to effect change or in this case management reforms, one can 
identify a number of characteristics of the audience which were 
mobilized in the argumentation to bring about the change. Fur-
thermore, differences in the community of minds in different 
contexts will be reflected in the selection of different kinds of 
themes or frames to construct the audience.  
This is not to deny that any one audience can be quite het-
erogeneous and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca recognize that 
the construction of the audience being wooed may change 
throughout the speaker's argumentation. More specifically, they 
make an important distinction between the universal audience 
and the particular audience. The concept of the universal audi-
ence is used in the New Rhetoric as a guarantee of the rational-
ity of argumentation, since the measure of rationality is the ad-
herence of the audience. The universal audience has been de-
fined as being "composed of all reasonable and competent 
people" in a particular context (Foss et al., 1984:124) and can be 
interpreted as the speaker's conception of what is valid and rea-
sonable for all normal adult persons of the cultural setting to 
believe It refers to argumentation that appeals to common 
sense or popular sentiment regarding what is generally deemed 
true and good. Perelman and Olbrechts –Tyteca explain: 
 
Everyone constitutes the universal audience from what he knows of his fel-
low men, in such a way as to transcend the few oppositions he is aware 
of…. each culture, has thus its own conception of the universal audience 
(Perelman and Olbrechts – Tyteca, 1969:33). 
 
The notion of the universal audience that a speaker adopts, 
whether conscious or unconscious, provides the basis upon 
which he or she makes selections about argumentation and its 
delivery. The construction of a universal audience by a speaker 
also acts to bring agreement from different particular audiences 
since it provides a norm of what is “good and right” that the 
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speaker can then use to transcend particular differences among 
composite audiences. It is noted: 
 
Each speaker’s universal audience can, indeed, from an external viewpoint, 
be regarded as a particular audience, but it none the less remains true that, 
for each speaker at each moment, there exists an audience transcending all 
others, which cannot easily be forced within the bounds of a particular audi-
ence (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2003:30). 
 
By contrast, the particular audience may be any real or hypo-
thetical audience limited by some particular feature such as a 
profession or taxpayers. It has been defined as " any limited 
group of addressees, either a concrete, temporally or spatially 
defined group of listeners, or an abstract target audience speci-
fied according to some principle” (Summa, 1993:225). It is not 
necessarily those physically present to a speech, but rather is the 
target audience of argumentation. For example, a politician 
speaking in parliament may define his target audience as the po-
tential electorate and not the group of listeners physically pre-
sent (Summa, 1993:225). In recognizing the voter mobility of 
some groups the politician may then focus upon the particular 
group of women and base the conditions for argumentation on 
what is appealing to this group. 
The distinction that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca make 
regarding the universal and the particular audience is analytical 
and there is an important connection between the two concepts 
since “(T)he task is not, as often assumed, to address either a 
particular audience or a universal audience, but in the process 
of persuasion to adjust to and then to transform the particulari-
ties of an audience into universal dimensions” (See Perelman, 
1984:192). A good orator will aim to illustrate how the concerns 
of the particular also equate with general notions of the com-
mon good. This is part of convincing one’s audience that what 
has been stated surpasses the mere probable and persuades 
them to believe that it is certain. To confuse matters somewhat, 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca also recognize the possibility 
that a speaker may construct particular elite audiences to em-
body the universal audience thereby neglecting other particular 
audiences (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2003:34-35). This 
occurs because “often the elite audience is regarded as a model 
to which men should conform…in other words the elite audi-
ence sets the norm for everybody…. and is regarded as the 
vanguard.” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2003:34). In chap-
ter 4 I explain how I have identified and distinguished between 
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the particular and universal audiences being constructed in the 
official agency accounts. 
3.4.2 Premises of argumentation 
Aside from the construction of the audience, Perelman and Ol-
brechts-Tyteca identify the premises of argumentation as fun-
damental. They connect the activity of identifying the starting 
points of arguments with establishing points of agreement with 
one’s audience. Perelman writes: “(T)o adapt to an audience is, 
above all, to choose as premises of argumentation theses the 
audience already holds” (Perelman, 1982:23). In The New 
Rhetoric distinctions are made between different types of prem-
ises and therefore also the different types of agreements that a 
speaker may make with the audience. These distinctions are also 
to connect with the kinds of audiences that a speaker constructs 
in her argumentation. The two basic distinctions include prem-
ises of argumentation that begin from the real and premises of 
argumentation that begin from the preferable, they are meant to 
confer respectively to the universal and particular audiences 
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2003:63-110). In this study, 
however, I have conceived of the universal audience as a ra-
tionale that tries to make particular themes or claims such as 
about financial management acceptable to broader audiences. 
This does not necessarily always concur with distinctions be-
tween the real and preferable.  Premises of argumentation start-
ing from the real, include argumentation that proceeds from 
agreements about facts, truths and presumptions, while argu-
mentation starting from the preferable proceed from agree-
ments regarding values, hierarchies and loci. Each of these con-
cepts will be described in the following paragraphs with exam-
ples that are presented in table 3.1 at the end of this section. It 
needs to be noted however that the premises of argumentation 
are difficult to briefly exemplify because they can be implicit to 
an argument and its final conclusions, and are not necessarily 
represented in one direct statement. 
Among the premises of argumentation adopted to obtain 
agreement about the real; facts and truths point to structures of 
the real that the audience is expected to accept. Indeed, when 
facts or truths are found to underlie an argument that has been 
judged sound by its audience, one can expect that there will be 
little “need to increase the intensity of the adherence or to gen-
eralize” since they will “require no justification” (Perelman and 
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Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2003:67). In this respect a fact is a fact, or a 
truth is a truth due to the agreement of the universal audience 
and not because of any actual correspondence to the structures 
of reality (Foss et al., 1985:127). For Perelman and Olbrechts –
Tyteca, the term facts is used to “designate objects of precise, 
limited agreement whereas the term truths are preferably ap-
plied to more complex systems relating to connections between 
facts” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2003:68-69, my empha-
sis). An example of a fact in public management argumentation, 
can be illustrated from an OECD text stating that autonomous 
bodies have increased in the last twenty years (OECD, 2003). 
This statement rests upon the fact that some public manage-
ment bodies have more autonomy than in the past. Alterna-
tively, a truth might be associated with the claim that traditional 
bureaucracies are less efficient than competitive markets - since, 
in the process of argumentation, it may become apparent that 
this truth has proceeded a number of systematic statements or 
ideas about individual incentives. Truths are meant to reflect a 
theoretical structure. 
The third object of agreement about the real, presumptions, 
refers to “statements expressing something that is supposed to 
be real or actual” (Van Eemeren et al., 1984; Perelman and Ol-
brechts-Tyteca, 2003:70). Presumptions are distinguished from 
facts and truths because they are said to refer to something that 
the audience can expect to be reinforced or proven, not some-
thing that is already agreed upon, as in the case of facts and 
truths. Among some common presumptions Perelman and Ol-
brechts-Tyteca point to the presumption that the quality of the 
act reveals the quality of the person responsible for it, or the 
presumption that human action will be sensible (Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2003:71). A presumption prominent in dis-
cussions of agency reform is that central ministries (will) ac-
tively steer agencies and other organizations implementing poli-
cies.  The premises of argumentation that adopt presumptions 
usually put forward some conception of a normal foundation for 
reasoning and even a reference group that relates to this foun-
dation of normality (See Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 
2003:72-73). It has been noted that one of the advantages of us-
ing presumptions in argumentation is that “it imposes the bur-
den of proof upon the person who wants to oppose” the rea-
sonableness of “its application” (Perelman, 1982:24-25; Foss et 
al., 1985:128). 
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A second group of objects that the speaker may use to ob-
tain agreement from the audience at the outset of argumenta-
tion relates to what is preferable. Among these objects Perel-
man and Olbrechts-Tyteca include premises of argumentation 
that rest upon values. Values may be used within argumentation 
to serve as guidelines for making choices and forming opinions 
about different kinds of actions or issues (Van Eemeren et al., 
1987:223). They are a reference to what should be prioritized in 
any decision or action. By knowing and adopting the kind of 
values that a particular audience is likely to adhere to in the 
premises of an argument, the speaker is able to use these in or-
der to obtain the agreement from the audience. In argumenta-
tion regarding the introduction of new rules or bureaucratic 
procedures to a public familiar with corrupt systems of gov-
ernment, the value of equality of treatment has been found to 
be an important premise (DuGay, 1994). 
Along with values, hierarchies of values are also identified as 
establishing certain preferences within the premises of argu-
mentation. Indeed, such hierarchies are deemed more impor-
tant because of the way they distinguish audiences from each 
other. As Perelman and Olbrech-Tyteca note, "(V)alues may be 
admitted by many different audiences, but the degree of their 
acceptance will vary from one audience to another"(Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2003:81). Although hierarchies of values 
often remain implicit within argumentation, they can be very 
useful for the speaker who may try to make the value most use-
ful to the argument predominate and act as a governing princi-
ple for the conclusion of the argument. Value hierarchies in ar-
gumentation can sometimes be extremely complicated, with 
quite heterogeneous and interconnected values being embraced 
within the hierarchical order. An example may be the subordi-
nation of the means or cause value to the end value (See Perel-
man and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2003:81). In public management, 
where trade offs between priorities are a recurring feature (Pol-
litt and Bouckaert, 2004:155-169), one can conceive of a num-
ber of possible hierarchies of value in argumentation. For ex-
ample, the subordination of cost containment to the rule of law, 
or of quality to the value of efficiency. In argumentation about 
New Public Management, it has been noted that the desirability 
of giving managers more freedom, has generally been subordi-
nate to the priority of maintaining political control (Aucoin, 
1990). Given the often implicit and complicated nature of these 
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hierarchies of values it is not always evident that the audience 
will be conscious of the hierarchical structure in the argument. 
Finally, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca also point to the loci 
that may be adopted by speakers when formulating premises of 
argumentation that favour the preferable. Loci have been de-
scribed as the common places that can be adopted indiscriminately 
in any kind of argumentation (See Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca, 2003:83; Skinner, 1996:113-114). It is the broadest type 
of argumentation that can be adapted to many kinds of argu-
mentative situations. There are two quite similar senses in 
which the term loci has been used by rhetoricians. “Sometimes 
they use the term to refer to general forms of reasoning that we 
can hope to master in the abstract and apply to individual 
cases” (Skinner, 1996:113). At other times, the term has been 
used to refer to “general maxims or stock themes which we can 
hope to apply in addition to the considerations specific to the 
case” (Skinner, 1996:113). In this latter sense one may expect 
loci to vary in different cultural settings and points in time. In-
deed, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca note that it is possible to 
characterize societies “not only by the particular values they 
prize but by the intensity with which they adhere to one or the  
  
Table 3.1. Premises of argumentation 
 
 
other of a pair of antithetical loci” (Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca, 2003:85). Among the loci8 available to a speaker there is 
                                                 
8 Since Ancient Greece through to the Renaissance and until today there 
have been numerous loci identified and classified for different kinds of ar-
Starting from the REAL  Starting from the PREFERABLE 
• FACTS 
Autonomous bodies have increased in 
recent years. 
• TRUTHS 
On the basis of (system of) theories 
about incentives, traditional bureaucra-
cies are less efficient than competitive 
markets. 
• PRESUMPTIONS 
Agency reform will promote a range 
benefits since (it is assumed) they will 
be steered. 
• VALUES 
Justifications for new rules premised on the 
priority of equality of treatment. 
• HIERARCHY 
Cost containment subordinate to rule of law. 
• LOCI 
Quantity since more is better OR the 
unique since it is always special. 
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a preference for the general as opposed to the special or a pref-
erence for quantity as opposed to quality. In the New Rhetoric 
the loci are identified as ordering the hierarchy of values under-
lying an argument. A focus upon the uniqueness of a situation 
or emphasis upon more (of a good thing) is better than less are also 
common loci in public management argumentation.  
 
3.4.3 Techniques of argumentation in the New Rhetoric 
Besides the premises of argumentation, Perelman and Ol-
brechts-Tyteca also identify a number of techniques that may 
be developed through the actual process of argumentation. Van 
Eemeren et al. (1984:227) have described these techniques as a 
typology of argumentation that may be chosen, given the pref-
erences that the speaker attributes to the different kinds of au-
dience. In the New Rhetoric a distinction is made between ar-
gumentation characterized by processes of association and 
those characterized by dissociation. Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca define processes of association as argumentative 
“schemes which bring separate elements together and allow us 
to establish a unity among them” thereby “organizing them or 
evaluating them by means of one another” (Perelman and Ol-
brechts-Tyteca, 2003:190). They identify three ways in which 
processes of association take place including, quasi-logic rela-
tions, relations based upon the structure of reality and relations 
establishing the structure of reality. Alternatively, they claim dis-
sociation refers to techniques of “separating elements which are 
regarded as forming a whole or at least a unified group within 
some system of thought” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 
2003:190). In the New Rhetoric it is noted that logically all as-
sociation implies disassociation, but that in argumentation the 
speaker is required to choose which elements to make present 
in order to be persuasive in an argument (See Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2003:190-191). Similarly, in the analysis of 
arguments, one needs to note in what way association and dis-
sociation takes place. An overview of some of these argumenta-
tive techniques, are presented in table 3.2 at the end of this sec-
tion. 
                                                                                                    
gumentation. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca focus only on the most gen-
eral and widely used types of loci. See Aristotle, 1991; Cicero, 1949 
The Netherlands   41 
Among associative argumentation, quasi–logical arguments are 
those arguments that follow the character of formal logic, de-
spite not meeting the criteria for formal proofs. Indeed, Perel-
man and Olbrechts-Tyteca argue that these kinds of arguments 
achieve their persuasive force because of their very similarity to 
logic and they list 15 ways in which arguments can take on a 
quasi-logical form (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2003:viii-
ix). A common type of quasi-logical argument is similar in form 
to syllogisms that set up procedures for compatibility and in-
compatibility, such as the famous: All men are mortal, Socrates is a 
man. Therefore Socrates is mortal. In public management, this might 
take the form of; Agencies are efficient, that is an agency. Therefore it is 
efficient. Quasi-logical arguments may be distinguished in two 
ways. They may attempt to show that persons, objects or situa-
tions of the same sort should be treated in the same way, for 
example we should see men and Socrates as mortal; or they may 
attempt to show a mathematical relationship between different 
persons, objects or situations.  
An example of such a mathematical relationship is, The club is 
bound by certain stipulations and therefore the members are also bound by 
those stipulations (Van Eemeren et al., 1987:233). Referred to in 
the New Rhetoric as the argument division of a whole into its 
parts, in these kinds of statements a relationship is established 
between a whole, and its parts. It can be used in different ways 
for example to argue that a part should be treated in the same 
way as the whole, such as justifying that a member should be 
treated in the same way as a club. Furthermore it can also be 
used  to show the audience that only one alternative is possible. 
This requires demonstrating to the audience that there are lim-
ited parts to a whole and that certain choices or outcomes are 
unavoidable. For example that the financial autonomy granted 
to agency managers is a limited part of a total amount of exist-
ing financial autonomy that can be divided. The division of a 
whole into its parts can also be expressed by referring to a part 
as a whole, such as referring to a car as the wheels. Other kinds 
of mathematical relationships can be achieved through identity 
and definitions in argumentation, as well as by comparisons that 
enable speakers to expose contradictions. It is perhaps not sur-
prising to note that loci of quantity such as statistics and other 
calculations are prevalent in the kinds of evidence adopted in 
the pursuit of quasi-logical argumentation.  
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In contrast to quasi-logical approaches to argumentation, which 
rely upon their rational appearance for validity, other kinds of 
arguments make associations between elements by relying upon 
accepted opinions about reality. Arguments that are based upon 
the structure of reality may attempt to show a sequential or co-
existent relationship between different objects or actions. Such 
a sequential relationship is claimed when two consecutive 
events or facts are presented together as means and ends or as 
cause and effect. They are able to make verdicts about the posi-
tive or negative consequences of a thing or an action. Among 
these kinds of arguments Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca refer 
to associations between objects by virtue of a causal link, such 
as increasing competition will improve efficiency. Other kinds 
of arguments that rely upon a sequential relationship are those 
that emphasize the direction one is taking, and include argu-
ments such as unlimited development which insist upon the 
possibility of always going further and increasing value. Simi-
larly, the argument of direction splits up the achievement of a 
desirable goal into necessary stages, since if one stage has al-
ready been taken, the next stage will appear more acceptable to 
the audience. Both of these arguments are useful when promot-
ing (more) budgetary cuts for efficiency gains.  
By contrast, a coexistent relationship draws a link between a 
person and his actions (the person and his acts), the group and 
its constituents or attributes of certain things (Van Eemeren et 
al., 1987:235). Setting up such a relationship might be useful 
when wishing to attribute blame or success for an outcome to a 
particular person or group, such as the tendency for govern-
ments to associate economic success with their own policies, 
and failures with their predecessors. Establishing a coexistent 
relationship in argumentation generally tries to illustrate some 
kind of essence to particular manifestations. The pragmatic ar-
gument, is one such argument that relies upon the audiences 
willingness to accept that certain consequences will simply arise 
from an event or act, without any kind of explanation. The 
statement, agencies are more accountable for their performance (note the 
quantitative loci) is an example. Another sub group of argu-
mentation that tries to establish this coexistent relationship is 
argumentation by authority. This is where the opinions of a 
group or person of prestige or expertise are used as evidence of 
the existence of some coexistent relationship, such as reference 
to the opinion of economists or national heroes. 
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The third type of argumentation that is used to prove associa-
tions between different elements has been called argumentation 
that establishes the structure of reality (Perelman and Ol-
brechts-Tyteca, 2003:350). In contrast to relying upon the 
common knowledge of the audience as with arguments based 
upon the structure of reality (described above), this kind of ar-
gumentation resorts to a particular case to prove that a certain 
relations exist between elements in reality. It is often associated 
with showing the audience some kind of ordering that is new in 
the discussion of a given situation (Van Eemeren et al., 
1987:240). Common argumentative techniques in this category 
include argumentation by a model, which is said to incite action 
or rather imitation (Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969:363). In this re-
spect, it is important for the speaker to choose models carefully, 
since “one does not imitate just anybody; the person (or thing) 
chosen as a model must enjoy some measure of prestige” 
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2003:363). In addition, the 
kinds of models selected to promote argumentation, also gives 
an indication of the cultural preferences of different audiences. 
In OECD reports, it has been noted that the UK or New Zea-
land often tend to be featured in their accounts of public man-
agement improvements (Premfors, 1998; Sahlin-Andersson, 
2001). 
Another kind of argument that Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca categorize as structuring reality, is argument by analogy. 
“An analogy is an argument that attempts to gain adherence 
about the relationship that exists in one pair (called the theme 
of the analogy) because of its similarity to the relationship that 
exists in another pair (called the phoros of the analogy)” (Foss 
et al., 1985:137). It attempts to impart a similar structure or idea 
known about an event, person or object to another event, per-
son or object, where this idea has not or is not usually applied. 
Metaphors are condensed analogies and perhaps the most well 
known and theorized aspects of language and argumentation. In 
her account of rhetoric in sociology, Edmondson describes 
how the term bridge (a term referring to a physical structure) op-
erates to gain the audience's adherence in discussions of occu-
pational roles in factories. Other terms that originate from im-
ages about physical structures and that are also used in the so-
cial sciences include flexibility and transparency. Metaphors may be 
integrated into language in ways that conceal their origin such 
as when words like efficiency are no longer adopted with refer-
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ence to certain inputs or outputs (Summa,1993:228). Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca refer to these kinds of metaphors as 
dormant. 
In contrast to techniques that try to bring elements together in 
an argument, there are also techniques to separate elements 
once thought united in some way. Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca call this dissociation, and it “occurs when one idea is 
split into two in order to avoid an incompatibility” (Foss et al., 
1985:137). In the New Rhetoric, it is noted that logically all as-
sociation implies dissociation, and they are therefore similar 
concepts, but it is still useful to consider dissociation since it 
encourages one to consider how exclusions operate in persua-
sion. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca identify the separation be-
tween appearance and reality as one of the most widely used 
forms of dissociation in argumentation. They also point out 
that such techniques promote the creation of more complicated 
  
Table 3.2. Techniques of argumentation 
 
descriptions of reality since old concepts are refined and re-
placed be ones that are more consistent to new argumentative 
situations. In discussions about management reforms, it can be 
argued that referring to agencies as autonomous organizations 
dis-associates non-agencies within departments from having 
any autonomy. It also makes it difficult to conceive of autono-
mous agencies as bureaucratic.  
Associative Argumentation Dis-sassociative  
argumentation 
• QUASI-LOGICAL (rational) 
Agencies are efficient. That is an agency, 
therefore it is efficient. 
• THE STRUCTURE OF 
REALITY  (accepted opinion) 
The OECD has endorsed agency reform in 
their recent report on performance im-
provement in public management. 
• ESTABLISHING 
STRUCTURE OF REALITY 
(introducing the particular 
through examples and meta-
phor) 
Agency reform bridges the gap between the 
citizen and government. 
• Agencies are autonomous, 
therefore they are not bu-
reaucratic. 
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The categories from the New Rhetoric presented above will be 
used in this study to describe how language has been used to 
construct agency reform. They are to be seen as techniques for 
interpreting the kinds of rules that have operated to encourage 
certain kinds of meanings about agency reforms (and discour-
age others) to different audiences. Also, they provide a way for 
diagnosing the kinds of speakers and audiences that are privi-
leged in official accounts of agency reform. Although, I have 
presented each of the rhetorical concepts above as distinct, it 
has been a criticism of the New Rhetoric, that not all of their 
categories are mutually exclusive (Van Eemeren et al., 
1987:255). In particular, the presumptions as premises of argu-
mentation and arguments that are based upon the structure of 
reality are sometimes difficult to separate, as are some premises 
that seem to rely upon values as facts, and not as something de-
sirable to strive for. In the following chapter on research de-
sign, I will describe how these overlaps in concepts will be dealt 
with in this study. 
 
3.5 The cultural context of rhetoric 
 
Rhetorical concepts and tools are useful in analyzing what has 
been said in texts and talk about agency reform. They also offer 
insight into the priorities and values predominant in different 
contexts since these are reflected in the kinds of ethos, pathos 
and logos that have been successful in obtaining audience ap-
proval. In turn, these also can also reveal patterns in the kinds 
of argumentative techniques adopted in official agency ac-
counts.  Explaining the appearance of official accounts also re-
quires a depiction of the site of rhetorical performances, or 
rather, in the words of Wittgenstein, their scenes of use. Indeed, a 
cultural profile of the political and administrative context in 
which reformers undertake to argue for particular reforms can 
enable expectations to be made about the kinds of rhetorical 
packaging or meanings one might expect to appear in a particu-
lar context. The scenes of use are likely to inform the kinds of 
constructions that can credibly be made about agency reforms. 
In this study, the conceptual framework provided by Grid 
Group Cultural Theory (GGCT) will be used to characterize 
different scenes of use, and thereby identify the likely limits and 
variation in what has been possible to say about agency reform 
in different national contexts. GGCT is attractive in compara-
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tive studies because it offers a simple and broad grained typol-
ogy for categorizing different contexts according to four ideal 
types. Moreover, it is particularly attractive to the present study 
because it can also be applied to the level of official agency ac-
counts. Borrowing from the recent work of Christopher Hood 
(2000), who has categorized public management themes accord-
ing to the GGCT typology, I can make predictions about the 
kinds of stories that one is most likely to expect to feature in 
official agency accounts. These predictions, as well as the corre-
spondence between national cultural characterizations and offi-
cial accounts can be assessed in the empirical chapters of this 
study. 
3.5.1  Grid Group Cultural Theory  
The anthropologist Mary Douglas developed GGCT as a heu-
ristic tool to deal with cultural diversity and to be able to com-
pare it. According to this framework, culture connotes ideolo-
gies, biases and world-views as well as patterns in social rela-
tions (Grendstad and Selle, 1995: 9). The theory identifies "two 
basic dimensions of sociality" in different cultures that have 
been used to identify four ideal cultural types, or rather, ways of 
life. The two basic dimensions are grid, which denotes the degree 
to which peoples' lives are circumscribed by rules and conven-
tions in a society, and group, that denotes the extent to which 
persons are tied to one another as part of a collective group. 
High grid social contexts are signified by "an explicit set of in-
stitutionalized classifications that keep individuals apart and 
regulates their interactions" (Douglas, 1982:203). Hood has 
suggested it includes societies that have fixed name sets dictated 
by religion or family conventions, while low grid mode can be 
associated with situations in which parents name their children 
as they wish (Hood, 2000:8). Alternatively, high group can be 
ascribed to communities who pool their resources, such as a 
monastic community, while a more atomized existence of per-
sons would be classified as low group (Hood, 2000:8). Taken 
together these dimensions have been used to generate four ideal 
types of social environment corresponding to different degrees 
of group (high or low) and grid (high or low). These four ways 
of life have been labeled hierarchy, egalitarianism, individualism 
and fatalism, and they have been central to much GGCT analy-
sis. The ways of life are presented in table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3. Four ways of life: grid group cultural theory 
 Group  
Grid Low High 
High Fatalist way 
 
 
Hierarchist way 
Low Individualist way 
 
 
Egalitarian way 
 
Before describing the characteristics associated with each of 
these ways of life, it needs to be reiterated that each way of life 
represents both structure and attitude. In one of the early cen-
tral texts outlining GGCT, Thompson et al. (1990:1) have ex-
plained that "causal priority, in our conception of ways of life, is 
given neither to cultural bias nor to social relations. Rather each 
is essential to the other. Relations and biases are reciprocal, in-
teracting and mutually reinforcing". Indeed, the requirement for 
correspondence between beliefs and social interactions in the 
theory makes possible the analysis of persistence and change in 
ways of life, since a shift in values or beliefs requires changes in 
social interaction, if it is to be sustained, and vice versa. 
Maeschaalk (1994:61) cites a criticism by Boholm (1996: 67-68) 
that Thompson et al. (1990:1) also identify social relations as 
generating and constraining beliefs and values, “thus emphasiz-
ing a uni-directional causal link”. He suggests that “both propo-
sitions can however be made consistent by allowing for bi-
directionality causality but emphasizing one causal direction”, 
such as the social relationships (Maeschaalk, 1994:61-62). 
It is also the rather radical claim of Douglas and many of her 
followers, that all cultures can be assessed and classified accord-
ing to these ways of life, and that they exhaust the universe of 
viable cultural possibilities. Although hybrids between ways of 
life are possible, complete synthesis is never achievable, and 
each way of life remains antagonistic and in competition with 
one another (Mamadouh, 1999: 403). As Thompson et al. 
(1990:4) explain; "Each way of life needs each of its rivals, ei-
ther to make up for its deficiencies, or to exploit, or to define 
itself against". Reactions between ways of life are continually in 
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play, although it is the generally the goal of GGC theorists to 
demonstrate the recurrent patterns between ways of life in dif-
ferent contexts. A further point to make about GGCT for this 
study, is that it embraces a social constructivist perspective in 
which facts in the world are not out there, but rather are the 
product of social interactions and the beliefs that get associated 
with them. Distinctive for GGCT, however, is the attempt to 
systemize the possibilities for social construction to the four 
ways of life (Douglas, 1999:412).  
3.5.2  Fours ways of life 
The four ways of life that are central to most GGCT analysis 
have been widely considered ideal types (Hendriks, 1996; Coyle, 
1994; Mamadouh, 1999a). A range of earlier studies have been 
undertaken to identify features that can be considered charac-
teristic of each of the ways of life. Here I will briefly describe 
some general features associated with each way of life. 
The individualist way of life (low grid, low group) favors 
self-regulation, where roles are achieved and opportunities 
taken, as opposed to being ascribed. Interference from any au-
thority, including the state, is continually challenged, and com-
petition is the preferred means of regulation. The individualist 
views the world as an endless source of possibilities, in which 
growth and improvement can continue, as long as individuals 
are stimulated to use their creativity (Hendriks, 1996:61; 
Thompson et al., 1990:26).  At the political level, Thompson et 
al. (1990:216) have associated the individualist way of life with a 
narrow definition of politics which "maximizes behavior that is 
considered private, and thus beyond the reach of government 
regulation".  
The hierarchical way of life (high grid, high group) favors the 
exercise of authority on the grounds that "different roles for 
different people enable people to live together more harmoni-
ously than alternative arrangements" (Douglas, 1978:206-207). 
“..individuals in this social context are subject to both the con-
trol of other members in the group and the demands of socially 
imposed roles…” (Thompson et al.,1990:6). Explicit rules and 
regulations, informed by tradition and experts, are desirable to 
ensure order and collective advancement. In this kind of culture 
it is legitimate that certain persons and individual interests be 
sacrificed for the whole of the collective good. The world is 
viewed as a place to be managed, and where advance is possi-
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ble, as long as the correct rules and procedures are applied 
(Hendriks, 1990:60; Thompson et al., 1990:26). Politically, hier-
archists approve of differentiating the public and private sphere 
and frequently harbor an expansive view of state functions 
(Thompson et al., 1990:217). However, politics is reserved for 
the qualified and privileged, and efforts will be made to ensure 
the boundaries of public and private are well defined.  
The egalitarian way of life (high group, low grid) rejects dis-
tinctions in status and authority and prefers rules to be the con-
tinuous subject of negotiation between group members. Inclu-
sion and participation of group members are primary concerns 
of egalitarians and any group decisions should apply equally to 
all members. Maintenance of group boundaries is supported 
through intensive contact between group members, as well as 
through emphasis upon their differentiation to those outside of 
the group. Egalitarians are always on alert for abuses of author-
ity and unmasking risks. Their view of the world is one of vul-
nerability, where resources can be exhausted and collapse is 
eminent, unless radical changes are made (Hendriks, 1996:60; 
Thompson et al., 1990:26). In politics, "(E)galitarians desire to 
reduce the distinction between the political and non-political", 
and promote a public sphere in which all can actively participate 
to give their consent to collective decisions (Thompson et al., 
1990:216).  
Finally, the fatalist way of life (high grid, low group) is char-
acterized by lots of rules and regulations and little collective 
loyalty. Distrust and alienation are reinforced in this context. It 
is not really disposed to one particular way of organizing since 
in this way of life one must be prepared for erratic events. Fa-
talists have a pessimistic view of the world, expecting that at-
tempts to improve their lot will result in failure (Ellis and 
Thompson, 1997:53). In politics, they do not discriminate 
sharply between the private and public spheres, since irrespec-
tive of definitions of the political, the blows come without ap-
parent meaning or pattern (Thompson et al., 1990:217).  
As mentioned above GGC theorists embrace the notion of 
competition between ways of life and use the idea of hybrids or 
rather cultural regimes (a mix of biases) to understand swings in 
cultural bias within any given social unit. They claim not all 
ways of life will be equally represented at a given point in time, 
but rather some flavors will be more prominent than others 
(Thompson et al., 1990:4). This means that when the vulner-
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abilities of a more prominent way of life become visible, it can 
be compensated and even surpassed in degree by a counterpart. 
Although this appears a fairly reasonable claim, the more ex-
treme assumption of some GGC theorists regarding requisite va-
riety is rejected in the present study. This is the claim that all of 
the ways of life will always be present (albeit in different de-
grees) at any point in time (Thompson et al., 1990:4; Mamo-
douh, 1999:397). As Hendriks (1996:79) and others (see Coyle, 
1994:227-228) have pointed out, this claim is difficult (and even 
unnecessary) to maintain at lower levels of analysis such as offi-
cial accounts where many examples of just one cultural flavor 
exist successfully - perhaps primarily because other biases are 
excluded. Although I remain open to the possibility that more 
than one cultural bias can be present in my object of study, it is 
certainly not assumed in the analysis. 
3.5.3  Level of analysis and scale 
So far, I have presented the four ways of life in rather general 
terms, without much consequent attention for the level of 
analysis to which the theory applies or to the associated meth-
odological issue of scale. Culture, as defined in the theory can 
be reflected in social relations as well as values or biases ob-
served in talk (Mamadouh, 1999). Indeed, Mamadouh identifies 
three analytical levels in which the cultural ways of life may be 
observed including the level of social relations, biases and be-
havior (Mamadouh, 1999:395). In their empirical work, GGC 
theorists have not always been very clear about the level of 
analysis to which their assessments of culture have applied and 
many have noted the difficulties of defining social relations and 
establishing cultural categories from them. Nevertheless, I have 
noted, among others, studies that diagnose cultural types by 
analyzing the social relations of individuals through their group 
contacts and their autonomy from rules (Engbersen, 1990); 
through assessing cultural values and biases as expressed in in-
dividual preferences within a political context (Grendtstad, 
1999), as well as studies that focus upon cultural biases as ex-
pressed within discourses (Rayner, 1991:86; Hood, 2000). 
These examples also point to the issue of scale and cultural 
theory's applicability to different units of scale. In early concep-
tualizations of GGCT Mary Douglas stated that the proper 
scale was "the social accounting level, the level of justification 
and explanation" (Douglas, 1978:15; Mamadouh, 1999:404). 
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This was generally assumed to be at the level of the individual 
and assessed according to their contacts with others and 
through the explicit rules present in their social environment. 
GGCT has also been applied at other levels such as the nation 
state or organization, and its proponents have boasted its appli-
cability to a range of scales (Thompson, 1997). Thompson in 
particular has been somewhat unclear, however, about what the 
application at different levels of scales means (Thompson, 
1997, 1998). Sometimes he appears to be suggesting that cul-
tural mixes at higher levels of scale within a given social system 
will be replicated at lower levels. He has written: 
 
The underlying idea in Cultural Theory is that there is no need to make the 
dichotomy between micro and macro, between the individual and society. 
To do so would be to slice right through the ‘meso level’ – the various viable 
patterns of social relationships, which is Cultural Theory’s point of depar-
ture. These patterns, Cultural Theory argues, work their way down into the 
village, into the household and even into the individual (individuality being 
something that, to a considerable extent, we get from others) (Thompson, 
1998:211). 
 
In this study, GGCT will be applied to both the national politi-
cal and administrative level, as well as the level of official 
agency accounts. As will be discussed in the following research 
design chapter, the cultural characterization of political-
administrative contexts is difficult. While features of the politi-
cal system are more amenable to characterizations of the ways 
of life as ideal types, there is less material to make similar char-
acterizations to administrative features. I have been open to the 
extent to which characterizations of the political culture also 
apply to the administrative level. As others have recognized a 
nuanced approach is necessary at such broad levels since within 
any culture, there will also be sub-cultures (see Mamadouh, 
1997, 1999b). My classification of national political culture will 
be informed by secondary sources that have based their find-
ings primarily upon individual preferences. With regard to the 
analysis of the cultural flavor in agency talk, however, I will bor-
row from the application of cultural types to public manage-
ment themes and arguments as developed by Christopher Hood 
(Hood, 2000:187). By applying cultural theory at these two dif-
ferent levels, political/administrative level and government offi-
cial accounts, it becomes possible to assess the extent to which 
correspondence can be observed between higher (political cul-
ture) and lower levels (agency talk) of scale. 
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3.6 Public Management Rhetoric and GGCT 
 
The identification and categorization of public management ar-
guments, as well as their association with different cultural 
types, has featured in a number of publications by Christopher 
Hood and colleagues (Hood and Jackson, 1991; Hood, 2000). 
In his most recent analysis of culture and rhetoric, this has in-
cluded an extensive overview of the kinds of public manage-
ment themes that correspond with each cultural type (Hood, 
2000). Drawing from a range of public management texts, ex-
periences and examples, he identifies the favored solutions, 
problems and watchwords that reflect the different cultural fla-
vors. Furthermore, he makes suggestions regarding the differ-
ent kinds of speakers that are likely to be privileged in the ac-
counts favored by each cultural type (ethos), as well as the likely 
cultural features of pathos and logos. Since ethos, pathos and 
logos are also prominent in the New Rhetoric of Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, it is possible to combine both approaches to 
make a cultural assessment of national agency accounts. Indeed, 
from the findings of this research it may also be possible to 
identify further rhetorical features that are most likely to be 
consistent with each way of life. In the following paragraphs, I 
will briefly present Hood's characterization of each cultural type 
in public management, as well as his suggestions for their likely 
ethos, pathos and logos. Both of these aspects of Hood's analy-
sis will provide the basis for assessing the cultural flavor of na-
tional agency accounts in this research.  
Beginning with the individualist way of life, Hood associates 
it with themes in public management that prioritize individual 
self interest. He suggests it favors institutional arrangements 
that focus upon incentive structures and increasing competition 
since according to this way of life lack of price signals are cen-
tral to public management problems (Hood, 2000:109-118). 
Some examples of the solutions Hood notes that individualist 
voices have promoted in public management include the intro-
duction of performance pay, benchmarking and creating con-
testable markets. Transparency is also identified as an individu-
alist (and egalitarian) theme since individualists have a general 
distrust of discretion in the hands of authority (Hood, 
2000:114). At the same time, Hood suggests that the individual-
ist way of life is also likely to favor individual responsibility for 
management decisions, as opposed to a committee or board. It 
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tends to start bottom up in its analysis of public management 
problems and takes particular concrete problems of collective 
action as its point of departure for analysis, rather than broad 
social values or orthodox state bureaucracies (Hood, 2000:99). 
Its emphasis upon individual self-interest makes the individual-
ist flavor vulnerable to failures stemming from lack of co-
operation or individual corruption (Hood, 2000:28), since these 
themes are overlooked when prioritizing the benefits of self-
interest. In descriptions of agency reform, we would expect the 
individualist voice to emphasize the role of competition and 
market incentives to promote agency (employee) performance, 
innovation and customer choice.   
By contrast, the hierarchical flavor in public management 
can be distinguished by an emphasis upon rules and impartial 
expertise. It favors institutional arrangements in public man-
agement that clarify and tighten up (differentiation in) roles, 
regulations and procedures. Public management solutions that 
are defined by experts and consider the collective good, as op-
posed to, and even at the expense of, individual interests are 
preferred according to a hierarchical way of life (Hood, 
2000:26, 73-74). In contrast to the individualist way of life, we 
can expect hierarchical accounts of public management to con-
sider public management problems in broader social terms 
where reference to collective groups and preferred values are 
more prominent. Some examples of hierarchical flavor in public 
management include clearly defined limits in management dis-
cretion, cameralism and the systematic focus upon how the state 
can best steer society, as well as preferences for a professional 
civil service (Hood, 2000:73-97). The hierarchical way of life is 
vulnerable to misplaced trust in expertise and the dramatic col-
lapse of big visions (Hood, 2000:28). A hierarchical account of 
agency reform, would be expected to focus upon getting steer-
ing from above right. According to Hood emphasis upon expert 
knowledge and categories to develop a systematic approach to 
steering are likely to be among its favored themes, as is concern 
for perverse behavior and the moral character of those in au-
thority. 
Like hierarchists, an egalitarian flavor to public management 
is also associated with concerns for management outcomes that 
benefit the collective, as opposed to individuals. However, the 
egalitarian approach rejects privileging expert authority since it 
is prone to abuse. Instead it prefers institutional arrangements 
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that are inclusive (and empowering) of effected groups, whether 
that be community members or front line staff (Hood, 
2000:26). Rather than favoring a rigid set of rules, egalitarians 
prefer these to be constantly in play and subject to informal 
(face to face) consultation. Some examples of egalitarian ap-
proaches to public management include arrangements to limit 
abuses of power through limited terms of office for chief ex-
ecutives, and the inclusion of citizens in the production of pub-
lic management goods and services through board member rep-
resentation (Hood, 2000). The egalitarian way of life in public 
management is vulnerable to deadlocks and weak leadership 
since it does not recognize any one supreme authority (Hood, 
2000:28). In accounts of agency reform, egalitarians are likely to 
focus upon bringing the public sector closer to the customer 
and making it more open and accountable to communities and 
citizens.  
Finally, Hood has also developed an account of the fatalist 
way of life in public management. This stresses the unpredict-
ability and unintended effects of management approaches and 
favors institutional arrangements that build in an element of 
randomness. On the one hand, Hood identifies the skepticism 
of fatalism to any way of organizing since from this perspective 
all attempts to control one’s environment are doomed. On the 
other hand, he also notes that there may be positive prescrip-
tions associated with fatalism and that it is not just a passive 
stance, but rather one in which unintended consequences and 
surprises are expected. He suggests that fatalist solutions in 
public management include random compliance checks of cli-
ents or of employees (Hood, 2000:159). He also mentions fire-
wall arrangements in which related elements or roles in decision 
making are separated in order to prevent corruption (Hood, 
2000:161). According to Hood the fatalist way of life is vulner-
able to inertia (Hood, 2000:28). It is difficult to imagine how a 
fatalist way of life might apply to official accounts of agency re-
form since reformers tend to emphasis their ability to control 
the effects of their initiatives, nevertheless we might find some 
discussion of how to control for unintended effects. 
Derived from Hood's account of GGCT in public manage-
ment, table 3.4 presents a summary of the kinds of themes, 
problems, solutions, watchwords and vulnerabilities that char-
acterize each of the four ways of life. These features of each 
way of life in public management, or in the case of vulnerabili-
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ties the lack of emphasis, will provide the basis for assessing the 
cultural flavor of the national official agency accounts in this re-
search.  
 
Table. 3.4. Four stories in public management according to a cultural theory 
framework  
 
Fatalist story 
Stress on: unpredictability and unin-
tended effects. 
 
Blame: the ‘fickle finger of fate’ 
 
 
 
Remedies: minimal anticipation at most 
ad hoc response after the event 
 
 
Watchwords: ‘resilience’, beyond contrl, 
luck 
 
Missing themes:: failures stemming from 
excessive inertia and passivity 
Hierarchist story 
Stress on: expertise, forecasting 
and management 
 
Blame: poor compliance with es-
tablished procedures, lack of 
professional expertise 
 
Remedien: more expertise, tighter 
procedures, greater managerial 
'grip' 
 
Watchwords: 'steering', authority, 
morality  
 
Missing themes: dramatic collapse 
of think big plans or projects 
Individualist story 
Stress on: individuals as self interested 
rational choosers 
 
Blame: faulty incentive structures 
through over-collectivization and lack 
of price signals 
 
Remedies market-like mechanisms, 
competitions and leagues, informa-
tion to support choice (eg.rating sys-
tems) 
 
Watchwords: 'enlightened self interest', 
innovation, choice 
 
Missing themes: failures stemming from 
lack of co-operation or individual 
corruption. 
 
Egalitarian story 
Stress on: group and power 
structures 
 
Blame: abuse of power by top-
level government/corporate 
leaders, system corruption 
 
Remedies: participation, the citi-
zen, communitarianism, whistle 
blowing 
 
 
Watchwords: 'community partici-
pation', democracy, mutuality 
 
Missing themes: failures stemming 
from unresolved feuds or colle-
giality degenerating into coexis-
tence. 
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Furthermore, I can also adopt for my assessment of cultural 
flavor in agency rhetoric, some of the suggestions Hood makes 
regarding likely ethos, pathos and logos in public management.  
Not surprisingly, given distinctions in their favored themes, and 
solutions in public management, Hood proposes significant dif-
ferences in the kinds of speakers (ethos) that will be privileged 
by each cultural story. He suggests "(t)he characteristic hierarchist 
ethos is that of an authority figure, as conveyed by marks of high 
scientific or official status" (Hood, 2000:180). Alternatively, an 
anti-authority ethos is proposed as being more compatible with the 
worldview, and thus, stories of egalitarians and individualists. 
According to Hood, the egalitarian ethos will be that of a mem-
ber of a solidaristic group facing threats from the power struc-
ture (eg. upper levels business and government), while the indi-
vidualist ethos is likely to be a lonely figure fighting a heroic bat-
tle against forces of collectivism or organizational power 
(Hood, 2000:180). Finally, if there is a fatalist ethos, Hood sug-
gests it is likely to be that of "a radical sceptic, distrustful of 
anything that passes for academic orthodoxy or received doc-
trine" (Hood, 2000:180). With regard to the ideal pathos for 
each way of life, Hood proposes a speaker-audience relation 
ship that reflects teacher and student or priest to a flock for hi-
erarchy (Hood, 2000:180), a collective feeling of anger against 
abuse of power for the egalitarian way of life, a self help atmos- 
phere for the individualist, and, a what’s the use stance in fatalist 
rhetoric (Hood, 2000:180-181). 
Finally, Hood also makes suggestions regarding possible lo-
gos in public management and identifies some examples of four 
master tropes (metaphor, synecdoch, metonymy, irony) that fit 
with each way of life. Since logos refers to specific techniques 
of argumentation (as opposed to the broader appeals of ethos 
and pathos), it is much more difficult to apply his ideal sugges-
tions, which refer broadly to public management, in the specific 
analysis of agency accounts. For example, Hood proposes cul-
turally tinged game metaphors in public management such as 
public management as a captained team game in hierarchy, or as 
a game of chance according to fatalism (for individualist and 
egalitarian suggestions see table 3.5). Instead, the categories of 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyetca (which also embrace metaphor, 
synedoch, metonymy and irony) that are observed in the cul-
tural flavored agency accounts can be one of the findings of this 
study. Given the variety of techniques of argumentation that 
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Perelman and Olbrechts Tyteca suggest, it is possible that com-
pletely different techniques will be more compatible for each 
cultural type. In paricular, arguments from authority are likely  
Table 3.5. Rhetoric and culture: Possible rhetorical applications of four 
world-views 
 
to be compatible with an hierarchical bias, while arguments that 
link a person with acts (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 
2003:293) or based on unlimited development (Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2003:287) are more likely to fit with an indi-
vidualist bias. Th favored logos for different cultural flavors in 
agency talk are to remain an empirical question in this research.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter the theoretical perspectives and tools for analyz-
ing official accounts about agency reform, as well as the cultural 
context in which these accounts appear, have been presented. 
Since this study is focused upon examining possible variety in 
agency talk, and the way that talk can be used to construct 
agencies in different ways, a social constructivist perspective has 
been adopted for this research. More specifically, the rhetorical 
concepts identified by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca are to be 
used to examine the kinds of rules of speaking (ethos, pathos, lo-
gos) that are applied to construct agency reform in different na-
tional contexts. These concepts can be seen as tools for uncov-
ering the kinds of rules that have been used by officials to make 
Hierarchist Individualist Egalitarian Fatalist
Possible 
'ethos' 
Authority 
figure 
Lonely figure 
battling collec-
tive pressures 
Member of 
persecuted 
solidaristic 
group 
Sceptic 
Possible 
'pathos' 
Teacher and 
pupils or 
priest and 
flock 
Self-help Outrage 
against abuse 
of power at 
the top 
"Whats the 
use?" skep-
ticism 
Possible 
'logos'- 
game 
meta-
phors 
Public man-
agement as a 
captained 
team game 
(eg.hockey) 
Public manage-
ment as an indi-
vidual game of 
skill 
(eg.chess) 
Public man-
agement as a 
non-captained 
non-
competitive 
group sport 
(eg.folk danc-
ing)
Public 
manage-
ment as a 
game of 
chance 
(eg.gaming 
machine) 
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agency reform appear good. They can also be used to diagnose 
the kinds of speakers and audiences that are privileged in the 
official accounts adopted in different contexts, and, their ways 
of speaking. Furthermore, GGCT is used in this study to char-
acterize the kinds of audiences in different national contexts, 
and therefore the kinds of accounts we can expect to appear in 
these contexts. These expectations can be evaluated in my em-
pirical chapters by assessing national accounts of agency reform 
with the features Hood has associated with each cultural type. 
In the following chapter, I will describe further my application 
of these theoretically concepts in this study and my selection of 
cases.   
 4 Research design 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This research is focused upon official accounts of agency re-
form and what it has been possible to say about agencies in dif-
ferent national contexts. It seeks to answer the following ques-
tion:  
 
How has agency reform been constructed in the official accounts presented in 
different cultural political administrative contexts and why have there been 
similarities and differences in the accounts? 
 
This question requires a framework for describing, analyzing 
and comparing both official accounts of agency reform, and the 
contexts in which they have been produced. In the previous 
chapter, such concepts were identified in both the New Rheto-
ric of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, and from GGCT. These 
theories are consistent with a social constructivist research 
agenda that focuses upon the production of meaning and its in-
teraction with institutional structures. They are also applicable 
to international comparative studies and enable national variety 
to be analyzed using the same conceptual framework. 
In this chapter I will present the research design adopted to 
answer the research question, as well as give an account of the 
way the theories, or in the case of rhetorical analysis, the tech-
nique, have been used to inform the collection and organization 
of data in this research. Section 4.2 outlines the definition of 
agency reform that has guided the identification of official 
agency accounts for this research. Section 4.3 explains the selec-
tion of countries for the research and their placement within 
the GGCT typology. Section 4.4 provides an account of the 
way the documents were selected for this study and section 4.5 
discusses the reconstruction of context and agency reforms in 
this research. In section 4.6 I outline the way the documents 
have been analyzed and the application of the New Rhetoric. 
Finally, in section 4.7 the chapter is concluded with an overview 
of the kinds of findings that this research design makes possi-
ble.  
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4.2 The object agency 
 
In order to identify appropriate agency accounts for this com-
parative research, it was necessary to make some decisions re-
garding which accounts were discussing the agency phenomena 
endorsed by the international public management community 
(see chapter 1). This task was complicated by the generic term 
of agency itself, as well as by the rather broad characteristics 
that have been attributed to agency reform, such as structural 
disaggregation and performance management (Pollitt et al., 
2001; Pollitt et al., 2004; Smullen, 2004). In English speaking 
countries, like Australia, the label agency has long been adopted 
to refer to a government organization or even central- depart-
ment, without any necessary allusion to the fashion of agency 
reforms (Halligan, 1998). To this extent, selection of rhetorical 
data purely by reference to the term agency presents the risk of 
analyzing statements that refer to other phenomena. By con-
trast, in non-English speaking countries such as Sweden, the la-
bel agency is clearly distinct in the national terminology (although 
it may be adopted when describing national arrangements to 
foreign audiences), yet there exists a plethora of statements re-
ferring to reforms of arms length organizations in that country. 
There are in this case relevant accounts without direct applica-
tion of the agency label.  
A further matter of significance is the instances of agency re-
form recognized within the international community of public 
management itself. International organizations such as the 
OECD and the World Bank provide fora for exchanging ex-
periences with reform initiatives, and the idea of agency has be-
come an important theme of international exchange. Already in 
1995 the OECD wrote, "A number of countries have seen 
merit in the agency model" (OECD, 1995:32; Pollitt et al., 
2001:271); and since that time it has held at least one major 
conference where national officials could discuss their agency 
experiences. Two-way exchanges between countries have also 
taken place, where national reformers have visited or communi-
cated with other countries in order to gain knowledge about 
public management initiatives for their own reform agenda 
(Sahlin-Andersson, 1996). In the UK agency initiatives followed 
a much earlier visit by the Fulton Commission to Sweden and 
their examination of the separation of policy and implementa-
tion functions (Fulton, 1968:138-140). They recommended the 
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introduction of accountable units. In their turn Sahlin Anders-
son has identified New Zealand reforms as being important in-
fluences upon ideas circulating in Sweden and has noted close 
contacts with Anglo Saxon countries more generally (Sahlin-
Andersson, 2001:49).9 In addition Rowlands has noted that in 
preparation for the design of Centrelink - the Australian Service 
Delivery Agency - officials went to New Zealand to discuss an-
other renowned agency arrangement their Crown entities and 
more specifically their social security agency.10 Alongside these 
quite direct exchanges of agency knowledge are also the refer-
ences within national reform documents. Here we find, among 
others, the Dutch officials identifying their own agentschappen 
program with arrangements elsewhere such as to the UK Next 
Steps agencies (Pollitt, et al., 2001; Ministerie van Financiën, 
1991:30-32). These exchanges illustrate the existence of an in-
ternal system of recognition within the field of public manage-
ment as to what has legitimately constituted agency reform. In 
addition, it suggests a desire to package national reform initia-
tives in agency attire. The existence of this discursive commu-
nity and the role of the symbol agency within it, should not be 
ignored in any assessment of agency classification, and particu-
larly not in the present study where symbolic activities such as 
talk are the central focus. Not only will content and local labels 
of agency reform be part of the present assessment of relevant 
agency accounts, but also its recognition within this interna-
tional discursive community.  
In light of the preceding discussion the selection of appro-
priate agency talk in this research has been guided by two kinds 
of criteria for agency status: first, the content of agency ar-
rangements and second, their recognition in agency talk. With 
regards to the first of these criteria, agency content, I have fol-
lowed primarily the criteria defined by Pollitt et al. (2004:10):  
• Organizations that have their status defined princi-
pally or exclusively in public law (though the nature 
of that law may vary greatly between different na-
tional systems); 
• Is functionally disaggregated from the core of its 
ministry or department of state; 
                                                 
9 Confirmed in email contact with Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson, 16/2/2004 
10 Discussed in person with David Rowlands, 23 July, 2003, University of 
Canberra, Australia. 
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• Enjoys some degree of autonomy which is not en-
joyed by the core ministry, but is still closest to the 
core ministry in any given administrative framework; 
• Is nevertheless linked to the ministry/department of 
state in ways which are close enough to permit min-
isters/secretaries of state to alter the budgets and 
main operational goals of the organization and 
• Is not a commercial corporation.  
 
With regards to the second criteria, agency talk, this includes 
international and/or national references to affiliation with the 
agency fashion, such as through the identification with agency 
arrangements elsewhere, by government/administrative offi-
cials, consultants or academics within the field of public ad-
ministration. Such references may occur within their home 
country, such as in official government speeches or documents 
and in academic writings, or in the international community, 
such as in OECD documents concerned with describing na-
tional reforms. In the case of academic literature, it includes 
published articles describing national reform arrangements, 
their origins, and likenesses with other agencies overseas. 
 
4.3 The selection of countries: the broader political cul-
ture and language 
 
This is an international comparative research project studying 
an international fashion and its national translations. Uncover-
ing variety in the official construction of national agency re-
forms is one of the outcomes expected from this study. Theo-
retically such variety across countries is to be ascribed to the 
scenes of use in this study, or rather the cultural context, and the 
political and administrative structures that support that culture. 
Since the research also seeks to identify patterns in the way that 
social construction takes place in particular cultural contexts, it 
is necessary to be careful about case selection. According to the 
theories adopted in this study official accounts may, on the one 
hand, be ascribed to the cultural context and the political ad-
ministrative structures that support that context. This would be 
reflected in the identification of national styles of speaking that cor-
respond to the cultural context and are found to be durable 
over time in the various documents analyzed in each of the 
countries studied. It could also be concluded from the identifi-
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cation of similar national styles of speaking across similar cultural 
and political administrative contexts. On the other hand, similar 
patterns found in official accounts across the different cultural and 
political administrative contexts may be ascribed to the story or 
fashion about agency reform itself. When the same kind of rhe-
torical features of an official account can be identified in en-
tirely different cultural and political administrative contexts, this 
would suggest that it is not the specific features of the cultural 
and political administrative context that has influenced what has 
been said, but features of the story being told. As will be ex-
plained further below, I have selected two strong egalitarian and 
high group cultural political contexts (The Netherlands and 
Sweden) that have been rated similarly according to the catego-
ries of GGCT, and which are also both consensus democracies. 
I have also selected a strong individualist and low group cultural 
political context (Australia) with an adversarial system of gov-
ernment. The theoretical, practical and empirical motivations 
for my choices of case selection are explained in the following 
paragraphs after a brief word on the breadth of this study. 
The assessment of official constructions of agency reform 
requires detailed document analyses therefore it is not possible 
to have a large number of cases. Indeed, most studies applying 
such laborious techniques focus only upon one case. This 
makes the empirical focus upon three countries in three differ-
ent languages in this study particularly ambitious. It also brings 
with it the drawback that the discussion of the scenes of use or 
rather context has to be more broad brush than would be the 
case if one was focusing only upon one, or indeed even two 
countries. The four ways of life in GGCT are arguably suited to 
such a broad brush approach (see Hood, 2000:226-230). In ad-
dition, since this research is concerned to identify whether there 
has been convergence in public management reform talk across 
countries, it has been most appealing to try to extend my cover-
age of national cases of talk as much as possible. For an indi-
vidual researcher working alone, this choice, together with the 
desire to assess talk in different languages, inevitably limits the 
time and energy available to provide detailed analysis of con-
text. As discussed in the following paragraph and in section 4.5 
below my analyses of the scenes of use has relied primarily 
upon the findings of others, together with some interview ma-
terial that I collected myself.  
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The GGCT categorizations of national political culture have 
been primarily based upon citizens’ attitudes in the World Val-
ues Study, although I have also used Hofstede’s account of in-
dividualism across the countries selected (Hofstede, 2001). In 
addition, I have supplemented these quantitative findings with 
academic literature in comparative political history and political 
science. In the cases of The Netherlands and Sweden I have re-
lied upon a study by Gunnar Grendstad (1999) which uses the 
World Value Survey in a factor analysis that derives values for 
grid and group in each country. It identifies the constellations 
of the four ways of life in these countries and their ratings. 
Both The Netherlands and Sweden are found to be high group 
political cultures ranking highest on egalitarianism followed by 
hierarchy (Grendstad, 1999:473).  Elsewhere Mamadouh (1999) 
has likened this alliance of GGCT ways of life to Elazar’s mor-
alistic political culture. This is a political culture that conceives 
of democracy as a public service where the state is supposed to 
promote the good society - often through comprehensive wel-
fare policies - and in which participation is emphasized 
(Mamadouh, 1997:23). It seems logical to conclude that such 
cultural conditions can also be expected to influence public 
management talk thereby reflecting and reinforcing the political 
way of life. Certainly if we are to accept some of the grander 
claims about GGCT and scale, we would expect more egalitar-
ian themes and arguments in official accounts of agency reform 
in these strong egalitarian political cultures (see section 3.5.3). 
Such an expectation is also strengthened by the notion of the 
universal audience from the New Rhetoric which forces the re-
searcher to consider the way in which the speaker seeks to ob-
tain broader (cultural) appeal from a particular audience within 
a given rhetorical situation, and thus to the broader cultural po-
litical context. 
For the purposes of this study both the strong egalitarian 
rankings of The Netherlands and Sweden, as well as the promi-
nent alliance between egalitarianism and hierarchy constitute an 
important cultural similarity between the countries. At the same 
time, it should be noted that individualism constitutes an im-
portant cultural difference in the Dutch and Swedish political 
contexts. Since the rankings of individualism are stronger in 
The Netherlands it can be expected that public management re-
form talk as illustrated by official agency talk is also more likely 
to embrace some and more individualist stories than Sweden. 
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In terms of NPM and the initial international story about 
agency reform documented in chapter 1, a stronger individualist 
sub-culture in The Netherlands makes it more amenable (than 
Sweden) to borrowing from themes and arguments about flexi-
bility, contracts, transparency and competition.  
The selection of the Australian case provides an entirely dif-
ferent GGCT constellation, and more specifically a much 
stronger individualist political culture. It has not been possible 
to find studies which directly characterize Australian political 
culture according to the categories of GGCT nor is there suffi-
cient data to replicate the study of Grendstad. Nevertheless the 
same questions in the World Values survey used by Grendstad, 
as well as other data, provide indications that Australia’s politi-
cal culture is more individualistic. Certainly there is much sup-
port for the conclusion that it rates lower on both the grid and 
group dimensions than either the Netherlands or Sweden. As 
discussed in chapter 6 this is reflected in lower citizen participa-
tion in groups and higher resistance to authority, as reflected in 
participation in unofficial strikes. According to his own classifi-
cation of individualism, Hofstede has rated Australia as highly 
individualistic, ranking second only to America (Hofstede, 
2001:215). He recognizes his classification as conceptually simi-
lar to individualism in GGCT (Hofstede, 2001:39). In contrast 
to the more egalitarian cultures of The Netherlands and Swe-
den, higher individualism in the Australian political culture 
makes it more akin to Elazar’s entrepreneurial political culture. 
This is a political culture which conceives of the political arena 
as a market in which participation is instrumental (Mamadouh, 
1997:23). “It implies equal opportunities for all individuals and 
blames the individual for failure. The state is likely to be re-
duced to a minimal scope to perform the necessary functions 
that guarantee the workings of the market” (Mamadouh, 
1997:23). It can be expected that official agency accounts in 
such a cultural context will be more amenable to adopting pri-
marily individualist themes and arguments. Given that Australia 
provides an entirely different cultural context, similarities be-
tween its official accounts with those in The Netherlands and 
Sweden would provide strong evidence for convergence in 
agency talk. It would indicate that stories themselves can and do 
travel independently of context. The primary GGCT character-
istics of the countries selected in this study are listed below: 
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• Sweden (predominantly egalitarian, then hierarchi-
cal, HIGH GROUP); 
• The Netherlands (predominantly egalitarian, then 
hierarchical but higher individualism than in Sweden 
HIGH GROUP); 
•  Australia (predominantly individualist – LOW 
GROUP). 
Aside from the cultural variety these countries represent, an-
other fundamental argument for their selection is the capacity 
to analyze rhetoric in their national languages. My mother 
tongue is English, however, I am also able to read Swedish and 
Dutch. This has been decisive for my selection of countries, 
since command of the vernacular is a prerequisite for conduct-
ing rhetorical analysis. It is nevertheless an attractive selection 
not only because of the variety in culture that it represents but 
also because of the variety in languages that can be studied. In-
ternational exchanges regarding agency reform, and public 
management reforms more generally, are conducted primarily 
in English. The processes of construction occurring in the in-
ternational arena are therefore more complicated in those cases 
where the reforms were original launched in another language. 
It is not only a matter of satisfying a different audience than in 
the national context, but also a matter of finding the corre-
sponding English terminology, which may not actually exist, for 
specific reform experiences. In this study I am able to analyze 
reform initiatives in their original Dutch and Swedish forms, 
and therefore consider quite literally their translations of agency 
reform. All reporting of these analyses will however be trans-
lated to English, which is the language of this thesis.  
Finally, there are also important empirical grounds for the 
selection of these countries. Although agency reform has been 
observed in a wide range of countries, the bulk of academic 
publications in this area, at least in English, tend to focus upon 
the more well-known cases of agency reform such as the pro-
grams in the UK and New Zealand. The selection of countries 
in this research provides the opportunity to analyze less dis-
cussed agency arrangements such as those in The Netherlands 
and Australia. Similarly, while Sweden is commonly credited as 
representing the genesis of the agency idea, there are, with a few 
exceptions, limited attempts to explain the content of their 
agency reforms and their association with the agency initiatives 
occurring elsewhere. Indeed, some of the English descriptions 
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offered by Swedish authors tend to confuse the outsider be-
cause of the broad range of topics they are inclined to include 
under their agency reforms (Pierre, 2004:203-214; Larssen, 
2000). The detailed account of agency initiatives presented in 
these national contexts, within a comparative framework, is an 
original empirical contribution of this research.  
 
4.4 The selection of documents 
 
The rhetorical data for this research has been sought from offi-
cial government documents, but not legislation,11 initiating or 
describing national agency reforms. It has been the intention to 
compare official stories about national agency initiatives and 
therefore only government sources have been consulted. This 
has still led to a great deal of variation in the type of texts found 
and the government authors of these texts since reform initia-
tives in the selected countries may be instigated by different 
administrative actors. In Sweden for example most public sec-
tor reform initiatives require legislative change and are prepared 
in specially appointed commissions that consult with a number 
of actors (Premfors, 1983: 623). By contrast, in Australia such 
changes can and have been introduced without consultation, 
but rather by an executive government decision or simply the 
presentation of new legislation to parliament. These differences 
also have implications for the quantity of texts that appear to 
discuss agency reforms and for the difficulty of identifying 
which texts have been most significant in initiating or describ-
ing these reforms. Again Sweden and Australia are illustrative of 
the extremes, where a plethora of candidate documents describ-
ing agency reforms in Sweden were found, while there were 
sometimes only legislative proposals that could be identified in 
Australia. In the Australian case, official speeches have been 
used where no other policy document exists or is available to 
the public. 
The year of publication was also another important distinction 
to consider in the sample of official documents available in each 
country. Agencies, according to the content definition applied in 
this study, have been a traditional feature of the Swedish admin-
                                                 
11 Legislation has not been considered appropriate examples of official ac-
counts in this study because it often does not provide rationales for changes 
introduced and is immersed in its own legal rhetoric as opposed to the pub-
lic management focus in this study. 
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istrative system and documents discussing their reform can be 
found throughout the history of the Swedish State. Since my 
focus is upon a relatively recent period in which agency reform 
has not only been a Swedish administrative arrangement but 
also a global fashion, I have limited my search to documents 
published since the 1980s, when the UK Next Steps Agencies 
were taking shape. In the case of Sweden, this coincides with a 
period of political debate about the independence of their myn-
digheten, which was to result in a range of initiatives to improve 
the steering of these organizations. By contrast, agency ar-
rangements in both The Netherlands and Australia have only 
been put in place since the 1990s, although there is a long his-
tory of statutory independent bodies in both countries (see Van 
Thiel, 2000; Wettenhall, 1990), and in the case of Australia con-
tractual arrangements within government departments. The 
consequence of variation in the commencement of agency re-
forms has inevitably been corresponding time variations (15 
years) between the appropriate documents available in each 
country. In order to compensate for this, I have tried where 
relevant, to select a few documents over time in each country. 
Clearly the process of document selection requires familiarity 
with the agency reforms that have been introduced in each 
country, the process leading to their creation, and the range of 
official descriptions in circulation. I adopted a two-pronged 
strategy to navigate the field of available documents and make 
my selection. Firstly, I consulted a range of primary and secon-
dary sources discussing administrative arrangements and agency 
reforms in each country. This included consulting academic lit-
erature, as well as government sources such as policy docu-
ments, parliamentary proceedings, and agency evaluations.  In 
this phase of the research, visits were also made to Sweden and 
Australia, and in all countries interviews were conducted with 
government officials about their agency reforms. The interviews 
in Sweden and The Netherlands were arranged as part of an-
other international project about agency reform that I worked 
on during the period of study for my dissertation (see Pollitt et 
al., 2004). There is no doubt that the information I gathered 
during this project has contributed to my understanding of 
agency reforms in these countries and the circumstances sur-
rounding these initiatives. In Australia, I was generously pro-
vided with facilities at the University of Canberra and was also 
able to consult with academic researchers occupied with this 
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area of public management reform. From the information gath-
ered during these experiences, a preliminary selection of official 
documents that had announced, described or discussed agency 
reforms in their initial phases was made. This was relatively easy 
in the case of The Netherlands where agency reform had been 
described in a small set of clearly identifiable policy documents 
and sources. It was, for reasons mentioned above, more diffi-
cult in Sweden and Australia, where the candidate documents 
were in the first case multiple with broader terms of reference, 
and in the second case, not available to the public except for of-
ficial speeches and legislation. The documents selected are pre-
sented in table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1. The selected documents across the countries 
 
The Netherlands Sweden Australia 
1991, Verder 
bouwen aan beheer 
[Further building 
on management]  
1983, Politisk styrning – 
administrativ 
självständighet [Political 
steering – administrative 
independence] 
1996, The Prime Minis-
ter’s address at the offi-
cial launch of Centre-
link 
1995, Verant-
woord verzelf-
standigen [Ac-
countable auto-
nomisation] 
1985, Regeringen, myn-
digheterna och myndighe-
ternas ledning 
[Government, agencies and 
agency’s management] 
1998, Three stages of 
an evolving model to a 
one stop shop – chal-
lenges at each stage 
1997, Verder met 
resultaat 
[Further with re-
sults] 
 
1997, I medeborgarnas 
tjänst 
[In the citizen’s service] 
2004, Connecting Gov-
ernment: Whole of 
government responses 
to Australia’s priority 
challenges 
 
The second stage of document selection involved consulting 
with experts in each country regarding their opinion on the 
most significant documents, and upon my own preliminary se-
lection. A questionnaire was sent to four experts in each coun-
try, including representatives from both academic and practi-
tioner domains. Both a list of the experts for each country and a 
sample of the questionnaire is presented in appendix A. 
The questionnaire was not only used to make an assessment 
about my own selection of documents but also to check the ex-
istence of documents which I may not have considered in my 
preliminary field work. Consultation with these experts was also 
conducted by email, particularly where there were disagree-
ments about the appropriate documents for analysis. As a result 
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of these interactions, a final selection of documents was made 
for each country.  
 
4.5 Reconstructing context: political and administrative 
structures 
 
Aside from the GGCT characterizations of national political 
contexts provided by cultural theorists, it has also been neces-
sary to offer specific details of national political and administra-
tive systems and an account of the content of national agency 
reform initiatives. Without this kind of information it is not 
really possible to appreciate the rhetorical analyses, or locate 
them in national context, because so much of what is written in 
the documents refers to these things external to the texts. There 
is also no doubt that political and administrative structures are 
informed by cultural identities and preferences, and in turn, can 
reinforce these preferences. Indeed, according to GGCT such 
structures are central to enforcing particular cultural identities 
and attitudes. How political and administrative structures corre-
spond to GGCT ways of life or even to grid and group has 
however been subject to only limited analysis. Nevertheless if 
the ways of life are taken as ideal types it hardly seems surpris-
ing that the consensus political systems of The Netherlands and 
Sweden rate high on egalitarianism, while the adversarial system 
in Australia has rated more highly on individualism. This is be-
cause consensus systems have been described as enabling wider 
participation and as being characterized by a more deliberative 
political style, while adversarial systems are considered to pro-
mote a more competitive approach where the winner then takes 
all. In both cases these general features of the political system 
correspond to descriptions of respectively egalitarian and indi-
vidualist ways of life. At the level of political decision making 
group think as a form of control is more centralized and unified 
in Sweden where the principle of collective government reigns 
over traditions of individual ministerial accountability which ex-
ists in The Netherlands. This is argued in chapter 4 to reflect 
the stronger presence of the individualist way of life in Dutch 
political culture. The more generous and universal welfare state 
traditions of the Netherlands and Sweden vis a vis the selective 
and more limited government traditions of Australia would also 
appear to corroborate these countries placement with respec-
tively a stronger egalitarian/ hierarchy alliance in Sweden and 
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The Netherlands – moralistic political cultures, and the stronger 
individualist – entrepreneurial political culture in Australia. 
Such broad rationales are less obvious at the level of the 
administration, as opposed to the political sphere, since the 
matter of scale and how the ways of life are replicated at differ-
ent levels presents confusion. It is unclear if we can expect the 
same mix of cultural ways of life to be observed throughout a 
political administrative structure, although some GGC theorists 
would appear to suggest that this is the case (Thompson, 
1998:211). By contrast, it has also been noted that irrespective 
of a particular political cultural alliance or dominance all admin-
istrative systems involve greater or lesser degrees of hierarchy 
(Hendriks, 1996:241). Hendriks makes a distinction between the 
external state structure and internal state structure, wherein he 
also argues that features of the Westminister tradition such as 
majority rules, which exists in Australia, provides greater oppor-
tunities for the hierarchical way of life to characterize political 
relationships with the administration and its operations 
(Hendriks, 1996:241). At the same time, it can be expected that 
moralistic political cultures, irrespective of their egalitarian aims, 
are likely to favor hierarchical administrative doctrines that are 
more outspoken and committed to formal rules, responsibilities 
and principles than a Westminister country like Australia with a 
weaker state or constitutional tradition. A rhetorical commit-
ment to formal rules can exist even when it may be supported 
by a practice of informal contacts and networks. It has also 
been noted that consensus democracies have a tendency to 
conduct policy making and reform debates at a distance from 
the political sphere as part of de-politicizing such activities 
(Andeweg & Irwin, 2002:105). Expert knowledge and techno-
cratic rationales, a feature of the hierarchical way of life, are 
used within committees or the administration to enable egalitar-
ian collaboration. Such approaches may also occur in adversar-
ial systems but they are less integral to its mode of operation 
since without the need for multi party cooperation, de-
politicization is unnecessary. 
One of the important distinctions between the stronger 
group political cultures (The Netherlands and Sweden) in this 
study and the stronger individualist political culture (Australia) 
is the degree of inclusion of organized interest groups (corpora-
tism) in administrative decision and policy making in the former 
countries. This has undoubtedly contributed to the strong 
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Dutch and Swedish group ratings and social redistribution 
commitments. It also brings other organized interests, besides 
the government and parliament, to which political and adminis-
trative actors are to adhere. The inclusion of organized interests 
in policy making is consistent with descriptions of consensus 
democracies (Lijphart, 1999: 37-38) and also reinforces the use 
of expert committees and knowledge. Australia is generally de-
scribed as a more pluralist system (Marsh, 2003). The difficulty 
of interpreting corporatism according to GGCT is illustrated by 
a recent study by Hood et al. (2004:11) who refrains from cate-
gorizing it into one of their four GGCT control styles. It has 
not been the primary task in this study to seek to show how 
both political and administrative structures can be assimilated 
with the categories of GGCT. Rather GGCT characterizations 
will be presented alongside descriptions of these structures. 
This leaves open the possibility that characterizations of culture 
at the political level may not be applicable to the level of the 
administration or the rhetorical situations in which agency re-
form is discussed. This could be revealed by culturally flavors of 
talk that are different to characterizations of political culture. In 
order to construct an account of national political and adminis-
trative context, the following features of these systems have 
been described in each country: 
• The political system and parliamentary representation; 
• The core executive and role of political leaders; 
• Policy making styles; and 
• Central administrative structure. 
The description of these features in the empirical research has 
borrowed primarily from academic literature in the fields of 
politics and public administration. In each of the chapters on 
national agency reforms, these descriptions provide a second 
account, besides culture, of the scenes of use. 
The reconstruction of national agency reform initiatives has 
been prepared with reference to a range of sources including 
government publications, academic literature, agency evalua-
tions and interviews with officials in each country. As men-
tioned in section 3.3 some of these interviews were conducted 
for another international comparative study into agency reform. 
Based upon this information a chronology of national agency 
initiatives has also been presented in each chapter. 
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4.6 Applying the New Rhetoric and analyzing the 
documents 
 
The process of document analysis required for this research has 
been a very time consuming and laborious task. Even prior to 
the application of the argumentative schemes of Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca each document was read on numerous occa-
sions in order to become familiar with the contents of the text, 
the terminology used and its structure. On these initial readings 
of the texts I have first reminded myself to apply the following 
general principles from a social constructivist perspective (see 
Burr, 1995:3; Wood and Kroger, 2000:91-93): 
• Be conscious of the way that I am reading the text;  
• Take a critical stance to the information in the text and look 
for taken for granted knowledge within the text; 
• View the text as a cultural artefact emerging from a particu-
lar context, ask myself in what situation is it possible to say 
these things; 
• Consider what is not in the text; and 
• Be alert to what knowledge or world that is being created in 
the text and what action this knowledge incites. 
 
Secondly, detailed inventories were made of each document 
in order to support and assist my analysis of the text. The 
documents were read to identify the main conclusions of the 
text and make a global assessment of what was being said in the 
text. This was to enable a reconstruction of how these conclu-
sions had been argued throughout the document and be con-
scious of any presumptions in the text that made these conclu-
sions possible. In addition, notes were made of the main 
themes discussed in each document, as well as their location 
and order in the text. Furthermore, attention was focused upon 
the choice of particular words throughout the text and their re-
lationship to the main themes being discussed. I cross checked 
the appearance of similar kinds of terminology, themes or ar-
gumentative techniques across all the documents in the same 
context and also across the documents in other contexts. Cer-
tain terms, as well as any phrases that seemed exemplary of the 
argumentative standpoints or styles being pursued in the docu-
ment were also noted for later consideration. Any terms or 
phrases in the document that seemed at odds with its main 
conclusions were also noted for consideration. To check these 
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inventories of the documents and their significance, I also 
sometimes counted the use of certain terms and made notes of 
the points of their appearance in the text. This information was 
used to support later diagnoses of the persuasive effect of the 
appearance of certain terms in the document. Once this process 
of familiarizing was complete, I then began to assess the docu-
ments again according to the conceptual framework of both 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, and Hood’s classifications of 
public management arguments. 
The conceptual framework of Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca has already been described in the previous chapter. The 
way that I have applied these concepts is described in the fol-
lowing paragraphs together with a brief summary of what those 
concepts are. Throughout this discussion it should be kept in 
mind that once one begins to deconstruct a text and identify ar-
gumentative arrangements and strategies, it becomes possible to 
use these findings to uncover even more language games in the 
text. To this extent, the rhetorical approach pursued in this re-
search can be an unending circle or rather spiral that becomes 
bigger, the deeper one delves into the text. The repetition of 
sequences in the analysis is therefore not unusual and almost 
impossible to avoid. As noted above I have generally proceeded 
from identifying the kinds of conclusions that were made in 
documents in order to reconstruct how such conclusions were 
made appealing to the audience. Beginning from the conclu-
sions also provided me with my own starting point for consid-
ering the processes that were essential to conditioning the audi-
ence to accept certain arguments and findings.  
Among the most controversial features of the New Rhetoric 
is the construction and distinction between the universal and 
the particular audience, or what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
refer to as the framework of argumentation. This framework re-
fers to the formation of an effective community of minds that 
the speaker constructs and the relationship with this audience. 
It has required me to assess the kind of knowledge bases that 
are used in official documents to obtain credibility with the au-
dience. In general assessments of the constructions of particular 
and universal audiences have not been completed until the 
other concepts, premises of argumentation and techniques of 
argumentation were applied and identified. This was because 
these features of the argumentation provided indications of the 
character of the audiences being wooed. Nevertheless in my ini-
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tial readings of the documents I first noted the kinds of termi-
nology, concepts and evidence that were adopted in the docu-
ments and how these varied throughout the argumentation. 
Where possible I have also tried to associate such presentations 
with particular professions or actors within the political admin-
istrative system. This has been especially important in identify-
ing particular audiences. 
I have also been alert to the tone of the argumentation, its 
level of detail or simplicity, whether it is formal or informal and 
the kind of action that such a style is trying to incite. In this en-
deavor I used Hood’s prescriptions for ethos in the different 
ways of life as a guide for my assessment e.g. did the speaker 
appear as an expert, a battler, skeptic or warrior for the op-
pressed and how? Or was there another characterization appro-
priate? Furthermore, the actual authors of the text were noted 
as well as the forums in which the document was it is to be re-
ceived. This was to assist in making sense of the argumentative 
procedures adopted and its target audience. At this stage of the 
analysis the following question was posed; to whom is the text 
addressed and to what kind of audience? 
In identifying the universal audience I sought to identify fea-
tures of the argumentation that would appeal to broader audi-
ences, not just the particular audiences I had identified as being 
constructed in the text. I looked for claims or principles that 
sought to establish acceptance across numerous professions or 
particular audiences in the documents and indeed that sought 
acceptance throughout the political administrative system. 
When assessing the universal audience I also consulted all of 
the documents that I had analyzed in each of the countries in 
order to identify any patterns in conceptualizations of the good or 
in the information that speakers always gave over time to obtain 
the adherence of national political administrative audiences. 
When certain styles or principles appeared repeatedly over time 
I interpreted this as part of the universal truth that prevailed in 
the political administrative context. In my analysis there was of-
ten an overlap between what the universal audience desired and 
the values or hierarchy of values (the value that was always su-
perior) ascribed to the premises of argumentation. 
Aside from the framework of argumentation, the premises of 
argumentation is used to describe the way that the speaker con-
ditions the audience to the espoused point of view. This is not 
so much through the terminology and concepts used to organ-
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ize the information being delivered but through the problems 
or situations that make certain arguments necessary and other 
arguments unnecessary. The premises of argumentation are the 
starting points of agreement with the audience from which ar-
gument unfolds and becomes possible. Perelman and Ol-
brechts-Tyteca distinguish between starting points starting from 
the real: truth, facts and presumptions, and starting points from 
the desirable: values, hierarchies of values and loci. Definitions 
and examples of each of these categories were provided in the 
previous chapter (see table 3.1). The problems and solutions 
that were identified in the texts and the way they were used to 
justify the need for reform were used to identify the premises of 
the argumentation. In reading the text in this way consideration 
was given to the conclusions of the argumentation and the way 
that problems or claims being identified in the text prepared the 
audience for such conclusions.  
The premises of the argumentation, particularly presump-
tions, were the most difficult to identify because they were 
sometimes implicit to the argumentation, rather than explicit. In 
addition, values are defined in this study as what was prioritized 
or preferred/desired in the text, but sometimes this was diffi-
cult to distinguish from a fact. For example the fact that busi-
ness management techniques had long been adopted in gov-
ernment also coincided with preferences or values being ex-
pressed for business like management practices in government. 
Another problem was distinguishing between presumptions and 
the pragmatic argumentative technique. Both concepts involved 
making links between events without an explanation of how 
they were linked. One of the criticisms of the New Rhetoric has 
been that some of its categories, such as those mentioned 
above, are not mutually exclusive (Van Eemeren et al., 1987: 
255). Where more than one interpretation of the data fitted the 
argumentative categories, I have reported both interpretations. 
The argumentative techniques were easiest to apply to the 
information supplied in the documents. I read and re-read the 
texts looking for matches between the argumentative tech-
niques defined and described by Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca. Again when looking for argumentative techniques I was 
guided by the conclusions and solutions that the speaker was 
describing and the kinds of techniques that aided such conclu-
sions. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca identify numerous dif-
ferent types of argumentative techniques that they classify as ei-
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ther associative or dissassociative, and may vary in different ar-
gumentative situations. Not all of these argumentative tech-
niques were discovered in the documents analyzed. As with the 
starting points of argumentation, there were also occasions 
throughout the analysis where more than one of the argumenta-
tive techniques were applicable. Again on these occasions I 
have reported the different interpretations of the techniques be-
ing adopted. In appendixes B through to D I present a brief 
summary of the inventories of the documents analyzed in each 
of the countries.  
4.6.1 Document analysis and the issue of language 
The challenge of conducting rhetorical analyses in languages 
other than one’s own mother tongue has been a constant 
source of concern throughout this research. After living in a 
number of foreign countries, including some said to speak my 
own mother language, and experiencing many incidents of em-
barrassing, funny and even tragic word bungles, I am very con-
scious of the dangers of incorrectly interpreting the documents 
through my own language inadequacies. Dutch and Swedish 
remain second languages to me, no matter what my experience 
with them, and I cannot overcome this fact. At the same time, 
my knowledge of these languages has enabled me to observe 
some of the distortions that take place in the study of public 
management because of the predominance of English as the 
language of exchange and a reliance upon secondary sources 
(among English speaking scholars and practitioners) for infor-
mation about non-English speaking countries. The capacity to 
see such incidents has encouraged me to take the risk of analyz-
ing across languages, even if some inadequacies remain in my 
translations. I have also tried to reduce misinterpretations as a 
result of language capacity, by consulting with Dutch and Swed-
ish colleagues and friends. This has included email discussions 
about the use and meaning of certain terms, as well as obtaining 
opinions about my reading of the documents and the plausibil-
ity of my analysis. This said, language remains a contested site, 
where meaning is never exhausted or pinned down. All inter-
pretations remain therefore my own.  
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4.7 Towards the research findings 
 
In this chapter I have identified the various decisions that have 
been taken in the design of this research project, regarding the 
selection of countries and the various sources and techniques 
that have been adopted when analyzing the data. These deci-
sions have been informed by the theoretical perspective and 
categories identified in the New Rhetoric and Grid Group Cul-
tural Theory. It was also explained that this is an international 
comparative research in which the same conceptual framework 
regarding national context and rhetoric will be applied to the 
empirical information collected. This will enable research analy-
sis and findings to occur at two levels. In the first instance the 
focus will be upon comparisons and relationships within each 
national case. I will make conclusions regarding: 
• The relationship between the national cultural and politi-
cal administrative context and the arguments used includ-
ing: 
- The match between the political cultural characteriza-
tion and the cultural flavor of accounts. 
- The applicability of political culture to administrative 
culture. 
- The match between the universal audience and the cul-
tural political context. 
Secondly, the findings will include international comparisons 
regarding: 
• The similarities and differences in national agency ac-
counts including: 
- Who is speaking from which institution and the kind of 
audience to which they are speaking; 
- The cultural flavor of the argumentation; 
- The construction of the universal and particular audi-
ences; 
- The starting points of argumentation; and 
- The argumentative techniques adopted. 
 
Finally, the research design allows some conclusions to be 
drawn about the claims that have been made about GGCT. In 
particular, its applicability to different levels of the political and 
administrative context can be evaluated and the ability of the 
theory to assess variations in meaning and across contexts can 
be assessed. 
 5 The Netherlands: Agencies as a unique 
and accountable alternative 
 
In de begroting en verantwoording van een agentschap zal het bedrijfsresul-
taat mede in de vorm van kengetallen en produktiemaatstaven opgenomen 
dienen te zijn. Daarnaast zullen ze ook hun kosten voor verrichte dienstver-
lening, bijvoorbeeld aan het moederdepartement, in rekening moeten bren-
gen (Ministerie van Financiën, 1991:76).  
 
[In the budget and account of an agency, the business result in the form of 
indicators and production measurements, should be reported. In addition, 
the costs of the produced services, for example for the mother ministry, 
must be charged]. 
 
Echter anders dan bij externe verzelfstandiging kan bij interne verzelfstandi-
gen wel worden ingegrepen in afzonderlijk gevallen (Commissie Sint, 
1994:8). 
 
[In contrast to external autonomization, with internal autonomization inter-
vention may occur in special cases]. 
 
Agentschappen voeren een bijzondere vorm van resultaatgericht manage-
ment omdat zij hierbij een afgezonderd en een afwijkend beheer hanteren 
(Ministerie van Financiën, 1998:20).  
 
[Agencies use a special form of results orientated management because they 
use a detached and deviant management system that deviates from the 
norm.] 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The creation of agencies in The Netherlands, or rather 
agentschappen in Dutch, was a novel change in the Dutch admini-
stration. While there had been a long tradition of arms length 
government in the form of extensive numbers of zelfstandige 
bestuursorganen (ZBOs), the formulation of agencies was to 
provide an alternative and less radical separation of functions 
within ministries. They were also a means for introducing a 
number of financial changes that had been under discussion 
since the 1970s (Smullen, 2004; Sober, 1996; Ministerie van Fi-
nanciën, 1991). Dutch agency reform has been programmatic 
and coordinated since its inception in 1991 by the Ministry of 
Finance. In contrast to the wildgrowth of its ZBO counterpart, 
and by Dutch standards more generally, the conditions for ac-
quiring agency status have been centrally defined and orches-
trated (Ministry of Finance), with this becoming even more rig-
orous overtime. Nevertheless, the maintenance of agency ar-
rangements, and more specifically performance contracting, has 
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been the prerogative of mother ministriess, who have tended to 
pursue this sluggishly and in their own independent and hetero-
geneous ways (Pollitt and Talbot, 2004; Smullen, 2004).  
The Dutch political and administative scene is a fragmented 
one in which almost all aspects of formal government arrange-
ments subvert clear identification of dominant roles. Indeed, 
the most read scripts are those that feature consensus and 
compromise (for the collective) between (separate) sovereign 
tribes. It is therefore hardly surprising that many academic ob-
servers, not only from a GGCT perspective, have emphasized 
the egalitarian features of Dutch formal political institutions 
and their propensity for mutuality and inclusiveness in decision-
making (Lijphart, 1999; Mamadouh, 1997, 1999b; Hendriks and 
Toonen, 2001). Official accounts of agency reform, by contrast, 
reveal a preference for individualist and hierarchical themes and 
remedies. This is contrary to expectations of high egalitarianism 
and has been aided by the preceding history of Dutch ZBOs 
and their function in official agency accounts. One still ob-
serves, however, some references to gesprekspartners [speaking 
partners], overleg [consultation] and draagvlak [creating support 
through consultation] in official constructions of agency re-
form. This may be interpreted as some limited appeal to an 
egalitarian audience. As will be argued in this chapter, however, 
ministerial accountability has been far more important in the 
construction of a hierarchical Dutch universal audience. 
In this chapter I will describe the Dutch scenes of use in 
which official accounts of agency reform have been produced. I 
will also present my analysis of those official accounts and their 
correspondence with Hood's stories of public management. 
The chapter begins with a brief discussion of the Dutch labels 
for agency reform in section 5.2. I then describe the political 
and administrative context in sections 5.3 and the GGCT diag-
nosis of this context in section 5.4. In section 5.5 I present a 
brief account of the content of Dutch agency reforms and pro-
vide a chronology of changes and events throughout the reform 
period up to the present. The analysis of Dutch official docu-
ments, according to the categories of the New Rhetoric, is then 
presented in section 5.6 and their classification according to 
GGCT stories is discussed in section 5.7. Finally, in section 5.8 
I discuss both the relationship between Dutch agency accounts 
and the Dutch scenes of use.  
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5.2 A word (s) on agency terminology in Dutch 
 
There are three main terms that have been used to talk about 
agency reform in the Dutch context. Firstly, the term agentschap 
was used in the initial presentations of the reform (Ministerie 
van Financiën, 1991:70-86). This has a number of likenesses to 
the term agency in English since it is a fairly familiar term to the 
Dutch context, and is also used generically to describe all kinds 
of organizations such as franchises of a post office or a branch 
within a business. Historically, the term agent was used in The 
Netherlands already in the Batavian period (1795-1806), and the 
following French period (Boels, 1993), to refer to highest func-
tionaries within ministries (an agent of the King). It was even-
tually replaced with the term minister from 1806 (Raadscheld-
ers, 1992). The term agentschap was also used to describe a na-
tional administrative organization called the Nationale Opvoed-
ings Agentschap [National Upbringing/Education Agency].12 It 
is perhaps no coincidence that the term agentschap was used in 
early descriptions of the reform, since these descriptions also 
referred to the UK Next Steps Agency Programme as an exam-
ple of international developments influencing the reform (Min-
isterie van Financiën, 1991:31). In the Dutch language 
agentschap is perhaps the closest term to the word agency in 
English, although it cannot be used in Dutch to mean freedom, 
as in English sociological texts. 
A second way that Dutch agencies are referred to in national 
debate is through the words intern verzelfstandigen. This is usually 
translated in English as internal autonomization. According to 
the famous Van Dalen dictionary the word zelfstandig, (the stem 
of the term ver-zelfstandig-en) means independence while the 
word verzelfstandigen is more akin to being made independent 
[het zelfstandig maken]. The term intern is much the same as the 
words internal or inside. In The Netherlands there is also a 
category extern verzelfstandigen [external autonomization] that can 
refer to government organizations with a public or private legal 
identity. These organizations are also referred to as Dutch zelf-
standige bestuursorganen -ZBOs [independent administrative or-
gans] and have been likened to the UK Non-Departmental 
                                                 
12 The information and references about the use of the terms agent and 
agentschap in Dutch political administrative history was provided to me by 
email from Prof. J.C.N Raadschelders, May 19, 2006. 
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Public Bodies (NDPBs). In the Dutch literature the general 
term verzelfstandigen has, at least throughout the 1980s and early 
1990s, been considered a type of privatization (De Ru, 1995:5; 
Verhaak, 1997:162). This is in contrast to the debates about pri-
vatization in English speaking countries where it is defined in a 
more limited way as the selling off of public property and ser-
vices.  An exception to the Dutch use of the term verzelf-
standigen as privatization occurred in the document Verantwoord 
verzelfstandigen [Accountable autonomization] which described 
the general preference for internal as opposed to external 
autonomization. In this document, which is analyzed below, pri-
vatisering [privatization] was presented as a distinct category to 
verzelfstandigen [autonomization] (De Ru, 1995:5). 
A third way in which agencies have been labelled in Dutch is 
with the term baten-lasten dienst. In accounting terminology baten 
[benefits] and lasten [burdens] are used together to describe an 
accrual accounting system [baten lasten stelsel], while the term 
dienst refers to a service or organizational unit. Literally baten-
lasten dienst can be translated to English as an accrual accounting 
organization. This label was created for Dutch agencies in 2001 
because, as will be described in section 4.5.2, the term 
agentschap was no longer considered desirable.  
 
5.3 Scenes of use I: reconstructing the political and ad-
ministrative context 
 
It is difficult to begin an account of Dutch formal politicial and 
administrative institutions without first mentioning something 
of the history of being together apart in The Netherlands. This is a 
story that often begins with pointing to the Dutch Republic of 
the Seven United Provinces (1588-1795), a highly decentralized 
federation of strong independent regions, who cooperated pri-
marily to avert foreign invasion (Daalder, 1990:23-28; Hendriks 
and Toonen, 2001:4). The fragmented power distribution in the 
Republic is argued to have encouraged a political culture where 
consultation and negotiation between elites were important fea-
tures of collective decision-making. Similar themes can be 
found in Lijphart's famous theory of consociationalism that was 
built upon a discussion of The Netherlands prior to the 1960s 
(Lijphart, 1975). In this account a politics of accommodation, also 
including consensus and compromise, became the means for 
achieving stability between politically and socially differentiated 
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groups, or in what has become popular terminology zuilen [pil-
lars]. Divisions between minority groups (where no single ma-
jority exists) were overcome through elite cooperation, while 
also maintaining a separate realm for groups to express and live 
their differences. Although many of the social conditions de-
scribed by Lijphart are no longer relevant to Dutch society to-
day, as will be shown below patterns of pragmatic negotiation, 
difference and separate realms continue to be endemic to its 
political and administrative institutions. 
5.3.1 The political system  
The Netherlands is a unitary state, with a long tradition of dele-
gating powers of autonomy and responsibility to both the prov-
inces and local government (Lijphart, 1999; Toonen, 1990). In-
deed, both of these lower tiers of government are accorded le-
gal recognition in the Dutch constitution. They have for exam-
ple an ability to collect their own income and a responsibility 
for the police force. 
Since 1917 the electoral system has been one of proportional 
representation. This was introduced at a crucial time in the his-
tory of the politics of accommodation when the cleavages in Dutch 
politics and society were most sharply drawn (Lijphart, 
1975:101-115). The principle of proportionality, not only for 
political representation, has been instrumental to obtaining po-
litical cooperation in The Netherlands since it enabled inclusion 
to be fairly distributed across the pillars. In its turn, proportion-
ality has also maintained political differentiation since, although 
the social circumstances supporting pillarization have changed, 
it has enabled the inclusion of a number of political parties to 
parliament. At the time of writing, for example, nine political 
parties are represented in the Dutch parliament. It is seldom 
that any one party will hold more than a third of the seats in 
parliament, with the consequence that government formation 
always requires a coalition of parties (Andeweg, 2002:101). 
There is also no guarantee that the largest party in the parlia-
ment will form part of the governing coalition as this depends 
upon the process of government formation and the negotia-
tions that take place after elections. 
5.3.2 The core executive 
Given the undecisive outcome of elections, it has been ob-
served that they "seldom have a determining impact upon the 
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formation of government" (Andeweg and Irwin, 1993:109). In-
stead, government formation depends upon a delicate process 
of lengthy consultation and negotiation, behind closed doors, be-
tween prospective coalition partners. Indeed, length of time and 
difference in political persuasion would appear to present few 
barriers to the propensity of Dutch political elites to uncover 
points of compromise through careful and detailed negotia-
tions. The duration of time devoted to government formation is 
among the longest in the world with records being attained in 
1977 when it took 208 days (the longest) and in 1948 when it 
was just 31 days (the shortest) (Gladdish, 1991:128). Further-
more, consensus and compromise between parties has proved 
to function across the political spectrum with government coa-
litions even being formed between the Liberals (VVD) and the 
Social Democrats (PvDA), although historically it is the Chris-
tian Democrats (CDA) that have been the lynchpin in this sys-
tem. CDA have been members of the most governments since 
1917 cooperating sometimes with the left, and, at other times to 
the right of the political spectrum. The necessity of cooperation 
between parties tends to constrain radical policy 
change/reform, the length of time it takes to make changes, as 
well as encourages a more pragmatic approach to politics rather 
than an ideological one. 
Aside from the negotiations to identify coalition partners, 
there are also negotiations to establish a policy agenda for the 
coming period of government and this is written up in the re-
geerakkoord or coalition agreement. It has been referred to as a 
codification of mistrust because many of the discussions preceding 
its publication are focussed upon areas of disagreement be-
tween the coalition partners (Andeweg and Irwin, 2002:104-
105). The content of the regeerakkoord includes bargains that 
have been struck between the coalition partners, sometimes fa-
voring the policy priorities of one partner in a particular do-
main, in exchange for the policy priorities of other partners in 
other areas. Although an agreement for collective government, 
it need not be understated that it is a compromise attained in 
circumstances of division. Appeasement is achieved by distrib-
uting ministerial posts and the position of state secretaries 
across the parties according to the principle of proportionality 
and by the strategy of de-politicization (Andeweg and Irwin, 
2002:105). De-politicization entails pursuing government in a 
business like manner, in order to avoid the destabilising or con-
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frontational effects of ideological outbursts and offending one's 
coalition partners. After all, these differences have already been 
neutralized in the negotiations. In its most potent form de-
politicization involves entrusting divisive issues to a committee 
or expert opinion, but it also manifests itself in the way gov-
ernment members present themselves and their use of technical 
concepts.  Critics have noted that this can make for bland poli-
tics. Stimulating the dualism between government and parlia-
ment has been a recurring theme in attempts to compensate for 
this tendency of Dutch consensus government (Andeweg & 
Irwin, 2002).  
Being together apart can also be observed in the ways that the 
roles of the prime minister and ministers in the cabinet are ful-
filled. The Dutch cabinet has been characterized as highly colle-
gial with the prime minister having few formal powers to influ-
ence cabinet decision- making (Lijphart, 1999:14; Andeweg and 
Irwin, 2002:113). Unlike the counterpart in Australia or Sweden 
for example, the Dutch prime minister does not select ministers 
and cannot remove them since these posts are negotiated upon 
between the coalition partners. He is also unable to give direc-
tives to ministers or intervene in disputes between ministers 
unless they agree to mediation. Indeed, the notion of a distinct 
role for the prime minister is only a recent feature of the Dutch 
political system; the position as chairman to the cabinet was sub-
ject to rotation between ministers until 1945 (Andeweg, 
1988:138). Following discussions about expanding this role in 
the 1980s former Prime Minister Lubbers gave a rather insight-
ful response to conceptions of the position in The Netherlands. 
Quoted in a current affairs magazine he stated:  
 
Mijn stelling is, dat de minister-president geen extra zaken in zijn portefeuille 
moet hebben; hij moet zijn handen vrijhouden om het besluitvormingspro-
ces van de ministerraad en de onderraden te kunnen blijven coördine-
ren…De minister-president moet als coördinator dienstbaar zijn aan zijn 
collega-ministers' (From Elsiviers magazine 21 December, in Postma p.74).   
 
[My position is, that the prime minister should not have any extra areas in 
his portfolio, he should have his hands free in order to be able to coordinate 
the ministerial and underministerial councils…The Prime Minister must as 
coordinator serve his minister colleagues.]  
 
The Dutch prime minister also has, compared with many other 
countries, relatively few advisory staff (10-12) and they consist 
primarily of civil servants. Political appointees are only an occa-
sional exception (Andeweg and Irwin, 2002:113). These features 
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aside, there has been the feeling that the position of prime min-
ister has been strengthening in The Netherlands (Andeweg and 
Irwin, 2002:113). This has no doubt been promoted by the 
weekly meetings with the press which has consolidated the 
prime minister's position as the face of the government and 
also by the participation of The Netherlands in the EU, since 
this lends the Dutch PM (and Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
Finance) more functions. 
By contrast, the position of cabinet minister has historically 
been characterized by much greater strength and independence, 
at least with respect to one's own portfolio. Individual ministe-
rial responsibility was recognized already in the constitution of 
1848, well before the notion of collective government or even 
the party system had established itself (Andeweg, 1988:137). 
Related to both circumstances of monarchy and pillarization, 
Dutch ministers have generally been recruited for their exper-
tise in a particular area rather than (or not only) for their politi-
cal persuasions. This has acted to promote further the concept 
of individual ministerial responsibility.  The constitution pre-
scribes that a minister cannot be a parliamentary member and it 
is not uncommon for the position to be filled by individuals 
without parliamentary experience or even long standing political 
affiliation.  Even before this regulation was introduced it was 
customary for parliamentary members to give up their seat if 
they attained the position of minister (Andeweg, 2002:116). 
Furthermore, the minister's advisors come primarily from their 
ministriess promoting ownership of turf and a focus upon the 
issues affecting one's ministry, rather than the collective gov-
ernment as a whole. Indeed, it is generally "frowned upon when 
a minister enters a debate in which their ministry has no stake" 
(Andeweg and Irwin, 2002:117). Consistent with maintaining 
consensus, this arrangement of a specialist minister has also 
promoted de-politicization within government and an expert 
approach to political problems. It has strengthened the notion 
of responsibility that is attributed to ministers for their minis-
tries and particular policy areas. 
5.3.3 Policy making style 
As with the formation of government, the style of policy mak-
ing in The Netherlands also involves extensive consultation and 
negotiation. This can scarcely be exaggerated with observers 
stating: 
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In the Netherlands almost every sector of government policy consists of a 
myriad of consultative and advisory councils, which are deeply intertwined 
with government and form an 'iron ring' around the ministerial departments 
(Kickert and In’ t Veld, 1995:53).  
 
It has been rated in a number of international studies as display-
ing a high degree of corporatism (Katzenstein, 1985), which 
corresponds with the tradition established under consociation-
alism, of exchange and cooperation between interests, rather 
than competition. With the creation of the Social Economic 
Council (SER) and the Foundation of Labour (Star) during 
postwar reconstruction, the social partners, employee and em-
ployer organizations, obtained an institutionalized role as major 
players in the creation of social security and economic policy 
(Visser and Hemerijck, 1997). They have also been represented 
in advisory boards in the food, retail and agricultural sectors. 
Their position was, at least formally, weakened after stagnation 
in consensus during the period between the 1970s and 1980s, 
but there still remains ample evidence of a commitment to, or 
at least appearance of, bargaining, consultation and compromise 
(see Hendriks and Toonen, 2001). There is also strong interest 
group activity in other areas of policy making, which perhaps 
explains the popularity of network theory in The Netherlands, 
although their numbers and degree of involvement vary with 
policy sector (Hendriks, 2001:29; Andeweg and Irwin, 
2002:145). One of the consequences of corporatism, and inter-
est group orientation in general, has been the verkokering, or 
rather compartmentalization of policy making in government. 
Like the history of pillarization, this is the tendency towards 
strong independent policy segments within and outside minis-
tries that operate in overlapping fields but still persist in avoid-
ing interaction or interact ineffectively. This makes central co-
ordination, by the cabinet for example, difficult.  
5.3.4 The central administrative structure 
Related to both the specialist approach to policy (which has 
been encouraged by coalition government), the need for de-
politicization and corporatism, the Dutch administrative struc-
ture is characterized by both heterogeniety and decentralization. 
There is a long tradition of heterogeneous ministries with dis-
tinct differences in recruitment, culture and structure (Van der 
Meer and Raadshelders, 1999). This has enabled them to re-
spond to, and be shaped by, organized interests and the specific 
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attributes of their policy fields. Even the same kinds of posi-
tions in each ministry have quite different functions (Andeweg 
and Irwin, 2002:151). Only recently, in 1995, were the first steps 
taken to create a unified civil service. Previously government 
employees were considered employees of a particular ministry 
(Van der Meer and Raadschelders, 1999:205). There are pres-
ently 13 ministries. 
Prior to the introduction of agency reform, functional de-
centralization of both policy- making responsibilities and their 
implementation had been widespread across the ministries. This 
occurred through different legal arrangements and for different 
purposes. For example in the immediate post war period there 
was a project to create a number of PBOs (publiekrechtelijk 
bedrijfs organen) [Public Law Business Organizations]. This 
was part of the corporatist attempt to include employers and 
employees into economic policy making, with the most famous 
PBO being the Social Economic Council (SER) (Andeweg and 
Irwin, 2002:142). A number of organizations in the social secu-
rity field were also created under public law arrangements 
around this time enabling initiatives from voluntary groups to 
obtain a semi government status (Van Thiel, 2000:9). In addi-
tion, legal identities were created for a large number of organi-
zations across the ministries during the financially tough times 
of the 1980s as part of an attempt to reduce their size (Van 
Thiel, 2000:20). 
Although there are endless distinctions that can be made be-
tween the various kinds of legal identities (created through pub-
lic or private law) operating at arms length from Dutch minis-
tries, many of these initiatives have been broadly defined as 
ZBOs (zelfstandige bestuursorganen). In 1993, the National 
Court of Audit counted 545 ZBOs in The Netherlands, 40% of 
which were established after 1980 (Algemene Rekenkamer, 
1995; Van Thiel, 2000:18). As will be shown later in this chapter 
ZBOs have, at least rhetorically, been somewhat out of favour 
in recent years, although they continue to be created (Van Thiel 
and Van Buuren, 2001).  In terms of both numbers and degrees 
of formal autonomy, the arrival of agencies in this context, 
would actually seem a rather mild initiative.  
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5.4 Scenes of use II: Dutch culture and GGCT 
 
Following from comparative studies by Grendstad (1999) and 
Mamadouh (1999), the cultural configuration present in the 
Dutch political context has been found to be primarily egalitar-
ian (47), followed respectively by hierarchy (28) and then indi-
vidualism (11). This configuration has been deduced from indi-
vidual responses to questions in the 1990 World Values Survey 
in which grid was measured using items referring to level of in-
dividual autonomy, while group was measured using responses 
related to membership of organizations and clubs (Grendstad, 
1999:468-469). The predominance of first egalitarianism and 
then hierarchy has been labelled more generally by GGC theo-
rists as social democracy (Mamadouh, 1999b) or a moralistic 
political culture (Mamadouh, 1997). Stability is attained between 
these ways of life because egalitarians can benefit from hierar-
chy in enforcing collective values (Lockhart, 1997:97). This 
characterization also corresponds to features already identified 
in the Dutch political administrative context such as the histori-
cal role of pillar elites in ensuring consensus, and the continued 
role of experts and expert knowledge in resolving political dif-
ferences.  
Further features of the Dutch political context that may be 
interpreted as illustrating a high group character include the 
emphasis upon consultation and consensus in decision making 
which, it is important to repeat, has emerged in conditions of 
heterogeneity rather than homogeneity. Finding consensus 
across groups is also related to observations that Dutch politics 
has had a tendency to be bland and that discussion is primarily 
focussed upon facts and logical reasoning rather than entertain-
ing the public with (divisive) political ideals. The long standing 
Dutch adage; “Doe maar gewoon, dan doe je al gek genoeg” 
[just act normal/average; that is crazy enough] would seem to 
describe succinctly national feelings about flamboyance al-
though this would appear to be changing as political figures 
such as Pim Fortyun have attained popularity through flaunting 
a more outlandish and provocative style. With the exception of 
such characters as Fortuyn, however, there is still more often a 
tendency for political elites to behave in a modest way. As 
Hofstede has argued hierarchical features such as distinctions in 
status tend to be less visible in countries where egalitarian val-
ues are prominent since the powerful in such societies tend to 
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renounce the formal symbols that highlight their position 
(Hofstede, 2000:97). Television footage of ministers, and not 
least, former Prime Minister Wim Kok, riding to parliament on 
a bicycle is a vivid example that springs to mind.  
Although rated as less prominent than egalitarianism and hi-
erarchy, it is noteworthy that there are contested opinions about 
the degree to which individualism characterizes Dutch culture 
vis a vis Swedish culture (see Grendstad, 1999, Hofstede, 2000). 
The figures that I have used from GGCT indicate that indi-
vidualism in The Netherlands is less than in Sweden, although 
other cultural studies such as those of Hofstede rate Dutch cul-
ture as more individualistic than Sweden. Certainly at the level 
of the cabinet the convention of individual ministerial account-
ability as compared to the principle of collective government in 
Sweden could be interpreted as indicative of a lower group rat-
ing in The Netherlands. Individual ministerial accountability has 
provided an important support to the functioning of coalition 
government in The Netherlands and recognizes that ministers 
should be left uninhibited to run their ministries and speak 
upon policy decisions in their field. In addition, the more frag-
mented institutional arrangements in The Netherlands, as re-
flected by only recent moves towards a unified civil service to-
gether with the tradition of many distinct and separate interests 
(albeit in groups), disperses the groups somewhat into autono-
mous spheres. More broadly speaking some commentators 
have suggested that the famous Dutch tolerance has been able 
to develop because citizens could get on with their own lives 
indifferent to what others were doing (Kickert, 2003:138). This 
detracts somewhat from the idea of a strong group feel. Again 
in more general terms individualism, at least in the form of self 
reliance and entrepreneurialism, has often been cited and asso-
ciated with the history of Calvinism in The Netherlands, as has 
paradoxically, godly patriotism and commitments to charity 
(Weber, 1930; Huizinga, 1968; Schama, 1991). Indeed, there are 
quite contrasting observations made about the political system 
and thus culture (see Hendriks, 2006:179, 185). 
 
 
The Netherlands   91 
5.5 Dutch agency reforms in brief13 
 
The blueprint for Dutch agency reform was first described in 
1991 (Ministerie van Financiën, 1991). Among a range of pro-
posals for improving financial management, agencies were pre-
sented as an instrument for achieving greater efficiency. They 
have also been created for other purposes such as the separa-
tion of policy and implementation, and as an alternative to 
ZBOs (Smullen et al., 2001). In 1994, the first four agencies 
were created and since that time some 30 agencies have been 
created. They constitute more than 30% of Dutch public sector 
employees and this figure is expected to grow to above 80% 
(Kraak and Van Oosteroom, 2002:11).  
Almost all ministries now have agencies within their domain 
and they are used for a wide variety of tasks, from forecasting 
the weather to administering residence permits (Smullen and 
Van Thiel, 2002). An overview of some existing agencies is pre-
sented in table 5.1. 
5.5.1 The contours of Dutch agencies 
As reflected in their most recent title baten-lastendienst [accrual 
accounting service], Dutch agencies have had a primarily finan-
cial character (Smullen, 2001; Smullen, 2003). Indeed, the pri-
mary distinction between Dutch agencies and other organiza-
tions within the ministries is that they (must) use an accrual ac-
counting system. In the early years of agency creation this was 
also recognized in the Comptabiliteitswet [Dutch Accounting 
Law], which was amended first in 1994, to include articles de-
fining an agentschap (Wijziging van de Comptabiliteitswet, Kam-
erstukken II, 1994/5). Aside from requiring that ministries’ 
budget accounting include a separate sheet for agencies in 
which details of their accruals and asset liabilities could be re-
ported, initial legislation also recognized some conditions for 
obtaining agency status. For example, the products and services 
of agencies should be measurable and they should have ob-
tained an accountant's declaration for their financial administra-
tion. Over the years, the conditions for agency status have be-
come more numerous and precise with just 3 conditions being 
required in 1994 to 12 conditions being applied from 2001  
                                                 
13 Parts of this section have already been published in Smullen et al., (2001) 
and Pollitt, Talbot, Caulfield and Smullen (2004). 
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Table 5.1. Examples of agencies across Dutch ministries 
 
Ministries Agencies Task Fte  
Foreign 
Affairs 
Centre To Pro-
mote Imports 
From Developing 
Countries 
[Centrum Bevorder-
ing van Import uit 
Ontwikkelingsland] 
Seeks to promote the com-
petitiveness of imports from 
developing countries in inter-
national markets. 
17 
Defense Paraseto Provides catering to all the 
defense locations both na-
tionally & internationally. 
1800 
Economic 
Affairs 
Senter Novem  Prepares applications for sub-
sidies by the private sector for 
technology & sustainable 
production. 
 
Justice Dutch Prisons Responsible for detaining of-
fenders of crime and rehabili-
tating them. 
16 195 
Agricul-
ture, Na-
ture and 
Food 
Quality 
Agency for rural 
areas 
[Dienst Landelijk 
Gebied] 
Implements programs and 
projects for changing land use 
& management of rural areas. 
 
Traffic & 
Water 
National 
Meteorological 
Institute 
[KNMI] 
Responsible for the collection 
of meteorological data, pre-
diction of the weather, & re-
search into climate change. 
225 
  
(Ministerie van Financiën, 2001). Since the new conditions have 
focussed primarily upon financial features such as calculating 
cost prices and identifying financial risks, the financial character 
of agencies would appear to have become even more aug-
mented. There are now also requirements mentioning quality 
indicators although these have been expressed in less precise 
ways, eg. must have numerous quality indicators. An overview of the 
conditions for agency status and their refinement since 1991 are 
presented in table 5.2.  
The Comptabiliteitwet also requires that ministers announce 
their intention to create an agency to parliament and that it can 
only proceed if, within 30 days, there are no further requests for 
information within the parliament. This article of the legislation, 
(which was proposed by a member of parliament and was not 
part of the original proposal of the legislation presented by the 
Minister of Finance), states that if the parliament is opposed to 
the intention of agency creation, it cannot proceed. 
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Table 5.2. Changes in conditions of Dutch agency status 1991-2004 
 
Accounting 
Legislation 
1991 
Accounting 
legislation 
1998 
Accrual Accounting Handbook 2001 
The products 
of services of 
the organiza-
tion must be 
measurable. 
 
Organization 
must have re-
ceived an ap-
proved decla-
ration from an 
accountant. 
 
There must be 
real possibili-
ties for effi-
ciency im-
provements. 
 
 
 
 
Business 
processes 
must be de-
scribed, in-
cluding 1 or 
more prod-
ucts and ser-
vices and a 
cost price. 
 
Organization 
has to identify 
beforehand 
how the as-
sessment of 
efficiency will 
take place 
through a cost 
price calcula-
tion, as well as 
at least one 
quality indica-
tor. 
 
The internal 
planning and 
external con-
trol cycle 
should be 
connected. 
 
There is an analysis of the environment. 
 
The products and services are identified. 
 
The business processes of the organiza-
tion are described. 
 
The costs of products and services are 
calculated using a cost price model. 
 
How the organization’s efficiency will be 
assessed is identified before agency status 
using a cost price and at least one quality 
indicator. 
 
There is a results-steering external plan-
ning and control cycle that is connected 
to internal planning and control. 
 
The (financial) risks of the organization 
are identified and agreements are made 
about how these will be covered. 
 
A trial of the results management model 
for the mother ministry and agency is 
conducted for at least a half year before 
agency status. 
 
There is a plan for setting up the opening 
balance, signed by the relevant actors. 
 
There is a financial strategy for bringing 
about the changes to accruals, signed by 
relevant actors.  
 
There is an approved accountant’s decla-
ration in the year before the official start. 
 
A trial of the accrual accounting admini-
stration is conducted for at least a half 
year before agency status. 
 
There has, as yet, been no incidence of parliament denying the 
intention of a minister although a few agency proposals have 
been the subject of lengthy debate, while others not at all. To-
gether with a letter from the minister describing the attainment 
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of agency conditions, a concept statute [conceptstatuut] de-
scribing agency products and services, performance measures 
and so on, has become the conventional way to inform parlia-
ment of agency status. This statute is also a key document in 
describing the steering activities of mother ministries, which 
with the more stringent conditions for agency status, has be-
come more detailed. Already from the early years of agency 
creation there was the expectation that all agencies should be 
subject to evaluation within 5 years of their creation, and the 
anticipated date of this evaluation is generally reported in the 
concept statute.  
Aside from the unit cost price indicator, which is a condition 
of agency status, the other measures used to assess agency per-
formance are the responsibility of the mother ministries. This 
arrangement corresponds with the ministerial responsibility for 
organizations within their ministries. In general the perform-
ance measures to be collected by an agency are communicated 
in their year plans, and later reported in their annual reports. 
There is no government wide approach to how agency per-
formance is assessed or by whom in the ministries, with each 
ministrie tending to have their own arrangements. The in-
volvement of mother ministries in setting the performance 
measures and performance targets would seem to vary from 
ministry to ministry and agency to agency, although some re-
cent evidence would suggest that it is often agencies themselves 
that create their own performance measures (Pollitt et al., 2004: 
133-135, 156-182).  
The exception is financial figures, whose collection is dic-
tated by the Ministry of Finance. Within ministries, it is the bu-
reaux Financial and Economic Services (FEZ) and the internal 
Accounting Service (DAD) that are most engaged in the main-
tenance of agency issues. FEZ collects the monthly financial 
figures of agencies and is responsible for ensuring that the 
yearly performance information is supplied in time for the na-
tional budget. The DAD conducts the audits into agency ad-
ministration, both to ensure an orderly administration prior to 
obtaining agency status and for the budget. Both the pro-
gramme wide evaluations of Dutch agency reform have lacked 
detailed discussion of the performance measures collected by 
agencies suggesting that this aspect of the reform has been less 
developed (Ministerie van Financiën, 1997; Berenschot, 2002). 
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Furthermore, the introduction of a new budget reporting sys-
tem in 1999 requiring the presentation of performance indica-
tors for all policy sectors in the budget, has meant that the col-
lection and reporting of performance measures is not a special 
feature of agencies alone (Ministerie van Financiën, 1999). Nev-
ertheless, agencies have consistently been the subject of criti-
cisms from the National Court of Audit, who has made an ex-
plicit commitment to scrutinizing their accounts. Managers of 
agencies have also noted the increased attention that has ac-
companied the status. 
Together with changes to the conditions of agency status, 
there have also been some changes to the process of attaining 
agency status. In the Comptabiliteitswet it is recognized that 
both the Minister of Finance and the minister responsible for 
the agency act to advise cabinet on prospective agency candi-
dates. This advice tended to follow findings from interdepart-
mental investigations or could come from expressions of inter-
est from departmental heads, or organizations themselves wish-
ing to become agencies. At first, it was the Ministry of Finance 
that assessed the agency proposal before the concept statute 
was presented to parliament, and assisted candidate agencies in 
preparing for the status. Already in 1995, when the conditions 
for agency status were still quite broad, a much more formal-
ized and comprehensive approach to agency assessment and 
guidance was pursued with the creation of the Begeleidingsteam 
Verzelfstandigen-BiFi (Guidance Team Autonomization). This 
was located in the Ministry of Finance, although included pro-
visions for consultation with Ministry of Home Affair’s staff 
(Van Oosteroom and Soons, 2002:22).  
Through the Bifi team the Ministry of Finance was able to 
consolidate its role as agency expert to the minstries, and the 
outside world more generally. This has been reflected in its re-
sponsibility for the first evaluation of the agency program in 
1998, the publication of a number of articles featuring agencies 
from its staff (Van der Knaap, Kraak and Mulder, 1997; Van 
der Knaap and Van Oosteroom, 1999; Van Oosteroom and 
Soons, 2002) and their organization of various agency seminars. 
There is little doubt that the Ministry of Finance has also been 
an advocate of agency reform in this role, with many of its pub-
lications emphasizing agency benefits. Following from the rec-
ommendations of an external evaluation of an individual agency 
in 2000, the assessment of agency proposals and their satisfac-
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tion of agency conditions became the responsibility of 
Toetsingcommissie Verzelfstandigen [Assessment Commission 
Autonomization] in 2003 (Van Oosteroom and Soons, 
2002:32). This is separate from the BiFi team but is still com-
posed of ministry leaders the Director General of the Rijksbe-
groting [Central Government Budget] within the Ministry of 
Finance and the Director General of Openbaar Bestuur [Public 
Administration] within Home Affairs. In 2002, National Court 
of Audit findings have also become important in this proce-
dure, since a regulation has been established that proposals can 
only be sent to parliament when there have been no irregulari-
ties found in the financial management of the candidate agency 
or of the other agencies from the same ministry. 
5.5.2 An overview of the reform period 
The initial proposal for agency reform first appeared in 1991 in 
an inter-departmental workgroup report Verder Bouwen Aan Be-
heer [Further building on management]. It was instigated by the Min-
istry of Finance and followed an earlier investigation into zelfbe-
heer [self management] which, in the early 1980s, had already 
considered arrangements for changing the financial regulations 
that ministerial units and their managers were subject to. The 
sketch of agency reform in Verder Bouwen Aan Beheer included 
the possibility of two types of agency. One type would be able 
to adopt an accrual accounting system while the other could 
maintain the cash based accounting system. In both cases there 
was the possibility to reserve unspent funds from the apparatus 
budget in a separate account at the Ministry of Finance (Minis-
terie van Financiën, 1991:x). This formulation of agency reform 
provided the blueprint for the first four agencies created in 
1994, two of which did not use an accrual accounting system at 
that time. Later that year, however, when the Parliament began 
to discuss the accounting legislation that would define agencies, 
accrual accounting would become their only option.  
There was initial enthusiasm for agency reform which was 
expressed by the Parliamentary Commission for Government 
Expenditure and by the Minister of Finance (Brief van de Min-
ister van Financiën, Kamerstukken II, 1992/93) who was able 
to begin creating agencies in anticipation of their seamless in-
clusion into the Dutch Accounting Laws. Around this same 
time, however, a number of concerns were beginning to emerge 
about the wildgrowth of ZBOs and their threat to ministerial 
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accountability. The National Court of Audit had been conduct-
ing an investigation during the periods 1993 and 1994 that re-
vealed great disparities in the way ZBOs were regulated, and 
indeed noted in some cases very little regulation at all (Alge-
mene Rekenkamer, 1995). This cast a shadow over autonomiza-
tion more generally and encouraged a more antagonistic re-
sponse to agency reform in the parliamentary debates surround-
ing the amendments to the Accounting Legislation. In the time-
span since the initial proposal for agency reform the first purple 
cabinet (a coalition between Labour, the Liberals and D66) had 
been formed and expressed their commitment to re-establishing 
the primacy of politics (see Hoenderkamp and Schillemans, 1997). 
This was a commitment to obtaining a tighter grip on the ad-
ministration through smaller core ministries and more accurate 
steering. An amendment to the accounting legislation which 
prescribed only the possibility of an accrual accounting system 
was reflective of the political spirit of the time, with a member 
arguing that this would make agency reform more precise and 
encourage a more cautious application of the reform (Behan-
dling van de zesde wijzingen Comptabiliteitswet, 1994-95, 
39:2704). The parliament was also successful in passing two fur-
ther amendments to the Accounting legislation. This included 
prescribing the presentation of agency product information and 
reporting requirements to parliament, as well as notification of 
agency status with a provision for parliamentary disapproval.  
There were also a number of initiatives in the following pe-
riod that attempted to rein in autonomization and make it a 
much more controlled affair. In 1995 for example the report 
Verantwoord Verzelfstandigen [Accountable or responsi-
ble/sensible autonomization] by the Commissie Sint set out a 
guideline for the choices of internal or external autonomization. 
In addition, it recommended a much more unified and coordi-
nated approach to the creation of future autonomized organiza-
tions and in the guidance they received (Commissie Sint, 
1994:22). This led to the creation of the BiFi team in the Minis-
try of Finance. A chronology of agency reform initiatives is pre-
sented in table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3. Agency reform in The Netherlands - A chronology of events 
• April 1991. The Reconsiderations report Verder Bouwen Aan Beheer pub-
lished. Presents a proposal for agency reform. 
• June 1992. Description of application of proposals in Verder Bouwen 
Aan Beheer presented to Parliament.  
• January 1994. First four agencies established. 
• July 1994. Proposal for sixth amendment to the Comptabiliteitswet 
[Accounting Laws] (which described agencies) is presented to parlia-
ment. 
• December 1994 - January 1995. Parliament amends proposal for 
Comptabiliteitswet. Amendment Liemberg requires Ministers to advise 
Parliament of intention to create agency, enabling Parliament to refute 
it. Amendment Kamp requires letter of advice to include description of 
agency products and the product information to be reported. Amend-
ment De Jong requires all agencies to adopt accrual accounting. 
• September 1994. Verantwoord Verzelfstandigen published. Presents 
thinksteps for autonomization decisions. 
• 1995. A report by the National Court of Audit about ZBOs and minis-
terial accountability finds that ZBO arrangements have been  
• April 1995. Begeleidingsteam Verzelfstandigen [Guidance Team 
Autonomization] created within the Ministry of Finance to assess 
whether candidate agencies have met the criteria for agency status. 
• January 1997. All agencies have adopted accrual accounting. 
• April 1997. Commissie Cohen report published 
• April 1998. Verder met resultaat, the first evaluation of the agency pro-
gramme is published by the Ministry of Finance. Criteria for agency 
status revised. 
• January 1999. Reserve facility of agency status replaced by loan facility 
through Ministry of Finance. Ministry of Finance regulation created 
bypassing parliament. 
• January 2000. Minister of Finance presents to parliament 8 new condi-
tions which agency candidates must comply, it becomes 12 conditions 
soon thereafter. 
• April 2001. Seventh amendment to the Comptabilitietswet [Accounting 
laws] changing the name of agentschappen [agency] to batenlasten di-
enst [accrual accounting] service. 
• January 2002. Agency proposals may only be sent to Parliament when 
the Court of Audit has found no irregularities in the financial manage-
ment of the candidate agency and of the other agencies the same minis-
try is responsible for.  
• June 2002. Second evaluation of the agency programme is published by 
external consulting bureau. 
• January 2003. A new testing commission created to oversee that candi-
date agencies satisfy conditions. The commission is composed of the 
Director General Rijksbegroting [Central Government Budgeting] from 
the Ministry of Finance and Director General Openbaar Bestuur [Pub-
lic Administration] from the Ministry of Home Affairs. 
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Further limits were placed upon the activities of agencies and 
ZBOs with the publication of a report from the Commission 
Cohen that expressed concerns about the effect of government 
commercial activities upon the health of competitive markets 
and the private sector more generally. A new government-wide 
doctrine emerged to the effect that agencies must not compete 
with the private sector and should sell off activities that were 
potentially profitable (Commissie Cohen, 1997; Pollitt et al., 
2004:73). This had implications for many agencies and led for 
example to the privatization of the commercial activities of the 
Dutch meteorological agency, KNMI (Pollitt et al., 2004:164-
166).  
The reserve facility of agencies was also revised after 1998, 
when it was observed that some organizations had saved large 
amounts of monies, the interest of which was not being in-
cluded in the calculation of cost prices. Some of the savings had 
to be returned and by 2000 a limit on the level of reserves agen-
cies could save were set, with a loan facility (that charges inter-
est) being introduced for the purpose of investments (Van 
Oosteroom & Soons, 2002:30-31). Though certainly not con-
sidered as problematic as ZBOs, the state of the agency image 
at this time is perhaps best reflected in the decision to change 
its name from agentschap to baten-lasten dienst via a further 
amendment to the Accounting Laws in 2001. This was because 
the term agentschap was considered to suggest too much auton-
omy, thereby reducing its appeal to parliament (Ministerie van 
Financiën, 1998:63). It interfered with the Deparment  of Fi-
nance's desire to expand the use of accrual accounting more 
generally across the whole of central government, an idea that 
was being touted in 1997 (Van Oosteroom and Soons, 
2002:27).  
Two evaluations of the program of agency reform have been 
conducted since its inception. The first occurred in 1998 and 
was performed by the Ministry of Finance itself. It was rather 
positive about the impact of agency reform upon the attain-
ment of efficiency, despite the lack of unchanging indicators to 
assess this in the period under study (Ministerie van Financiën, 
1998). Recommendations included the first, among many, of re-
finements to the conditions for agency status including the in-
troduction of the condition that the performance measures for 
assessing efficiency be set before becoming an agency, e.g. unit 
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cost plus a quality measure. Praises by the Ministry of Finance 
for the agency initiative were somewhat remarkable at this time 
since irregularities in the financial accounts of some agencies 
were beginning to emerge. For example in the years 1997, 1998 
and 1999 the National Court of Audit identified shortcomings 
in the financial accounts of agencies, some of which were 
traced to problems at the time of agency creation, such as with 
the opening balance (Algemene Rekenkamer, 1998, 1999, 2000). 
A negative financial result was also reported in a number of 
agencies raising questions as to their effectiveness as instru-
ments for better financial management. These findings and the 
promise of devoting extra attention to agencies in future Court 
of Audit reports, led to the creation of further conditions for 
agency status (see table 5.2 above). The second evaluation was 
conducted in 2002 by an external consultancy firm and con-
cluded (with limited proof) that efficiency gains had been 
achieved in 7 of the 22 agencies it investigated (Berenschot, 
2002:22).  
 
5.6 The rhetoric of agency reform 
 
Initiatives to introduce an agency programme in The Nether-
lands, and also to adjust that package, have primarily been de-
scribed in government documents prepared for the Ministry of 
Finance and by financial experts.  As was noted in the previous 
section, the original vision for agency reform was first articu-
lated in the 1991 heroverwegingen (reconsiderations) commission 
report Verder Bouwen Aan Beheer [Further building on manage-
ment]. It described many of the features of agency reform that 
would eventually be codified in the Dutch Accounting Laws 
such as the accrual accounting system, or the formal roles sur-
rounding agency creation and maintenance, including ministries’ 
responsibility for setting up agency performance requirements. 
Both its inception through Ministry of Finance proposals, and 
the related consequence of its financial character in accounting 
laws, ensured a central role for the Ministry of Finance in over-
seeing the creation of individual agencies, as well as the agency 
programme more generally. Indeed, as should be apparent from 
the chronology in the previous section, most of the adjustments 
to the formal policy of agency creation have been of a financial 
nature and initiated in the Ministry of Finance. To this extent, 
official accounts from central government of the Dutch agency 
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programme have, with a few important exceptions, also tended 
to have a financial character and been presented by Ministry of 
Finance officials. 
Following from responses to the expert questionnaire for 
the selection of documents, the analysis of agency rhetoric will 
focus upon the documents; Verder Bouwen Aan Beheer [Further 
building on management] (1991), Verantwoord Verzelfstandigen 
[Accountable autonomization] (1994) and Verder Met Resultaat 
[Further with result] (1998). Both the reports Verder Bouwen Aan 
Beheer and Verder Met Resultaat were published and prepared by 
the Ministry of Finance. Their findings were used respectively 
to introduce agency reform in 1994 and to make changes to the 
criteria for agency status that were inserted into the Com-
patabiliteitswet [Dutch Accounting Law] in 2000. By contrast, 
the report Verantwoord verzelfstandigen [Accountable autonomiza-
tion] was commissioned collectively by the Secretary-Generals 
of the ministries, which included the head of the Ministry of 
Finance. It was published by the Ministry of Home Affairs and 
had as its task to consider the issues surrounding the appropri-
ate choice for autonomization, given the different forms available 
to ministries. The comparison that is made between the choice 
for Dutch ZBOs and agencies is the primary contribution of 
this document to official discussions about agency reform.  Fur-
thermore, the think steps it identified for making a choice about 
autonomization were incorporated into the concept statute of 
agencies, thereby requiring ministers to substantiate their deci-
sion (for the agency form) to parliament according to its crite-
ria. 
5.6.1 Document one - Verder Bouwen Aan Beheer [Further building 
on management]  
The report Verder Bouwen Aan Beheer was published in 1991 and 
was commissioned to investigate how differentiated financial rules 
could be applied across central government (Ministerie van Fi-
nanciën, 1991:2). It was a commission report proposed by the 
Ministry of Finance as part of the reconsiderations [Heroverweg-
ingen] with the commission members being primarily financial 
experts from different ministries including the Ministry of Fi-
nance. It is 94 pages long and consists of a summary and six 
chapters. These discuss first of all the problems of the existing 
financial arrangements (chapter 2) and then present a vision of 
financial management for the future (chapter 3). A number of 
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features of the existing financial system are described, such as 
the apparatus article of the budget and its end of year limit, as 
well as the macro principles underlying this system such as 
budgetary control, parliamentary authorization and ministerial 
accountability (chapter 4). The possibility of adjusting the fi-
nancial system while maintaining these macro principles is dis-
cussed with special reference to changes to the apparatus 
budget, the annual nature of the budget, rules about borrowing 
and the introduction of incentives to efficiency gains. Following 
from this discussion proposals are then presented for changing 
the financial system through adjustments to budgetary rules 
(chapter 5) and by the introduction of internal autonomization, 
or rather, agencies (chapter 6). 
The report identifies five features of the existing financial 
system that present bottlenecks [knelpunten] to the achievement 
of efficient management. These are the separation between the 
personnel and material articles in the apparatus budget, the time 
limits associated with yearly budgeting, the lack of incentives 
for efficient operations, the uniform cash based character of the 
budget system, and, the level of consultation resulting from 
budgetary regulations (Ministerie van Financiën, 1991:5). The 
lack of flexibility granted to managers to make decisions about 
their financial management or obtain rewards for good deci-
sions is central to the discussion about the problems of the fi-
nancial system. By contrast, the management model for the fu-
ture sketched in the report emphasizes a focus upon results and 
greater freedom for managers.  
Against this background of financial problems and a results 
orientated vision for the future, the proposal is made to adjust 
budgetary regulations across central government. This includes 
the amalgamation of the personnel and material articles of the 
apparatus budget, the creation of a margin (.25%) for deviations 
in the end of year budget limits, and the possibility for minis-
tries to reserve funds over the years for the purpose of invest-
ment. In addition, differentiation in financial rules is also pro-
posed through the creation of agentschappen [agencies].  The re-
port recommends two types of agentschappen [agencies], one in 
which an accrual accounting system may be used, and another 
in which the cash based accounting system is retained, but with 
a greater capacity than other central government organizations 
to reserve funds (over time) from the apparatus budget. In both 
cases, annual performance agreements are to be made with 
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agencies regarding desirable performance and this is to be as-
sessed post hoc.   
5.6.1.1 Ethos and the construction of the audience 
The self-presentation of the speaker throughout the text, is one 
of an expert in financial developments and accounting con-
cepts. From the outset the credibility of the speaker is pursued 
by demonstrating knowledge of developments in financial ad-
ministration through reference to a number of financial projects 
and committee findings. Experience with earlier projects for 
example Zelfbeheer [Self Management] or the Operatie 
Comptabel Bestel [Operation Accounting System] are described 
(Ministerie van Financièen, 1991:1, 15) and parliamentary stud-
ies are also cited as evidence of the growing importance of 
good financial systems (Ministerie van Financièen, 1991:14). 
There is also reference to the financial relevance of earlier pro-
jects such as the Project Reorganisatie Rijksdienst [Project Re-
organization Central Administration], that itself was not primar-
ily focussed upon financial management. Financial features are 
then further emphasized throughout the texts with reference to 
a range of technical concepts such as reserve facilities, accrual 
accounting systems, and lending facilities. This terminology 
alone achieves a measure of reliability regarding the speaker's 
knowledge of financial management regimes. It constructs a 
particular audience of financial experts, such as a financial par-
liamentary committee, financial units of other ministries or the 
Minister of Finance.The financial ethos of the speaker is also 
revealed in the priorities placed upon achieving efficiency, or-
derly accounts and budgetary savings throughout the text. The 
focus of the speaker remains narrowly confined to financial is-
sues for most of the text and there is no mention of broader 
social goals or even the goals of particular policy sectors. Also 
in the presentation of agency reform, the discussion remains 
focussed upon features such as end of year flexibility, capital 
management and financial incentives for efficiency. Even the 
yearly agreements envisioned identify categories useful to finan-
cial calculations such as volume and cost price. 
At the same time there are attempts to extend the relevance 
of these financial categories to a much broader universal audi-
ence. There are at least two ways in which this occurs. In the 
first instance, the workgroup explains that the problems they 
have identified with the financial system are based upon an in-
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ventory gathered from existing organizations (Ministerie van 
Financiën, 1991:4). Their observations are in this sense not pre-
sented as a theoretical view about good financial systems, but 
rather as based upon actual experiences in central government. 
In this way, the financial categories dominating the text are pre-
sented as central factual concerns for all public sector managers. 
The speaker states: 
 
In de volgende paragraaf worden de bevindingen van de inventarisatie weer-
gegeven. Daarbij worden de diensten als het ware "aan het woord" gelaten 
(Ministerie van Financiën, 1991:5).  
 
[In the following section the findings of the inventory will be presented. In 
this way the organizations will be, as it were, allowed to speak and share 
their experiences].  
It is also noted that the findings of the workgroup are based 
upon a study of nine organizations across different ministries, 
representing different expenditure patterns such as those with 
small and big programme budgets, and those where price form-
ing for products is possible (Ministerie van Financiën, 1991:4-
5). This gives a scientific justification to the kinds of financial 
problems being identified by the workgroup since it is based 
upon a broad and well thought out selection of cases. It is not 
just a financial problem as such, but one that is relevant and 
applicable to organizations across central government. As we 
shall see in later documents, it is typical for Dutch speakers of 
agency reform to provide accounts of the sources of findings 
and the choice of sources. To this extent academic rules of jus-
tification can be considered part of the Dutch universal audi-
ence.Certainly the inventory does not seem to be really about 
allowing managers to speak since there is never a direct citation 
of a representative of a central government organization, nor 
are particular actors in those organizations made the subject of 
a sentence. There are no specific examples or experiences cited 
and the inclusion occurs at a very abstract level maintaining 
technical financial terms. The references to case selection can 
therefore be interpreted as part of ensuring the speaker’s state-
ments can be considered credible to a broad audience. 
Another way in which the particular financial preoccupations 
of the text are given more universal relevance is with regard to 
political issues and in particular the principle of ministerial ac-
countability. The speaker makes a number of references to the 
capacity of agency reform to promote and protect ministerial 
accountability and in this respect appeals to a broader audience 
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by arguing the compatibility of political conventions with the 
financial recommendations being proposed. Indeed, it is 
claimed that both ministerial accountability and parliamentary 
oversight will be given more content through the implementa-
tion of the workgroup's recommendations. They state: 
 
Bovendien moet meer resultaatgericht management de ministeriële verant-
woordelijkheid een meer betekenisvolle inhoud verschaffen. Ministers moe-
ten aanspreekbaar zijn voor de wijze waarop verantwoordelijkheden binnen-
departementaal zijn toegedeeld, naast de aanspreekbaarheid op de mate 
waarin de beoogde resultaten als gevolg van de verantwoordelijkheidstoede-
ling al dan niet zijn gerealiseerd (Ministerie van Financiën, 1991:30). 
 
[Moreover, more results-orientated management must give ministerial ac-
countability a more meaningful content. Ministers must be answerable for 
the way in which responsibilities are divided within ministries, next to ac-
countability for the degree to which the intended results, as a consequence 
of separation of responsibilities, have or have n ot been realized.] 
 
In addition the political goal of greater parliamentary insight 
into the activities of the administration is associated with the re-
forms, and thereby the minister’s performance. Such statements 
are less prominent than more direct references to ministerial ac-
countability itself. The document states: 
 
Ook voor de Staten-Generaal kan meer resultaatgericht management op de 
departementen positieve gevolgen hebben. Meer dan tot op heden zullen de 
Staten-Generaal door een sterkere nadruk op de resultaten van het beleid in-
zicht krijgen in de produkten en diensten die met de aangewende collectieve 
middelen worden voortgebracht (Ministerie van Financiën, 1991:v). 
 
[More results-orientated management in ministries can also have positive 
consequences for the Parliament. More than in the past, the Parliament can, 
through greater emphasis upon the results of policy, get more insight into 
the products and services that have been produced with the collective means 
used]. 
 
The financial categories and ideas dominating the text are pre-
sented as enabling the achievement of political principles such 
as ministerial accountability (Ministerie van Financiën, 1991:ii, 
x, 2-3, 9-10, 21). This extends the appeal of the argumentation 
beyond an audience in the financial sphere of the administra-
tion to political actors more generally and can be interpreted as 
an appeal to the universal audience. It enables the Ministry of 
Finance, particularly in the context of the fragmented Dutch 
administration, to demonstrate to other ministries and the par-
liament that they all have an interest in pursuing, or at least 
considering seriously, agency reform. 
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5.6.1.2 Premises of argumentation 
The arguments in this document proceed from a number of 
agreements regarding what is desirable for financial manage-
ment in government, and the practice of financial management 
more generally. Beginning from agreements about the desirable, 
it is evident throughout the argumentation that recommenda-
tions for the creation of agencies, and for changes to financial 
regulations more broadly have been made with the priority, or 
rather value, of efficiency in mind. Efficiency as a value, preced-
ing the kinds of conclusions and arguments in the document, is 
evident from explicit statements about the goals of the work-
group and the motivations for the reforms. Already in the 
opening paragraphs of the document, it is stated: 
 
Het beheer bij de rijksoverheid is volop in ontwikkeling. Op de fundamen-
ten die sinds 1985 met de operatie comptabel bestel zijn gelegd, wordt in dit 
rapport verder gebouwd. Het gaat daarbij om het formuleren van praktisch 
toepasbare oplossingen voor bestaande knelpunten ter bevordering van 
doelmatig beheer…(Ministerie van Financiën, 1991:I, my emphasis) 
 
[Management in central government is developing steadily. This report 
builds further upon the foundations that were laid with the operation ac-
counting system. It is about the formulation of practical and applicable solu-
tions for existing bottlenecks in order to promote efficient management….my 
emphasis]  
 
Or, at different points in the document one finds opening lines 
such as; 
 
Vanuit de optiek van doelmatig beheer…(Ministerie van Financieën, 
1991:vi). 
 
[From the perspective of efficient management…] 
 
Similarly, with regard to the creation of agencies the value of ef-
ficiency is identified as the primary motivation. This is illus-
trated in the statements below: 
 
Het verdient aanbeveling voor dienstonderdelen waar een doelmatige be-
drijfsvoering gediend is met speciale beheersregels… een apart beheersregi-
me te ontwikkelen via de constructie van een agentschap (Ministerie van Fi-
nanciën, 1991:75). 
 
[It deserves recommendation to develop a separate management regime via 
the construction of an agency for organizational units where efficient busi-
ness operations will be served by special management rules.] 
 
Wanneer geen besparingen mogelijk zouden zijn op het apparaatsbudget van 
de betrokken dienst en van het betrokken departement, moet men zich met 
nadruk de vraag stellen in hoeverre het zinvol is dat men zich de kosten en 
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moeite getroost die onvermijdelijk aan de creatie van vormen van verzelf-
standigen verbonden zullen zijn (Ministerie van Financiën, 1991:xiii). 
 
[When no savings on the running costs of the concerned organization and 
ministry would be possible, the question must be raised strongly to what ex-
tent it is desirable, to invest the costs and efforts that are unavoidably linked 
to autonomization.] 
 
Translating the term doelmatig from Dutch to English, and as ef-
ficiency, is somewhat problematic because it can have broader 
applications than the technical notion of efficiency as the ratio 
between inputs and outputs. Indeed, some translate the term as 
effectiveness. However, the financial tone of the document 
makes it difficult to interpret the term in a broader way espe-
cially given the emphasis upon savings. This interpretation has 
also taken into consideration the lack of any direct use of the 
term doelmatig or efficient with input or output calculations. There 
are instead various references throughout the document to the 
desire for savings from the financial reforms being introduced, 
such as the following: 
 
Als gevolg van de flexibilisering van het beheersregime bij verzelfstandiging 
kan worden verwacht dat in de bedrijfsmatige sfeer voordelen worden gera-
liseerd die ook tot budgettaire besparingen kunnen leiden (Ministerie van Fi-
nanciën, 1991:84). 
 
[As a consequence of making the management regime more flexible with 
autonomization, it can be expected that advantages will be realized in the 
business sphere/operations that can lead to budgetary savings.] 
 
With regard to any confusion that might exist about the priori-
ties being espoused in the document, it is noted that the ap-
pearance of statements about savings in the document, were of-
ten followed by references to obtaining efficiency improve-
ments. An example is presented below: 
 
Vanuit deze optiek ligt het in de rede dat aan agentschappen en de moeder-
departement eniglei vorm van taakstellende efficencykorting opgelegd krij-
gen (Ministerie van Financieën, 1991:84) 
 
[From this perspective it seems plausible that agencies and the mother min-
istry are given the task to achieve efficiency savings.] 
 
Although agreements regarding the value of efficiency underlie 
the recommendations for introducing changes to financial man-
agement, it is still conceived of as subordinate to political priori-
ties such as ministerial accountability and the authorization of 
the parliament for budgetary decisions. Such a hierarchy of val-
ues is illustrated by repeated reassurances throughout the text 
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that the proposals being introduced will not interfere with these 
conventions. The audience is advised: 
 
Ministers moeten aanspreekbaar zijn voor de wijze waarop verantwoorde-
lijkheden binnendepartementaal zijn toegedeeld, naast de aanspreekbaarheid 
op de mate waarin de beoogde resultaten als gevolg van de verantwoorde-
lijkheidstoedeling al dan niet zijn gerealiseerd. (Ministerie van Financiën, 
1991:30) 
 
 
[Ministers must be answerable for the way in which responsibilities are di-
vided within ministries, as well as for the degree to which the intended re-
sults, following from the division of responsibility are realized or not.] 
 
Other references include, 
 
Het is een kwestie van enerzijds administratieve doelmatigheid en anderzijds 
invulling van het autorisatierecht waarover duidelijk ook de opinie van de 
Staten-Generaal gehoord zou moeten worden (Ministerie van Financiën, 
1991:xii). 
 
[It is a matter of administrative efficiency on the one hand and giving con-
tent to the authorization right on the other, where the opinion of parliament 
should clearly be heard as well.]  
There is also some manoeuvring in the argumentation around 
this hierarchy of values regarding ministerial accountability as is 
evident in the following sentence: 
 
Natuurlijk blijft de minister onder wie een agentschap ressorteert, ten aan-
zien van de Staten Generaal volledig verantwoordelijk voor het beleid en 
beheer van agentschappen, maar defacto zal de positie van de minister ten 
aanzien van het beheer wel veranderen. (Ministerie van Financiën, 1991:xi) 
 
[Naturally, the minister under which an agency resides, remains completely 
accountable to the parliament for the policy and management of the agency, 
but defacto the position of the minister towards (agency) management will 
change.] 
 
The clearest evidence for the hierarchy of values between effi-
ciency and ministerial accountability is, however, reflected in 
references to distinctions between external autonomization or 
ZBOs, and internal autonomization such as agencies. It is writ-
ten: 
 
De situatie kan zich voordoen vanuit het gezichtspunt van de ministeriële 
verantwoordelijkheid, dat de voorkeur uitgaat naar het verrichten van be-
paalde taken door het rijk, maar dat bepaalde wensen vanuit de bedrijfsvoe-
ring er - ondanks de voorgestelde verandering van de comptabele en perso-
nele beheersregels- toe leiden dat toch gekozen wordt voor externe verzelf-
standiging, in plaats van interne verzelfstandigen. Bestuurlijk-politieke over-
wegingen prevaleren dan niet. Om oneigenlijke keuzen te voorkomen wordt 
een differentiatie van beheersregels voorgesteld (Ministerie van Financiën, 
1991:x) 
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[From the point of view of the ministerial accountability, the situation can 
occur where the preference is for government to perform a particular task, 
but that certain wishes from the management – despite the proposed (gov-
ernment wide) changes to the personnel and material management rules-lead 
to a choice for external autonomization instead of internal autonomization. 
Administrative-political considerations do not prevail in such cases. In order 
to prevent improper choices being taken, differentiation of financial rules is 
proposed.] 
 
From this statement, it can be concluded that agencies repre-
sent a way to address the hierarchy of values between ministe-
rial accountability and efficiency, since it is proposed they can 
satisfy, to some extent, the requirements of both.  
Agreements about loci in the argumentation are most 
prominently agreements emphasizing quality, or rather, the 
unique, although uses of quantitative loci are also made. From 
the perspective of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (2003) the 
prominence of qualitative loci is surprising, since as will be 
shown further below, the argumentative techniques in the text 
are predominantly quasi-logical. Typical references that lend 
agencies a qualitative value include statements about their spe-
cial character or special rules, their different status or their dis-
tinction from the normal government services. They include the 
following: 
 
Gelet op het bijzondere karakter van agentschappen…(Ministerie van Fi-
nanciën, 1991:85) 
 
[Given the special character of agencies….]  
Speciale beheersregels voor dienstonderdelen, die afwijken van de bovendepar-
tementale regelgeving, kunnen worden beschouwd als een vorm van interne 
verzelfstandigen. De werkgroep beveelt hiertoe aan een apart beheersregime 
te ontwikkelen via de constructie van een agentschap (Ministerie van Finan-
ciën, 1991:x my emphasis) 
 
[Special management rules for organizational units that depart from the gen-
eral ministerial regulations can be considered as a form of internal autono-
mization. The workgroup recommends to this end the development of a dif-
ferent/separate management regime via the construction of an agency.] 
 
Aside from references to the specialness of agencies, it may be 
concluded that qualitative loci are also present in the recom-
mendation that candidates for agencies be considered case by 
case and not according to some general principle or blueprint 
(Ministerie van Financiën, 1991:82). Agencies are promoted as a 
good thing in the argumentation because they are unique, spe-
cial and different to the normal arrangements.  
Quantitative loci used in the argumentation include refer-
ences to agencies having more authority, more independence and 
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more accountability. Sometimes such statements are made in iso-
lation from any comparison, but they are also made with refer-
ence to other government services (such as the example above) 
or other forms of autonomization such as state companies and 
earlier experiments with self-management. In such cases, agen-
cies are simply said to offer more than these arrangements. As 
will be discussed further below in the argumentative techniques 
adopted, it is significant that agencies are consistently identified 
as having management capacities that are analogous to ZBOs, 
but then with more accountability.   
Although it has not been possible to identify any agreed 
upon truths from the document, there are a number of facts 
and presumptions that the argumentation is premised upon. 
This includes the fact that financial differentiation will make ef-
ficiency gains possible. On the one hand, efficiency has already 
been identified as a value or priority in the document that has 
motivated the proposal for reform, but the certainty that it will 
be achieved through financial differentiation is also put forward 
as a matter of fact. In the description of the task of the work-
group it becomes apparent that, given the goal of efficiency, 
they should identify the practical implications for introducing 
financial differentiation with respect to legal consequences, the 
budgetary process and for line managers (Ministerie van Finan-
ciën, 1991:2). This would suggest that the fact that financial dif-
ferentiation, or rather agencies, will bring about efficiency has 
already been agreed upon. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca ex-
plain that when values are not precisely defined, it is possible to 
also treat them as facts (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 
2003:76). Indeed, by doing so the speaker is able to promote a 
particular value in a factual way and thereby obtain the adher-
ence of the universal audience, and not just a particular audi-
ence such as financial experts. As I will discuss further below, 
there is no attempt to define efficiency in this report except for 
linking it with the attainment of savings. 
The argumentation also departs from presumptions regard-
ing the ability of ministries to identify appropriate incentives for 
managers to achieve efficiency and to set clear indicators re-
garding tasks and results. In describing their vision of a mana-
gement model for the future, the workgroup states that “Bin-
nen de afgesproken randvoorwaarden mogen diensten meer 
zelfstandig beslissingen nemen over de inzet van de middelen 
en de weg bepalen waarlangs de taken het meest doelmatig ver-
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vuld kunnen worden” (Ministerie van Financiën, 1991:19). 
[Within the agreed conditions, units are able to make more in-
dependent decisions about the use of resources and the way in 
which tasks can be completed most efficiently.] They explain 
that ministries should set clearly stated expectations or results 
ad hoc, and that incentives should be built into the financial and 
personnel management regime (Ministerie van Financiën, 
1991:20-21). They write “Onder meer door prikkels in te bou-
wen in het financiële en personele beheersregime kan worden 
bevorderd dat verantwoordelijke managers in mindere mate zul-
len streven naar vergroting van het apparaat en maximale uit-
putting van het budget” (Ministerie van Financiën, 1991:20). 
[Among other things building incentives into the financial and 
personnel management regime, the responsibility of managers 
can be promoted such that they will to a lesser extent seek to 
increase their apparatus budget and exhaust their budget maxi-
mally.] It is presumed that ministries themselves are or will be 
familiar with the working circumstances of managers and will 
know the kind of results that can be expected from them and 
how to motivate managers to achieve these. Agency reform and 
the associated changes to the financial regulations come to ap-
pear a legitimate proposal for achieving efficiency since it is 
presumed that ministries will know both how to inspire this and 
also identify the results to achieve it.  
 
5.6.1.3 Techniques of argumentation 
Quasi-logical argumentation is adopted to make the introduc-
tion of agency reform and the other financial changes being 
proposed in the report appear acceptable, even desirable. This 
occurs by using argumentative techniques that divide the whole 
into its parts, and through comparison and definition.  
The use of a division of the whole into its parts becomes 
most evident in the second chapter of the report wherein the 
five main financial problems of managers are identified, along-
side budgetary legislation and the broader macro principles of 
government. Any solution to the micro problems that managers 
experience is presented as requiring adherence to the principles 
of ministerial accountability, parliamentary authorization for 
budget decisions, and macro goals regarding budgetary control. 
This idea of adjusting some financial arrangements without in-
terfering with the system as a whole is presented in the follow-
ing ways: 
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De vraag is nu of, gelet op de naar voren gebrachte knelpunten op micro-
niveau, aanpassing van de  beheersregels op macro-niveau mogelijk en wen-
selijk is in het licht van de visie op het financiële management en afgezet te-
gen de overige macro-doelstellingen. Gezocht dient te worden naar oplos-
singen die tegemoet komen aan gerechtvaardigde verlangens van de beleids-
directies, zonder dat de macrodoelstellingen en uitgangspunten onevenredig 
worden aangetast (Ministerie van Financiën, 1991:34). 
 
[The question is now whether, given the highlighted problems at micro level, 
adjustments of the management rules at the macro level are possible and de-
sirable in light of the vision of financial management and in contrast to the 
other macro goals. Solutions need to be found that satisfy the justified de-
sires of the policy directorates, without the macro goals and principles being 
unproportionally damaged.] 
 
In this quasi-logical argumentative process, differentiation of fi-
nancial regulations, such as changes to the running costs or the 
introduction of accruals, appear to be acceptable solutions be-
cause they do not interfere with the macro principles identified. 
Throughout the presentation of the workgroup's recommenda-
tions in later chapters of the report, the speaker continually 
points to the possibility of maintaining macro principles despite 
financial adjustments to the micro level. With regard to agency 
reform the reader is advised: 
 
Het agentschap is bedoeld voor onderdelen van het rijk waarbij een doelma-
tiger bedrijfsvoering bereikt kan worden via een speciaal beheersregime, 
zonder dat de macro-doelstellingen van normering, allocatie en beheersing in 
gevaar komen (Ministerie van Financiën, 1991:73). 
 
[The agency is meant for units of central government where a more efficient 
business operation can be reached via a special management regime, without 
macro goals or standards, putting allocation and control into danger.] 
 
The proposals of the workgroup appear reasonable because of 
their presentation in an argumentative style that reflects a 
mathematical reduction. 
This use of the division of the whole into its parts to per-
suade the audience of the desirability of agency reform also has 
implications for the connotations attached to internal and ex-
ternal autonomization in the report. Agency reform is labelled 
internal autonomization and thereby is attributed membership 
to organizations that comply with the main principles of central 
government. Alternatively, the label external autonomization 
acts to distinguish ZBOs from this membership, and thereby 
lessen their desirability in this argumentation. This appeal to 
logic in the text is pursued even though there are some excep-
tions to the conformity of agencies to macro principles. In par-
ticular, the recommendation that some agencies use an accrual 
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accounting system is inconsistent with references in the report 
to the budgetary principle of uniformity in government ac-
counts. The speaker deals with this exception by requiring ad-
justments to accounting legislation so agencies will still conform 
to the headlines or macro arrangements of the system. 
The quasi-logical technique of definition is also used in the 
argumentation. This occurs prior to the discussion of possible 
recommendations for improved management and involves pre-
senting a vision of public management in the future. A new 
(note the qualitative loci) management model is foreseen and 
five features of this model are identified. They include: more 
complete management (of results and resources), central steer-
ing on the headlines (not on the details), agreements about 
products and budget limits, systematic accountability through 
periodic reporting, and periodic examination of (the necessity 
of) public tasks (Ministerie van Financiën, 1991:22-23). This 
definition acts, by its very presence, to strengthen the credibility 
of the argumentation by making it more formal. It also func-
tions to limit the elements that need to be discussed if one is to 
argue for improvements in public management. This is because 
the vision itself has defined what needs to be done in order to 
satisfy results management. The definition operates to make the 
conclusions of the workgroup appear more logical since they 
correlate with many of the items that have already been defined 
in the document as constituting good management. In the pres-
entation of proposals for agency reform, for example most of 
the features are already identified as defining a vision of man-
agement for the future are present.  
Complementing the quasi-logical features of the 
argumentation, there is also at least one appeal to 
argumentation that relies upon the structure of reality. This 
occurs through reference to earlier successful financial reforms, 
which are presented as precursors to the workgroup's 
recommendations. An appeal is made to the audience's 
reasonable belief since the recommendations are presented as 
part of a sequential movement in a particular direction that is 
always getting better, as is reflected in the title of the document 
Verder Bouwen Aan Beheer [Further building on management]. 
The argument of unlimited development can be illustrated by 
the following quotation that explicitly establishes inter-
dependence with the workgroup's proposals and earlier 
operations to improve government accounting, and the idea 
that there is continuous improvement: 
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Het beheer bij de rijksoverheid is volop in ontwikkeling. Op de fundamen-
ten die sinds 1985 met de operatie comptabel bestel zijn gelegd, wordt in dit 
rapport verder gebouwd (Ministerie van Financiën, 1991:I) 
 
[The management of central government is steadily developing. This report 
builds further upon the foundations laid in 1985 with the operation account-
ing system.] 
 
There are numerous references to Operatie Comptabel Bestel [op-
eration accounting system] throughout the document, as well as 
to the project zelfbeheer [zelf management], which involved dele-
gating more financial functions to line managers.  By presenting 
these past activities as a (factual) success, and presenting initia-
tives (the next stage) that refine further the financial system, 
agency reform comes to appear as a reasonable, even inescap-
able, progression in financial management. 
Finally, argumentative techniques to structure reality can 
also be identified in the document. This includes both argumen-
tation by example and by metaphor. In describing their vision 
for desirable management, the workgroup point to initiatives 
taken in other countries including the UK, Sweden, Australia, 
Denmark, Canada and New Zealand. These examples act to 
demonstrate to the audience that the proposals to adjust the fi-
nancial system are sensible, even modern initiatives, especially 
since they are all presented as good initiatives. Regarding the in-
ternational examples identified, the report states:  
 
Een algemene lijn die in verschillende landen kan worden onderkend is dat 
de resultaten meer centraal komen te staan in het begrotingsproces, en dat 
budgethouders tijdens de uitvoering een grotere vrijheid hebben in de beste-
ding van de apparaatsbudgetten. Zo is er in het buitenland sprake van een 
(tussentijdse) verantwoordingsplicht, periodieke doorlichting en het behoud 
van (bespaarde) middelen, als ook vaak een soepeler eindejaarsregime (Mi-
nisterie van Financiën, 1991:31). 
 
[A general line that can be recognized in different countries is that results 
have become to be more central to the budget process, and that budget 
holders have a greater freedom to distribute their material budget during im-
plementation. Internationally there is talk of accountability requirements, pe-
riodic reporting and the ability to keep saved funds, as well as a more supple 
end of year regime.] 
 
This observation also communicates to the audience that the 
reforms being proposed by the workgroup are of a similar type 
to other international developments and to support the rule 
that as elsewhere, they will also be successful. This makes refer-
ence to an international community of agency reformers. 
With regard to the metaphors adopted throughout the ar-
gumentation, one notes the use of the terms flexibility, supple 
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and spaciousness to describe the proposals of the workgroup. 
Agencies are described as organizations with a greater eindjaar-
flexibiliteit [end of year flexibility] (Ministerie van Financiën, 
1991:74, 71,72) or as being able to in an “passend wijze flexibel 
in te spelen op de eisen die gesteld worden” [in a suitable way 
play (another metaphor) flexibly to meet the demands that are 
set] (Ministerie van Financiën,1991:75). Similarly, they are also 
described as being soepeler [more supple] (Ministerie van Finan-
ciën, 1991:72) and as having ruimere bevoegdheden [more spacious 
authority] (Ministerie van Financiën, 1991:71]. The financial 
character of agency reform is made more tangible to the audi-
ence by giving it these physical forms. Other metaphors used 
throughout the text include the term freedom. While describing 
the proposals of the workgroup and their vision of a manage-
ment model for the future, frequent reference is made to the 
creation of freedom for government organizations or their 
managers. It is stated for example that: 
 
Doelmatig beheer bij bepaalde overheidsonderdelen kan gediend zijn met 
vrijheden…(Ministerie van Financiën, 1991:14). 
 
[Efficient management in certain government organizations can be served 
with freedoms] 
 
Similarly the following citation was noted: 
 
Bovendien de vrijheden die een agentschap krijgt, materieel van invloed zijn 
op de wijze van goedkeuring van de uitgaven en ontvangsten door de Staten-
Generaal (Ministerie van Financiën, 1991:74). 
 
[Moreover all the freedom that an agency receives, will have a material influ-
ence upon the way that parliament approves expenditure and receipts.] 
 
In such statements the audience is being brought to understand 
the changes to financial regulations in terms of the political or 
philosophical ideals of freedom. Instead of stating that new 
regulations have been created or old ones adjusted, it is written 
that freedom has been granted or created. The positive baggage 
associated with these ideals is being used to promote a positive 
impression of the proposals of the workgroup.  The term verzelf-
standigen [autonomization] itself also includes reference to 
autonomy but then in the passive form. It suggests a more me-
chanical idea of autonomy as controlled phenomenon. Refer-
ences to the term verzelfstandigen in the report occur primarily in 
sections of the report discussing different types of autonomiza-
tion, and more specifically making the comparisons between 
ZBOs and agencies (Ministerie van Financiën, 1991:68-70).  
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Finally it can also be argued that the terms efficient and doel-
matig [efficient or effective] are used in metaphorical ways 
throughout the text. Along with the term results, references to 
doelmatigheid or efficiency are among the most cited words in the 
text and primary to the argumentation. They are used to either 
describe the reforms of the workgroup or justify the introduc-
tion of these reforms, but they are never defined. To this extent 
efficiency in the document can be described as a dormant 
metaphor, which has lost its origin in input-output calculations 
and become an obvious feature of agencies. Typical statements 
include: 
 
Het agentschap is bedoeld voor onderdelen van het rijk waarbij een doelma-
tiger bedrijfsvoering bereikt kan worden…. (Ministerie van Financiën, 
1991:72). 
 
[The agency is intended for sections of the government where more efficient 
business operations can be reached…] 
 
Another example is as follows: 
 
Er zijn oplossingsrichtingen voor bestaande knelpunten geformuleerd, om 
een doelmatiger financieel beheer tot stand te brengen…(Ministerie van Fi-
nanciën, 1991:87) 
 
[There are solutions for the existing bottlenecks identified in order that more 
efficient financial management can be brought about….] 
 
5.6.2 Document two - Verantwoord verzelfstandigen [Accountable au-
tonomization] 
Verantwoord verzelfstandigen is a report by the Commission Sint 
that was established to investigate and clarify the principles that 
should guide the choices for autonomization. It was published 
in 1994 at the request of the secretaries general (Heads of the 
Ministries) who had commissioned the report as part of their 
focus upon improving the implementation of policy and creat-
ing core Ministries. The report is 38 pages long and defines dif-
ferent types of autonomization, among them agency reform, 
that can be used to separate policy from operations. It seeks to 
identify a systematic and consequent approach that can be used 
across ministries for deciding upon the appropriate form of 
autonomization. Although it briefly mentions privatization and 
contracting out, its focus is primarily upon internal (agencies) 
and external autonomization (ZBOs). It considers the conse-
quences of internal and external autonomization for ministerial 
accountability and identifies the kinds of steering instruments 
available to ministries for controlling these organizations.  
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The report consists of six chapters including an introduction 
(chapter 1) and a list of recommendations for the future policy 
of autonomization (chapter 6). In the second chapter of the re-
port the motivations for autonomization are identified and it is 
observed that autonomization, and particularly external 
autonomization (ZBOs), has been used for inappropriate or 
misconstrued reasons such as escaping government cutbacks. 
This is followed by a list of features that can promote a good 
separation of policy and implementation, and that is consistent 
with political principles. The report then describes the different 
forms of autonomization, their implications for ministerial ac-
countability and the kinds of steering instruments available to 
ministries (chapter 3). Some of the false presumptions about 
autonomization are identified and systematic think steps for how 
to choose a form of autonomization are then presented (chap-
ter 4). A list of features that are important in establishing a 
good steering relationship between the core department and 
autonomized organization is also described (chapter 5), before 
presenting the final recommendations of the report (chapter 6). 
A central observation of the report is that the same sorts of 
steering instruments can be used in the cases of internal and ex-
ternal autonomization (ZBOs), however unlike internal 
autonomization (agencies) external autonomization (ZBOs) is 
described as requiring a transfer of ministerial authority to the 
autonomized organization. The report concludes with 11 rec-
ommendations, many of which are directed at perceived prob-
lems with external autonomization (ZBOs). There are also rec-
ommendations that apply to autonomization as a whole includ-
ing internal autonomization (agencies). In particular, it is con-
cluded that all proposals for autonomization should be thought 
out according to the think steps identified in the report. This 
will enable the various forms of autonomization to be pursued 
in a more consistent way. Another recommendation is that in-
ternal autonomization (agencies) be considered the equal of ex-
ternal autonomization (ZBOs) in attaining better functioning 
central government, but superior in ensuring accountability. It 
identifies only limited situations where external autonomization 
(ZBOs) is appropriate. 
5.6.2.1 Ethos and the construction of the audience 
The self-presentation of the speaker is one of a conservator of 
political principles and orderliness within the organization of 
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government. This is reflected in a plea for the primacy of politics, 
the emphasis upon protecting the principle of ministerial ac-
countability and the use of definitional categories to separate 
out different organizational types in government. From the out-
set of the report, the speaker pursues a sober and rational per-
spective on government reform by distancing herself from 
management fashion and hype. It is stated: 
 
Het thema verzelfstandigen krijgt soms trekken van een modetrend. Dat wil 
niet zeggen dat verzelfstandigen geen goede tendens zou kunnen zijn, maar 
wel dat verzelfstandiging en in het bijzonder externe verzelfstandiging te 
vaak als panacee voor allerlei problem wordt gezien (Commissie Sint, 
1994:6) 
 
[The theme autonomization sometimes becomes like a fashion. This is not 
to say that autonomization could not be a good development but that it, and 
particularly external autonomization, is too often seen as a panacea for all 
kinds of problems.] 
 
Instead, the trust of the audience is obtained by emphasizing a 
careful, principled approach to autonomization in which the 
purposes of the reform, and the formal roles and limits of pos-
sible organizational types appear to be precisely defined. This is 
reflected in the use of definitions throughout the report and the 
attempt to map out different types of autonomization, their fea-
tures and the consequences for the relationship between minis-
ter and parliament (Commissie Sint, 1994: 21).  
In discussing the matter of autonomization, and with it 
agency reform, the speaker also makes an appeal to the broader 
implications of such reforms for government and society more 
generally. The presentation of a formal scheme separating out 
organizational types, roles and functions follows from an ex-
pression of concern for the well being of society and democ-
racy. It is stated: 
 
Inhoudelijk en principele vragen over het primaat van de politiek, de positie 
van de overheid in (of soms tegenover) de samenleving en de democratische 
legitimiteit komen bij concrete verzelfstandigings discussies vaak niet of on-
voldoende systematisch aan de orde (Commissie Sint, 1991:6).  
 
[Substantive and principled questions about the primacy of politics, the posi-
tion of the government in (or sometimes versus) society and the democratic 
legitimacy, are often not, or insufficiently systematic consideration, given at-
tention in concrete discussions about autonomization.] 
 
To this extent the attention for different organizational forms 
of autonomization is made to appear central to addressing more 
universal problems and issues such as the primacy of politics. 
This can be interpreted as an appeal to the universal audience 
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with reference to the primacy of politics providing a unifying label 
under which the commission could present its findings. It is 
also consistent with the views of the ruling government at the 
time the report was presented (see section 5.5.2). The focus that 
the speaker lends to ministerial accountability is also part of 
demonstrating the universal interest in discussing autonomiza-
tion since protecting this convention is presented as part of 
pursuing, as the title states, accountable autonomization.14 Indeed, 
given the absence of other ideas about accountability or the po-
litical sphere, ministerial accountability is presented as the ulti-
mate means to ensuring the attainment of the primacy of poli-
tics.  
Other ways in which autonomization is given broader appeal 
is through references to the matter of collective interests and 
the appropriate role of government in society. These are made 
together with the presence for autonomization thinksteps. Ref-
erences to the relationship between politics and society and the 
association of clear distinctions in forms of autonomization 
with the attainment of accountability, and particularly ministe-
rial accountability, can be interpreted as constructing the uni-
versal audience in the argumentation. This is because the pres-
ence of these issues in the argumentation is part of giving wider 
appeal to the focus upon different types of autonomization. 
The speaker is demonstrating that autonomization is not to be 
simply interpreted as relating to particular organizational types 
or financial constructions, but it has important political conse-
quences and even consequences for society more generally. 
For the most part of the argumentation, however, the 
speaker adopts far narrower technocratic or legal categories to 
discuss issues surrounding agency reform. This is reflected, not 
least, in the use of the term/s (internal or external) autonomiza-
tion itself, which is never once throughout the document re-
placed by their household names, ZBOs [quangos] or 
agentschappen [agencies]. There is also a wealth of references 
to organisatieeenheid or organisatieonderdelen [organizational units] or 
taakstellingen, [tasks], the bestuurlijke bevoegdheden [(type of) admin-
istrative authority], the beleidskern [policy core], bestuurlijke inricht-
ing [administrative design]; beheersmatig en beleidsmatig relaties [ma-
nagement and policy relationships] the presence of ondergeschik-
                                                 
14 Note the term verantwoord can also be translated as responsible or sensi-
ble. 
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theid, an hierarchical relationship, or not, with the minister and 
the sturingsrelaties [steering relationships]. References in the ar-
gumentation to earlier reports and debates on government or-
ganization such as De organisatie en werkwijze van de rijksdienst [The 
organization and work practices of central administration] 
(Commissie Sint, 1994:5) also point the audience to the organiza-
tional genre of the knowledge being produced in the report. In 
addition, legal definitions and relationships are also prominent, 
particularly in the discussion of ministerial accountability, 
whose content, as we shall see, is measured in the report by the 
presence or not of administrative legal authority. These organ-
izational and legal aspects of the argumentation construct a par-
ticular audience concerned with Home or Internal Affairs. 
There are also points in the argumentation, primarily during 
the discussion of steering (Commissie Sint, 1994:16, 9) when 
special attention is being given to financial categories and ideas. 
As with the previous report, in these sections of the argumenta-
tion technical accounting concepts are used and there is even 
mention of products rather than tasks, performance rather than 
correct use of authority. This would suggest the speaker has 
also given some consideration for another particular audience, 
such as the Ministry/Minister of Finance, concerned with fi-
nancial expertise.   
Finally, there are other attempts to give the above particular 
concerns of the argumentation universal credibility by noting 
that the speaker's recommendations have been based upon 
examinations of four actual cases of autonomization. This is 
part of the scientific justification of the findings, which was 
consistently observed in Dutch argumentation. At the same 
time, however, it is also explained that  "De commissie heeft er 
bewust van afgezien om de vier praktijksituaties in dit rapport 
te bespreken" (Commissie Sint, 1994:5). [The commission has 
consciously decided not to discuss the four actual cases in this 
report.] In terms of the descriptions of the Dutch 
administrative context, statements assuring the audience that 
the investigation has involved consultation with the 
autonomized organizations, or rather, gesprekspartners [speaking 
partners] (Commissie Sint, 1994:5) can be interpreted as a 
specific reference to the Dutch universal audience.  
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5.6.2.2 Premises of argumentation 
The argumentation in the document begins with the implicit 
agreement that clear formal categories, in this case about 
autonomization, can prevent disorder in practice. This idea can 
be considered a truth in the argumentation, rather than a fact, 
because of its general nature and its possible application to 
many themes not just autonomization. The truth that formal 
order will assist in both the decision to and application of 
autonomization is evident from the preoccupation in the 
document with a systematic approach, defining the different 
features of types of autonomization, and recommendations for 
think steps to guide future decisions about autonomization. In 
the introduction to the document the speaker announces that 
clearing up the accountability issues of autonomization requires 
a systematic approach and that this in turn represents a well 
thought out approach (Commissie Sint, 1994:5, 6). Other indi-
cations of the agreement that order in principles will, of them-
selves, promote order in practice is evident from a table in the 
document defining types of autonomization and the various 
features associated with each type (Commissie Sint, 1994:24). 
All of these schemes are presented without any discussion of 
autonomization in practice or the possibility that such schemes 
are sometimes difficult to apply. The lack of attention to these 
kinds of application problems would suggest that there has 
been agreement that it is getting the principles right that will 
make autonomization a well thought out reform. 
Among the facts that underlie the argumentation is the 
agreement that external autonomization, or rather ZBOs, are 
problematic and have been created for improper reasons. 
Although there is no detailed reference to the experience of 
ZBOs, their appearance in the report is generally accompanied 
by cause for concern. The fact that ZBOs have been created for 
invalid reasons is also reflected in the description of 
assumptions about autonomization in the report (Commissie 
Sint, 1994:10-11), which makes special reference to ZBOs, and 
the recommendations of the report which are primarily 
focussed upon either improving ZBOs or avoiding them. The 
facts about the poor character of ZBOs as a starting point for 
argumentation is conducive to demonstrating the appeal of 
alternatives such as internal autonomization. 
There are also a number of presumptions underlying the ar-
gumentation in the document and these are most evident in the 
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discussions of ministerial accountability. As noted above an im-
portant conclusion of the commission is that internal and ex-
ternal autonomization can be distinguished by their impact 
upon ministerial accountability. Agencies are presented as a 
safer and more transparent option since ministers are unim-
peded by legislation to intervene in operations and can thereby 
be held accountable for achieving goals and tasks (Commissie 
Sint, 1994:6-7). ZBOs, by contrast, are described as requiring 
legislation and therein the transfer of ministerial authority for 
administrative activities. Ministerial accountability becomes 
then limited since such legislation can prevent ministerial inter-
vention in operational details. These statements about differ-
ences in ministerial accountability presume that it is not possi-
ble to make provisions for ministerial intervention within legis-
lation for ZBOs. They also presume that their capacity to inter-
vene in the case of agencies will be for the correct purposes of 
accountability and not for other political goals. The possibility 
that unimpeded intervention could get in the way of transpar-
ency is absent from the argumentation. The speaker leads the 
reader to believe that if there is complete ministerial account-
ability, such as in the case of agencies, then the minister will 
(always) be able to control for agency activities and ensure goals 
and tasks are met. This presumes a very direct role and influ-
ence of the minister on agency activities and there is no men-
tion of the ability that other actors could play a role in protect-
ing or indeed challeging the primacy of politics. 
Clearly the priority of ministerial accountability is central 
among the values about autonomization being presented in the 
argumentation. The title of the document Accountable autonomiza-
tion gives an indication of this priority. Already in the introduc-
tion of the document it is stated that autonomization can 
 
bijdragen tot een beter functionerende overheid op voorwaarde dat de poli-
tiek-beleidsmatige controle goed vorm krijgt en de verantwoordelijk-
heidstoedeling goed is doordacht en geregeld (Commissie Sint, 1994:5). 
 
[contribute to a better functioning government on the condition that the po-
litical-policy controls are given proper form and that the accountability divi-
sions are well thought out and organized.] 
 
Accountability, and more specifically ministerial accountability, 
is presented as a precondition for pursuing autonomization re-
forms and as an expression of the primacy of politics over admini-
stration more generally. Its unquestionable value in the argu-
mentation is reflected in the absence of any detailed discussion 
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of its content, except for broad references to the ability of min-
isters to intervene. Furthermore, the supreme position that is 
granted to ministerial accountability throughout the argumenta-
tion is evident in its role in distinguishing, and making more at-
tractive internal autonomization (agencies) as opposed to exter-
nal autonomization (ZBOs).  
The value of complete ministerial accountability, and with it 
internal autonomization, is also presented as if it can be 
achieved without any trade offs for the other values that appear 
in the text. Transparency, efficiency, effectiveness and the pur-
suit of core departments are all presented as being compatible 
with a situation in which the accountability relations are clearly 
defined. Indeed, it is suggested that to achieve one of these 
goals, the other values also have to be present. It is stated at the 
beginning of the report: 
 
De organisatorische scheiding van beleidstaken en uitvoeringstaken en ver-
zelfstandiging van taken kunnen bijdragen tot de doorzichtigheid en doelma-
tigheid van de overheidsorganisatie. 
Maar dan moet bij de verdling van verantwoordelijkheden en bij de inrich-
ting van de sturing wel op basis van een systematische benadering worden 
geopereerd. Zonder dat zou de doorzichtigheid en de doelmatigheid juist 
minder kunnen worden (Commissie Sint, 1994:6).  
 
[The organizational division of policy tasks and implementation tasks and 
the autonomization of tasks can contribute to the transparency and effi-
ciency of government organizations. But this requires that the separation of 
accountabilities and design of steering are based upon a systematic approach. 
Without this transparency and efficiency could be reduced.] 
 
To this extent, agreement about a hierarchy of values would 
seem to have been avoided and instead compatibility between 
the different objectives is emphasized.  
The loci adopted in the argumentation reflect implicit 
agreements with the audience regarding quantitative benefits. 
Internal autonomization, or agency reform, is presented as a 
good thing by describing it as a “meer verdergaande vorm van 
intern verzelfstandigen” (Commissie Sint, 1994:9), [a more fur-
ther going form of internal autonomization] which offers for 
example 'meer beslis ruimte' [more decision space]. This is in 
contrast to the appearance of ZBOs which are described with-
out adjectives and as simply external autonomization. Another 
example of quantitative loci throughout the argumentation oc-
curs with regard to descriptions of ministerial accountability. 
Agency reform is described as embracing complete ministerial ac-
countability while ZBOs are presented as having only limited (or 
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even less attractive incomplete) ministerial accountability 
(Commissie Sint, 1994:24). References to quantitative categories 
in combination with the value of ministerial accountability 
promote the goodness of internal autonomization in the argu-
mentation, as well as help to raise doubt about the credibility of 
external autonomization. Other quantitative figures used to de-
scribe accountability include more general references to the 
“normale volledige systeem van ministeriële verantwoorde-
lijkheid” [normal complete system of ministerial accountability] 
and to the possibility of getting the desired measure of account-
ability or of dividing accountability (Commissie Sint, 
1994:6,12,21,29). As we shall see these descriptions correspond 
with the quasi-logical techniques adopted in the argumentation 
and with the attempt to set out a systematic approach to 
autonomization. Aside from the quantitative references to 
autonomization and accountability, quantitative loci are also 
used in the discussion of steering agencies. References are made 
to more steering throughout the argumentation and the volledige 
[complete] steering of agencies (Commissie Sint, 1994:8,14). 
Again, these references act to promote the desirability of agency 
reform as a better and more complete organizational type than 
ZBOs. 
 
5.6.2.3 Techniques of argumentation 
The techniques adopted throughout the argumentation in 
Verantwoord Verzelfstandigen are primarily of a quasi-logical na-
ture. Techniques of definition, comparison and the division of 
the whole into its parts can all be identified in the document.  
Definition plays an important role in the process of argu-
mentation since it enables the speaker to set out the main char-
acteristics of objects under discussion, and in that process put 
forward elements that are functional to the conclusions being 
pursued. Three main instruments "for putting organizational 
units at a distance" are identified in the body of the report in-
cluding privatization, external autonomization and internal 
autonomization (Commissie Sint, 1994:7). Privatization is de-
fined as a situation in which the position of the organization is 
dependent upon its competitiveness on the market (Commissie 
Sint, 1994:7). External autonomization has a legally defined 
administrative task and obtains its authority from the law. In-
ternal autonomization is defined as "de organisatie/instelling is 
ondergeschikt aan de minister, die rechtstreeks de positie van 
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de verzelfstandigde eenheid bepaalt” (Commissie Sint, 1994:7). 
[The organization is subordinate to the minister, who directly 
defines the position of the autonomized organization]. These 
definitions act to enhance the preference for internal autonomi-
zation since the criteria of ministerial accountability is such a 
central value promoted throughout the text. Internal autonomi-
zation is shown to be a preferable choice because, by definition, 
it presents no challenges to ministerial accountability. In order 
to verify that external autonomization (ZBOs) is not consistent 
with ministerial accountability it is noted that, depending upon 
the legal arrangements of the organization, a minister cannot in-
terfere with the operations of a ZBO (Commissie Sint, 1994:7). 
This is one of the few references in the text to the content of 
ministerial accountability and would suggest that it is consti-
tuted in this text as the ability of political actors to interfere un-
impeded into the details of management activities.  
In combination with the definitions presented in the argu-
mentation, comparison is also an important technique adopted 
throughout the argumentation. Comparison between external 
(ZBOs) and internal (agencies) autonomization constitutes a 
large part of the argumentation. It is used to demonstrate that 
internal autonomization (agencies) is equal with external 
autonomization (ZBOs) in terms of the capacity to steer these 
organizations, but surpasses external autonomization in terms 
of the implications for ministerial accountability. A kind of 
yardstick is created to give more credibility to the claim that in-
ternal autonomization is preferable to external autonomization. 
The definitions of each type of autonomization in the docu-
ment provide important points of comparison. While internal 
autonomization is said to maintain a hierarchical relationship 
with the minister, external autonomization does not (Commis-
sie Sint, 1994:7). While internal autonomization is described as 
keeping organizations within the ministerial sphere (Commissie 
Sint, 1994:8), external autonomization does not, and while in-
ternal autonomization is said to maintain the convention of 
ministerial accountability in its complete form, external 
autonomization does not (Commissie Sint, 1994:8). In addition, 
these types of autonomization are also compared on their abil-
ity to enable the creation of core ministries, separate implemen-
tation from policy making, and on their capacity to steer. In all 
these matters the speaker concluded that internal and external 
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autonomization were equal. Some examples of the way these 
comparisons appeared in the argumentation included: 
 
Sturing op hoofdlijnen is ook bij interne verzelfstandiging het uitgangspunt. 
Echter, anders dan bij externe verzelfstandiging kan bij interne verzelfstan-
diging wel worden ingegrepen in afzonderlijk gevallen (Commissie Sint, 
1994:8). 
 
[Steering on head lines is, in the case of internal autonomization, the starting 
point as well. In contrast to external autonomization however with internal 
autonomization it is possible to interven in special cases.] 
 
Intern verzelfstandigen en extern verzelfstandigen (niet zijnde privatisering) 
kunnen naar het oordel van de commissie als gelijkwaardig worden be-
schouwd als het gaat om hun mogelijke betekenis voor het beter functione-
ren van de rijksdienst (Commissie Sint, 1994:22). 
 
[Internal autonomization and external autonomization (excluding privatiza-
tion) can according to the opinion of the commission be considered equal 
with regard to their potential for the better functioning of central govern-
ment.] 
 
Since the commission makes a plea for the value of complete 
ministerial accountability more generally, internal autonomiza-
tion is in principle revealed to be the preferred type of autono-
mization, except in certain circumstances (Commissie Sint, 
1994:21).  
A third quasi-logical technique that is used to promote a 
choice for internal autonomization is the division of the whole 
into its parts. This technique is implicit to the think steps identi-
fied for making decisions about autonomization. Once again, 
the presentation of these think steps operated to demonstrate 
the incompatibility of ZBOs, and compatibility of agency re-
form, with a accountable and responsible policy of autonomiza-
tion. The think steps are presented in the document as an in-
strument for distinguishing between the nature of existing gov-
ernment tasks and the appropriate form of autonomization that 
they should take. The whole of the problem of autonomization 
is divided into three procedural questions which in the final in-
stance lead to the question: "Indien er sprake is van een taak 
voor de centrale overheid, is de vraag aan de orde naar de op-
timale bestuurlijk-organisatorische vormgeving" [If there is a 
task for central government, then the question regarding the 
optimal administrative form should be posed] (Commissie Sint, 
1994:11). In effect, the think steps result in dividing the prob-
lem of autonomization into two possibilities: the transference 
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or not of ministerial authority.15 Where there are acute reasons 
for transferring ministerial authority, the choice of external 
autonomization with a public law character is appropriate and 
when such reasons do not exist the desirability of putting tasks 
at a distance from the policy core, such as through agencies, 
should be considered (Commissie Sint, 1994:11). By dividing 
the problem of autonomization in this way, the speaker is given 
the opportunity to demonstrate the weaknesses of choosing 
ZBOs (transferring ministerial authority) and thereby show 
agency reform to be, in general, the most preferable type of 
autonomization.  
Aside from quasi-logical techniques, argumentative tech-
niques such as metaphor acted to structure the reality being 
presented in the document. Most of the metaphors used in the 
document give viability to a systematic and principled approach 
to autonomization. Among the metaphors that associate physi-
cal properties with ideas about agency reform and also promote 
the idea of a controlled approach, are the terms doorzichtigheid 
[transparency] and transparent. The report states that: 
 
De organisatorische scheiding van beleidstaken en uitvoeringstaken en ver-
zelfstandiging van taken kunnen bijdragen tot de doorzichtigheid.(Commissie 
Sint, 1994:6, my emphasis).  
 
[The organizational separation of policy tasks and implementation tasks and 
autonomization of tasks can contribute to the transparency.] 
 
Government organizations and their actions are made to appear 
controllable by conceiving of them as something that can be 
seen through like glass. This gave greater legitimacy to the vari-
ous categories being espoused in the report and their applicabil-
ity. 
In addition, the term greep or in English grip is used through-
out the argumentation to create an image about ministerial con-
trol over autonomization. This makes it possible for the audi-
ence to conceive of the implementation of policy as something 
that can be touched or held, as long as it is carried out in the 
appropriate organizational form. Ministers are said to have no 
direct grip on ZBOs, while they can ingrijpen, take a grip into, 
                                                 
15 The possibility of privatization (state company) is also identified as an ap-
propriate arrangement when it is decided that there is a collective interest in 
the task, but that the government should not do it itself. This possibility is 
not discussed further in the document however since "the discussions are 
concentrated on the other forms of autonomization" e.g..zbos and agencies.  
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the activities of agencies. Examples of the use of grip in the re-
port, in both cases of autonomization, are as follows: 
 
De extern verzelfstandigde organisatie kan - binnen de ruimte die de instel-
lingswet biedt - relaties aangaan met ander partijen (andere overheden, ver-
schillende departementen en particuliere partijen) zonder dat de minister (en 
het departement) daar directe greep op heeft (Commissie Sint, 1994:8 my emp-
hasis). 
 
[The externally autonomous organizations can – within the requirements 
that the initiating legislation provide the opportunity to  – undertake rela-
tionships with other parties (other levels of government, different depart-
ments and particular private actors) without the minister (and the depart-
ment) having a direct grip upon this.] 
 
Echter, anders dan bij externe verzelfstandiging kan bij interne verzelfstan-
digen wel worden ingegrepen in afzonderlijk gevallen…..In uiterste gevallen 
kan de minister dus direct ingripen (Commissie Sint, 1994:8) 
 
[In contrast to external autonomization, with internal autonomization inter-
vention (literally taking grip of) can occur in special cases…in exceptional cases 
ministers can thus directly intervene.] 
 
Alongside the comparisons between ZBOs and agencies, hav-
ing no grip and grip, were in the case of agencies, spatial refer-
ences to describe the relationship with the minister. They are 
ondergeschikt [the term onder is literally under, in English subor-
dinate] to the minister or the minister is bovengeschikt [the 
term boven literally above, in English superior to them] (Com-
missie Sint, 1994:7, 8).   
An image of control is also promoted throughout the report 
with the use of the term steering. Along with accountability, this 
is one of the most cited terms in the text and appears in three 
of the headings used in the document. The sturingsrelaties [steer-
ing relationship], sturingsinstrumenten [steering instruments], een-
duidige aansturing [the ability to steer unequivocally/without am-
biguity], beheersmatige sturing [management steering], beleidsmatige 
sturing [policy steering] are all typical terms used throughout the 
report to describe relationships between departments or minis-
ters and autonomized organizations. It assumes that the imple-
mentation of policies can be controlled, separated and directed 
in a precise and organized way, like the steering of an automo-
bile or ship.  
The use of steering together with the term systematic in the 
argumentation creates a very mechanical or machine like view 
of the public sector in which its conclusions for clear think 
steps for example seem viable and possible. Finally, there is 
continual use of the term verzelfstandigen [autonomization] 
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throughout this report which brings together ideas of freedom, 
but then controlled freedom, and management reform. In con-
trast to the previous document there are few references to the 
term freedom itself and instead it is said that autonomization 
provides more space [ruimte] for management decisions.  
 
5.6.3 Document three - Verder met resultaat [Further with result] 
Verder met resultaat is the first government wide evaluation of the 
agency programme government wide. The execution of the 
evaluation was already announced as part of the original pack-
age to introduce agency reform in the early 1990s. It was con-
ducted by the Ministry of Finance itself who had been respon-
sible for both the initiation of the reform idea and for advising 
departments in procedures of agency creation. The report was 
published in April 1998 and is 70 pages long. Its central objec-
tive was to assess whether the main objects of agency reform 
such as increasing efficiency were achieved. The report investi-
gated both the implementation of agency reform, and whether 
this corresponded to the template following from Verder Bouwen 
Aan Beheer. It also evaluated the effects of agency reform. It 
sought to learn from the experiences of existing agencies and its 
findings were gathered from documents and interviews with 14 
agencies created prior to January 1997. 
The report consists of a summary, eight chapters and two in-
termezzos [interludes] between chapters 2 and 3, and, between 
chapters 5 and 6. At the outset of the report it is stated that the 
policy theory behind agency creation is to be reconstructed and 
tested, and the methods of research are identified (chapter 1). 
The motivations for agency reform are described and it is 
shown that agencies were not only created to overcome prob-
lems with financial regulations, but also because they could act 
as a catalyst for change and to separate policy from operations 
(chapter 2). In chapters 3 and 4 the implementation of agency 
reform is studied by analyzing its correspondence to the fea-
tures of results-orientated management (chapter 3), and the ap-
plication of the conditions for agency status in the 14 cases 
(chapter 4). This is followed by an analysis of the effects of 
agency reform and more specifically the attainment of greater 
efficiency (chapter 5). Chapter 6 focussed upon the possibility 
to refine the conditions for agency status. Chapter 7 then 
checks the implications that agency reform has had for the 
macro goals of the budget and chapter 8 presented the final 
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conclusions of the report. The intermezzos between the chap-
ters are used to focus upon the experience of the investigated 
organizations in an informative way. Issues relating to setting 
up the agency status are discussed such as informing personnel, 
creating an opening balance (first intermezzo), and the impact 
of agency reform on cultural change with its positive and nega-
tive side effects (second intermezzo) also described.  
It is found that agency reform has been implemented in ways 
consistent with results-orientation and that the conditions for 
agency status were also satisfied by most agencies. Agencies are 
found to have promoted efficiency through the creation of in-
centives. Nevertheless, it is recommended that the conditions 
for obtaining agency status be refined and that performance in-
dicators to measure efficiency be refined to: 
• The business processes of the organization should be 
described in one or more products and services, and 
with a cost price; 
•  The prospective agency should have identified how ef-
ficiency gains will be measured before attaining the 
status. The basic indicator is cost price and one or more 
quality indictators; and 
• There should be a results orientated external steering ar-
rangement that connects with the internal planning and 
control cycle. 
The report also noted that the term agency has been an im-
pediment to spreading the use of an accrual accounting system 
and recommends that this label not be mandatory for organiza-
tions wishing to adopt an accrual accounting system. 
5.6.3.1 Ethos and the construction of the audience 
In the first instance the presentation of the speaker is one of a 
scientist, since objectivity in the evaluation is claimed to have 
been achieved by applying scientific principles. It is explained 
that the policy theory of agencies is to be tested in the evaluation by 
applying a question list that has been designed in accordance 
with the principles of “volledigheid, juistheid, actualiteit en 
plausibiliteit” [completeness, correctness, relevance and plausi-
bility] (Ministerie van Financiën, 1998:12). In conceding the 
lack of a “voor/na of met/zonder metingen” (before and after 
measurements) for the evaluation, the speaker also sought to 
strate to the audience a familiarity with the requirements of 
controlled scientific experiments (Ministerie van Financiën, 
The Netherlands   131 
1998:12).  Despite incomplete accordance with scientific princi-
ples, the objectivity of the evaluation is still argued to be possi-
ble since caution has been taken to use logical reasoning, with 
careful consideration for intervening variables and factors (Ministerie 
van Financiën, 1998:13). Throughout the argumentation the 
scientific identity of the speaker is primarily maintained through 
the presentation of numerous tables specifying the numbers of 
agencies that have satisfied different features of agency reform, 
and the relaying of this numerical information in the text. There 
were, after the introduction, very few further explicit references 
to theory or to variables. The most important exception was in 
chapter five when it is explained that it is not possible to give 
scientific evidence of how big the efficiency gains from agency 
reform have been, nor to demonstrate a relationship of causal-
ity between agency reform and efficiency (Ministerie van Finan-
ciën, 1998:43). These references to a scientific approach, given 
that the document is an evaluation, can be interpreted as an ap-
peal to attain agreement from the universal audience. It can also 
be interpreted as universal since such ways of speaking to ob-
tain the credibility of the speaker with the audience were typical 
in all the Dutch agency accounts examined. Furthermore since 
the remainder of the document has a far greater business like or 
consultancy tone, the scientific features of the text seek to raise 
the arguments about efficiency and the business like activities to 
obtain broader universal agreement.  
For the most part of the text, however, the speaker adopted 
a fairly informal tone where the financial features of agencies, 
that once seemed so technical in Verder Bouwen Aan Beheer, are 
now reported in a user-friendly way. Financial terms are still 
prominent such as cash based accounting, end of year limit or loan fa-
cility but the audience is not weighed down, as in the earlier re-
port, with detailed technical descriptions. Instead, the financial 
categories are presented in short simplified ways such as in the 
following paragraph on the problems of the financial regula-
tions: 
 
De als meest knellend ervaren beheersregel betrof de eindejaarsgrens c.q het 
ontbreken van de mogelijkheid gelden te reserveren. Dit wordt elf keer ge-
noemd…..Opvallend was dat ook beheersregels werden genoemd die 
rijksbreed reeds waren afgeschaft. Gedacht moet worden aan de sturing op 
personeelsaantallen of het niet mogen schuiven tussen uitgaven voor 
peroneel en materieel (Ministerie van Financiën, 1998:14).  
 
[The management rule that was experienced as most pinching concerns the 
end of year limit i.e the lack of the possibility to reserve funds. This was 
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mentioned 11 times…It was interesting to note that also management rules 
that have already been dismantled across central government were men-
tioned. For example the steering of personnel numbers or lack of a possibil-
ity to shift between personnel and material budgets.] 
 
Such simplifications (of end of year limit and so on) functioned 
to allow the speaker to focus upon reporting the findings of the 
evaluation and, more specifically, the responses of informants.  
Aside from relaying numbers of agencies that have satisfied 
different features of the agency model the speaker also offers a 
commentary on what individuals in agencies and ministries have 
said. This takes the form of both direct citation or a summary 
of what one or more agencies have expressed. The audience is 
advised that one agent stated; "Sinds we het baten-lastenstelsel 
voeren ..hebben we nog nooit zo goed op de kas gelet" 
(Ministerie van Financiën, 1998:38) [Since we have the accrual 
accounting system…we have never been so aware of the 
money] or summaries of comments are made such as "Een 
aantal organisaties benadrukt" (Ministerie van Financiëen, 
1998:21) [A number of organizations emphasized], and,  
"Sommige agentschappen merk (terecht) op dat integrale-
managementverantwoordelijkheid ook grenzen kent (Ministerie 
van Financiëen, 1998:21). [Some agencies noted (correctly) that 
the integral management responsibility also has its limits.]  
Although all of these kinds of statements are presented and 
used to make conclusions in the evaluation, they also appear as 
an exchange (and even stimulus) about how other candidate 
agencies can pursue agency status. This is most evident in the 
intermezzos which offer insight into how organizations went 
about setting up agency status, but is also suggested in sub-
sections entitled learning by doing regarding the refinements that 
particular agencies have made to their management systems. 
The audience is advised about how agency status requires 
constant maintenance or that organizations eventually 
overcame (literally in Dutch became the boss over) some of the 
beginner's problems they faced. There are also boxes presented 
throughout the report offering short informative insights into 
different aspects of the agency status. These kinds of references 
about the agency model, together with the informal tone of the 
report suggest that the audience being constructed is a 
particular one and included both managers of both existing and 
potential agencies.  In making the evaluation interesting for existing or potential 
agencies, and for outsiders, however, it was also evident that the 
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speaker adopted the language of business-economics, a third 
particular audience being constructed. This was reflected in the 
consistent use of business like terms to describe the relation-
ships and activities of the agencies being evaluated. Some terms 
such as eigenaar [owner] (Ministerie van Financiën, 1998:5,24) 
were first explained to the audience and then simply inserted 
into later parts of the text, while other terms such as produkten 
[products], klanten [customers], bedrijfsmiddelen [business means] 
or bedrijfsplannen [business plans] were presented as normal ways 
to describe the activities of government organizations. There 
was also a tendency to make heroes of those agencies that were 
the most business like. For example it is footnoted, “Eén agen-
schap zoekt nog naar de uiterste grenzen van de over te dragen 
verantwoordelijkheden” (Ministerie van Financiëen, 1998:21). 
[One agency still seeks the farthest limits of handing over re-
sponsibilities.] Together with the frequent references through-
out the evaluation to the possibility of the Ministry of Finance 
to mediate in situations where agreements for improvements 
need to be made, this terminology would suggest that the 
speaker took on the character of a business consultant for most 
of the report. The exceptions were, as mentioned above, in the 
academic ethos pursued in the beginning of the report and in 
chapter 7 of the report, where the macro principles of the 
budget are discussed. In this second last chapter, the terminol-
ogy returned to the technical financial language adopted in 
Verder Bouwen Aan Beheer [Further building on management]. 
Finally, references to improving the quality of overleg 
[consultation] through better performance information and 
creating draagvlak [support] for agency status may be attributed 
to constructing the Dutch universal audience in the report. 
These terms referred respectively to the discussions or meetings 
taking place between ministries and agencies, and the kind of 
support fostered for agency reform through information and 
consultation. They are both typical references to the Dutch 
traditions of consultation. Similarly, references to the Ministry 
of Finance making agreements with those ministries where 
agencies had not satisfied different aspects of the evaluation, 
rather than setting time limits for change, may be interpreted as 
a call to the Dutch universal audience. It was an attempt to 
make the reforms appear desirable to all. 
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5.6.3.2 Premises of argumentation 
Although it was difficult to identify a truth underlying the ar-
gumentation in the document, was clear that the evaluation was 
premised upon agreements about the facts that agencies and ac-
crual accounting are good things in themselves. This was evi-
dent from the lack of any detailed assessment of problems with 
the agency initiative. When difficulties with agency status or ac-
crual accounting were identified in the argumentation, such as 
references to problems with the opening balance or even lack 
of evidence for efficiency gains, these were ascribed to lack of 
experience with the reform, and not the reform itself. Typical 
statements in the report that demonstrated agreement about the 
goodness of the reform, despite observing problems, included 
the following: 
 
De invoering van het baten-lastenstelsel blijkt over het algemeen goed ver-
lopen te zijn. Bij twee organisaties traden problemen op. De eerste organisa-
tie was een agentschap van het eerste uur. Hier wreekte zich het feit dat er 
nog weinig ervaring met het baten-lastenstelsel bestond (Ministerie van Fi-
nanciën, 1998:17).  
 
[The introduction of the accrual accounting system seems in general to have 
gone well. In two organizations there were problems. The first organization 
was an agency among the first to be created. The fact that there existed little 
experience with the accrual accounting system was an important explana-
tion.] 
 
That agencies are a good thing was also reflected in the very de-
scription of agency status as being results orientated or involving 
the attainment of freedoms under conditions that include, for ex-
ample, demonstration of a real possibility to work efficiently 
(Ministerie van Financiëen, 1991:4). These descriptions were 
repeated throughout the argumentation, even though the 
evaluation showed that the requirements for demonstrating the 
possibility for efficiency gains were too limited. Finally, agree-
ment that agencies are a good thing, was reflected in the desire 
to use the evaluation to learn from the experience so far, and thus 
not to reconsider the reform itself. Already at the beginning of 
the report it is stated: 
 
Een van de doelstellingen van onderhavig onderzoek was te leren van door 
agentschappen inmiddels opgedane ervaringen (bijvoorbeeld bij de vorming 
van agentschappen) en inzicht te krijgen in eventuele positieve en negatieve 
neveneffecten (Ministerie van Financiën, 1998:17). 
 
[One of the goals for this research was to learn from the experiences that the 
existing agencies have gathered (for example with the creation of agencies) 
and to obtain insight into the eventual positive and negative side effects.] 
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This suggested that there had already been agreement prior to 
the evaluation that agency reform should continue to be pur-
sued. 
In addition, there were a number of presumptions implicit to 
the argumentation in the report, not least the presumption that 
the conditions created by agency status provide the correct in-
centives for promoting more efficient management. This pre-
sumption was evident from statements about the financial re-
gime of agencies providing them with greater flexibility, which 
it is presumed were and will be used in an efficient way. In addi-
tion, it was also a starting point for the recommendation of per-
formance pay in the report as an appropriate means for encour-
aging cost consciousness and efficiency. Other presumptions in 
the report included the ability of ministries to steer agencies and 
the capacity of the Ministry of Finance to intervene and identify 
ways to bring about improvements in cases where necessary. 
This last presumption was reflected in statements in the report 
regarding the Ministry of Finances intervention in situations 
where improvements are necessary. Such statements indicated 
that there are agreements with the audience that the Ministry of 
Finance is able to make necessary improvements happen.  
Following from the earlier report on agency reform, the ar-
gumentation in this report also began from agreements about 
the value of efficiency and of business economics more gener-
ally. Primary among the reasons that agencies are a good thing 
was the claim that they can promote more efficient manage-
ment. In contrast to the earlier report from the Ministry of Fi-
nance, however, the descriptions of agency reform, particularly 
in the chapters discussing the actual experience of agencies, 
useed many more terms from economic theory and business 
management to demonstrate the value of agencies more gener-
ally. The use of these categories indicated that the argumenta-
tion is premised upon agreements about the desirability to con-
duct government activities in a way that is akin to market eco-
nomics. For example, as has already been mentioned, the rela-
tionship between agencies and other actors in their environ-
ment are presented as relations between owners and principles. 
It was written: 
 
Het derde element van het model van resultaatgericht management behelst 
het vooraf (tijdens de begrotings-of beleidsvoorbereiding) maken van af-
spraken (tussen de 'eigenaar' en/of de opdrachtgever en het agentschap) 
Chapter 5 136
over de te leveren prestaties en de daarvoor te maken kosten (Ministerie van 
Financiën, 1998:23). 
 
[The third element of the model of results orientated management includes 
prior (during the budget or policy prepration) agreements (between the 
‘owner’ and/or principal and the agency) about the performance to be deliv-
ered and the costs to be made for this.] 
 
Indeed, a preference is expressed for situations where the 
owner and principal are separate actors due to the different 
roles they, according to policy theory, fulfil (Ministerie van Fi-
nanciën, 1998:26). The speaker wrote:  
 
Ideal(iter) zouden beiden rollen gescheiden moeten worden omdat iedere rol 
andere belangen kan hebben (Ministerie van Financiën, 1998:24). 
 
[Ideally both roles should be separated because each of these roles can have 
different interests.] 
 
Similarly, it is also reflected in expressions of desire for incen-
tives that coincide with the individual interests of staff through 
performance pay. The report states: 
 
Van groot belang voor deze omslag is dat de medewerkers van het agent-
schap door prikkels ook persoonlijk belang hebben bij de prestatiegerichte 
manier van werken en dat creativiteit en eigen initiatief worden gestimu-
leerd….Het verdient aanbeveling meer gebruik te maken van de huidige 
mogelijkheden voor een presteatiegerichte manier van belonen en sanctione-
ren dan thans het geval is (Ministerie van Financiën, 1998:27-28) 
 
It is most important for this change that the staff of the agency also have a 
personal interest in the performance orientated way of working through in-
centives and that creativity and individual initiative are stimulated…..it is 
recommended to make more use of the current possibility for a performance 
related way of reward and sanction than is presently the case.] 
 
Other references to market economic categories included 
observations of the number of benchmarking investigations that 
have taken place or the adoption of quasi-market activities. Since 
the speaker admitted scientific evidence of efficiency gains can-
not be provided, the presence of these things are presented in 
the evaluation as evidence that efficiency has improved (Minis-
terie van Financiën, 1998:38-43). In both cases, as will be dis-
cussed further below, few details regarding the content of the 
benchmarking and quasi-market activities are provided, and in 
the questionnaire details at the back of the report there is sim-
ply a checklist noting presence or not of benchmarking. This 
can be interpreted as a factual presentation of these activities 
(and their relationship with efficiency gains), but it can also be 
interpreted as premises about values, since the use of these 
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categories to describe agency activities would suggest that they 
are a preferred way for agencies to operate.  
Agreements about a hierarchy of values are almost non-
existent in the report since most of the desirable things dis-
cussed in the report such as efficiency, transparency, cost con-
siousness and results orientation, are all presented as being con-
sistent with agency status. There is not even reference to politi-
cal priorities or ministerial accountability in the report. The ex-
ception was with regard to the macro principles of the budget, 
and an entire chapter was devoted to demonstrating that agency 
status has not interfered with these principles. The presence of 
this discussion in the report reflects agreements about a hierar-
chy between the macro principles of the budget and the intro-
duction of agency reform. 
Both quantitative and qualitative loci are adopted through-
out the argumentation. The quantitative loci appeared in two 
main ways. Firstly, it was used to advise the audience of the 
evaluation's findings in terms of number of responses from 
agencies or the degree to which they have satisfied particular 
criteria such as benchmarking. Typical statements reflecting this 
use include: 
 
Bij zeven van de bovengenoemde negen agentschappen worden tussen 
agentschap en "eigenaar" en/of afnemer ook daadwerkelijk afspraken over 
kwaliteit gemaakt. Bij twee van de negen nog niet (Ministerie van Financiën, 
1998:31). 
 
[In seven of the above mentioned nine agencies actual agreements about 
quality were made between the owner/purchaser and the agency. In two out 
of nine not yet.] 
 
In addition, quantitative loci were also used to amplify the posi-
tive effects of agency reform. In these kind of statements, agen-
cies are said to bring about greater insight (Ministerie van Fi-
nanciën, 1998:43), greater cost consciousness (Ministerie van 
Financiën, 1998:46), greater results orientation (Ministerie van 
Financiën, 1998:7), they are more transparent (Ministerie van 
Financiën, 1998:47) and lead to higher motivation (Ministerie 
van Financiën, 1998:47); even though few of these things were 
measured in the report. In correspondence with the preference 
for market economics and business-like values, many of those 
things said to increase were of an economic nature. Perhaps 
more important, however, are the references to qualitative loci 
throughout the argumentation. As with the earlier Ministry of 
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Finance document, these included a few references to the 
uniqueness of agencies by virtue of them being special or new, 
such as the following statement: 
 
Agentschappen voeren een bijzondere vorm van resultaatgericht manage-
ment omdat zij hierbij een afgezonderd en een afwijkend beheer hanteren 
(Ministerie van Financiën, 1998:20) 
 
[Agencies use a special form of results orientated management because they 
use a special and different management system.] 
 
Even more prevalent in this document was the emphasis on 
agencies as unique through presenting their existence as diffi-
cult. References to the difficulties of maintaining agency status 
occurred primarily during the chapters in which the speaker 
stated that the existing agencies are results-orientated and have 
conformed to the original three conditions required of agencies. 
The speaker advised the audience: 
 
Uit de onderstaande toelichting zal blijken dat het werken volgens het con-
cept van resultaatgericht management niet "automatisch" gaat, tijd nodig 
heeft en continu "onderhoud" vergt (Ministerie van Financiën, 1998:21).  
 
[From the report below it will become apparent that working according to 
the concept of results orientation management doesn’t go “automatically”, 
and requires time and maintenance.] 
 
The use of qualitative loci in this way rested upon implicit 
agreements about the goodness of being special, and empha-
sized agency reform as an achievement. It also acted to distract 
the audience from the lack of detailed discussion about the con-
tents of results-orientation, benchmarking or other features of 
the agencies being evaluated.  
5.6.3.3 Techniques of argumentation 
The argumentative techniques adopted throughout the docu-
ment include all of the three types of association identified by 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, however, unlike the previous 
documents, quasi-logical arguments were the least prominent in 
terms of centrality to the conclusions and quantity. They appear 
ed primarily in the early chapters of the report, in which the 
speaker described the implementation of agency reform, not its 
effects. In these chapters, the definition of results orientated 
management (identified also in the previous report) was pre-
sented and compared with the attributes of existing agencies. 
The same procedure of definition and comparison was also ap-
plied in the analysis of compliance to the three criteria for ob-
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taining agency status. In both cases, the procedure is brief, with 
a quick description of the criteria to be met and a short over-
view of whether these features were found in the evaluated 
agencies. Tables were used throughout the reporting to present 
the numbers of agencies that met each of the criteria. There are 
few details regarding the way the criteria have been imple-
mented and their content, rather their existence is presented in 
a factual way. Typical statements in the reporting of implemen-
tation of the results-orientated management model included the 
following: 
 
Bij elf van de veertien agentschappen kan gesproken worden van centrale 
sturing op hoofdlijnen; het moederministerie creërt randvoorwaarden waar-
binnen delegatie en mandatering van verantwoordelijkheden in de uitvoe-
ringsfase mogelijk worden gemaakt (Ministerie van Financiëen, 1998:21).  
 
[In 11 of the 14 agencies central steering on the headlines could be identi-
fied; the mother department creates conditions within which delegation and 
mandating of responsibilies can occur during the implementation phase.] 
 
There was little information regarding the kinds of conditions 
that have been set by individual mother ministries or how they 
constituted steering.  
In the presentation of the findings about compliance to the 
criteria for agency status, the quasi-logical procedure of defini-
tion and comparison were accompanied by an argument based 
upon the structure of reality, the argument of unlimited devel-
opment. This reinforced the finding that agency reform has 
been implemented correctly, even though, and indeed perhaps 
because, the quasi-logical technique was not completely con-
vincing for all the conditions. The speaker discussed consecu-
tively the three conditions for agency status; 
• Measurable products and services; 
• Accountants declaration; and 
• The real possibility of demonstrating more effi-
ciency. 
But devoted most attention to the first, and gives a wealth of 
examples of the kinds of performance measures that were used 
(Ministerie van Financiën, 1998:30-33). It is observed that "geen 
enkele organisatie hanteert momenteel nog dezelfde kengetallen 
als op het moment dat men als agentschap van start ging" (Mi-
nisterie van Financiën, 1998:32). [Not one single organization 
used at this moment the same performance measures that they 
used at the time that agency status began.] Rather than present-
ing this as posing some problems (which it does for measuring 
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efficiency) the speaker associated this finding with development 
and continuous improvement. The speaker wrote: 
 
In de eerste plaats werden de aanvankelijke indicatoren nagenoeg overal ver-
fijnd. Een op het eerst gezicht eenvoudig begrip als "doorlooptijd" blijkt 
steeds beter operationaliseerbaar (Ministerie van Financiën, 1998:32). 
 
[In the first place the original indicators were refined everywhere. What 
originally appeared as a simple concept such as ‘processing time’ became in-
creasingly more able to operationalize.] 
 
Rather than maintaining the focus upon the objective of condi-
tions, the audience is drawn to the notion of progress and going 
further in a certain direction as was reflected in the document's 
subtitles such as 'continu leren ook in de toekomst' [continued 
learning in the future].  This did not just occur in the discussion 
of performance measures (where it is most prominent) but also 
with regard to agency reform more generally. As we shall see in 
the discussion below, unlimited development was also rein-
forced by many of the traveling metaphors used throughout the 
document. With the idea of unlimited development implanted 
in the audience's mind, the speaker then provided a more con-
voluted definiton of the third criterion about demonstrating ef-
ficiency gains. It is stated: 
 
In de derde plaats werden de veertien agentschappen beoordeeld op de reële 
mogelijkheid om aantoonbaar doelmatiger te werken. De derde eis beteken-
de niet dat de reële mogelijkheid tot doelmatiger werken op dat moment 
concreet onderbouwd diende te worden. Wel was de opzet om door middel 
van kengetallen de doelmatigheid tot uitdrukking te brengen en de mecha-
nismen te beoordelen waardoor doelmatiger werken zou moeten kunnen 
ontstaan (Ministerie van Financiën, 1998:29).  
 
[Thirdly, the 14 agencies were judged according to the real possibilities to 
demonstrate more efficient work practices. The third demand does not 
mean that the real possibility to work more efficiently was at that time sub-
stantiated in a concrete way. The intention was that by using performance 
measures the efficiency could be expressed in numbers and the mechanisms 
for more efficient operations could be judged.] 
 
Since the existing agencies are argued to have had a conception 
of how efficiency would be improved in their statutes (Minis-
terie van Financiën, 1998:34), the third condition is also found 
(via definition and comparison) to be satisfied, despite changing 
performance measures.   
Another argumentative technique (based upon the structure 
of reality) used in the document is the causal link. This tech-
nique appeared primarily in chapter 5 when the speaker evalu-
ates the achievement of efficiency gains through agency reform. 
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Although the speaker advised that it is too early to draw con-
clusions about efficiency gains from the indicators of at least 
half the agencies evaluated, it is still claimed that efficiency 
gains have been achieved (Ministerie van Financiën, 1998:36). 
Ignoring earlier observations in the report that performance 
measures were continually changing, the speaker pointed to 
various indicators such as decreasing cost prices or tariffs at 
constant or increasing levels of quality, as factual evidence of 
efficiency gains (Ministerie van Financiën, 1998:36). The 
speaker then jumped to a discussion of possible explanations 
for the efficiency win. Under the heading a continuum of prikkels [a 
continuum of incentives], a range of incentives are identified that 
have (could have) caused efficiency gains. Arguments about 
causation relied upon relations of succession and agreements 
about the reasonableness of a cause. Among the causes identi-
fied in the argumentation were the following: 
• The accrual accounting system, and the flexibility in 
financial decision making that it allows, has led to 
efficiency (Ministerie van Financiën, 1998:38). 
• The greater cost consciousness arising from the bet-
ter insight into unit costs, as calculated by an accrual 
accounting system, has led to more efficiency (Min-
isterie van Financiën, 1998:38). 
• Visibility of costs has given agencies an incentive to 
improve efficiency since this can form part of the 
internal and external steering (Ministerie van Finan-
ciën, 1998:38-39). 
• The use of benchmark examinations by a number of 
agencies stimulates (has stimulated) more efficiency 
(Ministerie van Financiën, 1998:39-40). 
• The use of quasi-market arrangements stimulates 
(has stimulated) efficiency gains (Ministerie van Fi-
nanciën, 1998:40-41). 
All of these causal statements about the arrangements that have 
led to efficiency gains are accompanied by references to state-
ments from informants and illustrations of particular cases. To 
this extent achieving agreement about the outcome of efficiency 
gains, relied not only on arguments based on the structure of 
reality, but also arguments that acted to structure reality.  
In order to establish that efficiency gains were achieved (by 
the causes mentioned above) the speaker presented a number 
of particular examples to make the generalization of efficiency 
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gains from agency reform possible. This included the presenta-
tion of tables of cost prices from the Dutch Prison Agency be-
tween 1994-1997, together with number of complaints during 
the same period. Since both tables showed a decline over the 
period, it is concluded "(D)e combinatie van de kostprijs- en 
kwaliteitsontwikkeling duiden op doelmatiger werken" (Ministe-
rie van Financiën, 1998:37). [The combination of the cost-price 
and quality development indicated more efficient working]. An-
other example was a table indicating decreasing tariffs in the 
agency Senter. Since this agency also uses quasi-market ar-
rangements this example gave more legitimacy to the argumen-
tation about causes of efficiency gains. Furthermore, reference 
is made to a particular example of benchmarking in the agency 
Duyverman Computer Centrum (DCC) that lends greater 
credibility to the findings about efficiency gains from agency re-
forms. 
The metaphors used throughout the document include, as in 
the earlier reports, references that associate agency reform with 
physical structures such as flexibility and transparency. More 
particular to this report, however, were the uses of metaphors 
relating to both travel and learning. Setting up an agency in this 
report is frequently referred to as the optuigen [rigging up] of an 
agency (Ministerie van Financiën, 1998:17, 19, 50). This is a 
term generally associated with shipping and putting up one's 
sails. In this report it associated agency reform with the idea of 
adventure and travel. Together with references that agency im-
provements occurred stapsgewijs [step by step] or that agencies 
were nog in de kinderschoenen [still in children's shoes], the audi-
ence is brought to view agency reform as a journey. This makes 
them receptive to overlooking weaknesses of agency reform 
since they are to be seen as only initial problems. As I have al-
ready argued above, the idea of continuous improvement is also 
quite explicitly expressed in the argumentation, not only as 
metaphor. Finally, there were attempts to present agency re-
form as a business reform by referring to it as business redressing. 
Other metaphors in the document included examples of ex-
isting agencies as offering handvatten [handles] for other and 
prospective agencies, and use of expressions about learning. 
Agencies were said to have overcome (literally become the boss 
of) their problems; Deze zijn uiteindelijk allemaal de baas geworden, 
they are in charge (Ministerie van Financiën, 1997:19, 32). An 
overview of Dutch argumentation about agency reform and the 
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rules of speaking across all of the Dutch documents are pre-
sented in table 5.4. 
 
5.7 GGCT and the rhetoric of Dutch agency reform 
 
It is now possible to consider the resemblances between the ar-
gumentation about agencies in official Dutch accounts and the 
four public management stories Hood has derived from 
GGCT. Surprisingly, given the strong egalitarian character asso-
ciated with the Dutch political and administrative system, these 
resemblances are primarily with the individualist and hierarchi-
cal stories. The exceptions occurred with the discussion about 
which organizations should become agencies, and in the more 
token references to the universal audience. In these instances 
the rhetoric was more akin to features ascribed to an egalitarian 
account. 
5.7.1 GGCT and Verder Bouwen Aan Beheer 
The first observation to make about the account of agency re-
form presented in Verder Bouwen Aan Beheer is that the discus-
sion was narrowly focussed upon issues of financial manage-
ment. There were few references to collective problems and 
where these did appear they were primarily references to macro 
principles of the budget and how to accommodate these, 
through and while operating like a business. For example per-
formance measures were never presented as a means for pro-
moting democracy - democracy or other broad values never 
appeared-, but instead as a means to making better business de-
cisions. Instead, it was the role of parliament to oversee pro-
duction that was emphasized rather than other political con-
cerns of constituents or matters of redistribution. There was 
mention of ministerial accountability and the ability to intervene 
in agency decision making, but no further justification of why.  
As has already been mentioned in the rhetorical analysis there 
was also a preference for business accounting concepts, and 
references to optimal business operations [bedrijfsvoering] (Minis-
terie van Financiën, 1991:ix, 76), business result [bedrijfsresultaat] 
(Ministerie van Financiën, 1991:xi,xii,76, 77) and being business 
like [bedrijfsmatig] (Ministerie van Financiën, 1991:xiii, 84).
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Table 5.4 Overview of Dutch argumentation (continues on next page) 
 
 Verder bouwen aan beheer Verantwoord verzelfstandigen Verder met resultaat 
   Ethos 
Particular audience Financial expert, some atten-
tion for managers and political 
conventions 
 
Internal government expert, at-
tention for politics and society. 
Some attention for finance 
Business-economics consultant, atten-
tion for existing and prospective agen-
cies. Some attention finance and sci-
ence 
Ethos 
Universal audience 
Ministerial accountability Ministerial accountability  
 Scientific justification Scientific justification Scientific justification 
 Consultation Speaking partners Consultation, creating support 
[draagvlak 
   Premises 
Truth 
 
 
 
Clear formal categories in princi-
ple ensure order in practice 
 
 
Facts 
 
Financial differentiation leads 
to efficiency 
 
Zbos are problematic 
 
Agencies and accrual accounting are 
good things 
Presumptions Ministries know (incentives) 
how to motivate managers for 
efficiency 
 
Ministers can't intervene by law 
and won't intervene improperly 
 
Agencies provide conditions for incen-
tives to efficiency 
 
Values 
 
Efficiency Ministerial accountability Efficiency - being a business 
Hierarchy values Ministerial accountability 
above efficiency 
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Table 5.4 Overview of Dutch argumentation (continues on next page) 
 
  
Verder bouwen aan beheer 
 
Verantwoord verzelfstandigen 
 
Verder met resultaat 
   Techniques of argumentation 
Quasi logical 
 
Division of the whole into its parts 
(macro and micro) 
Division of the whole into its parts 
(Think steps) 
 
 Definition and comparison (Re-
sults management) 
 
Definition and comparison (types of 
autonomization, internal versus 
external autonomization 
Definition and comparison (Results man-
agement, conditions agency reform) 
Structure of reality 
 
Unlimited development (building 
on past financial reforms) 
 
 Unlimited development (refining perform-
ance measures, agency model) 
Causal link  (efficiency gains) 
Creating structure of 
reality - metaphors 
Flexibility, spacious, steering, 
freedom, efficiency,  
Autonomization 
Transparency, grip, steering, 
command, autonomization, verti-
cal, horizontal 
Rigging up, children's shoes, giving 
agencies handles, business redressing 
 Example: International experi-
ences UK, Sweden, New Zea-
land 
 Example: Proof of efficiency gains, 
particular agencies 
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These aspects of the argumentation were most consistent with 
Hood's individualist story line and its preference for market so-
lutions. 
A second feature of the account that indicated an individual-
ist flavor was the emphasis upon incentives and price forming 
throughout. This occurred when making explicit the problems 
with the existing financial system and also in promoting the ad-
vantages of new financial regulations, and more specifically, 
agency reform. The lack of incentives in the existing financial 
regulations, was one of the reasons identified for making new 
proposals in the report (Ministerie van Financiën, 1991: ii,7). In 
particular, the report noted the lack of monetary rewards for 
good performance in the financial regime and recommended 
organizations be allowed to keep efficiency wins (Ministerie van 
Financiën, 1991:7). A results management model for the future 
is presented as resolving this lack in the following way: 
 
Onder meer door prikkels in te bouwen in het financiële en personele be-
heersregime kan worden bevorderd dat verantwoordelijke managers in min-
dere mate zullen streven naar vergroting van het apparaat en maxzimale uit-
putting van het budget. Managers moet meer worden beoordeeld, en zo mo-
gelijk beloond, op de doelmatige uitvoering van de taken. Daartoe zou beter 
gebruik gemaakt moeten worden van het beschikbare instrumentarium op 
het vlak van de individuele bezoldigen (Ministerie van Financiën, 1991:21).  
 
[Among others, through building incentives into the financial and personnel 
management regime, the accountable managers will be encouraged less to 
strive for an increase in the apparatus budget and the maximal expenditure 
of this. Managers should be judged more, and as much as possible rewarded 
for, the efficient implementation of their tasks to that end. Use should better 
be made of the available instruments for individual payment.] 
 
Aside from the reference to performance pay, the proposals 
for agency reform included the possibility for organizations to 
keep the reserves they have built up from efficiency wins on a 
separate account (Ministerie van Financiën, 1991:79). Although 
an efficiency win was never explicitly explained, it can be inter-
preted as unspent funds, after delivering agreed upon volume 
for agreed cost price to the mother ministry/other parties. The 
presumption in the document that individuals/organizations are 
motivated by monetary incentives and ministries would know 
how to get these incentives, operated as an important premise 
throughout the argumentation. According to Hood this is a 
remedy typical of the individualist way of life in public admini-
stration (Hood, 2000:26, 105). 
The references to price forming in the argumentation included 
arguments about how cost calculation as a basis for transactions 
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within and outside of government can promote efficiency. It is 
stated: 
 
Een belangrijk instrument bij het verwerven van middelen en het genereren 
van efficienywinsten, kan zijn dat de kosten die overheidsdiensten maken, 
worden doorberekend aan de (eventuele) afnemers van de goede-
ren/diensten. Het verdient aanbeveling meer bewust om te gaan met de mo-
gelijkheid van toepassing van kostendoorberekening (Ministerie van Financi-
en, 1991:vii) 
 
[An important instrument in the bringing about of more means and the gen-
eration of efficiency gains can be that the costs of government services pro-
duced, be passed onto the (eventual) purchasers of the goods/services. It is 
recommended that more conscious use is made of the possibilities to pass 
on costs.] 
 
More specific to the proposals for agency reform were the dis-
cussions about performance measures which are primarily dis-
cussions about cost and volume. The argument was that agen-
cies will promote efficiency by using production indicators. 
This was stated as follows:  
 
Het gaat er in essentie om dat in kwantitatieve termen wordt vastgelegd wel-
ke produkten en diensten worden voortgebracht danwel welke activititeiten 
worden verricht respectievelijk welke middelen worden ingezet (Ministerie 
van Financiën, 1991:75).  
 
[In essence it is about defining the products and services produced in quanti-
tative terms, which activities are produced and respectively the means that 
are used.]  
 
Price forming is a further indication of the vision of the public 
sector as a business operation in the argumentation. “Dit kan 
gelden bijvoorbeeld voor onderdelen die goederen en diensten 
voortbrengen waarvoor prijsvorming mogelijk is”(Ministerie 
van Financiën, 1991:68). [This can apply for example to units 
that produce goods and services where a price calculation is 
possible.]  
There are also some elements in the argumentation that are 
more akin to the themes and concerns of the hierarchical way 
of life. Agency reform is not only to ensure the achievement of 
efficiency because of market incentives, but also because there 
will be central steering at the headlines (Ministerie van Finan-
ciën, 1991:iv, 22). Authority and rules remained important in 
setting the limits to activities that could be driven by market in-
centives, and, importantly for the Dutch case, made it possible 
to argue that ministerial accountability would be uneffected by 
agency reform. The hierarchical flavor in the argumentation was 
expressed in the definition of the results management model 
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which defined central steering as setting the conditions for 
delegating authority, and thereby making limited discre-
tion/autonomy possible (Ministerie van Financiën, 1991: iv). 
These ideas of steering and limited discretion were also ex-
pressed in terms of macro and micro goals throughout the ar-
gumentation, where it was the macro principles that set the lim-
its for financial discretions. It was stated: 
 
Bij het vinden van oplossingen gaat het om de verwezenlijking van de ge-
rechtvaardigde verlangens uit "micro"-oogpunt, zonder dat er een onevenre-
dige aantasting plaats mag vinden van de "macro"-doelen. Dat betekent dat 
de speelruimte veelal klein zal zijn (Ministerie van Financiën, 1991:ii).  
 
[In searching for a solution, the realization of the justified desires from the 
‘micro’perspective is at stake, without allowing for unproportional damage 
to the macro goals. This means that the leeway shall remain small most of 
the time.] 
 
The term autonomization, which was described in the rhetorical 
analysis as a metaphor, can be interpreted as part of presenting 
the hierarchical story throughout the document. This is because 
it showed that autonomy could be granted in a controlled way; 
and was about giving autonomy but in the passive form.  
Finally, although it was already noted that there was no de-
tailed discussion of collective goals or the social good in this 
document, it was not completely ignored. When it appeared it 
was to justify intervention from above. An example was: 
 
Bijsturing door centrale organen zal binnen organisaties met gemeenschap-
pelijk doelstellingen echter onvermijdelijk blijven. Wanneer daartoe aanlei-
ding bestaat, blijven ingrepen in de beleidsuitvoering daarom mogelijk (Mi-
nisterie van Financiën, 1991:iii). 
 
[Interventions by central organs in the organizations with a social goal re-
main however unavoidable. When necessary, the ability to intervene in the 
implementation of policy therefore remains possible.] 
 
The hierarchical flavor in the account of agency reform enabled 
it to be presented as a market like initiative that could also be 
controlled and directed by authorities. 
Although the conceptualization of agency reform in the ar-
gumentation was primarily a coalition between individualist and 
hierarchical hues, references to the implementation of agency 
reform suggested an element of informality and mutuality that 
could be interpreted as the egalitarian way of life. This was ex-
pressed in a number of references to considering the possibility 
of introducing agency reform case by case. Typical statements 
about the selection of candidates for agency status included: 
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Niet elk agentschap hoeft hetzelfde regime te hebben. Het gaat om maat-
werk, uiteraard binnen algemene kaders die voorvloeien uit het feit dat het 
gaat om aanwending van overheidsgeld. Van geval tot geval zal moeten wor-
den bezien welke bevoegdheden en verantwoordelijkheden een agentschap 
krijgt. Wellicht zal dan ook blijken of zich voor een bepaald type dienst een 
bepaalde set beheersregels uitkristalliseert (Ministerie van Financiën,1991: x, 
73). 
 
[Not every agency need have the same regime. It is about tailoring, of course 
within the general conditions that are associated with the fact that it is about 
the use of government funds. It must be considered from case to case which 
authority and responsibilities an agency receives. Perhaps it shall then be-
come clear which type of services fit with which set of management rules.] 
 
In terms of ethos, pathos and logos, the speaker in this docu-
ment adopted the character of a financial expert with mainly 
quasi-logical preferences. Other types of argumentation were 
used. The metaphors adopted made references to physical at-
tributes such as flexibility, as well as to results, efficiency and 
steering, and there was a preference for the unique.  
5.7.2 GGCT and Verantwoord verzelfstandigen 
The account of agency reform produced in Verantwoord verzelf-
standigen was most reflective of Hood's hierarchical way of life, 
with little reference to the themes and problems associated with 
the other cultural flavors. Indeed, the argumentation complied 
to all of the features Hood associates with the hierarchical way 
of life including (Hood, 2000:73-96): 
• Considering public management issues (agency re-
form) within a broader perspective about society e.g. 
principle questions about the primacy of politics and the rela-
tionship between government and society; 
• A preference for clarifying/separating roles and de-
fining categories systematically e.g. types of autonomiza-
tion, focus on separation policy and operations, the division of 
accountability, the thinksteps; and 
• A focus upon steering relations and steering instru-
ments eg. consequences of autonomization for ministerial ac-
countability. 
The argumentation revolved around the authority figure of the 
minister and the desirability to maintain vertical relationships 
with the administration for the sake of ministerial accountabil-
ity. This was apparent in references to internally autonomized 
organizations being subordinate to the minister and externally 
autonomized organizations as not being subordinate. It was the 
legal status of an organization that was the criterion for assess-
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ing compliance with the most desirable authority structure, 
namely internal autonomization. In this account legal status it-
self was not conceived of as providing means to steer but more 
as the mandating of authority.  
Complementing the hierarchical concern for steering 
throughout the argumentation, was also some reference to indi-
vidualist themes in the discussion of steering instruments 
(Commissie Sint, 1994:16-20). Oversight of business operations 
and clarifying financial relations through contracts, cost price, 
performance criteria, as well as customer charters were pre-
sented as means to steer autonomized organizations.  
The ethos in the document revealed a conservative and or-
ganizational expert wishing to preserve orderliness within the 
public sector. There was a preference for quantitative loci or 
pathos, quasi-logical argumentation, and machine-military 
metaphors such as steering, command and grip.  
5.7.3 GGCT and Verder met resultaat 
As with the first report Verder met resultaat considered the issue 
of agency reform in a very narrow financial way, without refer-
ence to broader consequences for society or even politics - the 
issue of ministerial accountability for example was also absent. 
The only issue outside the immediate concern for the workings 
of agency reform was a discussion of its consequences for the 
macro financial principles of the budget. This narrow focus is 
consistent with an individualist account of public management 
reform. 
There were also other features of the argumentation that re-
veal an individualist cultural flavor, not least the preference for 
business economic terminology and the focus upon the market-
like activities of agencies to justify their goodness in the evalua-
tion. References to price forming activities through the calcula-
tion of cost prices, the use of quasi-market operations and 
benchmarking are all presented as evidence that agency reform 
has led to efficiency gains. In addition, the stress upon incen-
tives throughout the argumentation, both through references to 
performance pay and market like activities, was most reminis-
cent of Hood's individualist way of life. There were also re-
peated incidences of presenting those agencies that have dele-
gated the most responsibility or adopted benchmark arrange-
ments to be the most heroic of agencies. 
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Besides the explicit reference to the market like features of 
agency reform, the emphasis upon learning by doing throughout 
the document may also be interpreted as  individualist in flavor. 
This aspect of the argumentation was concerned with dissemi-
nating agency experiences (there is mention of including them 
in a handbook (Ministerie van Financiën, 1998:17, 18) for the 
purpose of giving traveling tips to managers embarking upon the 
agency adventure. It also presented management as a creative ex-
ercise in self development and skill. 
A hierarchical hue was identified in the argumentation as re-
flected in references to steering. This occurred as part of the 
discussion of results orientated management and the condition 
of setting measurable objectives for agencies to pursue (see 
Ministerie van Financien, 1998:20-35; 49-53). Given that per-
formance measures were continually changing since the crea-
tion of agency status, the report recommended more precise 
conditions for agency status including the use of cost price 
measurements, quality indicators, and an established external 
steering plan that connects with the internal steering arrange-
ments (Ministerie van Financiën, 1998:51). Indeed, it is one of 
the observations of the report that there was not enough atten-
tion for the external steering of the deparments (Ministerie van 
Financiën, 1998:19, 21-233). The enthusiasm for continuous 
learning expressed in the report, for example in developing per-
formance measures, is to be tempered by better arrangments 
for control (this term hardly appears at all) and setting the con-
ditions for agency freedoms. Moreso than in the earlier reports, 
there is an explicit discussion about shifting from steering ac-
cording to the means used and steering on outputs (Ministerie 
van Financiën, 1998:25). This aside, the cost price (a figure cal-
culated from inputs) was identified as the most important indi-
cator for overseeing performance. While recognizing that the 
matter of steering is present within the argumentation, it ap-
peared primarily in the chapters focusing upon the implementa-
tion of agency reform, and not in the chapters discussing the ef-
fects of agency reform and the attainment of efficiency. In 
these latter chapters, it is the discussion of market incentives 
that predominate.   
Finally, there is an element of mutuality being expressed 
throughout the report that gave an egalitarian flavor. This oc-
curred throughout the evaluation with the observations that 
some agencies and ministries have not satisfied the conditions 
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of agency reform (Ministerie van Financiën, 1998:5, 8,31). 
Rather than adopt financial sanctions or introduce some kind of 
formal process or law for tackling this problem, the response to 
be taken is mediation from the Ministry of Finance. It is stated: 
 
Daar waar - op onderdelen- nog niet volgens het concept van resultaatge-
richt management wordt gewerkt, zal het ministerie van Financiën met het 
betrokken ministerie afspraken maken voor het treffen van verbetermaatre-
gelen (Ministerie van Financiën, 1998:5) 
 
[In cases when, units have not yet worked with the concept of results orien-
tated management entirely, the Ministry of Finance shall make agreements 
with the concerned ministry to implement arrangements for improvement.] 
 
This indicates a preference for informal consultation in order to 
agree upon a solution. 
The ethos in the argumentation can be described as a con-
sultant wishing to stimulate the enthusiasm of one's audience. 
There was an element of disseminating experiences so manag-
ers can do it themselves and an emphasis upon qualitative pa-
thos such as the difficult or new, and, metaphors likening 
agency reform to traveling and adventure.  
 
5.8 Conclusion: The translation of agency reform in 
Dutch official accounts 
 
Official accounts of agency reform in The Netherlands brought 
together three main themes: the financial management system 
of agencies and its distinction from other departmental organi-
zations, the greater desirability of internal autonomization as 
opposed to external autonomization, and related to this second 
theme agencies and (ministerial) accountability. In statements 
regarding financial management systems, Dutch agencies were 
constructed as embracing a results orientated model that en-
abled them to overcome the problems of previous financial ar-
rangements and to operate efficiently, flexibly and in a business 
like way. The calculation of cost prices for agency products and 
financial incentives, such as possibilities to keep efficiency wins 
or introduce performance pay, were ascribed to this model. It is 
presented as a financial arrangement differentiated from other de-
partmental organizations, though subject to the same macro 
principles, and of itself capable of adjusting to different cases. 
The main arguments espoused for agency reform in these ac-
counts included: 
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• More freedom to make financial decisions will (unlike the 
existing cash based accounting system) enable managers to 
make more efficient decisions; 
• New more flexible financial arrangements will (unlike the 
existing cash based accounting system) enable (financial) in-
centives to be introduced to encourage more efficient deci-
sions; and 
• Accrual accounting enables the calculation of cost prices 
and thereby promotes cost consciousness and provides the 
means for identifying financial incentives. 
 
In statements regarding agencies as a preferred alternative to 
ZBOs, or in the language of much of the argumentation, a 
preference for internal autonomization as opposed to external 
autonomization, agencies were constructed as preserving the 
convention of ministerial accountability. This is because agen-
cies are said to have many of the business management attrib-
utes of ZBOs, but remain within the departmental sphere and, 
unlike ZBOs, have no legal authority that can prevent ministe-
rial intervention in operational decisions. The construction of 
agencies as a preferred alternative to ZBOs relied upon state-
ments regarding the poor credibility of ZBOs. The main argu-
ments presented in these statements include: 
• Agencies are more accountable than ZBOs because they 
remain within the departmental sphere and there are no bar-
riers to minister intervention; 
• ZBOs have been created for improper reasons, lead a life of 
their own and are seen as a panacea for all kinds of prob-
lems. 
 
Finally, Dutch agencies were also constructed in statements de-
scribing their accountability. This included statements that 
Dutch agencies were more accountable than ZBOs, but also in 
Verder Bouwen Aan Beheer, statements about agencies giving 
greater content to ministerial accountability and greater over-
sight to parliament. Oversight and accountability were de-
scribed as the consequences of more reporting of agency re-
sults. Another kind of statement that expressed the accountabil-
ity, as well as transparency of agencies in The Netherlands, was 
again their location within the departmental sphere. Agencies 
were said to be more accountable because their departmental 
status was a guarantee that ministers can be responsible to par-
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liament for their activities. The arguments expressed in these 
kinds of statements included: 
• The reporting of agency results gives the parliament greater 
insight into agency products and requires ministers to be 
answerable for these results; and 
• The lines of accountability between agencies and ministers 
are clear and transparent because they are within the de-
partment. 
 
Together the use of these statements to describe agency reform 
in Dutch official accounts can be interpreted as giving them the 
meaning of a unique and accountable alternative. They are unique 
because their identity was expressed by distinguishing them 
from normal departmental organizations and ZBOs. The fea-
tures of their accounting system were prominent in the descrip-
tions distinguishing Dutch agencies from normal departmental 
organizations. They were also presented as an accountable alter-
native to ZBOs because they required no formal changes to the 
content of ministerial accountability. 
5.8.1 The rules of speaking 
The kinds of speakers and audiences privileged in Dutch offi-
cial accounts (ethos), together with the pathos and logos that 
they used to persuade the audience can be interpreted as the 
rules of speaking governing Dutch official agency accounts. It was 
observed that Dutch official speakers of agency reform consis-
tently included some appeal to scientific rationales in their self-
presentation. This was reflected in account giving about the de-
sign of commission investigations, such as the kinds of organi-
zations their findings drew upon, or the theoretical basis for in-
terview schedules. All these features of Dutch accounts sought 
to demonstrate an objective basis for findings and thereby make 
them appear credible. In addition, and perhaps contrarily, the 
ethos of Dutch speakers always included some reference to 
their findings being based upon consultation, or providing the 
possibility for the content of agency reform to be based upon 
consultation and/or negotiation. This was reflected in the pres-
ence of terms like financial differentiation, gesprekspartners 
[speaking partners] and creating draagvlak [support] in the 
documents. Together with ministerial accountability, which was 
continually cited to achieve the assent of the audience to the 
goodness of agency reform, I associated these features of 
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Dutch official talk as appeals to the universal audience and the 
construction of this audience. 
In addition, a prominent position for financial knowledge 
and concepts was consistently observed in all the documents 
analyzed in this study, although it was less prominent in Verant-
woord Verzelfstandigen. This ensured the credibility of the speaker 
to a particular financial/accounting audience. The way in which 
financial knowledge was central to the ethos of the speaker was 
reflected in the priorities of efficiency in Dutch accounts as well 
as technical jargon and categories adopted to describe agency 
reform such as the apparatus budget, cost price calculations, the 
rekening courant [current account] or normkostensystematiek [cost 
norm system]. It can be concluded that in order to speak credi-
bly about agency reform in The Netherlands, it was necessary 
to demonstrate knowledge of accounting concepts and attend 
to a particular audience of financial experts. This is not to say 
that Dutch speakers have not also sometimes attended to other 
particular audiences such as organizational experts or (prospec-
tive) agency managers themselves, indeed in Verantwoord Verzelf-
standigen the voice of a government organizational expert was 
far more prominent than finance. Rather it is to note that the 
particular financial audience and character of the documents 
had a dominant presence over time. As noted above Dutch 
speakers have universalized the goodness of these financial at-
tributes of agency reform by associating it with the maintenance 
of ministerial accountability, objective scientific findings and 
references to consultation. 
The conditioning of the audience to accept the arguments of 
the speaker, or rather, pathos of Dutch official accounts of 
agency reform relied upon agreements about the values of effi-
ciency and ministerial accountability. The audience was sensi-
tized to accept that agencies are a good thing because they 
promote efficiency and not reduce, indeed even give content to, 
the convention of ministerial accountability. Describing agen-
cies’ financial management regimes in terms of categories such 
as their cost prices, their flexibility and as results orientated 
management all conditioned the emotions for accepting that 
agencies are efficient. In addition, references to the inappropriate 
choice [oneigenlijke keuze] of ZBOs, their selection as panacea or 
the risk that they will lead a life of their own, contributed to present-
ing agencies as a more credible way to give freedom to managers. 
It should be noted that such statements appeared in texts to 
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promote agency reform, at a time when Dutch politicians and 
administrators were already well aware of negative findings 
about ZBOs from the National Court of Audit. Finally, positive 
dispositions towards agencies were sought in the argumentation 
by focusing primarily upon their creation as unique and an ad-
venturous challenge (locus of the difficult) for Dutch managers. 
Good feelings about agencies were played up by presenting 
them as daring and slightly free but not outrageously so. 
Much of the logos of Dutch accounts were based upon quasi-
logical argumentation, although metaphors were also always 
present. The main quasi-logical arguments used were the divi-
sion of whole into its parts, definition and comparison. These 
kinds of argumentative techniques were used to show that 
agencies would not disturb macro principles in the Dutch fi-
nancial system, that they are a results orientated way to conduct 
management and that they are preferable to ZBOs. There were 
also some arguments based upon the structure of reality in 
Dutch official accounts, in particular the argument of continu-
ous development and the causal link. These appeared primarily 
in the third document Verder met resultaat. Arguments of con-
tinuous development were used to show that agencies provided 
a better way to conduct financial management than in the past 
and that they would promote performance, while the causal link 
was used to demonstrate the attainment of efficiency gains. The 
metaphors used in the documents were subject to some varia-
tion and included flexibility, spacious (decision making authority), 
freedom, autonomization, efficiency and steering in the Ministry of Fi-
nance documents, and grip and command in the Home Affairs 
documents. 
5.8.2 The cultural flavor of official accounts 
Agency reform in The Netherlands has been consistently con-
structed using arguments that are compatible with the individu-
alist way of life on the one hand, and the hierarchical way of life 
on the other. Some egalitarian catch phrases were noted in all 
the documents and particularly, Verder bouwen aan beheer and 
Verder met resultaat, but their role appeared as a minor after-
thought, rather than being central to the Dutch agency story. 
The central figure of the ZBO in Dutch accounts of agency re-
form can be interpreted as acting as a node bringing together 
individualist and hierarchical ways of life since Dutch agencies 
were presented as having the same kind of (individualist) finan-
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cial conditions as ZBOs but, in contrast to ZBOs, without 
threatening vertical (hierarchical) relationships with the minister 
and his or her capacity to intervene in operational decisions. 
The individualist flavor of Dutch agency accounts appeared 
in arguments that emphasized the business like features of 
agency reform such as the attainment of efficiency and results, 
the calculation of cost prices and the introduction of financial 
incentives. Although there were some references to benchmark-
ing and quasi-market arrangements in Verder met resultaat, indi-
vidualist preferences for competition were not prominent in 
constructing the goodness of Dutch agency reforms. Quasi-
logical arguments were used to show that Dutch agencies are a 
results-orientated model and comply to macro principles, while 
arguments based upon the structure of reality such as unlimited 
development were used to demonstrate that the financial sys-
tem and performance arrangements of agencies have been and 
will continue to be refined in ways that promote flexibility, re-
sults and efficiency. The metaphors supporting individualist ar-
guments included autonomy, freedom, efficiency and results. In 
Verder met resultaat there were also some traveling metaphors 
such as rigging up (ones sails) that accompanied the argument of 
unlimited development. It was significant that in the documents 
with individualist argumentation, the qualitative locus of the 
unique was repeatedly identified. In addition there were some 
differences in the ethos of the speaker. In the first document 
Verder bouwen aan beheer for example, the speaker adopted the 
tone of a serious financial expert while in the evaluation docu-
ment, Verder met resultaat, there was a much lighter, more moti-
vational business-consultant approach. This was reflected in the 
presentation of information boxes for agency managers and the 
identification of agency heros who had done their utmost to be 
business like. The individualist way of life was always strongest 
when actual financial speakers dominated the commissions re-
sponsible for the reports. 
Hierarchical descriptions and arguments appeared in the dis-
cussions of ministerial accountability and the primacy of poli-
tics, in the preference for internal as opposed to external 
autonomization, in concern about clear divisions of account-
ability and categories of autonomization, as well as in references 
to steering through more precise conditions and performance 
measures. Significantly, Dutch accounts of steering included lit-
tle reference to compliance which is considered one of the fea-
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tures of the hierarchical way of life in public management. It 
was primarily quasi-logical argumentative techniques that were 
used to present hierarchical themes in Dutch accounts, while 
the metaphors supporting these were steering, transparency, grip, 
command and autonomization. In Verantwoord Verzelfstandigen the 
most hierarchical of the Dutch accounts, there was sole prefer-
ence for quantitative loci. The particular audience constructed 
was primarily an organizational expert rather than financial ex-
pert, and the speaker adopted a principled sober approach to 
the problem of autonomization. 
Egalitarian themes and arguments played a more cursory 
role in official Dutch accounts of agency reform. Their appear-
ance was only associated with watchwords in the documents 
such as consulting speaking partners or creating support 
[draagvlaak] through consultation. There was also the recom-
mendation that agency initiatives be considered case by case 
which could be interpreted as low grip since it requires agency 
initiatives to be the outcome of some kind of consultation, 
rather than a principled approach. Aside from these instances, it 
has not been possible to identify more specific kinds of egalitar-
ian solutions or arguments in the accounts of agency reform. 
This is not to say that these watchwords have not been impor-
tant in appealing to the Dutch universal audience, but rather 
that they have not been central to Dutch logos.  
 
5.8.3 The relationship between official accounts and the scenes of use 
In contrast to the strong egalitarian character that GGC theo-
rists, and others, have ascribed to Dutch political culture, the 
official accounts of agency reform consistently comprised of a 
mix in prominence of individualist and hierarchical arguments. 
Moreover it exhibited stark contrasts between strongly indi-
vidualist themes and arguments in Verder met resultaat, as well as 
strongly hierarchical themes and arguments in Verantwoord Ver-
zelfstandingen. Egalitarian themes presented themselves primarily 
in the form of watchwords about the importance of consulta-
tion or creating draagvlak [support], in both the collection of 
evidence about agencies and in their implementation. While 
these watchwords wer interpreted as appealing to the Dutch 
universal audience, the finding that they were cursory would in-
dicate that there has been limited correspondence between the 
cultural character of official agency accounts and the GGCT di-
agnosis of Dutch culture as highly egalitarian. Furthermore, the 
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universal audience was also characterized by other contrasting 
features, far removed from the egalitarian way of life, such as 
favouring the convention of Dutch ministerial accountability, 
and accepting evidence based upon a scientific rationale. These 
features are still akin to high group, but then more to the hier-
archical way of life. They would suggest that GGCT descrip-
tions of the Dutch context as highly egalitarian cannot account 
for the production of individualist-hierarchical official accounts. 
They have either been wrong in their diagnosis of Dutch cul-
ture or their characterizations are not relevant to the policy 
community in which Dutch agency reform has been discussed. 
It was described in this chapter that both Dutch culture gen-
erally, as well as the political administrative system, exhibited a 
number of paradoxes that are difficult to reconcile and interpret 
neatly. This was articulated in references to both the figures of 
the merchant and priest providing a rather unusual partnership in 
stereotypes of Dutch culture (Weber, 1930; Hendriks and 
Toonen, 2001:4). The history of being together apart, whether we 
are talking about the Republic of Seven Provinces, pillarization 
or consensus politics, is also exemplary of the strong opposi-
tions that can be observed in the Dutch culture. This is argua-
bly also consistent with the stark contrasts that were revealed in 
the analysis of Dutch official accounts, such as the metaphor of 
freedom and the business consultant speaker in Verder met resul-
taat, and the metaphors of command and grip as described by the 
conservative in Verantwoord Verzelfstandigen. Such contrasting 
cultural mixes could also be reconciled with the higher indi-
vidualist ratings in The Netherlands (compared to Sweden). It is 
plausible that individualist themes in Dutch accounts are a 
consquence of individualist elements in its cultural configura-
tion. An associated but alternative explanation for the individu-
alist themes and arguments in Dutch accounts is the promi-
nence of financial speakers delivering official stories. 
Leaving aside exclusively cultural explanations for official 
agency talk, there were a number of other features of the Dutch 
scenes of use that could explain both the shifts in prominence 
in the cultural tone of the stories and the themes and arguments 
identified. Not least among these were the actual speakers and 
audiences being addressed in the Dutch accounts of agency re-
form. It is hardly surprising given their financial preoccupations 
that individualist themes and arguments were strongest in the 
documents prepared by the Ministry of Finance, while they 
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were more subdued and even subordinate to the hierarchical 
themes and arguments produced in Verantwoord Verzelfstandigen, 
a commission report published by the Ministry of Home Af-
fairs. In addition, all of these reports and particularly Verant-
woord Verzelfstandigen were prepared at a time when there was al-
ready great parliamentary unrest about the accountability of 
ZBOs. This was further exacerbated by the 1995 Court of Au-
dit report citing irregularities in the wild growth of ZBOs. To 
this extent, there was little opportunity for egalitarian themes 
and arguments. Nor was there the need since these documents 
were all produced for audiences internal to the political admin-
istrative system, such as departmental officials or parliamentary 
committees, who given the circumstances were most interested 
in hierarchical solutions. Egalitarian elements, if you like, did 
not constitute extensive cultural features of the universal audi-
ence in this context. Instead the other features of the universal 
audience ministerial accountability and a scientific ethos would 
suggest the Dutch agency policy community was more hierar-
chical. 
Furthermore, the very predominance of Dutch ZBOs in the 
administration can also account for their strong presence in 
Dutch agency talk and as already mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, its hierarchical tone. Agency reform has, in the 
broader administrative system, been a rather marginal arrange-
ment in The Netherlands that has occurred in the shadow of 
the formally far more autonomous and numerous category of 
ZBOs. This organizational type has long characterized the 
Dutch administration, with their growth accelerating in the 
1980s as part of the Dutch style of privatization or rather autono-
mization (Van Thiel, 2000). As problems with this arms length 
solution began to emerge, at least in terms of the political sto-
ries being told about ZBOs, it was necessary to find a more ac-
countable alternative. To this extent, internal autonomization or 
rather agencies were a reaction to the previous solution of ex-
ternal autonomization or rather ZBOs. The pendulum swing 
noted in the international story about agencies, had already be-
gan in The Netherlands in the period I have analyzed, where 
the starting point for agency reform was on a trajectory follow-
ing a much longer and established history of arms length gov-
ernment in the form of ZBOs.  
Finally, both the function of ministerial accountability to 
universalize agency reform in Dutch official accounts as well as 
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the prominence of quasi-logical argumentation in most of the 
documents can be associated with the tradition of consensus 
democracy. With regards to ministerial accountability, it was 
shown in this chapter that this has had a particularly important 
place within Dutch politics because of the lack of a strong cabi-
net and the emphasis upon the professional rather than political 
role for ministers. Together with the fragmentation of the 
Dutch administration which has given minister’s strong feel-
ings/duties of ownership, these conditions arguably promoted a 
greater commitment to the convention of ministerial account-
ability than in adversarial systems. It provided a watchword that 
would promote the Ministry of Finance’s creation of agencies 
to other departments. Its appeal as a universal good is therefore 
not surprising especially when there are few other lynchpins, 
such as the cabinet or prime minister, providing a strong impe-
tus to unity. Similarly, the prominence of quasi-logical argumen-
tation in Dutch official talk corresponded with the need for de-
politicized, expert information in order to promote and enable 
consensus and compromise between the various speaking part-
ners in Dutch politics and policy making. All of these contex-
tual factors, however, do not account for the use of other ar-
gumentative techniques, and particularly the prominence of ar-
guments based upon the structure of reality in Verder met resul-
taat. This matter will be returned to in chapter 8 when the offi-
cial agency accounts across the countries are compared.  
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 6 Sweden: Steering agencies for democ-
racy and as constitutionally prescribed 
 
 
De missförstånd om regeringens befogenheter och ansvar som vunnit viss 
spridning synes i första hand bero på att den faktiska självständighet som 
många förvaltningsmyndigheter åtnjuter har uppfattats som konstitutionellt 
sanktionerade....har inget stöd I regeringsformen eller dess förarbeten (SOU, 
1983:99). 
 
[The misunderstanding about the government's authority and responsibility, 
which has gained certain ground, seems to depend on the factual independ-
ence that many agencies enjoy and  has been considered constitutionally 
sanctioned…(this) has no support in the constitution or its preparation]. 
 
Blir den offentliga sektorn alltför svårstyrd hotas inte bara effektiviteten utan 
även legitimiteten i det demokratiska systemet (SOU, 1985:33). 
 
[If the public sector becomes too difficult to steer, it is not only a threat to 
effectiveness, but also to the legitimacy of the democratic system]. 
 
 
Det är viktigt att det inom myndigheterna finns en levande insikt om att 
medborgarna är deras uppdragsgivare (SOU, 1997:147).  
 
[It is important that there is a living view within agencies that the citizen is 
their principal]. 
 
 
6.1 Introduction16 
 
The idea of and reference to independent government units op-
erating at a distance from ministries has long been present in 
descriptions and debates about the Swedish administration. 
This is because the administrative structure in Sweden has his-
torically been characterized by central government myndigheter 
[agencies] separate from Swedish departementen [ministries]. In-
deed, the Swedish constitution has recognized the independ-
ence of central government administrative units since 1809 
(Andrèn, 1968:14). Within this context, the agency reform ini-
tiatives in Sweden have tended to focus upon instruments for 
formalizing the relationship between agencies and ministries, 
and to this extent curbing the independence of agencies. This 
has occurred primarily through setting directives about agency 
performance in the budgetary process. In addition, the author-
ity of the Swedish government to influence agencies through 
                                                 
16 Parts of this section, section 6.3 and 6.5 have already been published in 
Pollitt, Talbot, Caulfield and Smullen (2004).  
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appointments of their director generals and boards has been an 
important feature in the pursuit of reform.  
As in The Netherlands, the Swedish political and administra-
tive context has a strong tradition of consensus politics but this 
has developed in a society that has been more homogenous in 
terms of religious and social cleavages (Davidson, 1989)17. This 
is not to ignore the existence of important divisions within 
Swedish society, both based upon religion18 and class, but it is 
to distinguish it from the institutionalized differences of the 
Dutch (Therborn, 1989:197-206). In Sweden unity and centrali-
zation have been more characteristic of political groupings, as 
reflected in the strength of the the Social Democratic party, its 
intimate ties with the labor movement and capacity to be the 
party of the nation (see Castles, 1978:93-99; Heclo and Madsen, 
1987:27). Collective decision making and the group has had a 
strong tradition in Sweden, which was the most agrarian of the 
Scandinavian countries and the last to industrialize (Kuhnle, 
1982:134, Huntford, 1971). GGC theorists, and others, have 
typified it as rating highly on egalitarianism, followed by hierar-
chical ways of life (Grendstad, 1999). Official accounts of 
agency reform also reveal a strong group flavor, but this has 
shifted over time from more hierarchical accounts in the 1980s 
to more egalitarian accounts in the 1990s. Individualist elements 
can be identified but in a more limited way. It is significant to 
note that irrespective of which cultural flavors feature in Swed-
ish official agency accounts, they always make reference to de-
mocracy and the Swedish constitution. This can be interpreted 
as an appeal to the universal audience in Sweden. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the Swedish termi-
nology for agency reform (5.2) and is then followed by a pres-
entation of the Swedish scenes of use (5.3 and 5.4). In section 
5.5 I offer a brief account of Swedish agency reforms, followed 
                                                 
17 It should be noted that both smallness and cultural homogeneity have fre-
quently been cited as explanations for social harmony and welfare expansion 
in Scandinavia and particularly Sweden. The cultural homogeneity explana-
tion has been rejected by Castles (1978), Jenkins (1968) and Therborn 
(1989), among others, because it is an invariant cause.  
18 Religious difference was concealed early in Sweden with King Gustav 
Vasa’s adoption of a Lutheran state church in the middle ages. This became 
associated with Swedish national identity to the extent that even catholic 
immigrants were expected to comply, even after the 1950s (Huntford, 
1971:21-24). 
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by an analysis of Swedish agency rhetoric. The analysis and 
conclusions of my findings are presented in section 5.6. 
 
6.2 A word (s) on agency terminology in Swedish 
 
In Swedish accounts of their agency reforms, the terminology 
adopted is clearly not the English word agency. Rather they re-
fer to their independent administrative units as myndigheten 
and/or styrelsen. These terms do not indicate a new kind of or-
ganizational form, nor a particularly modern type of organiza-
tion since Swedish agencies have long existed without any new 
name change. Indeed, many Swedish commentators translate 
the term myndigheten as authority, reflecting the administrative 
powers of these organizations, and the public nature of that 
power. Unlike the terms adopted for agency in The Nether-
lands and Australia, it is not possible to refer to private compa-
nies or organizations in Sweden as myndigheten.In international 
exchanges in English about Swedish agency reform, however, it 
has been the practice to translate the term myndighet as agency. 
 
6.3 Scenes of use I: reconstructing the political and ad-
ministrative context 
 
It is no exaggeration to say that the political administrative 
scene in Sweden is big. The Swedish public sector as calculated 
from GDP is the largest in the western world and, in the 1980s 
at least, was roughly equivalent to the entire manufacturing sec-
tor of the Swedish economy (Heclo and Madsen, 1987:4). This 
structural feature, as well as the universal generosity of the wel-
fare system, has been attributed to the hegemony of the Social 
Democratic party in Sweden and their capacity to use the state 
apparatus to implement their vision of the good society (Tilton, 
1990: chapter 1). The initiatives of the Social Democrats have 
always been pursued in close cooperation with the union 
movement, who has been the source and organizational capac-
ity of many ideas and their implementation (Castles, 1978). As 
Heclo and Madsen (1987:9) have noted, “(I)n no other nation 
has a reforming party of the political left held such a grip on the 
state apparatus and on the public perception of policy choices”. 
Even now when their grip on government seems to be loosen-
ing, the Social Democratic image of society lives on through 
commitments of parties on the right, and not to mention the 
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general public, to a strong and active welfare state tradition 
(Castels, 1978; Heclo and Madsen, 1987; Roper, 2006). After all 
there are a number of vested interests in the existing policy 
making system not only from organized employee groups, but 
also from agricultural interests and the authority of the political 
and administrative elite generally. Indeed it has been described 
as a very cosy policy making environment in which actors can 
expect to be in frequent contact with one another (Heclo and 
Madsen, 1987:21). 
Historically, the kinds of policies that Sweden has become 
famous for, such as their active labour market policies, has re-
lied upon a highly centralized system (Heclo and Madsen, 
1987:9; Huntford, 1971: chapter 2). While it is a corporate sys-
tem the state has had a strong voice in policy making (Ther-
born, 1989:226). This is distinct from the Dutch case where the 
state has played a more facilitative role allowing civil society to 
provide solutions. The Swedish approach has required an 
enormous planning capacity and a commitment to the rationale 
that the good society can be planned by a strong state (Tilton, 
1990; Rothstein, 1996; Andersson, 2006). An early citation from 
one of the intellectual engineers of Social Democratic ideology, 
Gunnar Myrdal is illustrative of the political mood; “foresight, 
and planning action to improve the outcome of the develop-
ment we foresee, particularly action to avert dangers ahead, is 
the essence of whatever rationality there is in human life” (cited 
in Tilton,1990:163). The extent of social planning, commitment 
to rationality, clear role definitions, detailed technicalities and 
the sheer reach of the state into private lives provides, com-
pared to The Netherlands, a much more assertive and unified 
image of the Swedish people’s home. 
6.3.1 The political system 
In the terminology of political scientists, Sweden is a unitary 
decentralized state (Lijphart, 1999). There is a strong local gov-
ernment tradition, and the local level has been permitted to 
pursue its own political and policy agendas. It is also responsi-
ble for the delivery of public services in a wide range of areas 
(Pierre, 1995:141), although in this chapter I have only focused 
upon public agencies at the national level. Since many parlia-
mentarians at the national level are active at the local level of 
politics there is also strong motivation within the political sys-
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tem to maintain attention for local government issues at the na-
tional level. 
The electoral system has been based upon proportional rep-
resentation since 1909 ensuring representation of a number of 
parties within parliament. It has also meant that minority gov-
ernment has been the most common type of government for-
mation since the early 1900s.  From the early 1930s the Social 
Democratic party became the key actor on the political scene 
forming governments almost consecutively until 1976 (with the 
exception of a few months in 1936) (Larsson, 1995: 41). It re-
mains the largest political party in Sweden, although as demon-
strated in the 2006 election it is no longer assured a position in 
government, as it was in earlier periods. 
Aside from the Social Democrats there are also four other 
parties that have consistently been represented in Parliament 
since the beginning of the 1900s. These include the Conserva-
tives (Moderata Samlingspartiet, M), the Liberals (Folkpartiet 
liberalerna, FP), the Centre Party (Centern) and the Left Wing 
party (Vänsterpartiet, VP). The Green party has also become a 
consistent presence in parliament since the late 1980s, together 
with the Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna). Although 
the number of parties in the Swedish parliament would indicate 
a multi-party system as in The Netherlands, it is still often char-
acterized as a modified two party system because the parties 
tend to practice their politics in two blocs, which are of similar 
size. There is the Socialist bloc composed of the Social Democ-
rats and the Left Party, and the Liberal/Conservative bloc 
composed of the Conservatives, Liberals and Centre Party. The 
Liberal/Conservative bloc has generally been more divided than 
the left bloc, which has been considered one of the reasons for 
its weakness in the past (Castles, 1978:131-142). This does seem 
to be changing however as the right have become more con-
solidated in their attempt to become a real opposition to the 
Social Democrats. The left bloc has also become more divided, 
particularly with the preparedness of the Greens to criticize the 
Social Democrats. Nevertheless government is usually, but not 
always, formed from one of the left right blocs.  
6.3.2 The core executive 
Following elections the formation of government begins 
through the appointment of the prime minister. The speaker of 
the parliament is required to select a candidate for prime minis-
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ter (after consultation with all parties) and this candidate is then 
appointed (or not) by the members of parliament through a 
vote (Larsson, 1995:37). It is then the task of the prime minister 
to form the government. Although there are few rules and prac-
tices governing how the prime minister is to select his or her 
team, given the tendency towards coalition governments, there 
is usually some kind of negotiation between the partners regard-
ing the allocation of ministerial posts.  This negotiation is, how-
ever, not on the same kind of scale or pursued with the same 
kind of rigour as in The Netherlands, since the formation of the 
cabinet has long been considered the privilege of the Swedish 
head of state, which in practice is the prime minister19. Accord-
ing to King's categorization of prime ministers influence in 
cabinet, the Swedish prime minister has an intermediary posi-
tion secondary to the influence of the German chancellor or 
UK prime minister, but still above the kind of influence attrib-
uted to the Dutch prime minister (Lijphart, 1999:114). It is the 
Swedish prime minister for example that summons the cabinet 
for their informal sessions and oversees the cabinet debate 
from which he or she establishes government policy. In recent 
years, changes to the recruitment of agency director generals, as 
well as other changes have been argued to strengthen the prime 
minister’s office in Sweden. The style of recent prime minister 
Goran Persson in particular has been described as more presi-
dential, and even as a dictator of conditions (Őberg cited in 
Mongalvy, 2006). This has to some extent been fostered by in-
stitutional arrangements which grant the prime minister the task 
of appointing and dismissing ministers. 
Aside from some special authority granted to the prime min-
ister, cabinet decision making is highly collective with almost 
total absence of individual ministerial rule. Larsson has written; 
"At the most, a Swedish minister may perhaps make a couple of 
hundred decisions on his own, decisions which usually concern 
the internal organization and the administration of his own 
ministry, while his colleagues in other countries make thou-
sands of decisions in their own name" (Larsson, 1995:50). The 
Swedish constitution prescribes collective decision making in 
government meetings and this is taken quite seriously in Swe-
den with various conventions existing to ensure that inter-
                                                 
19 The King is the formal head of state, but unlike in The Netherlands, plays 
no role whatsoever in the appointment of ministers. 
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ministerial contact takes place regarding government decisions. 
For example all government bills and important statements by 
ministers (such as replies to questions in the Riksdag) are circu-
lated in advance to the other members of the cabinet so that 
they may express their views (Larsson, 1995). Cabinet members 
also usually lunch together daily providing yet another avenue 
for questions of common interest to be discussed. These con-
ventions for collective government have the effect of diluting 
ministerial ownership for a particular administrative turf. It is 
nevertheless been observeed that the Minister of Finance, to-
gether with his ministry, have traditionally held a very powerful 
position and influence within Social Democratic governments 
(Ruin, 1991:66; Rothstein, 1996:61). While formally there is the 
principle of collective government, there are more possibilities 
for the prime minister and minister of finance to influence pol-
icy direction within the cabinet. 
6.3.3 Policy making style 
As in The Netherlands, the policy making style in Sweden is 
generally characterized as open, at least to elite insiders, and 
consensus orientated (Lijphart, 1999). Policy-making occurs 
primarily through the commission system, which conducts 
much of the preparation for policy change, which in other 
countries would be carried out by ministries (Larsson, 1995:81). 
The government appoints a commission with a directive to in-
vestigate a particular area of policy change and this will usually 
result in a very extensive report, which in the past could take 
years to complete. It is typical that the inquiry of the commis-
sion will be modelled on the ideals of scientific inquiry, with ex-
isting conditions, practices, and, historical roots, first being ana-
lyzed before attending to the question of reform or change 
(Premfors, 1983:629). Indeed Premfors (1989) has noted that 
this aspect of the Swedish model attaches disproportionate 
weight to the preparation of decisions and their formal proce-
dure at the expense of execution, evaluation and feedback (See 
also Rothstein, 1996:70).Since the early 1980s reforms to the 
commission system have included setting a time limit of two 
years at the most for their completion. Although the appoint-
ment of a commission requires a decision of the cabinet, the 
initiative and most of the details relating to the commission 
(such as the appointment of its members) typically rests with 
the individual minister and his or her staff (Premfors, 
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1983:627). Larsson has noted that in almost two thirds of the 
commissions there is a civil servant appointed who acts as the 
eyes and ears of the ministry (Larsson, 1995:82). Whether an 
administrator, politician or academic, appointment to a com-
mission is prestigious and exemplary of a certain type of expert 
knowledge. Heclo and Madsen have described it, somewhat 
controversially, as follows: 
 
The commissions of inquiry form an extension of the small permanent min-
isterial staffs through which individuals with specialized, political, adminis-
trative, interest group and professional roles can together work out ap-
proaches to whatever reform problem lies at hand. And because the cabinet 
rather than commission members bears official legal responsibility for pre-
senting any commission proposals to parliament, most deliberations can be 
carried on in semiprivate conditions – outside the glare of public sunshine 
laws but in full view of other insiders participating in the group life of gov-
ernment (Heclo and Madsen, 1987:12-13). 
 
Irrespective of whether they are allowed to comment upon 
findings, the length of commission reports and their expert 
style give them a character that is inaccessible to the general 
public.  
There is considerable leeway for organizational interests and 
political opposition to effect the outcome of an investigation 
since those "responsible for the inquiry are required to go to 
great lengths to invite the opinion of all parties who might be 
concerned in one way or another" (Larsson, 1995:81).  Indeed, 
together with membership on agency boards, commission ap-
pointments have been one of the ways in which organized in-
terests have been integrated into the state apparatus. Their in-
clusion may also take the form of called upon outside expertize, 
as part of the inquiry itself, or, of commenting upon the find-
ings of the inquiry at its conclusion. There is a remiss or referral 
system that follows from the submission of a commission 
which enables any actor to submit a reference voicing their 
opinion of the report's findings. These reactions are then also 
to be taken under consideration by the government before 
making its decision on the report. It is typical that effected 
agencies will comment upon the commission's findings. The in-
clusion of a number of opinions within the investigation and 
reporting process makes the commissions an important arena 
for elite deliberation, political negotiation and compromise.  
A consensus approach to policy making is also reflected in 
the corporatist character of the Swedish state. Organized inter-
ests have long been included in the decision-making procedures 
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of the public sector and they have been strongly represented on 
committees within ministries and within the boards of agencies 
(Gustafsson and Richardson, 1980:28). The growth of the 
Swedish welfare state for example under Social Democratic 
governments is often associated with the inclusion of union in-
fluence within the field of social security, upon policies to pro-
tect employees and reduce unemployment more generally. Ac-
cording to international studies Sweden with the other Scandi-
navian countries is among one of the most highly corporatized 
countries in the world (Rothstein, 1996; Sundström, 2003:74). 
In order to promote a solidaristic wage policy, its main interest 
group organizations have also been extremely centralized 
(Tilton, 1990:206, Johansson, 2003:308). In recent years there 
has been much debate about the continuing corporatist charac-
ter of the Swedish state (see Thelen, 1993; Svensson and PerOla 
Őberg, 2002; Blom Hansen, 2000, Michelettii, 1991). The break 
down of centralized wage bargaining between peak organiza-
tions and the rejection of agency board membership by the 
leading employer organization SAF in 1991 dealt a serious blow 
to Sweden’s corporatist image. Nevertheless the links between 
organized actors and the political administrative apparatus have 
still been found to be intimate, albeit different from in the past 
(Svensson and Őberg, 2002; Michelletti, 1991). The threats to 
corporatism in Sweden have frequently been fueled by criti-
cisms that the influence of organized interest groups is un-
democratic and has alienated individual citizens and grassroot 
union members. 
Informal contacts between ministries and agencies have 
been a widely cited feature of the Swedish policy making style 
(Pierre, 2004:209). This has been necessary because while it is 
small ministries and commissions that are constitutionally pre-
scribed the role of policy making, it is the administrative agen-
cies that implement and thereby have extensive knowledge 
about policy. The lack of ministerial rule, the creation of policy 
in the separate realm of the commission system and constitu-
tional regulations that recognize administrative independence in 
applying the law has created a very strict formal delieanation be-
tween policy and administrative roles. This presents agencies 
with great scope to influence policy since in practice they are 
responsible for policy implementation at a distance from gov-
ernment and have some legal authority for this. Indeed, there is 
a real aura around the autonomy of Swedish agencies and some 
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evidence that it is they, through their own lobbying, authority 
and knowledge, that initiate the policies that are formally pro-
posed and introduced in the policy making sphere (Pierre, 
2003:210-212). It should be noted that the role of Swedish 
agencies in policy making is also entangled within the corpora-
tist system itself since organized interests also have close con-
tacts with agencies and have traditionally been represented on 
their boards. Concurrence between government policy and ad-
ministrative decision-making is sought through informal chan-
nels and contacts between both ministerial and agency employ-
ees. This occurs however against the background of detailed 
legislation and administrative procedures to guide decision mak-
ing within agencies. There has been a strong legalistic tradition 
within the history of Swedish administration and in the past 
many administrators had a legal education (Anton, 1980).  This 
meant that rather than relying on interventions from the legisla-
ture or politicians in the cabinet, accountability in the admini-
stration could be “sought through a legalistic conception by 
which the individual administrator is fully liable for failure to 
keep within the collectively sanctioned rules” (Heclo and 
Madsen, 1987:11; Anton, 1980). To this extent the more delib-
erative aspects of Swedish policy making have been accompa-
nied by a wealth of regulations. 
A final observation to note about policy making in Sweden 
is the official commitment to openness in public decision mak-
ing generally. The Swedish offentlighetsprincipen [publicity princi-
ple] is a widely cited feature of the Swedish Constitution that 
requires that most official documents be accessible to the pub-
lic. It was actually a convention promoted by a Finnish clergy-
man in Sweden, Anders Chydenius, and followed already exist-
ing practices in Finland, which was part of the Swedish realm at 
the time (Lamble, 2002:3). The offentlighetsprincipen requires that 
most official documents be available to the public including the 
documents agencies have used to come to an administrative de-
cision or the material foundations from which commission in-
quiries have been based. Civil servants also have the right to in-
form the media of agency activities and this is meant to occur 
without reprieve or attempts by the agency to uncover who has 
spoken with the media (Larsson, 1995: 110). There is no re-
quirement however for civil servants to speak out about agency 
activities and in general they are loyal to the organization for 
which they work.  
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6.3.4 The central administrative structure 
The Chancellory is composed of 10 government departementen, 
the Prime Minister’s office, the Office of Administrative Affairs 
and the Permanent Representation of Sweden to the European 
Union. There are approximately 450 state agencies responsible 
for the administration of government policy (Premfors et al., 
2003:164). Some of these agencies have branches at the regional 
level, and there is also an administrative apparatus at the mu-
nicipal level. The central level has a dual administrative struc-
ture that can hardly be exaggerated - in 2002 there were a total 
of 220,000 employees working in central agencies in Sweden 
and just 5000 employees working in the Ministries20. The per-
sonnel ratio between ministries and agencies has actually de-
clined substantially over the last ten years with just 3500 em-
ployees working in the departementen and 361,000 employees 
working in agencies in 1992. While the focus in this research is 
upon central government agencies, it should also be noted that 
the municipal level plays a significant role in the delivery of 
government services and there are approximately 734,000 mu-
nicipal employees (OECD, 1997).  
In stark contrast to Australia and The Netherlands, agencies 
dominate the administrative scene at the national level in Swe-
den. There are at least two other types of organizational catego-
ries distinguished in Sweden at the national level, public enter-
prises and state companies. A distinction is made in Sweden be-
tween civil service work (myndigheten) and public service enter-
prises (centrala affärsverk), where civil service work is primarily 
occupied with public tasks and goals while enterprises combine 
public goals with commercial activities21. Civil service work has 
generally come to be understood as the realm of myndigheten or 
rather agencies.  
Public enterprises or Affärsverk are a dying breed in Sweden 
with most of them, including Swedish Post having been reor-
ganized into state companies during the 1990s. The reorganiza-
tion of affärsverk into state companies has been cited as the 
main type of organizational change in the first half of the 1990s 
(Premfors, 1999:157), and has sometimes been cited as privati-
                                                 
20 These figures were provided by Åke Fagrell in the Employers Agency 
(Arbetsgivarverket). 13 February, 2003. 
21 My thanks go to Petter Peterson , Advisor in the Swedish Agency for 
Administrative Development, for his assistance in this section. 
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zation in Sweden and elsewhere. Today, only 3 Affärsverk or-
ganizations continue to exist, including the Civil Aviation Ser-
vice and the Electricity Grid. 
The demise of this organizational type would seem to be part of 
an attempt by Swedish government to cultivate [renodel] the 
public sector through applying a rationale that distinguishes be-
tween organizations with commercial goals, affärsverk, and those 
without, myndighetsutövning (Premfors, 1999:161). The implica-
tion for the Swedish public sector has been that commercial ac-
tivities by the state should be pursued in the form of state com-
panies and not within organizational forms closer to core gov-
ernment such as state enterprises or agencies (Premfors, 
1999:162). This has meant that the commercial activities that 
have remained the responsibility of agencies have been the sub-
ject of much controversy since the early 1990s. They have also 
had to apply strict accounting rules which distinguish between 
the commercial and non-commercial activities of their organiza-
tion in order to demonstrate that their commercial activities 
comply to free market principles and not government subsidi-
zation (see Pollitt et al., 2004:161-162).  
 
Table 6.1 Organizational types in the Swedish administration 
 
Alongside the some 450 agencies and 3 state enterprises, there 
are also 59 state companies or statliga bolag. These state compa-
nies are mandated under the Swedish Limited Liability Incorpo-
ration Act. The majority of state companies are entirely state 
owned, although there are some exceptions where state shares 
are as small as 9.5%.  Some examples of these different types of 
organizations are presented in table 6.1. 
 
Agencies State Enterprises State Companies 
• Swedish Meteoro-
logical and Hydro-
logical Institute 
(SMHI) 
• Swedish Employ-
ment Agency  
Arbedsmarknadssty- 
relsen 
• Civil Service Avia-
tion (Luftfartsverket) 
• National Maritime 
Administration 
(Sjöfartsverket) 
• National Electricity 
Grid (Svenska kraft-
nät) 
• Swedish Post 
(Posten AB) 
• Sveaskog AB 
• Royal Opera 
AB (Operan) 
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6.4 Scenes of use II: Swedish culture and GGCT 
 
GGC theorists have recognized a high degree of egalitarianism 
within the Swedish political culture (Grendstad, 1999:473, 
Mamadouh, 1999:479), followed by hierarchy. This is not a sur-
prising alliance since both ways of life exhibit concern for the 
health of the social collectivity (Lockhart, 1997:97). Like the 
Netherlands, it is a moralistic political culture and hierarchy is 
used to promote the achievement and maintenance of equality 
(Mamadouh, 1997:23). Sweden provides many examples of the 
state playing an active role in the promotion of the good society, 
whether through the creation of legislation to promote greater 
equality in the home (father’s maternity leave) or to limit wage 
disparities. Indeed achieving the good society has been an ex-
plicit objective of the Social Democratic party and has been 
pronounced by many of its visionaries throughout its history 
(Tilton, 1990). Heclo and Madsen have put it as follows: 
 
In the Social Democratic vision, politics is a kind of therapeutic exercise. Its 
mission is the slow, careful eradication of disease and the establishment of a 
regiment of good health in society. It is always to be done with the patient’s 
consent, but also with the recognition that some unpleasant medicine and 
restrictions may need to be accepted because they are good for the people 
(Heclo and Madsen, 1987:27).   
  
By comparison with the other countries in this study, Sweden 
represents the most high group country, with some observers 
even arguing that individualism and concern for the individual, 
outside of the group, has been very limited (Heclo and Madsen, 
1987; Huntford, 1971). Among its political and administrative 
institutions, there are also limited examples of the individualistic 
features of competition or individual responsibility. Perhaps an 
exception is the strong legal conception for individual adminis-
trators to abide by the law and apply it in a neutral way (all are 
equal before the law). This kind of tradition has however been 
described by GGC theorists as also typical of the hierarchical 
way of life (Hood, 2004:11; Schwarz and Thompson, 1990:66). 
The egalitarian flavor of the Swedish political culture can be 
ascribed to the many rituals devoted to participation and delib-
eration. For example, there are the lengthy consultation proce-
dures of the commission system or the various formal and in-
formal arrangements to encourage deliberation among the cabi-
net members themselves.  The principle of collective govern-
ment also formalizes a commitment to shared group responsi-
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bility, it emphasizes equality among government members, as 
opposed to distinctions in status or roles. This is not to say that 
such distinctions do not exist, and in the case of the prime min-
ister or minister of finance there are some real opportunities to 
act as team captains. Other political and administrative features 
that may be interpreted as egalitarian include the emphasis that 
some scholars have placed upon the consolidative role of in-
formal contacts between administrators and politicians. Politics 
and policy making is a cozy realm in Sweden and these contacts 
act to promote mutuality among the political and administrative 
elite. 
There are also a number of features of Swedish political in-
stitutions that can be associated with the hierarchical way of 
life. As in The Netherlands, the hierarchical feature of expert 
knowledge and expert participation within the policy process is 
typical of the Swedish policy making style. It has become re-
nowned for its painstaking attention to technical details, as nu-
merous examples of refinements to regulations in various policy 
areas have testified (Heclo and Madsen, 1987). This is particu-
larly significant given the wealth of areas in which the state is 
active. Even though these may be compensated by informal in-
teraction, the formal emphasis upon the distinctions between 
policy and administrative roles can also be interpreted as typical 
of the hierarchical concern for clearly defined areas of respon-
sibilities. Finally the structured way in which consultation takes 
place in Sweden and the historical commitment to social plan-
ning can be interpreted as typically hierarchical. In few other 
western countries has there been such detailed and extensive 
implementation of policies and regulations to achieve optimal 
social conditions.  
From these descriptions and GGCT ratings, it can be said 
that the group dimension is particularly strong in Sweden, and 
stronger than the other countries examined in this study. Cer-
tainly, compared to The Netherlands there has been historically 
a more unified and uniform group tradition within the political 
system. In contrast to The Netherlands, it has also been the 
state rather than civil society that has been the primary facilita-
tor of solidarity. This has been fostered by the dominance of 
the Social Democrats within politics and their close ties with a 
centralized labour movement. As Francis Castles has argued the 
success of this partnership brought about a Social Democratic 
image of society, undisturbed in its hegemony until at least the 
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early 1980s, and this became the status quo or establishment 
opinion within Swedish politics, its administration and indeed 
Swedish society (Castles, 1978, Heclo & Madsen, 1987). To 
quote Heclo and Madsen yet again, the plight of the individual 
within this group tradition has been described as follows: 
 
The Swedish system arranges things in such a manner that results can be 
achieved only if participants play their clearly distinguished role in group set-
tings requiring the assent of other designated group representatives. Any in-
dividual not playing by the rules of the group interaction is potentially alone 
and vulnerable, with no place to go. There is simply no alternative mecha-
nism to commission work, no alternative structures of corporate representa-
tion, no alternative processes for getting heard and getting along in public 
life (Heclo and Madsen, 21-22). 
 
In light of this interpretation, it seems no surprise that the 
Swedish political culture has, among countries examined in this 
study, rated lowest on individualism. 
 
6.5 Swedish agency reforms in brief 
 
There are two features of agency reform in Sweden that distin-
guish it quite fundamentally from the trajectory in many other 
countries. Firstly, the long tradition of organizational separation 
between policy making and implementation has the conse-
quence that the starting point for agency reform has actually 
been making these agencies more within arms reach, rather than 
putting them at arms length. Swedish agency reform initiatives 
have not included new arrangements to make some kind of 
separation between departments and agencies possible, but in-
stead been concerned to formalize existing arrangements. This 
has occurred primarily through the introduction of manage-
ment by results within the budgetary process, through the use 
of government ordinances to define more specifically agency 
tasks, and through more active government policies regarding 
the appointment of agency director generals and the structure 
of their management boards. A second distinction to note in 
the Swedish case is that agencies are numerous in Sweden and 
the primary way of implementing policy at the national level. 
This has the consequence that any change across the central 
administration effects agencies, thereby leaving a very broad 
pool of activities that can be described as Swedish agency re-
form. As explained in chapter three, my focus has been primar-
ily upon initiatives to create more contract like relations between 
national administrative agencies and the government. 
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6.5.1 The contours of Swedish agencies 
It is the Swedish Constitution that provides a legal basis for the 
separation of agencies from the government offices. This oc-
curs through the recognition of a dualistic system in Sweden 
and with a particular passage regarding the legal role of agen-
cies. Known as the independence principle [självständighetsprinci-
pen], this constitutional article prescribes that agencies should 
make their legal decisions, in particular cases (eg. about indi-
viduals), independent of other or higher authorities. Together 
with the extensive legal authority that some agencies have ac-
quired over time, it has been said that many of the tasks of 
Swedish agencies can be characterized as being similar to that 
of a court (Premfors et al., 2003:67-69). Agency independence 
from departments has also been promoted by the requirement 
of collective government decisions, and not ministerial direc-
tives. Ministerial steering [ministerstyre] is generally understood 
to be forbidden by the Swedish Constitution and can result in a 
minister being reprimanded by the parliament for abusing 
his/her position (Pierre, 2003:206). While, as we shall see, the 
degree of independence that the Constitution prescribes to 
agencies is contested amongst Swedish commentators, it is dealt 
with very cautiously by departments and ministers and with a 
regard that is often difficult for foreigners to fathom.  By con-
trast, in interviews it was noted that agency independence is a 
feature that many agency directors and employees will boast 
about with much confidence. 
The tasks of agencies and the framework within which they 
should be conducted are defined in government ordinances. 
There are two types of ordinances affecting agencies, a more 
general ordinance which outlines the criteria that all agencies 
should seek to satisfy in the operations (eg. avoiding unneces-
sary costs, cooperating with other agencies) and a more specific 
ordinance describing agency tasks and management structure 
(Molander et al., 2002:73-74). The government will prescribe 
one of three different kinds of management structures that can 
apply to agencies in Sweden. They may be prescribed a one man 
rule model [enrådighetmodel], which confers full responsibility 
for decision making to the agency director, a limited responsibility 
board or an extended responsibility board (Larsson, 1995:60). With 
extended responsibility boards, the director general of an 
agency is not the chairperson, although he or she is usually a 
member of the board.  Limited responsibility boards are still 
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quite common among agencies in Sweden today and entail stra-
tegic decisions being made by a board wherein the director gen-
eral is chairperson. Boards have been a recurring theme in 
agency reform debates because of criticisms that they confuse 
lines of responsibility and represent interests other than those 
of the general good (SOU, 1983; SOU, 1985). Although initially 
one of the primary corporatist features of the Swedish admini-
stration, board membership includes not only organized interest 
groups, but also parliamentarians, citizens and experts in the 
field. Among a range of proposals to shift towards management 
by results in the Swedish budget, it was argued that the one man 
model, with its clearer lines of command, should become the 
main management structure (SOU, 1985). The parliament re-
jected this proposal, however, because parliamentarians are of-
ten represented on boards and use this as a check on agencies22. 
This has also meant that links with organized interests can be 
maintained. Nevertheless, with the refusal of the employer or-
ganization to participate in these arrangements union board 
membership was also reduced in some fields during the reign of 
the right bloc government in the early 1990s (Johansson, 
2003:308). 
It is the government that is responsible for the appointment 
of both agency directors and board members. In practice, how-
ever, the selection is often based upon recommendations from 
responsible departments (in consultation with the agency) and, 
depending upon the nature of the agency’s task, through nego-
tiations within the policy sector. Against the background of a 
strong tradition of agency independence, the appointment 
powers of the government have been touted as an important 
means for ensuring agency conformance to government policy 
and intentions. Explicit party political appointments are con-
demned although next to merit, an appointee that understands 
the government's policy objectives, are legitimate criteria for the 
selection. With the long reign of the Social Democrats up until 
the late 1970s, it has been suggested that the administration had 
also obtained a party political flavor, although this was more the 
consequence of a politicized society rather than an agenda from 
the fovernment (Pierre, 1995:148). The discontent of the in-
coming Conservative government with the administration (after 
                                                 
22 This information was pointed to me by Goran Sundström in email on 
26/2/2003. 
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the Social Democrats long reign) set the ball rolling for a more 
active recruitment policy. In the period between 1987-1994 
three changes to the recruitment of agency directors have been 
introduced. It is now possible that they serve a shorter second 
term, that they be transferred to another agency (with same 
employment conditions) where deemed suitable, and that they 
be transferred to newly created units in the departments in or-
der to facilitate a quick transfer. Although clearly these ar-
rangements are very convenient to the government, it should be 
repeated that explicit political party appointments are con-
demned and ministers may be reported in this matter to the 
parliamentary committee on the constitution. Nevertheless 
some observers seem to be suggesting that political appoint-
ments are on the increase (Pierre, 2004) and certainly appoint-
ments have been more centralized to the prime minister’s of-
fice. Lindvall and Rothstein (2006:52) also speak of the creation 
of more ideological state apparatuses engaged in the production of 
ideological positions, rather than the implementation of laws. 
Since the heads of these organizations are often former politi-
cians, they have labeled them policrats. 
The government has also used the budget process to set per-
formance objectives for agencies (Sundström, 2003). The ap-
propriation document [regleringsbrevet] in which financial re-
sources are allocated to agencies, has since the late 1980s be-
come the means for communicating broader performance re-
quirements. This includes the general political goals the agency 
is to achieve, as well as some more detailed performance meas-
ures that should be reported back to the government in an 
agency annual report. It is not always the case that precise tar-
gets are set, however, and the agency may be required to de-
velop measures that demonstrate their achievement of the set 
political goals (Pollitt et al., 2004:92). Furthermore, the gov-
ernment also uses the appropriation document to request vari-
ous kinds of reporting about agency activities. Although for-
mally it is the department that prepares the information pre-
sented in the appropriation document, in general its contents 
are already known to the agency and have been negotiated with 
them. Some agencies write most of the document themselves 
because the departments have lacked the knowledge to develop 
(specific) performance goals and measures for agencies (Sund-
ström, 2003:265; RRV, 1994:32, 23).  
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Following a commission report in 1985 agencies have also 
been required to report back their accomplishments to the gov-
ernment (Sundström, 2003:264 Brunsson, 1995:111), the first of 
these annual reports occurred in 1992. The National Audit Of-
fice (RRV) became responsible for creating an ordinance to de-
fine the general kinds of information that must be included in 
the annual report, besides the specific requests of the govern-
ment. This has been refined on at least two occasions requiring 
firstly detailed information per agency activity, to a focus upon 
the relationship between the agency’s activity results and its 
contribution and subsequently their set goals (ESV 1999:19, 
14). The National Audit Office investigations have found that 
the information supplied by agencies has been too detailed to 
be useful or accessible to government and that they were often 
manicured for the requirements of auditors rather than politi-
cians (Brunsson, 2002:197). The quality of information supplied 
in the reports has also been criticized at different times 
(OECD, 2001:54). Again refinements have been made to try to 
simplify the annual reporting of agencies, for example by 
requiring only a limited number of key indicators.  
To complement the performance information in the annual 
report, there is also regular financial reporting between agencies 
and the Swedish Financial Management Authority (ESV).  
Every month a list of standard financial information such as the 
use of appropriations, the collection of income and types of ex-
penditures are sent electronically to ESV (ESV, 2001:8). They 
compile and analyze this information and then transfer it to the 
ministries and other agencies such as the National Institute for 
Economic Research. Quarterly and half yearly financial reports 
are also submitted to ESV covering respectively the articles in 
the National Accounts and the same financial figures required 
for the annual report (ESV, 2001:8). 
Accompanying the introduction of performance reporting in 
the budget, has also been the delegation of more financial and 
personnel decisions to agencies. This was firstly in the form of 
setting financial frames for agencies, wherein managers were 
required to decide how set resources would be distributed in 
their organization. They were also delegated some decisions re-
garding wages and the design of their organization. In 1993 ac-
crual accounting was introduced and this also enabled agencies 
to save funds over time with interest (up to 3-5% of the total 
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appropriation) and to make investment decisions (Pollitt et al., 
2004:94).  
6.5.2 Overview of the reform period 
At the beginning of the 1980s Sweden was still being governed 
by the first non-Social Democratic government in 40 years, and 
it was suffering a large budget deficit. Concern over the size of 
its public sector had become paramount (Wilks, 1995:33). This 
had placed budgetary reform on the agenda, and, more specifi-
cally the possibility for reviewing expenditure. Indeed, the 
budget would become a forum for a number of reforms, and 
these would also provide an important means for steering agen-
cies. Although the circumstances were favourable, it was no co-
incidence that the budget would become the source of much 
fine-tuning from the late 1980s since experience and expertize 
into budgetary reform had been built up in Sweden's central 
coordinating agencies (Sundström, 2003:143). In particular, the 
Agency for Administrative Development (Statskontoret) and 
the National Audit Agency (RRV) both had experience with 
Programme Budgeting in the 1960s and conducted their own 
investigations into new budgetary techniques. I have focused 
my analysis upon budgetary changes in this section although 
clearly there have been a range of different kinds of reforms ef-
fecting agencies since the early 1980s. This includes the Re-
newal programme with a large decentralization of agency activi-
ties to the local level (Gustafsson, 1987), a focus upon service 
and training (Gustafsson, 1987), reducing agency regulations 
(Premfors, 2003:281), as well as later aims to cultivate clearer 
distinctions in agencies’ commercial, legal and government ac-
tivities (Premfors, 2003:293-302).  
Preceding the first budgetary reform in 1988, were also two 
important commission reports opening up discussion about the 
steering of agencies. In 1983 Politisk styrning - administrativ 
självständighet [Political steering - administrative independence] 
problematized the matter of agency independence and argued 
that it was quite legitimate for the government to steer agencies 
(SOU, 1983). The budget, in particular was an attractive means 
because it was recognized as a financial power of the govern-
ment (SOU, 1985). The second commission report was pub-
lished in 1985 and provided the first proposals for new budget-
ary arrangements. It also presented initiatives to change the 
length of tenure of agency director generals and promote their 
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mobility. By this time the Social Democrats had returned to 
government and were keen to demonstrate their ability to re-
form the public sector. They unleashed a Renewal programme 
that besides creating a new Civil Departement responsible for ad-
ministrative reform, and training agencies to develop service 
initiatives, also embraced initiatives to enhance political control 
over the budget (Premfors, 1991:88). The budget plans were 
ambitious and entailed a three-year budget that was to promote 
long-term perspectives upon financial management. Beginning 
in 1988 after a trial period, it required agencies to supply in 
depth analyses of their activities once in a three-year cycle, with 
more simplified reporting in the other years. The government 
was to set long-term goals for agencies over the three-year pe-
riod, to be achieved within a frame budget. Agencies were then 
to report back at the end of the three-year period, which was in 
turn to provide material for further directives. Incorporated in 
the budget goals were 2% saving standards for all agencies to 
satisfy in their existing budgets. They were required to identify 
how they would achieve this themselves (Brunsson, 1995:114). 
It was this budget arrangement that initiated the use of the ap-
propriation document [regleringsbrevet] for steering agencies 
and provided the foundations for the reporting system within 
the budget. By 1993, however, the three-year system had been 
dismantled as financial crisis took over. Three year expenditure 
limits were still being set but reporting was once again annual 
without an in depth report in the third year. The budget unit in 
the Ministry of Finance had now taken over the responsibility 
for public sector reform and accrual accounting was introduced 
across the administration (ESV, 2001). References to some of 
these reforms are included in the chronology in table 6.2. 
In 1996 the budgetary decision-making process was refined 
even further. The beginning of the fiscal year was changed and 
even more precise stages were identified for exchanging various 
documents to support the process (OECD, 1998). Twenty 
seven expenditure areas were defined in the budget and two de-
cision making phases were introduced for setting firstly the lim-
its of an expenditure area, and secondly the specific allocation 
within that area. Agency managers have argued that these ar-
rangements have limited the opportunity to negotiate their ap-
propriation (Pollitt et al., 2004). Each expenditure area was di-
vided into sectors that corresponded to an overarching goal 
that agencies should aim to achieve, as well as a broken down 
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goal specific to each agency. This has since been criticized for 
the detail in reporting it has required (SOU, 1997:57, 81) and 
depending on the agencies' task such broken down goals may 
not be requested. In a study of four Swedish agencies in 2004, it 
was evident that the government directives were fairly broad 
with the exception of the large Employment Agency (Ar-
betsmarknadsstyrelsen) (Pollitt et al., 2004: 91-92). Some ob-
servers suggest the reporting requirements have become 
pathologically precise (SOU, 1997), while others have stated 
that government directives are vague, unsuitable for measure-
ment, or general goals without any indication of how they 
should be reported (Molander et al., 2001: 79).  
More recently, the budget unit of the Ministry of Finance 
has made further proposals for a more integrated performance 
budgeting system in Sweden. Their proposals included identify-
ing a number of objectives in the political arena for policy areas, 
programme areas and then sub-programmes which concerns 
those activities conducted within separate agencies. The budget 
unit envisions goal setting that will tie the activity goals of par-
ticular agencies with wider objectives at the programme and 
policy levels (Ministry of Finance, 2001; DS, 2000). According 
to the findings of the VESTA project these linkages will pro-
mote more explicit connections between the principles of the 
budget and the structure of management and control tools. 
Their ambition is to put the national budgetary accounts on 
the same footing as those of the accounts of organizations in 
the public sector, including agencies, by moving the budget to 
full accruals (Ministry of Finance, 2001). Some movement to-
wards introducing the recommendations of VESTA was seen in 
the budget bill of 2001 when 47 policy areas were distinguished. 
The impetus for these new budgetary changes is, according to 
VESTA, the continued input orientation of the budget and the 
limited role that agency reporting has continued to have in ef-
fecting budgetary decisions (Ministry of Finance, 2001).  
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Table 6.2. A chronology of Swedish reform events  
   (continues on next page) 
• Budget year 1979/1980 2% cuts in running costs were demanded 
across the board from all Government agencies. 
• 1982. New Social Democratic government created Civildepartementet 
(Ministry of Public Administration) responsible for improvement 
of public service production and efficiency, and the relations be-
tween administrative bodies and citizens. It was to coordinate the 
forthcoming renewal activities of the Government. 
• June 1983. Publication of Politisk styrning – administrative 
självständighet. Finds that there is constitutional legitimacy, and in-
deed a democratic requirement, for the government to actively 
steer agencies. 
• April, 1985. Renewal program and action plan introduced including 
seminars and training sessions for civil servants, more scope for 
decision making at local level and less regulations. 
• August. 1985 publication of Regering myndigheterna en myndigheternas 
ledning. Recommends shift to three year budget with more precise 
and detailed steering from the government, that the general ar-
rangement for boards should be a one man rule system and that 
the government more actively recruit and transfer director generals 
of agencies. 
• May, 1986. New Administrative Procedure Act passed regulating 
the way that civil servants make their decisions. It stressed open-
ness, service and simplified contacts with citizens. 
• March – May, 1987. The second contract term of directors of 
agencies was shortened to three years and new general director’s 
office created within the chancellery in order to enable quick trans-
fers. 
• 1988. Many central reform activities taken over by the budget unit 
of the Ministry of Finance.  
• 1988. Three year budget cycle introduced for first group of agen-
cies, it included using the appropriation letter to set agency goals. 
• Budget years 1989/90 and 1990/1991 both included propositions 
to make distinctions (cultivation/[renodling])between agency work 
(myndighetsutövning) and commercial work (affärsverk). 
1990/1991 proposition included preference for state company 
(statlig bolag) rather than enterprise (affärsverk) where commercial 
work was prominent. 
• 1993. The three year budget reporting system dismantled with only 
three year budgetary goals being set and no longer indepth report-
ing. Accrual accounting introduced across central agencies. 
• 1994. Change to law regulating civil servants employment thereby 
enabling the government to transfer directors of agencies to an-
other office. 
• 1994. New ‘coordination’ minister position created within the gov-
ernment to coordinate administrative reform activities across the  
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Table 6.2. A chronology of Swedish reform events  
               administration. 
• 1994. New legislation passed devolving collective bargaining to 
agencies and making it the responsibility of agency directors. 
• 1996. Further changes to budget process introduced. Appropria-
tion levels set for different policy sectors and the budget year 
made to correspond with the calendar year. 
• 1996. New ordinance setting out the categories to be reported 
upon within annual reports. 
• March 1997. Publication of I medborgarnas tjänst. It criticizes the 
renodling of agencies and detailed results steering for increasing 
fragmentation within the administration, as well as the closed cir-
cle of experts responsible for results steering. Recommends fun-
damental changes to results steering and greater focus upon civil 
service ethics and training within administration. 
• 1997. New minister post for questions of democracy and admini-
stration created together with three units for administration mat-
ters within the Justice Ministry including: unit for administrative 
development [enheten för förvaltningsutveckling], personnel poli-
tics unit [personalpolitiska enheten] and the democracy unit [de-
mokratienheten].  
• 1998. The E government unit of the National Audit Agency 
(RRV) is separated and placed within a new organization (ESV) 
the Swedish National Financial Management Authority. It be-
comes responsible for developing steering of state more generally.  
• 2000. The Vesta group coordinated by the Ministry of Finance 
publish their ambitious report for accruals reporting in the budget. 
• 2002. The Ministry of Finance obtains full responsibility for public 
management issues 
 
Although this final development would suggest that the budget-
ary unit in the Ministry of Finance has maintained a strong hold 
over reform initiatives in Sweden, from 1997 the Justice Minis-
try did become responsible for a large part of the administrative 
reform activities for a short period. A separate minister post 
was also created for questions of democracy and administration. 
Following from a commission report in 1997 (SOU, 1997), new 
units were created in the Justice Ministry for employment and 
recruitment matters, for steering and management and for mat-
ters of democracy (Premfors et al., 2003:307-308). In more re-
cent times, however, the Ministry of Finance has once again be-
come solely responsible for public management issues. A chro-
nology of the reform period is presented in table 6.2. 
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6.6 The rhetoric of agency reform 
 
Any proposals to reform the state administration, and thereby 
agencies, in Sweden are usually prepared and discussed within 
the commission system. The government appoints a commis-
sion with the task of investigating specific kinds of changes or 
problem areas. It is typical that the commission will also assign 
different specialists and authorities to report on different as-
pects of their task, as part of gathering evidence for their inves-
tigation and eventual recommendations. Sometimes these 
smaller assignments, and who is to perform them, are also de-
fined within the government directives for the commission in-
vestigation. This presents the possibility for other speakers, be-
sides the commission members, to have an influence upon the 
contents of their report. Sundström, for example, has argued 
that some commission reports discussing results steering in 
Sweden were limited by their dependence upon findings from 
Statskontoret (National Agency for Public Management) and 
RRV (the National Audit Office) (Sundström, 2003:176). This 
was because these agencies were the state experts on these mat-
ters, since they had already been developing ideas in this area. 
At the same time they had thereby an (uncritical) interest in 
promoting them. The commission document is a negotiation of 
all of the different perspectives gathered, often from different 
actors, during the investigation. 
 It is important to note that although the final report of the 
commission system can be seen as providing the initial argu-
mentation for a change in policy or the introduction of man-
agement reforms, its proposals may only provide the basis for 
further discussion. Indeed, if the proposals are implemented, it 
is not unusual that they will also occur in an adjusted form. As 
was noted earlier in this chapter the commission system in-
cludes an open process of debate whereby any actor is able, in 
writing, to reject the findings or recommendation of a commis-
sion and explain their own standpoint in a given matter. In pre-
senting their response to the commission's findings and even-
tual actions, the government is expected to show consideration 
of the commission's standpoint, as well as for the remiss state-
ments. This is not to say that the government will not take a 
position of its own (which must then be approved by parlia-
ment), which may only conform in a limited way to the com-
mission findings and/or remiss statements. Nevertheless, there 
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is generally some uniformity in the kinds of terminology 
adopted by the government and an emphasis upon they way 
agreement has been found with both the commission and re-
miss findings. This uniformity is in part fostered by the terms 
of reference for the commission report that have been set by 
the government, itself. Perhaps exemplary of the egalitarian 
character of Swedish political and administrative culture, em-
phasis upon agreement tends to occur even when the govern-
ment decisions proposed would suggest the commission find-
ings have been overlooked or rejected (see for example Reger-
ings Proposition 1997/98:136, 34-49).  
The first commission document analyzed for this chapter is 
Politisk styrning - administrativ självständighet [Political Steering - 
administrative independence] published in 1983. This commis-
sion report was one of two reports prepared for the Förvaltnin-
gutredning [Public Administration investigation] that was first 
given a government directive in 1976 to consider methods for 
steering the state administration. Politisk styrning - administrative 
självständighet was later added to the commission's task because 
of constitutional questions raised around that time about the le-
gality of government steering of administrative activities and 
decision making (Sundström, 2003:176). The government direc-
tives for this investigation were quite general and did not re-
quest recommendations for change, but rather an analysis of 
the constitutional prescriptions for steering and its factual ap-
plication (SOU, 1983). Consequently the argumentation in this 
report did not directly lead to legislative change or bring about 
any direct reforms to Swedish agencies. Instead it set out a 
number of principles and constitutional possibilities for political 
steering, as well as to describe the actual independence of 
Swedish agencies. The findings have since been used (selec-
tively) to provide legitimacy for reformers introducing steering 
initiatives such as management by results and a more active re-
cruitment policy for appointing and relocating agency director 
generals. This use continues to be made even though the com-
mission findings were and still are contested in legal circles 
(Sundström, 2003:182). 
The second commission document analyzed is Regeringen, 
myndigheterna och myndigheternas ledning [Government, agencies and 
agencies' management]. Published in 1985, it was also given 
broad directions to investigate methods for government to im-
prove the steering of agencies. The directive focused primarily 
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on the need to investigate the different ways management (in-
cluding director generals and boards) were organized across dif-
ferent types of agencies, their management functions and re-
sponsibilities, since these features were seen to have implica-
tions for effectively satisfying the parliament's and govern-
ment's intentions. In addition, brief mention was also made of 
investigating the introduction of frames for agency goals within 
the budget and other areas of economic steering (SOU, 
1985:40, 235-247). Although the bulk of the report focused 
upon the management level of agencies including their boards 
(composition), director generals and management teams, the 
most important decision following from this report were 
changes to the budget and the introduction of management by 
results. It was the grounds for adopting a three-year budget, a 
more formalized system of result reporting and for delegating 
more financial and personnel decisions to agency management. 
Other consequences from the report's findings were adjust-
ments to the appointment conditions of agency director gener-
als. Their tenure was shortened, legislation was created to en-
able the government to transfer them to other state offices, and 
units were created in the Regeringskansliet to facilitate quick 
transfers. Finally, the report also made a number of proposals 
regarding the boards of agencies. It expressed the need for 
clearer division of responsibilities for boards, the removal of in-
terest group representation on boards, and, a preference for 
boards in which the director general maintained responsibility 
for agency decisions. Although no direct changes occurred 
from these recommendations, clarifying the lines of responsi-
bilities of boards and their role in the Swedish democracy has 
remained an ongoing theme of discussion about Swedish agen-
cies throughout the 1980s and 90s.  
The third commission document analyzed in this chapter is I 
medborgarnas tjänst [In the citizen's service]. Its instructions were 
to analyze the current forms of steering and the structural or-
ganization of the state administration (above the level of a sec-
tor analysis), as well as to provide guiding recommendations for 
the administration in the coming years (SOU, 1997:57, 171-
177). Although the directive was once again broad and even re-
quested an account of how the administration had developed 
since the Second World War (!), it also gave an explicit com-
mitment to the continued use of management by results (SOU, 
1997:57,173). Furthermore, it defined demands for democratic 
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steering, oversight and control, legality, effectiveness and acces-
sibility as basic principles that should underlie the commissions' 
work (SOU, 1997:57:175). As we shall see, the commission was 
highly critical of management by results and raised some reser-
vations about the renodling [literally cultivation] or rather focus 
upon core activities which has occurred over the last decade 
because they contributed to the fragmentation of the admini-
stration. Many of its recommendations concerned promoting 
unity and cooperation across the whole of state activities. Al-
though the government (in accordance with many remiss 
statements) did not accept the commission's proposals to com-
pletely overhaul management by results activities, it did agree to 
make a number of refinements to the program. Not least 
among these, were changes to the double role of the National 
Audit Office in the evaluation and development of manage-
ment by results activities. Instead a new organization, the 
Agency for Economic Management (EVS), was created to de-
velop management by results.  
The government also accepted that steering needed to adjust 
more to the different kinds of activities performed by different 
agencies and in future government letters would prescribe sepa-
rate result goals for each agency that corresponded to a sector 
goal. In order to promote cooperation within sectors, they 
would only prescribe an overarching goal for a sector instead of 
an overarching goal for each agency. Other refinements made 
to management by results included a more structured approach 
to the exchange of result information (to strengthen political 
engagement) and more dialogue between departments and 
agency director generals. Other initiatives following from the 
commission's report included the creation of a new agency to 
promote the quality and competence of the administration. This 
organization was to support other kinds of steering activities 
such as the promotion of a public sector culture, maintain the 
program for agency director generals (their selection and train-
ing), and encourage the simplification of agency regulations. 
6.6.1 Document one - Politisk styrning - administrativ självständighet 
[Political steering - administrative independence] 
Politisk styrning - administrativ självständighet was the second 
of two reports prepared for the Förvaltningutredning [admini-
stration examination] and first appointed in 1976. The original 
directive to the commission requested an overview of steering 
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and organizational questions within the state, with special atten-
tion for budget processes (Sundström, 2003:176). Later, follow-
ing from a parliamentary motion reviving constitutional consid-
erations of the democratic steering principles for the admini-
stration, a second directive was made to examine the constitu-
tional conditions for steering the administration, as well as the 
actual relationships between administration, government and 
parliament. One of the main motives for this examination was 
to consider constitutional prescriptions for steering, given the 
widespread belief that the government is unable to steer directly 
by virtue of the Swedish tradition of agency independence. The 
terms of reference for the report were expressed as follows:  
 
(A)tt kartlägga de förändringar som skett i den statliga förvaltnings organiza-
tionen och mot bakgrund härav beskriva och analysera nu rådande förhål-
landen och problem i relationerna mellan regering, riksdag och förvalt-
ningsmyndigheten (SOU, 1983:9). 
 
[To map out the changes that have occurred in the state administration's or-
ganization and against this background describe and analyze the existing re-
lationships and problems in the relations between government, parliament 
and agencies.] 
 
This task was assigned against the background of perceived 
problems with government steering of agencies and their strong 
independence. It is observed: 
 
Den demokratiska styrningen av den statliga verksamheten uppfattas som 
otillräcklig. Härav följer, menar man, å ena sidan att politiska intentionerna 
inte får ett tillfredsställande genomslag i myndigheternas arbete. Å andra si-
dan har förvaltningen givits befogenheter att fatta beslut för vilka ansvar i 
politisk ordning inte kan utkrävas (SOU 1983:18). 
 
The democratic steering of the state activities is considered insufficient. This 
means, it is argued, on the one hand that political intentions do not have a 
satisfactory impact on the work of agencies. On the other hand, the admini-
stration has been given the authority to take decisions on things for which 
responsibility within the political order cannot be demanded.] 
 
The commission's objective was therefore to clarify the means 
available for government to steer agencies (SOU, 1983:18). 
Commission members were primarily active politicians but 
also included a political scientist, Daniel Tarschys as chairper-
son. The final report is just over 100 pages long and consists of 
five chapters examining respectively the constitutional founda-
tions for steering (chapter 2), the government's steering func-
tion (chapter 3), the administration's increasing independence 
(chapter 4) and steering and responsibility (chapter 5). There is 
also an introductory chapter that provides an overview of par-
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liamentary debate about the steering of the administration and 
an account of previous reports examining this issue (chapter 1). 
The final chapter of the report (chapter 5) brings together 
the main findings and identifies three courses of action that 
may be taken to improve the democratic steering of the admini-
stration. A central conclusion is that there is no constitutional 
barrier to political steering of the administration by parliament 
and government. Indeed, the commission finds that the notion 
that there is such a barrier has been the result of widespread 
misunderstanding about the constitution and dualism in Swe-
den. At the same time, it is argued that it may be desirable to 
limit detailed political steering of the administration in order to 
protect other values such as legality, pluralism, local and re-
gional identity, and, the business activities of the state (SOU, 
1983:96-97).  
Three main problems in the existing relationship between 
government and the administration were drawn from the analy-
sis in the report. This included the problem that agency inde-
pendence has grown in a way that has limited government's 
possibility to be responsible for its activities to parliament. It 
was argued that government needs to have better insight into 
the activities of agencies. The second problem identified relates 
to the lack of clarity in the relationship between the political 
sphere and the administration, which is exacerbated by the un-
clear role of boards in agencies. These boards are found to have 
been subject to very little government regulation and great un-
certainty is said to exist about the kinds of roles they play and 
their composition. The third problem identified relates to the 
creation of regulations by agencies and the lack of knowledge in 
the political sphere about the kinds regulations being made and 
how they are used. 
Finally, the report closed with three possible roads the gov-
ernment can take to promote stronger democratic steering of the 
independent authorities (SOU, 1983:105-106). These roads in-
cluded increasing the influence of the political sphere or in-
creasing social influences through, on the one hand, shifting 
more responsibilities to the municipalities or, on the other 
hand, by using market steering. The report suggested that in-
creases in political influence could be pursued by returning 
some decision -making competencies to the political sphere 
and/or by increasing the political influence upon the manage-
ment of agencies. Some suggestions were made about cultivat-
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ing the authorities through the selection of management, board 
types and board members. Alternatively, the routes to increase 
social influences are argued to offer a means by which local po-
litical opinion or the consumer can influence the direction of 
authority work. No examples are offered regarding the kind of 
activities that would be most appropriate for more democratic 
steering through decentralization to the municipalities or 
through market steering.  
6.6.1.1 Ethos and the construction of the audience 
In the self-presentation the speaker, devoted much effort to 
demonstrate very broad knowledge about the administration 
and its place within society. This occured through an account of 
the complexity of industrial countries (SOU, 1983:17) and its 
implications for the state, and through presentation of the de-
mocratic chain within which the administration operates (SOU, 
1983:16-17). There was also an overview of the themes dis-
cussed in previous commission reports (SOU, 1983:14). Fur-
thermore, accounts of the history of the administration through 
an inventory of commission reports that have been conducted 
since the 1800s, and a discussion of dualism also from around 
this time, are brought together to demonstrate the credibility of 
the speaker. All of these elements corresponded with the more 
general concern in the argumentation for Swedish democracy, 
and act to appraise it in many ways. To this extent, they can be 
interpreted as appeals to the universal audience in the Swedish 
political and administrative system. After all, the idea of democ-
racy is appealing to most audiences, and particularly those that 
have been imbued with a social democratic image of society. As 
Premfors has noted, it is also typical for Swedish commission 
reports to attend to some rewriting of history (Premfors, 1991). 
At the same time, the kinds of detail and techical terms 
adopted also indicated that the speaker constructed particular 
audiences throughout the text. The various definitions from po-
litical science, as well as the devotion to constitutional law dis-
cussion indicated an appeal being made to an expert audience 
of political scientists. Definitions included the representative 
democracy principles of the Swedish state (SOU, 1983:16), the 
kinds of authority the constitution prescribes to public power 
(SOU, 1983:19-29), and dualism (SOU, 1983:37). The vocabu-
lary included various references to other political science terms 
such as the parliamentary democracy, sovereignty of the people, 
Chapter 6 194
the separation of powers and systems of government such as 
those based upon a system of ministerial accountability (SOU, 
1983:41-42). With regards to constitutional terminology the au-
dience is exposed to a range of citations from the Swedish Con-
stitution, as well as statements from various legal commentators 
about the implications of constitutional articles for more active 
steering of the administration (SOU, 1983:43-49). Indeed, these 
provided much of the evidence for the legitimacy of more ac-
tive government steering of the administration. In addition, al-
though references to the complexity of society are rather cur-
sory, they still provided a signal to an academic audience with 
the capacity to connect these to their knowledge about theories 
of the state in (post industrial) society. Finally, the speaker also 
paid reference to scientific evidence through the provision of a 
number of statistics describing the growth of agency tasks and 
their regulation. These features of the text all require the audi-
ence to have rather extensive knowledge of political science 
ideas in order to process the evidence presented.  
Associated with the academic political science elements of 
the argumentation was the attention for political-administrative 
history in Sweden. In some cases this occurred in a rather cur-
sory way, as if to attend to some important dates in Swedish 
political history (eg. SOU, 1983:35, 39), but on other occasions 
this occurred in such a detailed way that a particular expert au-
dience is being constructed. For example there was extensive 
analysis of the relationship between the administration and 
government in Sweden, and, the history of dualism (SOU, 
1983:37-43). This examination included descriptions of earlier 
commission proposals to change the relationship between the 
government and the administration, and references to the cir-
cumstances that reigned during these periods. It also identified 
origins of the tradition of agency independence in Sweden and 
the relatively weak position of departments with reference to 
the absolute monarchy in Sweden. A number of the problems 
that can be attached to dualism in the Swedish state are given 
an historical perspective such as double work, weak harmony 
and unclear accountability relationships. This constructed an 
expert audience interested in political -administrative history.  
Finally, an audience of politicians is another particular audi-
ence being constructed throughout the argumentation. This was 
reflected in the devotion of the speaker to a range of citations 
from parliamentarians and their concerns about the Swedish 
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administration (SOU, 1983:9-12). These included citations 
about the lack of oversight of agencies' regulations and activi-
ties, oversight of their board composition and corporate charac-
ter, and the weak position of the citizen against such monolithic 
bureaucracy. More generally, there was some element of sympa-
thy being expressed for the politician given the growth of the 
state, which would appeal to politicians. By contrast, there is no 
reference to the perspectives of civil servants or agency director 
generals. 
6.6.1.2 Premises of argumentation  
Premises of argumentation based upon the structure of reality 
included the truth that complexity in the world, and with it the 
expansion of the state more generally, has brought with it the 
problem of unsteerability. The commission pointed to debates in 
the international community about the industrial worlds' growth 
and its consequences for simultaneously reducing the ability of 
governments to steer, as well as strengthening bureauracracy's 
position as an independent power (SOU, 1983:17). Although 
there was no detailed analysis of this debate, it acted as a truth 
in the argumentation because it depends upon a system of 
thought relating a range of facts about society, government and 
the administration. It provided the backdrop throughout the ar-
gumentation for the focus upon steering and thereby acted to 
give urgency to the themes being discussed by the commission. 
Fleeting reference to komplexitet [complexity] and the expansion 
of the state occurred throughout the argumentation (SOU, 
1983:17,63, 95, 96) and acted to reinforce to the audience that 
the matter of steering should be addressed. It also promoted 
the credibility of the speaker as familiar with international and 
academic accounts of the state of play. 
Related to this truth was the fact of the independence of 
Swedish agencies, as a premise of the argumentation. This was a 
starting point of the argumentation that the commission then 
sought to explain in its analysis. Together with the observation 
of complexity and its consequences for the bureaucracy as an 
independent power, it was also noted that "Våra statliga myn-
digheter karaktäriseras sedan länge av en betydande 
självständighet" (SOU, 1983:17) [Our state agencies have for 
long time been characterized by significant independence]. The 
assessment of the relationship between government and agen-
cies therefore required an analysis of its independence, which is 
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all the more important given the complexity of the state and 
problems regarding its ostyrbarhet [unsteerability]. Together with 
the fact of agency independence, and the truth of complexity, 
was another fact that democratic steering has been insufficient. 
These starting points in the argumentation all made it possible 
to then reconsider the arrangements in Sweden that limit politi-
cal control, and focus upon the administration as a problem for 
democracy.  
Presumptions that provided the starting points of argumen-
tation included the presumption that there is a motivation 
within the political system for government members to steer 
and be accountable for agencies. This presumption was re-
flected in the various references to complexity and state expan-
sion as the primary reasons for the delegation of tasks and re-
sponsibilities to agencies. Perceptions of the constitution were 
also identified as a cause of the lack of steering, while political 
motivations remained undiscussed or were only given very cur-
sory attention. Indeed, in many parts of the text the politician 
was presented as a victim of the growth of the state with little 
handlingsfrihet (room for negotiation). A second presumption 
was that the system of representative democracy in its most tra-
ditional form is capable of providing a means for achieving 
meaningful government accountability. The commission made a 
plea for more meaningful accountability relationships within the 
accountability chain. This is a chain with links from the people to 
parliament to government and to the administration. More ac-
tive government steering was justified because then it can sat-
isfy demands of accountability to parliament. This supposed 
large information processing capacities on behalf of the gov-
ernment, as well as an interest in the management activities of 
agencies within parliament. Only cursory mention was made of 
other forms of steering and accountability eg. through decen-
tralization to local communities, at the end of the document.  
The starting points regarding the desirable in the argumenta-
tion included the primacy of the values of political accountabil-
ity and legality. Indeed, it was for the value of democracy more 
generally that the analysis of steerability was being conducted in 
the report. This was reflected in the focus upon the Constitu-
tion as the only criterion for assessing the capacity of the gov-
ernment to steer the administration and in various other de-
mocracy artefacts presented in the document, such as state-
ments from politicians and public law experts or descriptions of 
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the Swedish democratic system. The focus upon steering in the 
argumentation was primarily pursued because of the conse-
quences for democracy from a lack of steering. The report 
stated: 
 
Frågor som tidigare avgjordes av de politiska organen hanteras nu av myn-
digheterna själva….Dessa tendenser har aktualiserat en rad spörsmål kring 
de förtroendevaldas reella kompetens att styra den offentliga sektorn och 
kring förvaltningens demokratiska legitimitet (SOU, 1983:95). 
 
[Questions that were earlier decided upon by political organs are now man-
aged by agencies themselves….these developments have raised a range of 
questions about the real competence of democratically elected representa-
tives to steer the public sector, and about the democratic legitimacy of the 
administration]. 
 
Or, with regards to accountability in democracy: 
För att regeringens ansvar inför riksdagen och riksdagens ansvar inför folket 
skall ha en reell innebörd måste de båda statsmakterna också ha förutsätt-
ningar att bestämma inriktningen av det arbete som bedrivs i förvaltningen 
(SOU, 1983:18). 
 
[In order to give real content to the government's accountability to the par-
liament, and parliament’s accountability to the people, both state powers 
must also have the necessary conditions to decide the direction of the work 
that is conducted in the administration.] 
 
In these statements the democratic system was presented as re-
quiring a hierarchical relationship between the government and 
the administration, where agencies are to be the tool [redskap] 
for actualizing the government's intentions (SOU, 1983:58). 
The article of the Constitution "förvaltningsmyndigheten lyder 
under regering" [agencies are subordinate to the government] 
was cited to achieve this view of democracy. Furthermore, it 
was against this vision of the democratic system that the inde-
pendence of the administration was presented as a problem in 
the argumentation. This problem was expressed as follows: 
 
Klart är emellertid att betydande uppgifter successivt har överförts från de 
politiska till de administrativa organen utan att de samlade effekterna på det 
demokratiska systemets funktionsduglighet har prövats (SOU, 1983:98).  
 
[It is clear, however, that significant tasks have successively been handed 
over from political to the administrative organs without examining the ac-
cumulated effects on the democratic system’s functional competencies]. 
 
Indeed, agency independence was presented in general as being 
inconsistent with the democratic system, and with it the sover-
eignty of the people. 
With regards to a hierarchy of values, it was also observed 
that although the commission expressed a preference for the 
subordination of the administration to government as central to 
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the good functioning of democracy, in particular kinds of legal 
cases, agency independence was considered a higher value. This 
was discussed with reference to the article RF 11:7 of the Swed-
ish Constitution which rejects the right of an external power to 
direct the application of law by an agency towards a private in-
dividual or other actor in a particular case (SOU, 1983:44). It 
was explained: 
 
Förvaltningsmyndigheternas grundlagsskyddade frihet att bestämma efter 
eget omdöme syftar primärt till att garantera rättssäkerhet vid förvalt-
ningsmyndighets myndighetsutövning eller tillämpning av lag… (SOU, 
1983:39). 
 
[Agencies constitutionally protected freedom to decide according to their 
own judgement aims primarily to guarantee the rule of law in the administra-
tion’s exercise of authority or application of law...] 
Regeringsformens bestämmelser om förvaltningsmyndigheternas ställning 
avser som nämnts att ge garantier för myndigheternas oberoende vid 
handläggningen av vissa ärenden och uttrycker rättssäkerhetskrav (SOU, 
1983:46).  
 
[The constitutions prescription’s about agencies’ position exists, as men-
tioned, to give a guarantee for agencies’ independence of certain assignments 
and expresses the demand for the rule of law.] 
 
Although much of the argumentation around this article of the 
Constitution was concerned to demonstrate that it is only appli-
cable in a limited area of agency activities (regarding the exer-
cise of their legal authority towards individuals), it remained ex-
onerated from government steering.  
The preference for quantitative loci was prominent in the ar-
gumentation, particularly in its discussion of the causes of the 
growth in agency independence. For example this was demon-
strated with reference to the increase in the number of tasks the 
authorities have become responsible for or the number of regu-
lations that they create. Tables and graphs with statistical in-
formation are used to illustrate this growth (SOU, 1983:66-69). 
Even when the commission claimed to be presenting qualitative 
evidence of the growth in agency independence, this informa-
tion was presented by emphasizing the quantitative aspect of 
this evidence. For example, the report claimed that the kinds of 
laws and budgets which agencies have been subject to have 
changed in a way that gives them greater influence upon the 
content of their activities, this was argued to be a qualitative 
change. There was, however, no indication about the way such 
influence has been used in practice, rather there was only a fo-
cus upon the increase in the use of these kinds of laws or budget 
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frames. In addition, quantitative argumentation was used in the 
prescriptions of the report. For example it stated that one desir-
able way to make the relations between the administration and 
the political sphere more democratic was to have more political 
steering. There was also reference to increasing steerability (SOU, 
1983:105). 
Besides the strong quantitative locus, the qualitative locus of 
the precarious was used in two important ways to sensitize the 
audience to greater concern for the desirability of stronger po-
litical steering. First, there was an emphasis upon historical ex-
planations with attention for the history of the relationship be-
tween ministries and agencies. The origins of dualism was ex-
plained by describing agencies acquisition of an independent 
position from ministries, as a consequence of the king disallow-
ing ministers strong powers of authority over the administration 
(SOU, 1983:38). This encouraged the audience to reconsider 
the tradition of agency independence in Sweden. It occurred 
together with an account of the various proposals to change the 
weak position of departments and ministers throughout the 
1800s and in the early 1900s (SOU, 1983: 37-42). It was noted 
for example that past commissions have even favored a tradi-
tion of ministerial accountability by virtue of the dissatisfaction 
with Swedish arrangements, although it is stated “tiden var inte 
mogen härför” (SOU, 1983:41). [The time was not right for 
this]. Together with the observations of the speaker that the re-
cent focus upon the administration in Sweden during the 1970s 
and 1980s  made the space for serious discussion about agency 
independence (SOU, 1983:16), an appeal was made to the ar-
gumentative power of timeliness. Timeliness is described as be-
ing based upon the qualitative value of precariousness (Perel-
man and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2003:91). The transitory state of af-
fairs, in this case constitutional debate and reconsideration of 
agency independence, were presented as an opportunity for 
making change, which was also being shown through the ac-
count of history to be overdue. Given that one of the main ar-
guments of the commission was that widespread perceptions 
about the (constitutional) correctness of agency independence 
are wrong, the use of qualitative loci was not surprising.  
A second way the precarious locus was used is in descrip-
tions of the need for more democratic steering. This need was 
described against the background of growing bureaucratic 
power. The position of the political sphere was argued to have 
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weakened because of the increasing strength of organized inter-
ests and the expertise of the administration, which has also 
taken over many political responsibilities (SOU 1983:17). More 
democratic steering was presented as necessary because other-
wise democracy, where the political sphere determines the in-
tentions of, and steers the activities of the state, is under threat. 
This urged the audience to see that agency independence is in-
deed a problem.  
6.6.1.3 The techniques of argumentation 
It was primarily quasi-logical techniques that were used to es-
tablish that the steering of agencies is a legitimate activity of the 
government and that agency independence has only limited 
constitutional recognition. In addition, techniques based upon 
the structure of reality, such as the causal link, were used to ex-
plain the growth in agency independence. In addition, meta-
phors and arguments of dis-sociation were identified.  
The division of the whole into its parts, definition and com-
parison were all used to demonstrate government steering of 
the administration is legitimate. The Constitution played a cen-
tral role in this argumentation because it is the source of many 
of the definitions identified and compared. Division of the 
whole and its parts was achieved together with the definition of 
the central principle in the Swedish state being described as an 
"ansvarskedja i fyra länkar" [responsibility chain in four links] 
(SOU, 1983:16). This chain includes the members of parliament 
elected by the people (1), the prime minister (2) elected by the 
parliament, who then selects government ministers (3), and, the 
administration (4) who is linked to government. This definition 
included a system of relationships between the different parts 
of the Swedish state, in which the administration was presented 
as subordinate to government in order that the people be 
served. The relationship between these parts were presented as 
follows: 
 
Det demokratiska statsskicket innebär samtidigt att det måste råda en stark 
samstämmighet mellan förvaltningen och de politiska organen. All offentlig 
makt utgår enligt regeringsformen från folket. Riksdagen är folkets främsta 
företrädare. Regering styr riket och är ansvarig inför riksdagen. För att rege-
ringens ansvar inför riksdag och riksdagens ansvar inför folket skall ha en 
reell innebörd måste de både statsmakterna också ha förutsättningar att be-
stämma inriktningen av det arbete som bedrivs I förvaltningen (SOU 
1983:17-18). 
 
[The democratic state structure entails at the same time that there must be a 
strong concordance between the administration and the political organs. All 
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public power emanates, according to the constitution, from the people. The 
parliament is the people's primary respresentative. Government steers the 
country and is responsible to the parliament. In order that there be real con-
tent to the government’s responsibility to the parliament, and to the parlia-
ment's responsibility to the people, both state powers also require the condi-
tions to decide the direction and the work conducted in the administration.] 
 
Government steering is necessary in this system for it to be ac-
countable to parliament, while conversely too much administra-
tive independence was argued to disrupt this accountability to 
parliament, and it in turn to the people. A mathematical rela-
tionship was assigned to the parts of the Swedish state in which 
increased responsibility in one part, such as the administration, 
results in a reduction of the capacity of other parts to be re-
sponsible eg. the government to the parliament. With the ex-
ception of certain legal decisions that are discussed later in the 
argumentation, this responsibility chain enabled the speaker to 
identify administrative independence as incompatible with the 
Swedish state tradition. 
Definition was also used to amplify the mathematical rela-
tionships between the parts, wherein four types of public power 
are defined. These included regulative powers, financial powers, 
the appointment powers and the control power (SOU, 1983:19-
29). All of these types of powers were defined quite precisely 
with some references to the Constitution. It was noted that 
some of these kinds of powers such as the regulative and pre-
scriptive powers were delegated to the administration. Together 
with the chain of responsibility that is to accumulate into ac-
countability to the people, the description of delegations in the 
use of public power aided in demonstrating that the acquired 
independence of the administration from these shifts was inap-
propriate. 
A second way in which definition was used, together with 
comparison, was in the presentation of the articles of the Con-
stitution which recognize agencies subordination to govern-
ment and the independence of agencies in questions of law. 
The article referring to agency independence was cited as fol-
lows: 
 
Ingen myndighet, ej heller riksdagen eller kommuns beslutande organ, får 
bestämma, hur förvaltningsmyndighet skall i särskilt fall besluta i ärende som 
rör myndighetsutövning mot enskild eller mot kommun eller som rör 
tillämpning av lag (SOU, 1983:44).  
 
[No authority/agency, nor parliament or municipal decision making organ, 
can decide, how an agency shall, in the individual case, decide in assignments 
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concerning exercise of agencies’ public authority towards individuals or 
communes or that concern the application of law.] 
 
It was then compared to the activities that agencies undertake 
in order to identify how extensive this immunity from govern-
ment subordination is. Another definition was introduced, the 
definition of factual activities of agencies, as opposed to the areas 
of work requiring the application of law. Factual activities were 
argued to constitute a large area of agency work including 
health care and education. A comparison with what the Consti-
tution states and this large area of factual activities enabled the 
speaker to demonstrate that the constitutional sanctioning of 
agency independence was snäv [narrow] and applies only to lim-
ited areas of agency work. The commission writes: 
 
Regeringsformen (RF 11:7) reglerar endast förvaltningsmyndigheternas 
handläggning av ärenden och behandlar inte deras s.k faktiska handlande. 
Vad avses då med begreppet faktiskt handlande?Hit hänförs uppgifter som 
har karaktär av service eller prestationer till den enskilde, t.ex. undervisning 
sjukvård, kommunikationer, men även informerande, rådgivande eller opini-
onsbildande uppgifter (SOU, 1983:46) 
 
[The constitution (RF 11:7) regulates only agencies management of assign-
ments and not their factual actions. What is then meant with the concept 
factual activities? This includes tasks that have the character of service or 
performance to the individual, eg. education, healthcare, communication, 
but also informational, advisory or opinion setting tasks.] 
 
By comparing simplified definitions regarding what the Consti-
tution says and what agencies do, in order to demonstrate that 
the legal basis for agency independence is limited, the commis-
sion sought to show their audience that limited independence is 
self evident and rational. They relied, it should be noted, on the 
audiences’ acceptance that these definitions are clear and un-
equivocal. In terms of arguing that existing agency independ-
ence is a problem for democracy, the demonstration of limited 
reference to agency independence in the Constitution also in-
vited the reader to compare it with their discussion of growing 
agency independence. Since this was then presented in the fol-
lowing chapter of the report. The comparison with formal con-
stitutional rule provided the basis for the proposition that 
agency independence as a legal category has been misunder-
stood in Sweden. Although clearly a quasi-logical operation was 
taking place in the discussion of the Constitution and its appli-
cation in practice, its use in the argumentation may also be in-
terpreted as argument by authority. This is because of the status 
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of the Constitution itself as the authority on what is right to do 
within the political administrative system. 
Before proceeding to the arguments based upon the struc-
ture of reality, techniques using dissociation were also be identi-
fied as contributing to the argument that strong agency inde-
pendence has been misunderstood in Sweden. These are argu-
ments that break connecting links in a concept in order to show 
an incompatibility. In this report a distinction was made be-
tween formal or rather legally prescribed independence and the 
customary or factual independence that agencies have. By con-
structing these two ways of considering independence, it be-
came possible for the commission to express to the audience 
that although the independence of agencies has been extensive 
in Sweden, this is not consistent with the independence pre-
scribed them in the Constitution. References to this distinction 
between customary and factual independence included the fol-
lowing: 
 
En orsak är att de rådande föreställningarna om statsskicket ännu är färgarde 
av 1809 års regeringform; en annan att de också har influerats av en sedvan-
erättslig doktrin som vuxit fram vid sidan om och delvis i strid med den skrivna 
grundlagen (SOU, 1983:106). 
 
[One reason is that the prevailing ideas about the state system today are still 
colored by the 1809 Constitution; another (reason) is that it has also been in-
fluenced by customary doctrine that has grown along side and partly in stride 
with, the written constitution.] 
  
More active steering from the political sphere was thereby iden-
tified as essential, not only because it is legally sanctioned and 
essential to democracy, but also in order to change a misin-
formed custom (SOU, 1983:106). 
Arguments based upon the structure of reality included the 
causal link to establish that agency independence has grown. As 
noted above, a starting point in the argumentation was that 
agencies have strong independence in Sweden. By demonstrat-
ing how this independence had grown (and become a problem 
for democracy) therefore became a central occupation of the 
commission. Indeed, the entire fourth chapter was devoted to 
identifying causes of increasing agency independence. They 
identified four clusters of change that have increased agency in-
dependence and thereby reduced government steering. The 
clusters included (1) development of many big agencies, decen-
tralization of authority to agencies in form of frame laws and 
frame budgeting (2) increasing competence and security of em-
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ployment of public servants (3) increasing influence of board 
members, and, (4) steering from outside of government (SOU, 
1983:63). All of these factors were associated with the expan-
sion and complexity of the state more generally. Their impact 
upon agency independence relied upon the audience's willing-
ness to accept such a causal relationship as reasonable. In this 
particular case, they also acted to divert attention somewhat 
from other possible causes such as the responsibility of the po-
litical sphere itself for the growth of agency independence.   
Among the metaphors used to obtain the audience’s agree-
ment that government steering of the administration is neces-
sary and legitimate, was the term steering itself. This is used fre-
quently throughout the document and in combination with a 
number of other terms such as democratic steering or political steer-
ing. The metaphor of steering gave the impression that the ad-
ministration can be controlled to go in a particular direction, it 
sounded, particularly in combination with the word democratic, 
less confronting than control. An example of how democratic 
steering is used in the argumentation included the following:  
 
Ett genomgående tema…av tilläggsuppdraget kan sägas vara att den demok-
ratiska styrningen av den statliga verksamheten idag är otillräcklig (SOU, 
1983:12, 16).  
 
[A pervading theme…of the additional directive can be said to be that the 
democratic steering of the state activities today is insufficient]. 
 
Other metaphors that give a physical dimension to the argu-
mentation included the descriptions of relationships between 
the administration and the political sphere as requiring more 
balance or being imbalanced (SOU, 1983:96). Similarly, references 
to the lack of space for political steering provided the audience 
with an image of the problem of the political sphere. Another 
association between physical attributes and the ideas being 
promoted in the argumentation was government steering being 
described as strengthening democracy and the state. 
With regard to the use of the term democracy throughout 
the argumentation, it was noted that it also relied upon meta-
phorical characterizations. Not least among these, the notion of 
a responsibility chain, linking the different parts of the state sys-
tem. This acted to promote acceptance of the idea that respon-
sibility can be achieved because the parts of the system are 
linked. It may also be argued that democracy itself is a dormant 
metaphor throughout the argumentation. This is because it was 
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used metaphorically when in combination with such terms as 
steering or system, but also because it appeared without 
explaining exactly what it is or how government steering can 
ensure more democracy. Democracy itself was also provided as 
a reason for more steering within the administration, without 
any further meaning being offered about what more democracy 
will entail. 
6.6.2 Document two - Regeringen myndigheterna och myndigheternas 
ledning 
The second report analyzed is Regeringen, myndigheterna och myn-
digheternas ledning [Government, agencies and agencies' management]. 
This report was first commissioned in July 1983 by the newly 
elected Social Democratic government to follow up upon the 
recommendations of the earlier report Politisk styrning-
administrativ självständighet [Political steering-administrative independ-
ence]. More specifically, Regeringen, myndigheterna och myndigheternas 
ledning [Government, agencies and agencies' management] focused upon 
the two paths for improving political steering that were identi-
fied at the end of Politisk styrning- administrativ självständighet [Po-
litical stryning-administrativ självständighet]. These included bringing 
back decision making competence to the political sphere and 
increasing the political influence upon management organs of 
agencies (SOU, 1985:33). Commission members appointed 
were a former Director of Statskontoret [Agency for Public 
Management] as Chairman, five members of parliament, two 
Professors of Political Science, Prof. Daniel Tarchys and Olof 
Ruin, and civil servants, including one from RRV [National 
Audit Agency] (Sundström, 2003:212-214). Sundström has de-
scribed it as a somewhat multicoloured [brokig] commission 
because of the different expertise and interests the various 
members brought with them from different financial agencies 
e.g. Statskontoret and RRV, and their involvement in earlier 
commissions eg. Daniel Tarchys who contributed to the previ-
ous report (Sundström, 2003:213). Nevertheless, the financial 
expertise represented among their members and their historical 
interests in management by results was significantly greater 
among these members than those represented on the other re-
ports analyzed in this study. The report is some 292 pages long 
with four chapters focusing upon strengthening government's 
decision-making competence over the administration (chapters 
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2-5) and six chapters devoted to analyzing the political influ-
ence upon management organs in agencies (chapters 6 -11).  
Among the topics dealt with to promote government's deci-
sion-making competence were legislative guidelines (chapter 2), 
budgetary steering (chapter 3) and informal contacts (chapter 
5), while promoting political influence on management included 
chapters on the history of boards and advice counsels (chapter 
6), analysis of existing board arrangements (chapter 7), princi-
ples regarding the appointment of board members (chapter 8), 
and the appointment of agency directors (chapter 9). Besides 
the chapters that examined the two paths to improved political 
steering, there was also a chapter at the beginning of the report 
describing the points of departure [utgångspunkter] (chapter 1) 
and four chapters at the end of the report describing its applica-
tion, consequences and costs (chapters 12 - 16).  
In its presentation of the questions the commission was to 
assess, explicit connection was made with the findings of the 
previous report. These connections included not only the focus 
upon strengthening political steering in the two earlier identified 
ways, but also accepting the previous reports interpretation of 
the constitution. Indeed, the commission expressed constitu-
tional prescriptions regarding the steering of agencies in far less 
uncertain terms than the previous document such as the follow-
ing: 
 
Utredningens (Politisk styrning - administrativ självständighet) bestämda 
slutsats var den att bestämmelserna i regeringsformen inte reser några bes-
värande hinder för regeringen att styra de statliga myndigheterna på det sätt 
och i den omfattning som i varje situation befinnes önskvärd (SOU, 
1985:14). 
 
[The commission’s (Political steering-administrative independence) final 
conclusion was that the prescriptions in the constitution do not raise any 
troublesome hinderance for the government to steer state agencies in the 
way, and to the extent that is considered desirable in every situation.] 
 
There are important distinctions to note in the role that is at-
tributed to the administration for requiring more and better po-
litical steering. In the previous report the desire for better po-
litical steering was expressed against the background of increas-
ing political authority being handed over to the administration, 
which in its turn enhanced the independence of the administra-
tion. In this report, however, the desire for political steering 
was expressed against the background of an increasing techno-
cratic state that is insensitive and closed to the political inten-
tions of government and parliament (SOU 1985:13). It referred 
Sweden  207 
to "oro över att den statliga byråkratin blivit för okänslig för riksdagens 
och regeringens styrsignaler" [concern regarding the state bureauc-
racy becoming insensitive to parliament’s and government's 
steering signals]. This departed somewhat from the characteri-
zation of the problem in Politisk styrning - administrativ 
självständighet which emphasized the undemocratic nature of the 
bureaucracy and lack of political freedom (for politicians) to 
negotiate because political decisions had been handed over to 
independent agencies. Although there were different reasons 
identified for the sources of the need for improved political 
steering in both reports, this remained unrecognized in the 
presentation of the background to the problems in Regering, 
myndigheternas och myndigheternas ledning. Instead, the focus upon 
the connections between both reports in its introduction gave 
the impression that it was merely adding to the findings of the 
previous report.  
In order to improve and make more effective the political 
steering of the administration, the commission identified in ex-
cess of 70 recommendations (SOU, 1985:24-29). These range 
from observations that the Constitution gives the government 
satisfactory authority to steer agencies (SOU, 1985:40, 24), or 
that informal contacts between agencies and departments be 
developed (SOU, 1985:40, 26), to quite detailed adjustments to 
the budget such as its timing and the documents delivered 
(SOU, 1985:24-25).  The chapters analyzed in this section in-
clude those on the budget (chapter 3) and on the appointment 
of director generals and their employment conditions (chapter 
10). I have also noted some of the findings in chapter 5 on in-
formal contacts. In the case of the budget these recommenda-
tions included a shift to a three-year budget wherein the gov-
ernment sets agency specific directives for agencies, on the ba-
sis of in depth reporting from agencies every three years.  
With regards to the appointment of director generals, the 
recommendations included a review of the appointment after 
the first six years, with reappointment possible for a shorter pe-
riod of time than six years. A limit of 18 years in the position 
was also recommended. Furthermore they recommended that 
recruitment for director generals be actively sought outside of 
the activity area and that units be established for director gener-
als in the departments which enabled the government to trans-
fer director generals of agencies.  
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6.6.2.1 Ethos and the construction of the audience 
As in the previous document, the speaker attended to a broad 
concern for democracy in the presentation of its problem analy-
sis. This occurred through various references to the democratic 
system, as well as the threat that it was under given the growth 
of the bureaucracy as an independent power (SOU, 1985:40). 
Credibility was established through cursory reference to politial 
theories about the growth of the state, although there was no 
reference to accountability as there was in the previous docu-
ment. The political sphere (parliament and government) was 
identified as the only power that could keep the threat to the 
weakening of democracy at bay (SOU 1985:13). Furthermore, 
references to Swedish democratic traditions such as the consti-
tution and the history of the board system, constructed a uni-
versal audience that is proud of its democracy and wants to pre-
serve it. Another universal good thing that was presented con-
cerned effectiveness, which is equated by the speaker with 
promoting democracy.  
Against the background of these broader concerns and 
themes (which are most prominent in the introduction of the 
text), the speaker's self-presentation also included a concern for 
very practical solutions to the problem of steering. A particular 
management ethos was pursued wherein budgetary concepts 
and employment conditions were central. Once democratic le-
gitimacy for steering was established, the focus shifted very 
quickly and narrowly to techniques to improve the management 
and steering of agencies. The analysis being presented relied 
primarily upon budgetary and accounting concepts (eg. statens 
ekonomiadministrativ system (SEA) [the states economic ad-
ministrative system], anslagframställningarna [appropriation 
proposals], ränteinkomsterna [interest income]), as well as an 
overview of the employment conditions of agency director gen-
erals. In both cases statistical information was used to support 
the management analysis. In the case of employment conditions 
of agency director generals, the focus was upon creating the in-
centives for greater mobility and effectiveness. In addition, the 
central goals of promoting values of effectiveness and flexibil-
ity, as well as some reference to ways of working in the private 
sector, all contributed to the construction of a particular audi-
ence primarily concerned with the financial management of the 
administration. The appeal to such a particular audience was 
also evident in the call for the role of director generals to be-
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come a profession in itself with its own (financial) management 
values (SOU, 1985:166), rather than other kinds of expertise. 
The speaker also paid consideration to the plight of agency 
director generals that can be interpreted as a construction of 
them as a particular audience. This occurred through the pres-
entation of interview statements from director generals and 
demonstrated that they too will benefit from the proposals of 
the commission. For example, references were made to director 
generals that showed their dissatisfaction with existing budget-
ary arrangements and the interplay with departments through-
out the budgetary process (SOU, 1985:68). In the presentation 
of proposals for initiatives to promote the mobility of agency 
director generals such as the possibility for shorter second 
terms, it was noted that the current length of time is experi-
enced as oppressive (SOU 1985:170). Finally, much of the analysis 
was concerned to make the introduction of greater mobility, a 
possibility within financial sanctions for director generals. All 
these features of the text acted to construct a concern for the 
particular audience of agency director generals. 
6.6.2.2 Premises of argumentation 
The argumentation rested upon a number of agreements re-
garding the structure of reality. Among these are the truth that 
the complexity of the industrialized world, and with it the 
growth of the state, had created a situation in which the need 
for specialists within the bureaucracy have also made it insensi-
tive to government steering (SOU, 1985:13). I have interpreted 
this as a truth because it borrows from political theories criticiz-
ing the corporatist state. It posed that the growth of special in-
terests outside of the state and their influence within the state, 
together with a growing technocracy, led to decisions being 
made outside of the political arena. Against the background of 
this view of reality, it became more reasonable to make the ar-
guments in the document for more extensive and precise gov-
ernment steering. This was a slightly different premise to that 
found in the previous report which attributed political decisions 
being made in the bureaucracy as a consequence of the com-
plexity of problems and government handing them over to the 
administration.  The truth regarding the insensitivity of the bu-
reaucracy was revealed in the following citations: 
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Under årtionden pekat på tendenser i samhällsutveckling som alla haft det 
gemensamt att de försvårar för de politiska makthavarna i industrivärldens 
demokratier att hålla den växande byråkratin stången (SOU, 1985:13). 
 
[Throughout decades, tendencies in societies development have been noted, 
which have in common that they make it more difficult for the political 
powers in the democracies of the industrial world, to hold the growing bu-
reaucracy at bay.] 
 
Or 
 
Den statliga verksamhetens allt större komplexitet har lett till en ökad spe-
cialisering hos myndigheter och tjänstemän (SOU, 1985:41). 
 
[The extensive complexity of the state's activities has lead to increasing spe-
cialization among agencies and their civil servants].  
 
And 
 
…Politikerna blir därmed i allt högre grad beroende av experter, som gör 
sina bedömningar ur en vetenskaplig eller teknisk synvinkel, utan att väga in 
politiska krav och utan at ta hänsyn till helheten (SOU, 1985:42) 
 
[…Politicians thereby become, in a higher degree dependent on experts, 
who make their judgements from a scientific or technical perspective, with-
out considering political demands and without consideration for the whole]. 
 
It was because of the truth of the closed bureaucracy and its un-
democratic nature that it was argued that the government must 
steer through more precise demands upon the bureaucracy and 
through influencing the kinds of management that are ap-
pointed within the administration. 
In addition, there were agreements about a number of facts 
that are also relied upon to make the argumentation in the text. 
This included the fact that the Swedish state is struggling finan-
cially and has only limited resources to conduct its activities. 
The fact of limited finances provided a basis for focusing upon 
techniques of financial steering. Both in the opening chapters to 
the report and in the chapter on budget steering it was noted 
for example: 
 
Att budgetstyrningen måste fungera väl har i takt med de ökade kraven på 
statsförvaltningens effektivitet blivit allt viktigare, inte minst som en följd av 
de minskade budgetramarna (SOU, 1985:61). 
 
[That the budget steering must function well has, together with the increas-
ing demands on the public administration’s effectiveness, become all the 
more important, not least as a consequence of the reduced budget frames.] 
Or 
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För regeringens del kan det betyda att fatta mycket mer precisa beslut, ofta 
av föga populär natur, om den fortsatta färdriktningen för enskilda myn-
digheter inom ramen för krympande resurser (SOU, 1985:14).  
 
[For the government's part, it can mean that they have to make more precise 
decisions, often of an unpopular nature, about the future directions for indi-
vidual agencies within the frames of shrinking resources.] 
 
The urgency which is associated with the crimping resources of 
the Swedish state also legitimized the focus upon the govern-
ment being very precise about the activities it requires of the 
administration.  
Another agreed upon fact from which the argumentation 
departed was the fact that the Constitution, and it would seem 
nothing else, defined what kind of steering the government is 
able to pursue legitimately. This fact was illustrated by the vari-
ous references to the Constitution and its role as a source of au-
thority for the focus upon government steering throughout the 
argumentation. 
Among the agreed upon presumptions implicit to the argu-
mentation, was the presumption that the government has the 
resources and knowledge to steer the administration precisely. 
This presumption was reflected in the view that more precise 
steering is a realistic solution to reduce the insensitivity of the 
administration. The reliance upon the view that the government 
was able to be precise in its steering was reflected in the various 
references to the capacity of government to set precise goals for 
the administration in the budget (See SOU, 1985:4, 15, 64). It 
was also reflected in a number of statements emphasizing the 
need of government to clarify their role and also that of manag-
ers within the administration, and of government to be able to 
identify suitable managers (SOU, 1985:165). At no point in this 
discussion was mention made of the possibility that it may be 
difficult to be precise and clear in steering arrangements. In the 
arguments about changing the budgetary process, the presump-
tion of precise government steering was presented with the pre-
sumption that agencies are able and will provide the necessary 
information for government to steer (SOU, 1985:69). This was 
evident from the recommendation that agencies themselves 
present the government with advice regarding how their activi-
ties can be developed (SOU, 1985:71).  
Furthermore there was a presumption that politicians are 
willing to steer the administration through clearer directions. 
This presumption was on the one hand evident in the recom-
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mendation that they should be able to steer more precisely but 
also on the other hand from the various aspects of reality that 
acted to blame their apparent lack of steering in the past on 
other factors. For example, the document identified the insensi-
tivity of the bureaucracy, the perceptions of the Constitution 
and shortage of time (another presumption) in the budget, as 
reasons as to why the government had not steered in the past. 
Except for one phrase identifying that the political sphere had 
avoided clarifying where cuts in agency budgets should be made 
(SOU 1985:66), there was little attention given to the possibility 
that the government and politicians more generally may not al-
ways be interested in steering the administration precisely. In-
stead it was simply observed that important decisions had been 
left over to agencies (SOU 1985: 43) 
Finally another presumption was that only the government 
and parliament were able to steer the administration in a de-
mocratic way. Indeed, it was stated at the outset of the report 
that "Det är den (the political powers) ensam som ser till hel-
heten och som kan hålla de andra krafterna stången" (SOU, 
1985:13). [It is it (the political powers) alone that considers the 
whole and can keep the other powers at bay]. Other indications 
that there was a presumption that the government is the most 
appropriate actor to steer, could be found in the exclusive focus 
upon the steering techniques available to government and the 
responsibility of parliament to stimulate government steering. 
Among the premises regarding the desirable it was clear that 
the values of effectiveness and democracy were central agree-
ments from which the argumentation departed. Frequent refer-
ence was made to the desire to attain greater effectiveness espe-
cially given the fact of limited resources. Such references in-
cluded the following: 
 
I direktiven …. statsmakternas krav på rationaliseringsinsatser och önskad 
effektivitetsutveckling och en begäran att myndigheten i sitt underlag re-
dogör för alternativa vägar att nå dess mål (SOU, 1985: 71). 
 
[In the directives…(there is) the state powers demand for rationalization, 
and desired improvements of effectiveness, as well as a demand upon agen-
cies to give alternative routes to meet their goals] 
  
In general the desire for increased effectiveness was associated 
with greater flexibility and sensitivity to the requirements of the 
government and parliament. The recommendations for changes 
to the management arrangements in agency boards and to di-
rector appointments were based upon the view that these func-
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tions should be filled in ways that were instrumental to the de-
cisions of government. In addition, the proposals for budgetary 
changes had a similar goal to ensure that government directs 
more clearly the way that effectiveness goals and other priorities 
should be achieved. This view of agencies as tools of govern-
ment was expressed as follows: 
 
Direktiven till kommittén betonar att ett grundläggande krav på den of-
fentliga förvaltningen är att den fungerar som ett effektivt redskap för att 
förverkliga riksdagens och regeringens intentioner. Att de krympande eko-
nomiska ramarna för den offentliga verksamheten ökar detta effek-
tivitetskrav framhålls också (SOU, 1985:31). 
 
[The directives to the committee emphasize the fundamental demand upon 
the public sector is that it functions as an effective tool for realizing) the par-
liament’s and government’s intentions. The shrinking economic frames for 
public activities also increases the stress placed upon this effectiveness de-
mand.] 
 
It was also expressed in various statements about obedience 
[lyhörd] to the directives of government and having a sensitive ear 
for their intentions. Democracy becomes an important value 
for the administrative reforms being proposed since, as is re-
flected in the above statements, it was interpreted as being obe-
dient to the demands of the political sphere. It should be noted 
that there were a couple of references to the desire for agencies 
to respond to those that they serve (SOU, 1985:31), aside from 
government, but these statements were never explained further. 
Since the attainment of effectiveness, as a central goal of the 
government, was presented as consistent with democracy, the 
argumentation did not base itself upon an existing hierarchy of 
values. The view of democracy being presented was a hierarchi-
cal one wherein the administration should be obedient to the 
desires of government, which in the case of this document was, 
the achievement of effectiveness.  
Therefore these values came to appear compatible with one 
another especially since there was never recognition that they 
may sometimes be incompatible with one another or with other 
goals in the administration. The premise that effectiveness and 
democracy are compatible were reflected in the speaker's atten-
tion to demonstrating that the Constitution recognizes that 
agencies are subordinate to the government (SOU, 1985:34-38) 
and therefore should be obedient to its desires for effectiveness. 
The compatibility of effectiveness and democracy was also 
brought together in another way, against the background of ex-
isting difficulties with steering: 
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Blir den offentliga sektorn alltför svårstyrd hotas inte bara effektiviteten utan 
även legitimiteten i det demokratiska systemet (SOU, 1985:33).  
 
[If the public sector becomes too difficult to steer, it is not only a threat to 
effectivenss but also to the legitimacy of the democratic system.]  
 
It was being proposed that in order to maintain the democratic 
system it was necessary that effectiveness be achieved.  
There was clearly a preference for a quantitative locus 
throughout the document. This was reflected in statements de-
scribing the changes to the budget requiring more precision (SOU, 
1985:16, 64), increased cost consciousness (SOU, 1985:64), in-
creased responsibility for agencies (SOU, 1985:43, 62, 63), in-
creased freedom (SOU, 1985:71, 75), and an increased long sightedness  
(SOU, 1985:65). Quantitative loci were also used in statements 
about increasing the mobility of agency director generals. Other 
ways in which quantitative loci was used was in the presentation 
of quantitative information about budget reporting (SOU, 
1985:65) and past experience with director appointments, such 
as figures on who had made their appointments or average 
length of tenure (SOU, 1985:166-169). There were nevertheless 
some qualitative loci including in particular the locus of the pre-
carious. This was used in two ways. In the first instance it was 
used in the claims that strengthened political steering was nec-
essary to keep the threat to democracy at bay. This was the 
threat presented by undemocratic powers such as organized in-
terests and expert bureaucrats with specialist but undemocratic 
interests. It was also reflected in statements about the time be-
ing right for budgetary changes. 
6.6.2.3 Techniques of argumentation 
The quasi-logical techniques adopted throughout the argumen-
tation included comparison. Early on in the document the 
speaker sought to establish agreement with the audience that it 
was possible and legitimate for the Swedish government to ac-
tively steer agencies. The Swedish Constitution played a promi-
nent role in this argumentation. Certain parts of the Constitu-
tion were presented and their application to the activities of 
agencies are compared and given different values. This discus-
sion took place under the sub-title Myndigheternas lydnadsplikt och 
självständighet [Agencies requirement of obedience and their in-
dependence]. It began by citing the paragraph in the Constitu-
tion that recognizes agencies to be subordinate to the govern-
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ment (SOU, 1985:34), and then went on to define the obedi-
ence requirement of agencies to the government's intentions as 
follows: 
 
Lydnadsplikten innebär att myndigheterna är skyldiga att följa de direktiv 
som regeringen meddelar. Och detta gäller både generalla föreskrifter och di-
rektiv som meddelas för särskilda fall (SOU 1985: 35).  
 
[The obedience requirement means that agencies have an obligation to fol-
low those directives that the government communicates. And this includes 
both general prescriptions and directives that are communciated for individ-
ual cases.] 
 
The commission also explained that the government in its law-
making capacities was able to ensure that agencies satisfied its 
intentions, even in individual cases, by taking new decisions in a 
matter that could be actual or by dispensing with its previous 
regulations (SOU, 1985:35). Possible application of the obedi-
ence requirement of agencies and their subordination to gov-
ernment was presented as being extensive. By contrast, the 
parts of the Constitution recognizing agency independence 
were presented as having limited application. This was reflected 
in the following statement that began the discussion on the 
constitutional recognition of agency independence: 
 
De statliga förvaltningsmyndigheterna har sedan länge en betydande själv-
ständighet. I RF finns emellertid endast ett fåtal bestämmelser som kan sägas 
gäller detta (SOU, 1985:35). 
 
[The state agencies have, for a long time, had significant independence. In 
the constitution, however, there are only a few statements that refer to this.] 
 
Four paragraphs of the Constitution, all relating to the applica-
tion of law, were then identified as having some reference to 
agency independence, with the most important of these being 
RF 11:7. The commission noted that in areas of law, particularly 
with regard to its application in individual cases (effecting citi-
zens for example), agencies in Sweden were required to take an 
objective position similar to the courts (SOU, 1985:36). It then 
went on to identify the areas that fell outside of agencies legal 
authority such as their factual activities [faktiskt handlande] (giving 
advice, security and care, education, building and transport), 
and areas of civil law (SOU, 1985:36-37). There was only one 
sentence devoted to identifying broadly the kinds of areas in 
which agencies' legal authority and independence applied. It sta-
ted: 
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Vid myndighetsutövning är det fråga om en myndighets ensidiga avgörande i 
kraft av en maktbefogenhet i förhållande till medborgarna. Med myndighet-
sutövning mot enskild avses sålunda "utövning mot enskild bestämma om 
förmån, rättighet, skyldighet, disciplinär bestraffning eller annat jämförbart 
förhållande" (SOU, 1985:36).  
 
[The exercise of agency authority concerns an agency’s one-sided decision to 
use authority in relation to citizens. With agencies exercise of authority to-
wards an individual is meant the “exercise towards an individual decision 
about benefits, rights, obligations, disciplinary sanction or another compara-
ble relationship.] 
 
This was then followed by statements regarding the kinds of ac-
tions the government could take, such as writing general guide-
lines, to steer agencies even in these areas and reference was 
made to the findings of the previous commission report (SOU, 
1985: 36-37). The conclusions were: 
 
RF slår klart och entydigt fast regeringens beslutanderätt över myndigheter-
na. Myndigheterna har att verkställa de beslut som regeringen fattar. Det 
förhållandet att myndigheterna har att på egen hand utan inblandning av re-
geringen eller någon annan besluta i vissa typer av ärende ändra inte på detta 
förhållande. Anser regeringen att de beslut som myndigherna fattar i sådan 
ärende strider mot sådan intentioner regeringen finner väsentliga, har rege-
ringen möjlighet och anledning att själv eller via förslag till riksdagen ändra 
på de regler som gäller för berörda myndighetsbeslut (SOU, 1985:38). 
 
[The constitution makes clear the government's decision right over agencies. 
Agencies must actualize the decision that the government makes. The 
proposition that agencies may take decisions in their own hands, without in-
terference from the government or someone else, in certain types of assign-
ments, does not change this relation. If the government thinks that the deci-
sion that an authority makes in such assignments is in opposition to the in-
tentions of the government, the government has the possibility and reason 
to change the rule concerning the agency's decision themself or via the par-
liament.] 
 
Or to put it more bluntly: 
 
RFs regler, främst i 11:6-7, utgör därför enligt kommittén en fullt tillräcklig 
grund för regeringen att styra sina myndighter precis så bestämt och i den 
omfattning som regeringen själv finner önskvärt och lämpligt i varje särskild 
situation (SOU, 1985:38). 
 
[The constitution’s articles, particularly in 11:6-7, include therefore, accord-
ing to the committee, sufficient grounds for the government to steer their 
agencies as precisely and as decisively as it considers desirable and suitable in 
every separate situation.]  
 
In other words, the paragraphs regarding agencies subordina-
tion and obedience to government in the constitution were pre-
sented as having a more extensive application than the refer-
ences to agencies' independence. Indeed, these were described 
as being relevant to only limited kinds of situations (note the 
quantitative loci), and even then, should be in accordance with 
Sweden  217 
the government's intentions which were presented as having 
overriding value. The argumentation took the form of a com-
parison between two parts of the constitution which described 
the relationship between the administration and the govern-
ment. This comparison ascribed different values to these differ-
ent paragraphs and lent them a quantitative appearance that 
promoted the view of the commission that there were no barri-
ers to government steering. 
A second type of quasi-logical technique that was identified 
in the argumentation is the technique of definition. This oc-
curred at the outset of the argumentation and aided in establish-
ing the formality of thought being presented. It also assisted in 
giving logic to the order of the presentation. The definitions 
provided were with respect to steering and included a distinc-
tion between direct steering and indirect steering. Direct steer-
ing was defined as those methods that sought to return political 
decision making capacities to the political sphere (SOU, 
1985:14). They included the government setting legislative 
guidelines and setting directives in the budget and were dis-
cussed in the first half of the report. Indirect steering by con-
trast was defined as activities to increase political influence over 
agencies management and included policies regarding the ap-
pointment of board members, agency directors and the organi-
zation of management in agencies. These activities coincided 
with the matters discussed in the second half of the report.  
Techniques based upon the structure of reality were also 
used throughout the argumentation. In particular, argument by 
authority was used to obtain acceptance of the introduction of 
budget reforms as an instrument for direct government steering 
and to obtain adherence regarding the commission's proposals 
for recruitment of agency director generals. Two different 
sources of authority were used to make these respective claims. 
With regards to direct steering of agencies via the budget, the con-
stitution was (again) cited as allowing a three-year budget, or 
rather as not disallowing it. The chapter on budget processes 
actually began with the observation that although the Constitu-
tion recognizes the parliament's right to decide upon the alloca-
tion of the state's means, it does not describe how the budget 
itself should be designed (SOU, 1985:61). It was stated: 
 
Men RF reglerar inte hur statsbudgeten och anslagssystemet skall utformas. 
Man har ansett att grundlagen inte skall lägga hinder i vägen för hur den stat-
liga budgetsystemet löpande skall förnyas (SOU, 1985:61).   
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[But the constitution does not regulate how the state budget and the appro-
priation system shall be designed. It should not present a hinderance to how 
the state budget system will be renewed on an ongoing basis).] 
 
Together with the earlier arguments that the government's con-
stitutional capacity to steer exceeded, or was prior to, agency 
independence, the discussion around the constitution's accep-
tance of budgetary reform acted further to move the audience 
to accept that steering through budgetary reform was a com-
pletely legitimate activity. Indeed, it followed from this discus-
sion of the Constitution's prescriptions regarding financial 
powers that the speaker proceeded to describe recent budgetary 
history, current troubles and proposed solutions. 
The commissions recommendations that government pursue 
a more active recruitment of agency directors was, by contrast, 
promoted by reference to the private sector. This occurred after 
making observations that the majority of appointments in agen-
cies had come from within the administration itself and to a 
much more limited extent from politics (SOU, 1985:166-167). 
It was noted: 
 
I diskussionen om delegationens befogenheter gjordes jämförelse med hur 
chefsförsörjningen fungerar i vissa storföretag där cirkulation och befordran 
av lämpliga chefsämnen styrs mycket hårt på central nivå (SOU, 1985:167, 
18).  
 
[In the discussion about the authority of the delegation, comparisons were 
made with how the recruitment and training of director generals functions in 
certain large companies, where circulation and promotion of appropriate di-
rector general themes was steered very hard from central level.] 
 
Although two quite distinct sources of authority legitimizing the 
commission’s proposals they fitted with the values of effective-
ness and democracy and the premise that these were comple-
mentary.  
Techniques based upon the structure of reality were adopted 
primarily in the argumentation about the proposals for budget-
ary change. More specifically the argument of unlimited devel-
opment was used to obtain the audience's agreement that budg-
etary processes had already undergone modernization and renewal 
(SOU, 1985:62-65), and could continue to do so in future peri-
ods. The speaker offered an account of initiatives that had been 
taken to improve the budget since the 1970s, noting that it had 
been subject to modernization even before that time (SOU, 
1985:62). This information demonstrated to the audience that 
there had already been movement towards a more improved 
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budget and that the proposals of the commission were merely 
adding to this development. It was stated for example that, 
 
Den modernisering av den statliga budgeten som genomfördes 1980/81, lade 
grunden för en rad konkreta inslag i ett löpande arbete på att modernisera det 
statliga budgetarbetet (SOU, 1985:63). 
 
[The modernization of the state budget that took place in 1980/81, laid the 
basis for a range of concrete changes in the continual work to modernize the 
state budget operations.] 
 
Or that 
 
… att väsentliga steg ( har) )redan tagits mot ett styrssystem som mer riktar 
uppmärksamheten mot verksamheternas mål och resultat (SOU, 1985: 63).  
 
[… essential steps (that have) already been taken towards a steering system 
that directs attention towards the activities goals and results.] 
 
Furthermore, the commission noted the successes made with 
savings in the budget and the continued work to improve this. 
It explained: 
 
Ett fortsatt rationaliserings-och effektiviseringsarbete är därmed ett viktigt inslag 
i utvecklingen av budgetprocessen (SOU, 1997:68). 
 
[Continued rationalization and effectiveness efforts are thereby an important 
element in the development of the budget process.] 
 
Indeed, this section of the report was filled with a number of 
metaphors regarding moving forward (eg. a step) or building 
upon, all of which complemented the argument of continuous 
development in the budget. By describing the budgetary pro-
posals as part of an ongoing project, and associating this 
movement with an increase in value, these reforms were made 
to appear desirable in the text.  
Together with the argument of unlimited development, was 
use of the argument of the causal link to demonstrate the causes 
of the remaining problems in the budgetary process and how 
they could be improved. Again this argument was based upon 
the structure of reality and relied upon accepting the reason-
ableness of relations between certain facts regarding the existing 
budgetary arrangements. The commission identified lack of 
precision and time as causes for the unsatisfactory reporting 
(from agencies) that took place within the budgetary process. 
This in its turn was identified as a reason for why so few deci-
sions to re-examine the way funds were spent in particular areas 
did not take place within the budgetary process but through 
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other separate examinations (SOU, 1985:66). With regards to 
the timing of the budget, two kinds of problems were identi-
fied. Firstly, the period of a year was argued to be too short to 
make it possible for serious examination and re-prioritizing by 
the government to take place. This was expressed in such 
statements as:  
 
(normalt) har skett ytterst få reella omprövningar av verksamheter i anslut-
ning till det reguljära budgetarbet…Att så är fallet hänger bl a samman med 
tidspressen inom regeringskansliet i ansluitning till budgetarbetet. Det finns 
inte tid att under denna period ta tag i nya stora frågor (SOU, 1985:66-67). 
 
[(normally) there has been very few real revisions of activities through the 
regular budgetary work…That that is the case is, among other things, related 
to the time pressure associated with budget work within the cabinet offices 
and ministeries. There is not enough time during this period to consider new 
big questions.] 
 
In addition, the timing of the actual phases within the budget 
were argued to bring about difficulties in using the information 
collected from agencies, since for example their year reports 
and accounts were not handed over until quite late in the budg-
etary process (SOU, 1985:67). Identifying lack of time as a 
cause for the budget procedure not being used to revise re-
source distribution within or across agencies, gave credibility to 
the commissions proposals for a three year budget. This is es-
pecially the case since a detailed account was given regarding 
the reporting requirements of agencies over a three year period, 
and because more time was argued to enable the government to 
be more precise in the information they expected of agencies 
(SOU, 1985:68-73).  
 
(Regeringen har, som tidigare visats, under senare år givit de statliga myn-
digheterna stor frihet inom ramen för sina uppgifter utan motsvarande ökn-
ing av den övergripande styrningen (SOU, 1985:66)) 
 
[The government has, as shown earlier, given state agencies large freedom 
over the last years to conduct their work within the frames of their tasks, 
without a corresponding increase in the overarching steering.] 
 
Among the arguments to structure the reality in the document, 
there were a number of metaphors. These acted to bring the 
audience to see the reforms the commission was proposing in 
association with the attributes of physical objects or of other 
activities. Among the most cited term in the document was the 
word steering, which was used in combination with other terms 
to make the audience conceptualize the administration as a ma-
chine that could be controlled in precise (another frequently cited 
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term) ways. Such a vision was most evident from the statement 
that likened the administration to a tool [redskap] for the inten-
tions of the government and parliament (SOU, 1985:31). The 
commission spoke of direct steering, indirect steering, democratic steer-
ing (SOU, 1985:13], budget steering [budgetstyrning] (SOU, 
1985:61), overarching steering [övergripande styrning], the steering 
signals [styrsignaler] (SOU, 1985:13), styrsynpunkt [steering per-
spective] (SOU, 1985:32] and the steering route [styrfart] (SOU, 
1985:168).  This terminology made it possible for the audience 
to conceive of administrative activities as something certain that 
could be driven by the government along a particular course. It 
became reasonable to think that setting goals in the budget 
would ensure that they are achieved or that appointing and 
transferring agency director generals was simply part of keeping 
the machine on course (SOU, 1985:14). Creating certainty was 
also achieved by describing the three year budget as enabling 
long vision or far sightedness [långsiktighet] to be used within the 
budget (SOU, 1985:68). Finally the machine metaphor in the 
argumentation can be associated with reference to budget pro-
posals as ensuring the modernization of financial management. 
Other physical attributes were also given to the reform pro-
posals that made them appear reliable and tangible. The three-
year budget was for example described as enabling deepened 
[fördjupad] examination or mention was made of sharpening 
[skärpning] directives. Similarly, the reforms regarding the ap-
pointments of agency directors included greater mobility or of 
broadening the (presently narrow) sphere from which directors 
were selected. By contrast, the problems the administration 
faces were given greater urgency through other kinds of physi-
cal attributes such as time pressing [tidspressen] situations in the 
one year budget or the shrinking resources available [krympande 
resurser]. Perhaps one of the most mentioned physical attrib-
utes in this document was the effects of the reforms for strength-
ening things such as the state, rather than weakening it. There 
was also frequent mention of political powers being concerned 
for societies’ interest as a whole rather than the particular inter-
ests of experts for example (SOU 1985: 42,13). 
In the presentation of reforms to the budget, reference was 
made to giving agencies freedom. Freedom has a lot of baggage 
in the western world and makes an association with reforms 
and philosophical ideals (Smullen, 2002). The delegation of fi-
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nancial decisions were made to appear desirable through such 
statements as the following: 
 
Det är kommitténs uppfattning att en förbättrad styrning från regeringens 
sida som en följd av det förändrade budgetsystemet bör kunna kombineras 
med ytterligare ökad frihet att besluta i olika frågor som rör den inre verk-
samheten (SOU, 1985:40, 75). 
 
[It is the commission's opinion that  improved steering from the govern-
ment’s side as a consequence of the changed budget system should be able 
to be combined with further increases in (management) freedom to decide in 
different questions relating to internal activities.] 
 
Finally, there was also a dormant metaphor that could be identi-
fied throughout the argumentation. A dormant metaphor is a 
word that has lost association with an original meaning and ap-
pears as an obvious aspect of the sphere of the reforms the 
commission was proposing. Dormant metaphors are no longer 
a fusion with an idea from an physical object or some other 
sphere but instead play an active role in creating the identity of 
the reforms since they also provide reasons for the reforms. 
The term effectiveness can be observed as a dormant meta-
phor. It was continually cited throughout the argumentation al-
though the speaker never defined the term. It was also given a 
quantitative character such as increasing effectiveness although 
what is increasing or how was never explained. Some examples 
of the use of effectiveness in the argumentation included the 
following citations: 
 
Ett fortsatt rationaliserings-och effektiviseringsarbete är därmed ett viktigt 
inslag i utvecklingen av budgetprocessen (SOU, 1985:68). 
 
[Continued work in rationalization and effectiveness is thereby an important 
element in the development of budgetary processes.] 
 
Effektivitetssträvandena måste vidare bygga på ett ökat engagemang från 
myndigheternas sida (SOU, 1985:69) 
 
[The strive for further effectiveness must build further upon increasing the 
engagement from the side of agencies.] 
 
Klart är att om denna attitydförändring kommer till stånd kan effekten bli en 
allmän stimulans inom berörda myndigheter och därigenom också en positiv 
påverkan på effektiviteten i myndigheterna (SOU, 1985:169). 
 
[It is clear that if this change in attitude is brought about the effect can be a 
general stimulation within the concerned agencies and thereby also have a 
positive influence on the effectiveness in the agencies.]  
Sweden  223 
6.6.3 Document three - I medborgarnas tjänst 
The commission report, I medborgarnas tjänst [In the citizen's ser-
vice], was published in 1997 after being called for by the gov-
ernment in 1995. In contrast to many earlier commission re-
ports examining the administration, which had given strong 
representation to civil servants among their appointments, aca-
demics were more strongly represented on the membership for 
this commission report23 (Sundström, 2003:298). The excep-
tions were a former Justice Minister (Sven Wickbom) as chair-
person, and, the selection of two civil servants including the 
General Director for the Taxation Agency (Lennart Nilsson), as 
well as a former manager within the Administration unit of the 
National Audit Office (Britt-Marie Bystedt). The report is 179 
pages long and consisted of a summary and 15 chapters. The 
first three chapters presented the challenges facing the admini-
stration as a whole and the experiences of the past, while chap-
ters 4-15 discussed separate areas of the administration, all af-
fecting agencies, and made recommendations about these. Only 
a limited number of chapters (1,2,6,13) were selected for analy-
sis because the document is too large to enable an analysis in 
the available time. The changes following from the chapters se-
lected included refinement to management by results and the 
creation of a new organization charged with focussing upon, 
among other things, the competence of civil servants.  
In chapter 1, three inter-connected problem areas were iden-
tified as requiring special attention by the commission. These 
included the difficulties of steering the administration (svårstyr-
barhet), the fragmentation of the administration and with it the 
disappearance of one civil service culture, and thirdly, the chal-
lenges of internationalization for the state, particularly through 
the participation in the EU. This was then followed by a discus-
sion of the administration's place within Swedish democracy in-
cluding the values it should uphold (chapter 2), and, an over-
view of the development of the administration, together with 
the then prevailing ideas of administrative politics [förvaltning-
politik], since the Second World War (chapter 3). The values of 
democracy, legality and effectiveness were identified as overrid-
ing principles. The areas discussed for recommendations from 
chapters four to fifteen range from discussions of the structure 
                                                 
23 Prof. Barbro Anell, Bengt Jaccobson, Lena Marcusson, Rune Premfors, 
Dr Kerstin Sahlin- Andersson and Dr Torbjörn Larsson 
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of the administration (chapter 4), the relationship between the 
courts and the administration (chapter 8), public access and 
oversight of administrative decisions (chapter 11), the appoint-
ment of agency directors (chapter 10) and their board types 
(chapter 9).  
The recommendations relating to management by results 
and civil servants were presented in chapters 6 and 13. Both of 
these chapters brought together problems with steering, frag-
mentation and the tendency to give too much emphasis to the 
value of effectiveness as opposed to legality and democracy. In 
chapter 6, the instruments available to the government and par-
liament for steering the administration were investigated. Al-
though informal contacts and frame laws were also discussed in 
this chapter, it was noted that the introduction of management 
by results had been the most important change in the way that 
the administration was steered (SOU, 1997:76). A number of 
problems were identified with the way that management by re-
sults was implemented, in particular the breaking down of over-
arching goals for individual agencies was criticized (SOU, 
1997:57, 81). This was argued, among other things, to have 
made reporting too detailed to be useful and encouraged a fo-
cus upon individual agencies' goals as opposed to the goals of 
the administration as a whole (thus promoting fragmentation). 
The commission proposed that the government should take the 
initiative to overhaul management by results in a fundamental 
way so that it can adjust better to the type of activities per-
formed by each agency (SOU, 1997:86). It also recommended 
that independent evaluation be used in analyzing agency activi-
ties and that in order to incite cooperation within the admini-
stration it would sometimes be useful to give an overarching 
goal to a particular sector, rather than an individual agency, 
(SOU, 1997:87).   
In chapter 13, the focus shifted to the role of the civil ser-
vant and to the civil service culture in Sweden more generally. It 
was stated that a common tradition within the administration 
was on the way to disappearing (SOU, 1997:146). This observa-
tion was associated with the rise of market thinking within the 
administration such as through changes to the employment leg-
islation of civil servants. The commission identified legality and 
the democratic system within which agencies operated as offer-
ing fundamental and collective values that distinguished it from 
the private sector (SOU, 1997:147). It also identified special 
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competencies required of civil servants including the capacity to 
make decisions in complex situations with contrary goals and 
the need to strengthen such characteristics as professionalism, 
objectivity and legality among civil servants (SOU, 1997:150). 
The commission recommended that the civil servants role and 
culture should live in consciousness and discussion and that 
training should be taken to encourage a common ethics. In ad-
dition, it proposed further investigations into employment legis-
lation with the view of legislating for negligence and breach of 
duty among civil servants.  
 
6.6.3.1 Ethos and the construction of the audience 
As with earlier documents, the commission presented itself as 
concerned with the broader issues of democracy, and the rela-
tionship between the state and society. Steering was presented 
as a central concern for Swedish democracy especially against 
the background of internationalization and fragmentation. The 
emphasis upon Swedish democracy was also underlined 
through various references to the Swedish constitution, Swed-
ish traditions of government and important dates in Sweden's 
administrative and political history. In addition, a general over-
view was given of the themes of administrative politics, demon-
strating the speaker's broad knowledge of the subject area. 
Aside from democracy, effectiveness and legality were also 
identified as central concerns of the administration, which to-
gether with the above, can be interpreted as appeals to a univer-
sal audience. 
At the same time the commission presented itself as an ex-
pert in a number of academic theories and concepts including 
theories about the complexity of the state, about organizational 
learning, and about democracy more generally. This was re-
flected in the various uses of citations from academics and aca-
demic studies regarding ideas about the state as an arena (SOU, 
1997:21), about closed networks (SOU, 1997: 23, 86), about the 
effects of performance measurement (SOU, 1997:79-85) and 
about ethics (SOU, 1997:146, 149) within the administration. 
Many of the relations and values being described as central to 
the analysis were also presented in a nuanced way and thereby 
constructed a particular audience that favors complex inter-
relationships and explanations. There were also quite detailed 
critiques presented of management by results and employment 
conditions, but this occured in a very compressed way, requir-
Chapter 6 226
ing an audience that could manage a number of different kinds 
of critiques simultaneously. This said, it should be noted that 
despite the existence of a number of academic ideas and cita-
tions, the text itself was written in a clear and direct way. 
The speaker also constructed a particular audience interested 
in the historical details of the Swedish state and administration. 
In all of the chapters analyzed there was reference to the his-
torical roots of different aspects of the Swedish administration. 
This included reference to origins of the Swedish state in the 
1600s (SOU, 1997:21), its growth after the Second World War 
(SOU, 1997: 21), the beginnings of programme budgeting in the 
1960s and 70s (SOU, 1997:76), the beginnings of the civil ser-
vice (SOU, 1997:145) and the publicity principle (SOU, 1997: 
145). There was also an entire chapter devoted to administra-
tion politics [förvaltningspolitik] during the period following 
from the Second World War, with brief comments on earlier 
periods. This discussion included analysis of the growth of the 
Swedish welfare state and more recent experience with market 
competition and savings. It was the only section of the report 
where quantititative information was predominant, illustrating 
state growth and expenditure. This discussion of the long his-
tory of the Swedish state concluded with the observation that 
economic perspectives and considerations have been predomi-
nant since the 1980s. Against the richness of the history being 
described, one could conclude that the historically interested 
audience being constructed was also one that wanted to pre-
serve some kind of political tradition rather than an economic 
one.  
Another particular audience being constructed by the 
speaker was agency directors themselves. There were various at-
tempts throughout the argumentation to make an association 
between the academic theoretical ideas being presented and the 
experience of directors. A number of interview statements were 
used to illustrate the impact of results steering upon directors 
(SOU, 1997:78, 84) and their experience of contacts with the 
departments. These provide indications that agency director 
generals had become results orientated, but lacked sufficient 
contact and understanding from departments. Together with 
academic discussions of reductions in civil servants' employ-
ment security and observations that management by results had 
been designed by a closed group of financial experts, the 
speaker constructed director generals or civil servants more 
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generally as a mistreated group. Indeed, it was stated that man-
agement by results was experienced by civil servants as burden-
some [betungande] (SOU, 1997:81). 
Finally, the speaker also made appeals to the citizen and in-
cluded them in its construction of the audience. This occurred 
through various statements that put the needs of the citizen as a 
central obligation for agencies. For example, the speaker noted 
that agencies must have enough independence to adapt to the 
needs of the citizen (SOU, 1997: 22), to allow citizens influence 
over decisions that effect their wellbeing (SOU, 1997:35, 39), 
and require a living consciousness of the citizen's centrality to 
the democratic system (SOU, 1997:147). This was interpreted as 
a construction of the citizens as audience or also as part of the 
(democratic) universal audience being appealed to. 
6.6.3.2 The premises of argumentation 
The argumentation in the document departed from a number 
of agreements about the context in which agencies operated 
and about the kinds of values that should guide their activities. 
A truth underlying the argumentation was that the world has 
become a highly inter-dependent complex place in which no ac-
tor, including the state, has complete control over the outcome 
of actions. This truth was reflected in statements as; "Komplex-
iteten i den statliga förvaltningen är emellertid överväldigande" 
(SOU, 1997:21) [Complexity in the state administration is how-
ever overwhelming], or, to the state no longer being an actor 
but an arena (SOU, 1997:21). It also underlied criticisms to-
wards setting precise goals for agencies in the budget process 
since these were argued to prevent agencies from taking their 
own initiative to respond to signals in their environment or to 
report information about events that did not fit with the set 
goals. These concerns were expressed as follows:  
 
Det finns een uppenbar risk att kraven blir alltför bindande, och även om 
det finns utrymme att göra avsteg från bestämmelserna om redovising så 
sker detta inte i särskilt stor omfattning (SOU, 1997:85). 
 
[There is an obvious risk that the demands will become too binding, and 
even if there is space to depart from what has been requested to report, it 
does not occur to a great extent]  
 
Similarly, management for results was also criticized in the first 
chapter of the document for embracing a hierarchical view of 
the state that did not fit with the need for taking initiative, en-
couraging experience and self renewal, to name but a few of the 
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phrases mentioned (SOU, 1997:22). It was against the truth that 
the administration must operate in this complex world that 
these attributes appeared important in the text. The truth of 
complexity in the world as a premise of argumentation made it 
possible to describe the problems of steering, fragmentation 
and internationalization in the document (SOU, 1997:24-29). 
This was because these things were said to have emerged from 
increasing numbers of actors influencing decision making and 
depending upon one another. It also made sensible the frequent 
references to the need for cooperation throughout the argu-
mentation.  I have interpreted this view of the world as a truth 
because it echoes theoretical discussions about governance and 
network theory in academic discussions of public administra-
tion and thereby represented a system of thought (See John, 
2001).  
Among the facts underlying the argumentation was the un-
derstanding of government activities as being multi-dimensional 
and ridden with value conflicts. Although related to and consis-
tent with the truth of a complex world, this fact also existed 
separately from that system of thought and was more difficult 
to associate with some overarching view of action or actors. 
The description of the administration was presented in the 
document as follows: 
 
Det typiska för statlig verksamhet är att dess mål är flerdimensionella. Av 
förvaltningsmyndigheter krävs en förmåga att hantera mål och värdekonflik-
ter - exempelvis mellan effektivitet och rättssäkerhet ..(SOU, 1997:23). 
 
[It is typical that the goals for state activities are multi-dimensional. The ca-
pacity to manage goal and value conflicts is demanded of administrative 
agencies - for example between effectiveness and the rule of law goals.] 
 
This fact as a point of departure for the argumentation aided in 
demonstrating the weaknesses of setting precise goals, which 
was presented as the Swedish practice of management by re-
sults, since these could be pursued at the cost of other needs or 
values. Agreement about the fact of multi-dimensionality and 
value conflicts as inherent to public tasks was also a premise 
used to distinguish it from the private sector. This enabled the 
speaker to further question the applicability of management by 
results in the public sector, since it was identified as coming 
from the private sector. The speaker wrote; 
 
Skillnaden i förutsättning är emellertid betydande, eftersom 'resultat' i det 
privata företaget i allmänhet är relaterat till lönsamheten, medan statlig verk-
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samhet i de flesta fall saknar ett sådant entydigt resultatmått och dess mål 
typiskt sett är flerdimensionella (SOU, 1997:23). 
 
[The difference in conditions is however significant, since 'results' in a pri-
vate company in general are related to profitability, while state activities in 
most cases lack such a clear-cut result measure with their goals typically be-
ing multi-dimensional.] 
 
In the discussion of the position and responsibility of the civil 
servant, the nature of administrative tasks and their distinction 
from private sector tasks, was a fact that also enabled criticism 
of changes in public sector employment conditions that made 
them more akin to the private sector (SOU, 1997:149). It was a 
starting point that underlied recommendations for greater atten-
tion to the kinds of values and duties that are important in the 
public sector, as well as a focus upon the competence to weigh 
up these values in given situations. This was expressed as fol-
lows: 
 
Det mest centrala och det mest krävande i en hög förvaltningsetik låter sig 
inte sammanfattas i några enkla punkter. De krav som ställs på myndigheter 
och statstjänstmän är ibland motstridiga, och en viktig del av kompetens 
som krävs av dem är att hantera mål-och värde konflikter (SOU, 1997:150). 
 
[The most central and demanding aspects of a high administrative ethics 
does not allow itself to be summarized in a few points. The demands that 
are placed upon agencies and civil servants are sometimes conflicting, and an 
important part of the competence that is required of them is to manage goal- 
and value conflicts.] 
 
As we shall see the commission identified a number of values 
that should be central to administrative activities such as the 
rule of law, and, which they argued distinguished the public sec-
tor from the private sector. They did this on the basis of the 
fact of the special nature of public administration activities. 
Agreed upon presumptions in the argumentation included 
presuming that commonality across the administration could be 
achieved through learning, despite adapting to variety at the 
level of the individual agency. This presumption was present in 
both arguments and recommendations about management by 
results, and also in arguments and recommendations about 
identifying fundamental ethical principles for making decisions 
within the administration. On the one hand, it was recom-
mended that the level of detail used to steer agencies should ad-
just to the nature of different administrative activities (SOU, 
1997:82). Here it was suggested for example that less precise 
goals and results be set for agencies responsible for such activi-
ties as research and culture. At the same time, the speaker 
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warned about strengthening individual agencies' identity at the 
expense of the whole administration and associated this 
strengthening with the focus on set goals (SOU, 1997:85). It 
was recommended that broad goals should sometimes not be 
made more precise and that sector goals even be set leaving re-
sponsible agencies to negotiate how their contributions could 
achieve the desired results for the whole. This presumed that 
individual agencies would be able to identify between them-
selves how their actions contributed to the whole, and with that 
learn from post evaluations about how successful their actions 
had been.  
A similar kind of presumption could also be identified in the 
discussion of civil servants and the promotion of a civil service 
culture. The commission rejected the establishment of a civil 
service code since it is stated,  
 
Enligt kommissionen vore det inte meningsfullt att försöka formulera en 
sådan etisk kod för de svenska tjänstemännen…….Det viktiga är att förvalt-
ningskulturen och statstjänstemännaroller lever i medvetandent och diskus-
sionen (SOU, 1997:150). 
 
[According to the commission, it would not be meaningful to try to formu-
late such an ethical code for the Swedish civil servants…What is important 
is that the administrative culture and the civil servant's role lives in con-
sciousness and discussion.] 
 
Together with the various references to the need for civil ser-
vants to have the capacity to weigh up the applicability of con-
trary goals in given situations, this living notion of administrative 
culture presumed that civil servants would be able to identify 
the right underlying principles. This was to be promoted 
through training and a focus upon democratic values. At the 
same time, in the discussion of civil servants it was also clear 
that the commission would like to encourage the attainment of 
a shared culture and was keen to identify certain values and at-
tributes as desirable (SOU, 1997:147). They recommended for 
example that civil servants be subject to breach of duty and 
negligence legislation or sanctions, while still expecting a reflec-
tive and adaptable approach to situations at hand. This pre-
sumed the capacity to find a delicate balance between a reflec-
tive civil servant and one that complies to the shared values of 
Swedish democracy.  
The agreed upon values as premises for the argumentation 
included democracy, the rule of law and effectiveness. In the 
early chapters of the report the commission set out its vision of 
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administrative politics [förvaltningspolitik] and the content and 
criteria this should meet. It was stated: 
 
Med utgångspunkt i regeringsformen vill kommissionen ange demokrati, rät-
tssäkerhet och effektivitet som överordnande mål för förvaltningspolitiken 
(SOU, 1997:37). 
 
[With a starting point in the constitution the commission wishes to recog-
nize democracy, legality and effectiveness as the superior goals for adminis-
trative politics.] 
 
This was then followed by definitions (a quasi-logical tech-
nique) of legality and effectiveness, although the audience is ad-
vised that "Demokrati som ett mål för förvaltningspolitiken 
låter sig inte lika lätt definieras och kan bli föremål för varier-
ande tolkningar" (SOU, 1997:38). [Democracy as a goal for ad-
ministrative politics does not allow itself to be as easily defined 
and can become subject to various translations]. From other 
statements in the document, however, it can be deduced that 
the kinds of solutions the commission were seeking are ones 
that do not just view the position of the administration within 
democracy as hierarchically subordinate to the government and 
parliament. Instead they desired a notion of democracy that 
emphasizes horizontal features, in particular where the admini-
stration is free to respond to citizen's needs and be subject to 
their influence. Such statements included the following: 
 
Förvaltningen lyder under regeringen. Den är dess instrument för att förver-
kliga den politik medborgarna gett sitt stöd i riksdagsvalen, och kravet på 
styrbarhet måste ställas högt. Medborgarnas anspråk och förväntningar på 
statsförvaltningen är emellertid av den arten att myndigheterna och 
statstjänstmännen samtidigt måste tillerkännas ett stort mått av självstän-
dighet (SOU, 1997: 22). 
 
[The administration is subordinate to the government. It is their instrument 
to actualise the politics that citizens have given their support for in the par-
liamentary elections, and the demand for steerability must be set high. The 
citizen’s demands and expectations upon the administration is however of 
the kind that agencies and civil servants both must be granted a large degree 
of independence.] 
 
Or to put it more directly; 
 
Demokratin som styrelseform syftar till att ge medborgarna ett så stort infly-
tande som möjligt över förhållanden som påverkar deras egen tillvaro, direkt 
eller indirekt (SOU, 1997: 39). 
 
[Democracy as a steering form aims to give citizens as much influence as 
possible upon the conditions that affect their existence directly or indi-
rectly.} 
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It is the value of democracy that also underlied the emphasis 
upon, openness (SOU, 1997:39,19) and civil servants' objectiv-
ity (SOU, 1997:150) and integrity (SOU, 1997: 22,91) through-
out the argumentation. 
 There was also a hierarchy between the values premised 
upon in the argumentation that relied upon agreements that 
democracy and legality are actually preferable to effectiveness. 
This was evident in statements reminding the audience that 
"(E)ffektivitet i arbetet met förvaltningsärenden, frikopplad från 
demokratin och rättsstatens normer, är ett tvivelaktigt och ib-
land negativt värde" (SOU, 1997: 41). [Effectiveness in the 
conduct of administrative tasks, isolated from democracy or 
rule of law norms is a dubious and sometimes negative value]. 
The preference for democracy and rule of law was evident 
throughout the argumentation in its expressions for attaining an 
administrative culture that is distinct from the private sector. 
Such statements included: 
 
Vissa grundläggande element måste emellertid vara gemensamma för stats-
förvaltningen. Utgångspunkten är att den offentliga förvaltningen är en del 
av demokratin och rättsstaten och att de som arbetar i förvaltningen tjänar 
vissa gemensamma mål, vilka skiljer dem från anställda i den privata sektorn 
(SOU, 1997:41). 
 
[Certain basic elements must in the meantime be shared by the administra-
tion. The point of departure is that the public sector is a part of democracy 
and the rule of law and that those who work in the administration serve cer-
tain common goals, which distinguish them from the employees in the pri-
vate sector.]  
 
It became obvious throughout the argumentation that it is de-
mocracy and rule of law, unlike effectiveness, that distinguished 
the public sector from the private sector. Furthermore, the 
criticisms of management by results and changes to employ-
ment conditions rested upon the opinion that the effectiveness 
value was inadequate and had been taken too far.  
Obtaining the audiences' adherence to the values of democ-
racy and rule of law relied primarily upon agreements that quali-
tative features were most desirable. This was evident in refer-
ences to the complicated tasks of the public sector and their 
distinction from the private sector. Descriptions of public sec-
tor activities as multi-dimensional and subject to contrary goals 
acted to intensify the appeal for an approach to steering that 
was also multi-dimensional, and does not just include manage-
ment by results. It emphasized the difficulty of public sector 
work and thereby mad it appear special in itself. The speaker 
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amplified this with various examples of special public sector 
work stating; "(V)issa funktioner som kräver särskild kompe-
tens är typiska för den offentliga förvaltningen" (SOU, 
1997:148). [Certain functions that demand distinct competence 
are typical for the public administration]. Being special was not 
only prominent in the descriptions of public sector activities 
but also in the accounts of the Swedish state throughout the ar-
gumentation. This was evident in the presence of statements 
regarding the tradition of the Swedish state, Swedish democracy 
(SOU, 1997:149) or the Swedish model (SOU, 1997: 32, 91). 
The audience was advised for example of special Swedish fea-
tures such as small departments with a long tradition of rela-
tively independent agencies and achievements were emphasized 
such as the following: 
 
(Svenska) statsförvaltningen visade tidigt också starkt positiva sidor. För att 
vara ett fattigt land i Europas periferi hade Sverige en effektiv, hederlig och 
okurrumperad förvaltning. Sverige var det första landet i världen med en hel-
täckande folkbokföring. Den av ämbetsmän under frihetstiden härskande 
riksdagen införde år 1766 den första tryckfrihetsförordningen. De statliga 
ämbetsmännen var den samhällsklass som framför allt kom att bära upp 
rättsstatsidealet (SOU, 1997:145). 
 
[(Swedish) central administration also demonstrated early a strong positive 
side. For a poor country in Europe's periphery, Sweden had an effective, 
honest and uncorrupt administration. Sweden was the first country in the 
world with a complete peoples' registration. Created by bureaucrats during 
the period of free rule, the first press laws were introduced by the parliament 
in the year 1766. The state bureaucrats were a social class that above all gave 
represention to the ideal of the rule of law.] 
 
Together with a chapter on the history of Swedish administra-
tion and the various references to the Swedish Constitution 
throughout the argumentation the conditions were set for con-
sidering prescriptions that maintained this specialness. In the 
chapter on civil servants the locus of the special was also com-
plemented by another qualitative locus, the locus of the irrepa-
rable. This was evident in the statement; 
 
(vi) är på väg att tappa bort väsentliga och värdefulla inslag i den svenska 
förvaltningstraditionen, framför allt sådant som är förknippat med statens 
kärnfunktioner (SOU, 1997:146). 
 
[We are on the way of losing essential and valuable elements in the Swedish 
administrative tradition, above all what is closely connected to the state's 
core functions.] 
 
Agreements about the preference for democratic values and le-
gality were underlined by posing market values and effective-
ness more generally as a threat to a special tradition.  
Chapter 6 234
While I have argued that agreements about qualitative loci 
were most prominent in the argumentation, there was also one 
very important quantitative aspect to the argumentation and 
this was the preference for doing what is best for the whole. Fre-
quent reference was made to finding solutions that promote the 
whole of the Swedish administration or that satisfy collective goals. 
This was evident in subtitles such as, "En förvaltnings politik 
för staten som helhet" (SOU, 1997:29) [An administration poli-
tics for the state as a whole] and a number of statements like;  
 
Men en utgångspunkt måste vara att effektivitetssträvandena beaktas främst 
för staten som helhet samt att andra förvaltningspolitiska värden som rät-
tssäkerhet, insyn och demokrati inte försummas (SOU 1997: 78). 
 
[But a point of departure must be that the striving for effectiveness consid-
ers first of all the state as a whole together with other administrative political 
values such as legality, insight (into public activities and documents) and 
democracy, so that these values are not neglected.] 
 
Or 
 
Förvaltningspolitiken bör stärka de krafter som håller samman helheten och 
främja en för all statlig verksamhet så långt möjligt gemensam förvaltning-
skultur och förvaltningsetik, dvs att skapa enhet in mångfalden (SOU 
1997:41).  
 
[Administrative politics should strengthen the powers that hold together the 
whole and promotes for all state activities, as much as possible, a common 
administrative culture and administrative ethics. That is to say, to create 
unity in diversity.]  
6.6.3.3 Techniques of argumentation 
The argumentative techniques adopted throughout the docu-
ment included quasi-logical techniques such as definition and 
the whole and its parts, techniques based upon the structure of 
reality such as the causal link and argumentation by authority, 
and, arguments that structured reality including argument by 
example and metaphor.  
In general it can said that the quasi-logical techniques in the 
document focused upon elements in the text that were concen-
trated on promoting what is good for the whole of the Swedish 
administration. A number of definitions were presented in the 
first two chapters of the report which functioned to lend for-
mality to the analysis and acted as arguments for what is to be 
important (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2003:215) in ad-
dressing problems of the administration. The speaker created a 
scheme for assessing the problems at hand that had implica-
tions for the kinds of solutions proposed. Among the defini-
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tions presented at the outset of the document were definitions 
of fragmentation (SOU, 1997: 24), the basic frames of an ad-
ministrative politics (SOU, 1997:31, 37), and, the overriding 
principles that the administration should hold up such as legal-
ity and effectiveness (SOU, 1997: 37-38). Difficulties with steer-
ing, internationalization and democracy, the first two being 
problems and the last matter being an overriding principle, were 
also presented as part of this discussion but were not subject to 
precise definition. Later in the document government's defini-
tion of management by results was also presented and judged as 
being too narrow (SOU, 1997:77).  
In terms of the criticisms and recommendations the com-
mission was making the definitions were useful in demonstrat-
ing that the practice of management by results had been inade-
quate. This was because what were argued to be the effects of re-
sults steering included increasing fragmentation and effective-
ness at the expense of democracy and legality. Fragmentation 
and effectiveness for example were defined as follows: 
 
Kommissionen har uppmärksammat det fenomen som betecknas som frag-
mentering: brist på sammanhang mellan den statliga förvaltningens olika de-
lar, tendens til splittring, oförmåga att se till de gemensamma, överordnande 
målen. Svårstyrbarhet och fragmentering hänger delvis samman men måste 
ändå betraktas som företeelser av olika karaktär (SOU, 1997: 24). 
 
 
[The commission has recognized the phenomenon that is fragmentation: 
lack of integration between the state administration’s different parts, ten-
dency to splintering,, inability to see the shared, overarching goals. Difficult 
steerability and fragmentation are in part associated but must anyhow be 
considered of different character.] 
 
Effektivitet menas att de av statsmakterna fastlagda målen för verksamheten 
nås med rimlig resursinsats och inom givna ekonomiska och andra ramar 
(SOU, 1997:38). 
 
[Effectiveness means that the goals set by state powers for activities are met 
within reasonable resources and within given economic and other frames.] 
 
Later it was stated that: 
 
Resultatstyrningen, liksom den omfattande delegeringen av befogenheter till 
myndigheterna att bestämma över den egna organisationen, har ökat fo-
kuseringen i myndigheterna på de egna prestationerna och därmed förstärkt 
organisationsidentiteten inom förvaltningens olika delar. Detta kan på en 
gång öka effektiviteten inom olika verksamheter tagna var för sig, och förs-
vaga de krafter som håller samman den statliga förvaltningen som helhet 
(SOU, 1997:25). 
 
[Results steering, such as the extensive delegation of authority to agencies to 
decide over their own organization, has increased the focus in agencies upon 
their own performance and thereby strengthened their organizational iden-
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tity within the different parts of the administration. This can at the same 
time increase the effectiveness within separate individual activities, and 
weaken the powers that hold together the state administration as a whole.] 
 
...I sin strävan att nå uppsatta mål och resultat kan förlora de för förvaltnin-
gen övergripande, gemensamma målen ur sikte. En alltför stark fokusering 
på resultatstyrning kan leda till ökad fragmentering (SOU, 1997:26). 
 
[In striving to achieve set goals and results, sight can be lost of the admini-
stration's overarching shared goals. Too strong a focus upon results steering 
can lead to increased fragmentation.] 
 
This observation regarding the focus upon improving individual 
organizational performance came to appear even more prob-
lematic against the background of earlier stated definitions and 
problems of fragmentation. Furthermore, together with the 
presentation of definitions of what an administrative politics 
should consider, the commission was able to give greater le-
gitimacy to the argument that broader approaches to steering 
needed to be pursued such as through informal contacts and 
frame legislation (SOU, 1997:57, 88-94). It could then be ac-
cepted that management by results did not have to always be so 
precise if there are other ways of steering. In addition, the limi-
tations of effectiveness as a principle were indicated in the dis-
cussion of management by results and pointed the reader to the 
desirability of the other principles democracy and legality. 
The other way quasi-logical argumentation was applied 
throughout the document was with regard to the relationship 
being presented between the overarching values of democracy, 
legality and effectiveness. These values were presented together 
as the whole of what is desirable for the Swedish administration 
to pursue and they were spoken about as if they were units or 
parts within a mathematical relationship. The argumentation 
used was division of the whole into its parts. This was ex-
pressed as follows: 
 
Demokrati, rättssäkerhet och effektivitet måste ses i sitt inbördes samman-
hang. Förvaltningen tjänar inte demokratin väl om den inte samtidigt fyller 
höga krav på rättssäkerhet och effektivitet. Effektivitet i arbetet med förvalt-
ningsärenden, frikopplad från demokratin och rättsstatens normer, är ett tvi-
velaktigt och ibland negativt värde..….Att finna den rätt balanserade helhe-
ten av demokrati, rättssäkerhet och effektivitet är förvaltningspolitikens mest 
centrala uppgift (SOU, 1997:57, 38). 
 
[Democracy, rule of law and effectiveness must be seen in their reciprocal 
relations. The administration does not serve democracy well if it does not at 
the same time meet the high demands upon the rule of law and effective-
ness. Effectiveness in the work with administrative assignments, isolated 
from democracy and legality norms, is a doubtful and sometimes negative 
Sweden  237 
value… Finding the right balance of the whole of democracy, legality and ef-
fectiveness in administrative politics must be the most central task.] 
 
Throughout the discussion of both management by results and 
the civil service culture the notion of a mathematical relation-
ship between these values was used to emphasize the view that 
effectiveness had been taken too far at the expense of democ-
racy and legality. In both cases, (an increase in) private sector or 
market influences were equated with an increase in effective-
ness and thereby a reduction in the democratic values and legal-
ity across the whole of the administration. It was stated for ex-
ample;  
 
När konsulter analyserar förvaltningsmyndigheters problem saknas ofta de-
mokratiperspektivet och de etiska frågorna....Ekonomisk effektivitiet har 
blivit det överordnade (SOU, 1997:57,148) 
 
[When consultants analyze agencies’ problems, there is often a lack of the 
democracy perspective and ethical questions…Economic effectiveness has 
become superior.] 
 
Or in the case of management by results it was explained that 
the focus on individual performance; "kan på en gång ha ökat 
effektiviteten inom olika verksamheter tagna var för sig och 
försvagat de krafter som håller samman den statliga förvaltnin-
gen som helhet." (SOU, 1997:57, 24-25). [can at the same time 
have increased effectiveness within different activities consid-
ered separately and weakened the powers that hold together the 
state administration as a whole.] Another way in which division 
of the whole into its parts was presented in the argumentation 
was with the notion that an increase in savings or effectiveness 
in one part of the administration would increase the costs in 
another part of the administration (see SOU, 1997:57, 85).  
Among the techniques emphasizing the structure of reality 
throughout the argumentation, the pragmatic argument was 
used to demonstrate a fact-consequence relationship between 
management by results and other market like trends within the 
administration, and their undesirable consequences eg. frag-
mentation and loss of democratic values. Indeed, while there 
were a few references to positive effects (SOU, 1997:57, 79), 
much of the text in the chapters on steering and the position of 
civil servants were devoted to describing the negative conse-
quences of recent initiatives. The fact consequence relationships 
identified included: 
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• Precise goals in management by results leads to a focus 
upon activities or aspects of activities that are easy to meas-
ure (SOU, 1997:57,84) 
• The detailed information provided is too difficult and un-
clear for departments and politicians to use, so it leads to 
their disinterest (SOU, 1997:57, 84) 
• The binding demands for information relating to precisely 
stated goals prevents willingness to depart from set agenda 
and report other information that may be important (SOU, 
1997:57, 84) 
• Setting detailed goals leads to focus upon individual agency 
performance rather than that of administration as whole 
(SOU, 1997:57,85) 
 
In the case of the position of civil servants the consequences of 
reforms such as management by results were presented in more 
broad terms such as; 
 
De förändringar kommissionen pekat på som orsaker till den statliga verk-
samhetens fragmentering har verkat upplösande också på statstjänsteman-
narollen; det kräver en viss ansträngning at hitta några gemensamma näm-
nare för statens alla tjänstemän. (SOU, 1997:57,146)  
 
[The changes the commission has identified as reasons for the state admini-
stration's fragmentation has also worked to dissolve the state civil servants 
role; it requires a certain effort to find some common denominators for all 
the states civil servants.] 
 
Or 
 
Johan Hirschfeldt påpekar att marknadskulturens inträde i förvaltningen kan 
få till följd att myndighetskulturen inträde vattnas ur. Han har märkt en 
förändrad syn på  frågor om jäv och bisysslor, känslan för var gränserna går 
har försvagats. Hos en del myndigheter har han funnit brister i den förvalt-
ningsrättsliga standarden (SOU 1997:57, 146). 
 
[Johan Hirschfeldt points out that the arrival of the market culture within 
the administration can have as a consequence that the agency culture is wa-
tered down. He has noticed changed perspectives upon questions about ap-
peals and side activities, the feeling for the limits has weakened. In some 
agencies he has found deficiencies in the administrative law standards.] 
 
Another technique based upon the structure of reality used 
throughout the argumentation was argument by authority. This 
is an argument whereby the prestige of the status of a particular 
person, profession or document is used as the proof of a par-
ticular assertion. As in the earlier Swedish documents the Swed-
ish Constitution was referred to by the commission to support 
their theses about steering (SOU, 1997:57, 88), the independ-
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ence of agencies (SOU, 1997: 22), the role of civil servants 
(SOU, 1997: 22, 148) and the primacy of the rule of law (SOU, 
1997:33-34). More generally its presence throughout the argu-
mentation acted to promote the importance of the value of 
democracy and its distinctiveness. Among one of the most im-
portant ways the Constitution was used to legitimate the argu-
mentation of the commission was with regard to criticizing the 
need for precision in government steering and highlighting 
other forms of steering such as the rule of law. The preparation 
for making this argument occurred already early in the docu-
ment when the findings of the previous Verksledningskommittén 
(document two discussed above) were explicitly rejected. The 
commission referred to the various criticisms within legal circles 
to the Verksledningskommittén's interpretation of an article in 
the Constitution identifying a role for precise government steer-
ing (and thus management by results), and, instead identified 
two other articles that brought this earlier interpretation into 
question (SOU, 1997: 33-34). Both of these articles related to 
the rule of law - that like situations should be treated alike un-
der the law and that the law should be applied in a professional 
and objective way. The commission stated,  
 
Nu nämnda bestämmelser understryker att ämbetsmannens lojalitet inte skall 
riktas enbart mot de politiker som har makten utan också mot lagarna (SOU, 
1997: 34) 
 
[The just mentioned regulations underline that civil servant's loyalty shall not 
only be directed exclusively towards the politicians that have the power but 
also towards the law.] 
 
Another article of the constitution was used to make the more 
general point that it allowed for more horizontal views of steer-
ing; which of course wass consistent with the governance per-
spective underlying the argumentation. This was expressed as 
follows: 
 
Förvaltningen har en horisontell dimension, som kom till uttryck i 1809 års 
regeringsform paragraf 47, där myndigheterna och ämbetsmannen ålades att 
"lyda konungens bud och befallningar och räcka varandra handen till full-
görande därav och av allt vad rikets tjänst utav dem fordrar (SOU, 1997:57, 
22). 
 
[The administration has an horizontal dimension that came to expression in 
the 1809 Constitution, paragraph 47. Here agencies and civil servants are 
called to serve the kings wishes and orders and commit themselves to the 
fulfilment thereof and all the services that the country requires from them].  
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Together with the presentation of legality and democracy as be-
ing (superior) parts of the whole of the administration, the 
Constitution was also used to demonstrate the legitimacy of 
broader kinds of steering methods than (hierarchical) manage-
ment by results steering through the budget. 
Other authorities were also used to achieve agreement about 
the assertions of the commission. In particular academic com-
mentators were directly cited, primarily from the fields of po-
litical science and law, as well as legal practitioners (See SOU, 
1997:89, 146, 148-149, 150-151). For example the observations 
of a Lecturer in Public Administration were presented to show 
that the positive effects of management by results have not yet 
been proven (SOU, 1997:23). Similarly, the findings of a Pro-
fessor in Politics were used to demonstrate that changes in civil 
service conditions have made government employees depend-
ent upon their superiors and thereby silenced their criticisms 
(SOU, 1997:146-147). The facts about the damaging effects of 
market like arrangements such as management by results or 
employment conditions similar to the private sector were 
achieved in this way. 
Techniques that structure reality such as example and meta-
phor were also identified in the argumentation. Particular ex-
amples such as direct citations from agency employees or de-
partments were used to demonstrate that reporting of results 
had been a flawed process and led to the provision of informa-
tion that was not necessarily relevant to agency work but fitted 
with the expectations of departments (SOU, 1997:57, 84-86). In 
addition, examples of agency activities lent legitimacy to the as-
sertion that detailed steering was not necessary for all agencies 
(SOU, 1997:84-85) and that they conducted specialized work 
characterized by contradictory goals (SOU, 1997:147-148). 
The metaphors adopted throughout the argumentation in-
cluded references to the desirability of greater openness in the 
administration and its recent reform initiatives being developed 
in closed circles. The desire was expressed for a strong society and 
there were also a number of organic metaphors used to de-
scribe the Swedish state. These included the following descrip-
tion of the Swedish administration: 
 
Den Svenska statsförvaltningen är ett träd med många årsringar och månger 
grenar. Den har bibehållet vissa grundläggande drag med rötter i 1600 talet, un-
der det att verksamheten utvidgats till nya fält (SOU, 1997:21). 
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[The Swedish state administration is a tree with many year rings and many 
branches. It has preserved certain fundamental aspects having their roots in the 
1600s, while the activities have expanded to new fields.] 
 
Another organic metaphor included reference to the civil ser-
vice culture being watered down, [vattnas ur], which aided in the 
construction of the state as fragmenting. 
Fragmentation was another prominent metaphor, together 
with splintering and integration (SOU, 1997: 24). Indeed the de-
scription of this problem of a fragmenting administration in the 
argumentation was almost completely reliant upon the images 
supplied by these metaphors since few other descriptions are 
given of this problem. By contrast, the use of the term the whole 
throughout the argumentation could also be identified as a 
metaphorical description. 
Finally the term democracy was used throughout the argu-
mentation in metaphorical ways and constituted a dormant 
metaphor. In this document no definition was given of democ-
racy rather the speaker noted it is too difficult to define. It re-
mained a reason for many of the proposals the commission was 
making, and created a mystery about the specialness of the 
Swedish state more generally. An overview of the rhetorical fea-
tures identified in the Swedish documents examined is pre-
sented in table 6.3. 
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Table 6.3 Overview of Swedish argumentation (continues on next page) 
 
 Politisk styrning - administra-
tiv självständighet 
Regeringen, myndigheterna en 
myndigheternas ledning 
I medborgarnas tjänst 
   Ethos  
Particular audience: Political/Legal science  Historian 
 
Management experts, 
Agency directors 
 
Academics 
Agency Directors 
Civil servants 
Universal audience: Democracy, the constitution Democracy, the constitution Democracy, citizen, the constitution 
   Premises 
Truth 
 
 Specialization makes the state insen-
sitive to politics 
Relationships are interdependent, the 
world is complex 
Facts 
 
Democratic steering has been in-
sufficient 
 
Urgent lack of financial resources 
Constitution prescribes the level of 
steering 
Government activities multi-
dimensional and ridden of value con-
flicts 
Public sector work is distinctive from 
private sector work 
Presumptions 
 
Governments can be motivated to 
steer.  
 
Agencies are highly independent. 
 
Governments can steer precisely, 
and want to steer. 
Government is the only actor that 
can steer democratically 
Agencies can and will provide nec-
essary information 
Commonality and integration across 
administration possible despite varia-
tion 
 
The ability to learn 
 
Values 
 
Democracy, legality, political ac-
countability 
Effectiveness and democracy Democracy, rule of law and effective-
ness 
Hierarchy of values 
 
Agency independence superior to 
political subordination in matters 
of the law. 
Effectiveness and democracy are 
compatible 
 
Effectiveness subordinate to democ-
racy 
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Table 6.3 Overview of Swedish argumentation 
 
 Politisk styrning - administra-
tiv självständighet 
Regeringen, myndigheterna en 
myndigheternas ledning 
I medborgarnas tjänst 
Loci 
 
Primarily quantitative  
 The precarious (time for change, 
threat to democracy). 
Primarily quantitative. The precari-
ous (threat to democracy, time for 
financial changes). 
Primarily qualitative (unique public 
sector and precarious threat to public 
values) 
Quantitative- the whole 
  Techniques of argumentation 
Quasi-logical Definition & Comparison (constitu-
tion prescriptions for steering) 
Division of whole into parts (democ-
racy) 
Definition & Comparison (constitution 
prescriptions for steering)  
Division of whole into its parts (over-
arching steering and increased man-
agement freedom 
Definition (fragmentation, management 
by results, legality) 
Division of the whole into its parts (the ten-
sions between legality, effectiveness, 
democracy 
Structure of reality Argumentation by authority (The 
constitution) 
Argumentation by authority (The con-
stitution and the private sector) 
Argumentation by authority (the constitu-
tion and academics) 
  Causal link (timing and consequence 
of budgetary changes for effective-
ness) 
Pragmatic argumentation (bad conse-
quences of market forces) 
  Unlimited Development – reforming the 
budget 
 
Structuring reality - 
Metaphors 
mapping, steering, democracy, 
balance, sharpen, weak and strong 
state/society 
Steering, deeper, broader, stronger, 
long sightedness, sharper, modernis-
ing, freedom, effectiveness, whole, 
broad, narrow 
Tree, branches, dissolving like water, 
steering, democracy, fragmentation, 
whole 
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6.7 GGCT and the rhetoric of Swedish agency reform 
 
It should be evident from the above analysis that argumentation 
in all the Swedish documents departed from rather broad per-
spectives regarding the matter of agency reform. This was ex-
pressed in references to state steering, strengthening democracy, the 
criteria of the Constitution, and, in the consequences of post-
industrial society for the relationship between state and society. 
Even in the second document, which was most narrowly con-
cerned with management reforms, attention was given to these 
matters. Following from Hood, such a broad conceptualization 
of the problems facing the administration are typical of group 
narratives and more specifically hierarchical accounts. Meta-
phors such as steering and a strong state are also consistent with 
hierarchical accounts and were prominent in all of the docu-
ments examined.  
A number of egalitarian themes could also be identified in 
the descriptions of agencies and the administration more gener-
ally. Not least, democracy as a consistent watchword in all the 
documents is identified by Hood as typical of egalitarian ac-
counts of public management reform. As we shall see, however, 
democracy and the egalitarian theme of informal contacts were 
most often used to justify hierarchical relationships within the 
administration, and in the third document to encourage more 
mutuality. Other themes and watchwords in the argumentation 
that corresponded with an egalitarian flavor included emphasis 
upon openness (low grid) and, deliberation. These themes oc-
curred most in the third document. The prominence of both 
hierarchical and egalitarian arguments throughout the Swedish 
documents corresponds with the GGCT typification of the 
Swedish national political and administrative context. There 
were, however, some individualist themes and arguments in the 
Swedish official accounts but these always appeared in the con-
text of broader concerns such as democracy. 
6.7.1 GGCT and Politisk styrning - administrativ självständighet 
Accounts about the possibilities for agency reform in this 
document were primarily hierarchical and egalitarian. Aside 
from the broad perspective taken by the speaker such as a con-
cern for steering the state, other hierarchical themes included 
emphasis upon formal rules and the desire to establish clearer 
accountability relationships between politics and the administra-
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tion. It was the Swedish constitution that provided the main 
source of rather detailed descriptions regarding public power 
and the legitimacy of more active government steering. These 
included citations regarding the subordination of agencies to 
the government. Another way in which this subordinate rela-
tionship was expressed was with reference to democracy and 
the existence of an accountability chain in which subordination 
of the administration to government was necessary to satisfy 
accountability demands. 
The focus upon democracy in the argumentation could also 
be interpreted as including an egalitarian flavor primarily be-
cause it was to be the citizens that were to be served by the ad-
ministration through accountability to government and parlia-
ment. Nevertheless, the term citizen hardly appeared. Other 
egalitarian themes in the argumentation included concern with 
the power structures in society. The need for more democracy 
was expressed against the observation that the bureaucracy was 
becoming an independent (and undemocratic) power in society 
(SOU, 1983:17). Hood describes stress upon power structures 
as a feature of egalitarian accounts and this stress is emphasized 
by a presentation of the growth of agency independence. An-
other feature in the text was its recognition of informal contacts 
as an important means for ensuring concordance of views be-
tween agencies and departments (SOU, 1983:100). Hood de-
scribes informal contacts as egalitarian because they encourage 
mutuality, there was however a tendency in the text to present 
informal contacts as a way for the government to influence the 
administration according to their intentions rather than as a 
mutual activity. Other egalitarian themes that were mentioned 
in a more cursory way include reference to citizen participation 
on agency boards and its history as an important means for 
promoting democracy within Sweden (SOU, 1983: 80-85), and 
recognition that more decentralization to the local level  pro-
moted the influence of the citizen upon agencies (SOU, 
1983:106). 
In terms of individualist themes, there were very few fea-
tures in the argumentation that could be identified as corre-
sponding to Hood's categories. There was a question raised 
about the limit of state growth, given budgetary problems, 
which may be interpreted as an individualist concern (SOU, 
1983:17) and more attention to the customer as an alternative 
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means for steering agencies. Both of these matters constituted 
only a few sentences in the entire document.  
 
6.7.2 GGCT and Regering, myndigheterna och myndigheternas styrning 
In contrast to the previous document, the argumentation in Re-
gering mydigheterna och myndigheternas styrning brought together hier-
archical and individualist themes. The hierarchical flavor of the 
official account was reflected in the desire to strengthen gov-
ernment steering in precise ways. Even the indirect ways of 
steering such as proposals for greater discretion for government 
in the appointment and transfer of agency managers were based 
upon a hierarchical relationship between the administration and 
government. As mentioned above, these hierarchical arrange-
ments were presented as consistent with democracy. Statements 
illustrating the hierarchical tone of the argumentation included 
the following:  
 
..fullt tillräcklig grund för regeringen att styra sina myndighter precis så 
bestämt och i den omfattning som regeringen själv finner önskvärt och 
lämpligt i varje särskild situation (SOU, 1985: 38). 
 
[..  sufficient grounds for the government to steer their agencies precisely as 
much and as decisive as it considers desirable and suitable in every separate 
situation.]  
 
Other hierarchical themes prominent in the argumentation in-
cluded the clarification of roles in setting out precise goals of 
the administration. Together with the steering watchword in 
this document, being precise was one of the most cited con-
cerns. An example of statements focusing upon the precision of 
role content was the following account of budgetary docu-
ments: 
 
Direktiven bör vidare ange efter vilka huvudlijner myndigheterna bör arbeta 
fram det nödvändiga underlaget för statsmakternas precisering och prioriter-
ing av hur verksamheten inom angivna resursramar bör förändras under den 
kommande treårsperioden (SOU, 1985: 71) 
 
[The directives should further inform about which main lines agencies 
should work from, to provide the necessary basis for the state powers preci-
sion and prioritising of how activities within a given resource frame should 
be changed during the coming three year period.] 
 
Or 
 
I fråga om rollfördeling mellan statsmakterna och myndigheterna föreslog 
budgetutredningen att styrningen av de statliga verksamheterna efter hand så 
långt som möjligt borde förändras så att statsmakterna mer riktade 
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uppmärksamheten mot verksamheternas mål och resultat och mindre mot 
valet av resursslag (SOU, 1985:62). 
 
[Regarding the separation of roles between the state powers and agencies, 
the budget commission proposed that steering the state activities conse-
quently should be changed as much as possible in order for the state powers 
to direct more attention towards the activities goal and result and less to-
wards the choice of resources.] 
 
More generally the emphasis on precision was reflected in the 
entire discussion of the budget, wherein a very detailed pro-
gramme was described including the kinds of documents to be 
supplied, when they should be provided and by whom. This de-
scription fitted with the mechanical metaphors adopted in the 
argumentation such as the administration as a tool. Further-
more, there was some reference made to compliance in the 
form of feedback providing the basis for future government 
decisions in the budgetary process. The desire for more active 
government steering in the argumentation was often expressed 
as promoting a strong state. 
Alternatively, distaste was expressed about professionals and 
technocracy. This is more akin to an individualist flavor. The 
problem with professionals and expert knowledge in this 
document was that it allowed the bureaucracy to make deci-
sions undemocratically. Instead, the commission called for us-
ing management knowledge and suggested that the role of 
agency director become an expertise in itself (SOU, 1985: 166) 
or through the greater management freedom. Other individual-
ist themes and watchwords in the argumentation included the 
emphasis upon effectiveness, flexibility and savings. It should 
be noted these priorities were presented as consistent with the 
promotion of more democratic arrangements. Furthermore, 
there was some reference to economic incentives in the presen-
tation of the modernization (another favored individualist term) 
of the budget, such as the introduction of interest rate incen-
tives for agency savings and a limit to agency's cheque balance 
(SOU, 1985: 64). This last feature was argued to promote the 
cost consciousness of agency managers.  
Economic incentives were also cited in the proposals for 
changes to the appointment of agency directors. This was ex-
pressed in relationship to encouraging the mobility of agency 
directors and not sanctioning them (in terms of employment 
conditions and pay) because theyd transferred. Other individu-
alist flavors in the proposals for reforms to the appointments of 
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agency director generals included the comparisons with the op-
erations of big business. The justifications for more active re-
cruitment were made with references to how this was done in 
the private sector, and the capacity for director generals to se-
lect their management team were also justifed in this way. This 
was expressed in the following way: 
 
Inom näringslivet är det vanligt att nytillträdande verkställande direktörer 
successivt försöker omge sig med personer som han har varit med om att 
välja själv. Detta bl.a för att underlätta en eventuell nyordning av verksam-
heten (SOU, 1985:176). 
 
[Within the business world it is common that newly appointed directors suc-
cesively attempt to surround themselves with people that they have chosen 
themself. This is among other things to facilitate the new order.] 
 
It is significant to note that the argumentation in the document 
did not include any reference to competiton or choice. 
Finally, while the argumentation would appear to be primar-
ily hierarchical and individualist, it can be suggested that the 
frequent references to terms and themes such as democracy or 
informal contacts gave it an egalitarian character. This was de-
spite the rather hierarchical interpretation of these concepts. In 
reference to informal contacts for example, their purpose was 
presented as a means to relay clearly the intentions of govern-
ment decisions or attain background information regarding 
agency activities (SOU, 1985: 97-99). It was not really that they 
should promote mutuality but rather to ensure that administra-
tors were sensitive to the intentions of the government. Infor-
mal contacts were to ensure concurrence with the government’s 
perspective. 
 
6.7.3 GGCT and I medborgarnas tjänst 
The official account in this document indicated a strong group 
flavor that was reflected in the emphasis upon the whole of the 
administration and finding a common civil service ethics. It was 
most akin to an egalitarian narrative although hierarchical and 
individualist themes were also present. In general, the argumen-
tation placed various blames upon individualist solutions such 
as focussing upon individual agency performance and employ-
ment conditions similar to the private sector. Market values 
more generally were also argued to have caused the dissolution 
of a distinctive public service culture (SOU, 1997:146). To this 
extent it could be seen as a reaction to and criticism of the pre-
vious document. 
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The egalitarian flavor in the argumentation was drawn from 
the emphasis upon promoting democratic values and enabling 
the citizen to have "influence upon the conditions that affect 
their wellbeing" (SOU, 1997: 39). Although a precise meaning 
of democratic values was never given throughout the argumen-
tation there were various indications that it is to be more than 
the traditional hierarchical chain between voters and representa-
tion in parliament and government. Indeed, the commission 
explicitly rejected a hierarchical approach to democracy and 
steering as was indicated in the following citations: 
 
En koncentration på frågor om styrning och styrbarhet leder till en ensidig 
uppfattning av statsförvaltningen som en hierarki på bekostnad av frågor 
som gäller förvaltningens förmåga till framförhållning och initiativ, dess 
kunskap, erfarenhet, rättrådighet….Förvaltningen har en horisontell dimen-
sion (SOU, 1997:22). 
 
[A concentration upon questions about steering and steerability leads to a 
one sided perspective about the administration as a hierarchy at the cost of 
questions regarding the administration's ability to plan ahead and take initia-
tive, its knowledge, experience and legal advice…the administration has a 
horizontal dimension.] 
 
Det är inte möjligt att styra en omfattande och komplex statsförvaltning på 
ett sådant sätt att dess maktutövning helt och hållet framstår som ett utflöde 
av beslut fattade av demokratiskt valda organ. En sådan ordning vore inte 
heller önskvärd, eftersom den skulle förutsätta en stärkt centraliserad och hi-
erarkisk styrning, som inte skulle gagna effektiviteten och inte heller harmo-
niera med de demokratiska värdena i vidare mening (SOU, 1997:38).  
 
[It is not possible to steer an extensive and complex administration in such a 
way that its exercise of power simply seems like an outflow of decisions 
made by democratically elected organs. Such a situation would also not be 
desirable, since it presupposes a stengthened centralized and hierarchical 
steering, that would not be conducive to effectiveness nor be in harmony 
with the democratic values in a wider sense.] 
 
The kind of horizontal relationships that were envisaged, how-
ever, were not made entirely clear. 
Other egalitarian features of the document included the de-
sire for less formality and precision in the application of man-
agement by results in the budget. This desire was explained with 
reference to the observation that setting precise results for indi-
vidual agencies through breaking down overarching goals for 
particular agencies in a sector could lead to a focus upon indi-
vidual agency performance at the detriment of the whole. In-
stead the commission proposed that only sector goals be set 
leaving agencies to negotiate between themselves how to satisfy 
the overarching goal (SOU, 1997: 87). This was a solution em-
phasising mutuality and cooperation between agencies. 
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The citizen also played a prominent role in the account thus 
lending it an egalitarian flavor (SOU, 1997:80-83, 87, 22, 75, 
147). It was argued for example that agencies require independ-
ence in order to respond to the expectations and needs of citi-
zens.It was stated:   
 
Medborgarnas anspråk och förväntningar på statsförvaltning är emellertid av 
den arten att myndigheterna och statstjänstemännen samtidigt måste 
tillerkännas ett stort mått av självstandighet. Förvaltningen måste ha integri-
tet (SOU, 1997:22). 
 
[The citizens demands and expectations upon the administration is, how-
ever, of the kind that agencies and civil servants at the same time must have 
a large degree of independence. The administration must have integrity.] 
 
Enabling citizens to have greater influence over the policies that 
effect their wellbeing (SOU, 1997:39), facilitating greater access 
of the administration to the citizen24(SOU, 1997:35), as well as 
the need for civil servants to have a living understanding of the 
citizen as their client (SOU, 1997:147) were the ways the com-
mission described these themes. These references to serving the 
citizen were distinct from market kind of relationships, such as 
that with a customer, since they also focused upon the desire of 
legality, objectivity and equality of access (SOU, 1997:39). 
There was also emphasis upon openness throughout the ar-
gumentation that may be interpreted as consistent with both 
egalitarian and individualist accounts. For example the commis-
sion criticized the closed circle of elites that developed and 
evaluated management by results (SOU, 1997:86), thus prevent-
ing other perspectives. This is a criticism of expertise and lack 
of participation. In addition, there was frequent reference to the 
Swedish tradition of the principle of publicity whereby civil ser-
vants have an obligation to disclose public information and citi-
zens have access to official documents affecting them. Main-
taining and strengthening this tradition of openness was identi-
fied as a means for steering. Finally, references to the desire for 
deliberation about the role of civil servants was especially typi-
cal of the egalitarian flavor. This occurred in the following 
kinds of statements: "De viktiga är att förvaltningskulturen och 
statsjänstemännarollen lever I medvetandent och diskussionen" 
(SOU, 1997:) [What is important is that the administrative cul-
                                                 
24 This is primarily in discussions of administrative arrangements at the level 
of the commune and in arguments about public insight and access of infor-
mation. 
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ture and also the state civil servant’s role lives in consciousness 
and discussion].  
There were also features of the argumentation that could be 
ascribed to a hierachical account of the administration. In par-
ticular, the calls for more (independent) expertise to develop re-
sults orientated management and train civil servants were reflec-
tive of a hierarchical desire for more specialist knowledge 
(SOU, 1997: 86, 83,147). Furthermore, recommendations to 
formalize informal contacts between civil servants and depart-
ments can be interpreted as emphasizing more hierarchical rela-
tionships. This was expressed in the desire for informal con-
tacts to be documented in order to clarify accountability rela-
tionship (SOU, 1997:91) and would appear to be a kind of 
counter weight to the recommendation to de-formalize the set-
ting of results for agencies. Finally, a hierarchical flavor was as-
cribed to the emphasis upon the rule of law and civil servants' 
independence in decision-making being subordinate to legisla-
tion. Although this may replace other hierarchical relationships 
such as the superiority of political decisions, it still bestowed au-
thority to rules from above (see SOU, 1997:34). Formal laws 
were also recommended to promote a civil service culture by 
legislating for breach of duty and neglience among civil ser-
vants. 
Finally the critique of results management that was pre-
sented in the report can be argued to correspond to Hood’s de-
scription of the fatalist way of life. He explains that such scepti-
cism and focus upon the contrary effects of reforms relies upon 
the role of irony to draw attention to the descrepancies between 
intention and consequences. Observations of startling contrary 
effects were presented in accounts that the shift to results steer-
ing had actually brought about more details in the steering, had 
led to less interest of politicians in agencies work and to report-
ing for its sake rather than about what was relevant (SOU, 
1997:83-85). I have not included the technique of irony in my 
analysis but did observe that these arguments were presented 
using the causal link.  
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6.8 Conclusion: The translation of agency reform in 
Swedish official accounts 
 
Official accounts of agency reform in Sweden have been com-
posed of contesting statements about the role and independ-
ence of agencies within the Swedish democratic system, the re-
lationship between effectiveness and democracy, and the bene-
fits of specific steering and management arrangements. In the 
documents I have analyzed it has not been possible to speak 
about specific steering and management arrangements without 
first resolving, or at least attending to, broader concerns about 
the appropriate means for reform given the Swedish system of 
democracy. The interpretation of the Constitution has provided 
the primary source from which statements about the role of 
agencies within the Swedish democratic system were derived. 
This resulted in conflicting statements about the role and inde-
pendence of agencies and the extent to which they can or 
should be subject to government steering. On the one hand, the 
appropriate role for agencies was constructed as a tool subordi-
nate and obedient to government, while on the other hand they 
were constructed as requiring independence to guarantee legal-
ity and public service to the citizen. The kinds of statements 
that were important in Swedish argumentation include the fol-
lowing: 
• The Constitution prescribes the administration as sub-
ordinate to the political sphere and therefore presents 
no barriers to the active government steering of agen-
cies. (Indeed, agencies are to be a tool of government 
and actualize the decisions and intentions espoused in 
the political sphere) 
• Since the government is responsible to parliament and 
parliament to the people, it is a necessary condition for 
democracy that the government has clear oversight of 
the activities of agencies, actively steers them, and 
thereby can be responsible for their activities 
• The Constitution prescribes only limited independence 
to agencies in specific applications of law, which can 
also be overridden by government legislation 
• Agencies have acquired independence that exceeds con-
stitutional prescription 
Or alternatively; 
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• The constitutional basis for agency independence (in 
individual cases of legal application) is to guarantee le-
gality, agencies are therefore not only subordinate to the 
government but also to the law (they can depart from 
government directives where this is in opposition with 
the law) 
• A democratic system aims to give citizens direct and in-
direct influence over the relations that affect their well-
being. In order to respond to citizen’s demands in such 
a system agencies must have sufficient independence 
 
Corresponding with the above divisions were also conflicting 
statements about the desirability of effectiveness as a political 
goal and its consequences for democracy. Diverging statements 
identified included: 
• Increasing the effectiveness of the administration pro-
motes democracy and democratic institutions 
• Effectiveness taken too far will have negative conse-
quences for democracy and legality 
Finally in statements about the benefits of specific steering 
and management arrangements, Swedish agencies were con-
structed through reference to the budgetary systems used to 
steer them and the effects of employment conditions and cul-
ture upon their work. It should be noted that official accounts 
included a range of statements about other specific manage-
ment and structural arrangements effecting agencies such as au-
diting, the task features of agencies (legal, commercial, policy 
implementation) and their management boards, but it has not 
been possible to cover all of these in this chapter. The state-
ments that were identified, however, revealed divergences of 
opinion about the necessity of precision in budgetary steering 
and its focus upon individual agencies. There were also other 
differences of opinion about market like arrangements for pub-
lic sector employment and other aspects of agency work. 
Statements presenting the need for more precise decision mak-
ing included: 
• Setting (precise) goals in the budget will enable the gov-
ernment to steer individual agencies more directly and 
clarify the activities and goals required of them (SOU 
1985:16) 
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• Longer time for decision making in the budget will en-
able precise demands to be set and improve quality of 
reporting back 
• Giving more freedom to managers (for the allocation of 
internal resources) to achieve overarching goals (over 
longer time period) will promote effectiveness 
• Introducing interest sanctions and returns for savings 
will promote cost consciousness 
• Requiring agencies to identify areas for savings them-
selves (since they have the best knowledge of their area) 
will provide a better basis for decision making and will 
promote effectiveness 
• Increasing the breadth of director  recruitment, their 
mobility and tenure will promote the governments’ abil-
ity to steer the administration (indirectly) 
Alternatively, statements rejecting more precise decision making 
and the apparently market ideology it represented included: 
• Setting precise goals for agencies leads to fragmentation 
• Setting sector goals rather than goals for individual 
agencies will promote integration of the whole 
• Market influences (introduced for more effectiveness) 
upon employment conditions and operations in the 
public sector have reduced civil servants independence 
and their commitment to public values and traditions. It 
has contributed to fragmentation of the state. 
 
Constituted through these statements, it can be concluded that 
agency reform in Sweden has been contested in official ac-
counts, with its meaning changing over time and resting upon 
different interpretations of what the Constitution prescribes 
and different conceptions of democracy and what is good for it. 
The degree of prominence of legality in these interpretations is 
an important point of distinction in the different interpreta-
tions. Finally, agency reform in Sweden has been constituted in 
statements about budgetary reform and methods for controlling 
director general/employee incentives and behaviour.  
6.8.1 The rules of speaking 
There were important similarities in the self-presentation of the 
speakers and their construction of the universal audience in all 
the official documents. This was despite different conceptions 
of agencies and democracy within the documents themselves, 
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and, despite differences in the actual composition of commis-
sion members. My analysis indicated that the credibility of 
Swedish official speakers required demonstration of a commit-
ment to democracy and knowledge of the institutional ar-
rangements that support it in Sweden. This was expressed in 
the presentation of articles of the Constitution and knowledge 
of the Swedish political system itself, such as its system of rep-
resentative democracy, commitment to collective government, 
its corporatist character and system of dualism. This feature of 
Swedish ethos favored political science categories and theories, 
as well as historical accounts of the origins of Swedish democ-
racy.  
In all of the documents analyzed the speaker provided an 
account of Swedish political administrative history, whether this 
was about the history of dualism or of administrative change as 
in the first or third documents, or the history of the board sys-
tem as in the second document. It is perhaps significant that in 
the second document, in which the greatest challenge to the 
tradition of agency independence was expressed, there was little 
discussion of this particular dualistic tradition of Swedish politi-
cal or administrative history. Another implication of the re-
quirement of Swedish speakers to announce their commitment 
to democracy was that Swedish speakers must present their par-
ticular initiatives with reference to the broader system and its 
goals. The universal audience in Sweden was constructed in all 
of the documents as a group concerned with the role of the 
agencies within democracy, and with knowledge about the de-
velopments of industrialization and complexity within society 
more generally. Swedish speakers tended to present the knowl-
edge of different expert groups in quite technical ways. All 
Swedish particular audiences were experts. Whether it was the 
knowledge of political scientists, constitutional law experts or 
financial management, Swedish speakers gave detailed accounts 
of their subject areas complemented by textbook definitions 
and the provision of evidence from statistics and interview find-
ings. 
The conditioning of the audience to accept proposals for 
agency reform in Swedish official accounts relied upon the re-
lease of emotions about the goodness of Swedish democracy 
and existing threats to the democratic system. This occurred in 
different ways, such as identifying the threat to democratic 
power from closed technocratic groups, or the looming dissolu-
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tion of the distinctiveness of the public sector. In any case, in 
all of the documents the value of democracy was identified as a 
priority. In the second document analyzed the urgency of the 
financial situation in Sweden was also used at the outset of the 
argumentation to promote the audience’s consideration of pro-
posals for more precise budgetary steering. Indeed, the locus of 
the precarious (a threat) was consistently adopted in all of the 
Swedish documents.   
Swedish official accounts exhibited primarily quasi-logical 
argumentation to describe the benefits of agency reform. Defi-
nition, comparison and the division of the whole into its parts 
were all used to demonstrate the role of the administration 
within the democratic system and the prescriptions of the con-
stitution for steering Swedish agencies. With regards to the 
proposals for budgetary reform, the division of the whole into 
its parts was used to demonstrate that more freedom to manag-
ers would not disrupt, and was compatible with, the overarching 
steering of the government. All of these descriptions sought to 
obtain the adherence of the audience by likening the rationale 
for agency reforms and their benefits to mathematical deduc-
tion. Arguments based upon the structure of reality were used 
in the argumentation to demonstrate the benefits of budgetary 
reforms and results orientated management. This occurred with 
the techniques of continuous development and the causal link 
being used to demonstrate to the audience that it was reason-
able to believe that budgetary reforms can achieve greater effec-
tiveness and improvements in financial management. In the 
third document, the pragmatic argument was used to refute the 
benefits of such budgetary arrangements by associating frag-
mentation with the budgetary reforms and with market orien-
tated initiatives more generally.  
Metaphors that were prominent in the Swedish accounts in-
cluded steering which was used on numerous occasions, particu-
larly in the first two documents, and in a variety of combina-
tions such as democratic steering, political steering or budgetary steer-
ing. The term democracy was also interpreted as a dormant meta-
phor. This was because it was often cited as a reason for agency 
reforms, without detailed discussion of what was actually meant 
by democracy or what more democracy entailed. It was also 
common to find the metaphor of mapping and balancing in the 
Swedish documents. These were used to describe respectively 
the activity of the commission and the relationship between the 
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administration and politics or between values. In the third 
Swedish document there was a clear change in the kinds of 
metaphors adopted as reflected in the adoption of a number of 
organic metaphors. These included the whole as well as tree, water 
and living.  
 
6.8.2 The cultural flavor of official accounts 
The broad problematization of the issues facing the administra-
tion, and the state and society more generally facilitated the 
consistent presence of the hierarchical way of life in Swedish 
accounts of agency reform. Swings in the prominence lent to 
different cultural ways of life, could also be observed in the dif-
ferent documents analyzed. Over the period studied the the 
prominence of cultural flavors shifted from primarily hierarchi-
cal themes and arguments in Politisk styrning – administrative 
sjalvstandighet, to hierarchical and individualist themes and argu-
ments in Regering, myndigheternas en myndigheternas ledning, to egali-
tarian and hierarchical themes and arguments in I medeborgarnas 
tjänst. Irrespective of which ways of life most characterized the 
themes in the documents, the Constitution and democracy were 
always central to the argumentation in Swedish official ac-
counts. 
The individualist way of life was least prominent and when it 
did appear it was always in the context of a broader concern for 
democracy. This was illustrated with the presentation of a 
number of individualist themes and arguments presented al-
most exclusively in the second document Regering, myndigheterna 
en myndigheternas ledning. It is noteworthy that there was strong 
representation from financial experts among the commission 
members responsible for this document. The desire for more 
effectiveness and cost savings were argued to correspond with 
the attainment of more democracy. Other individualist themes 
and arguments identified included proposals for budgetary re-
forms and for changes to the employment conditions of direc-
tor generals. There were arguments about giving more financial 
freedom to managers to promote effectiveness and cost sav-
ings. There were also arguments that financial incentives 
(through price signals eg. interest returns on savings), or in the 
case of agency director mobility, lack of financial sanctions, 
could promote more effective outcomes. Insofar as broadening 
the pool from which agency director generals were selected can 
be interpreted as promoting more competition, it was the only 
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reference to increasing competition in Swedish official ac-
counts.  
There were also some individualist criticisms of hierarchical 
features in Swedish accounts, such as the argument that the re-
liance of politicians upon experts in Swedish democracy made it 
undemocratic. A counter argument posed was that manage-
ment, rather than other professions, should become an exper-
tise of its own. Most of the individualist arguments presented in 
Regering, myndigheterna en myndigheternas ledning relied upon argu-
ments that structure reality such as the argument of authority, 
unlimited development or the causal link. In arguments about 
the constitutional right of government to steer or give more 
management freedom in the context of overarching steering, 
quasi-logical arguments were used. The metaphors used to sup-
port many of these individualist themes and arguments included 
effectiveness, modernization, mobility, flexibility and freedom.  
As has already been noted it was arguments and themes that 
corresponded to the hierarchical way of life that were most 
prominent in Swedish accounts of agency reform. This was re-
flected in the broad way in which the problem of agency reform 
was posed, as well as in the focus upon steering, and clarifying 
the roles of the administration and the political sphere. An im-
portant hierarchical theme in early Swedish accounts was that 
the government had a constitutionally prescribed power to steer 
agencies and that the administration was subordinate to the 
government. Alternatively, in the document I medborganas tjänst 
the administration was argued to be not only subordinate to the 
government but also to the law. Both claims relied upon the au-
thority of formal rules in the Constitution to prescribe behav-
iour of agencies, and in the second case other features of public 
law to prescribe agency decisions. In the proposals for budget-
ary reforms, the desire for more precise government steering 
was interpreted as a hierarchical argument. Finally, other argu-
ments that corresponded with the hierarchical way of life in-
cluded proposals to formalize informal contacts through their 
documentation. There was also the desire to use more specialist 
knowledge in the development of management by results and 
civil servants training.   
Most of these hierarchical themes and arguments were 
posed using quasi-logical argumentative techniques. In particu-
lar the division of the whole into its parts, definition and com-
parison were all used in accounts of Swedish democracy and in 
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applying the constitution to different interpretations of the ad-
ministration’s role. In some cases the use of the constitution 
could be interpreted as argument by authority, although in gen-
eral the discussion proceeded in a mathematical way with com-
parisons and value attributes being ascribed to particular inter-
pretations of the constitution. The metaphors supporting hier-
archical argumentation in Swedish accounts included steering, the 
strong state and in some cases democracy itself. Both qualitative 
and quantitative loci were observed to have supported these ar-
guments. 
There were also themes and arguments that were ascribed to 
an egalitarian flavor, although these occurred primarily in the 
third document I medborgarnas tjanst, which was prepared primar-
ily by academic commission members. They included the argu-
ment that more independence for agencies is necessary if the 
administration is to respond to the desires of citizens. There 
was also a preference for more horizontal relationships within 
the administration rather than vertical relationships. Proposals 
to change budgetary steering instruments to setting sector goals 
rather than individual agency goals can also be interpreted as an 
egalitarian argument promoting more mutuality and coopera-
tion within the administration. These arrangements were to re-
duce fragmentation. Other egalitarian themes and arguments 
included deliberation about the role of the civil servant and an 
emphasis upon more openness in policy making and in the ac-
tivities of the civil servant. The desire for more openness could 
also be attributed to an individualist way of life, as it is low grid. 
Finally, the concern for power structures that was expressed in 
the loci (threat to democracy from organized interests/the bu-
reaucracy) of the first two documents could be interpreted as an 
egalitarian concern. At the same time, both themes conceptual-
ized the problem of the administration in broad terms, which I 
have interpreted above as hierarchical. Although it is difficult to 
specify a greater prominence of quasi-logical or arguments that 
structure reality when presenting these egalitarian accounts, the 
metaphors that were associated with them included openness, the 
whole, democracy and the strong state. Organic metaphors where 
the state is described as a tree or loss of values as, like water dis-
solving, may also be attributed to the Swedish egalitarian flavor. 
In response to earlier individualist themes and arguments 
noted above, there were a number of blames put upon market 
initiatives in the third document I medborgarnas tjänst. It is diffi-
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cult to ascribe these blames primarily to an egalitarian or hierar-
chical flavor, but rather to a group flavor more generally. The 
arguments that blamed market initiatives for the problems of 
the administration focused primarily upon its fragmentation. 
This was expressed in the argument that setting goals for indi-
vidual agencies or that giving them more individual financial 
freedoms leads to a focus upon individual performance and 
identity at the detriment of the whole. Similarly, market values 
and employment conditions were argued to have dissolved pub-
lic values and the distinctiveness of a public service culture. 
These arguments were expressed in arguments that structure 
reality such as the causal link and in metaphors such as the 
whole, dissolving or fragmentation itself.  
It has already been observed in section 5.8.1 above that the 
Swedish speakers tend to conform to a self-presentation in 
which democracy, aspects of the political and administrative 
history of Sweden, and its institutional features are used to 
demonstrate credibility and knowledge. At the same time, there 
were some distinctions that can be observed in the way of 
speaking that was prominent in the different documents. These 
may be attributed to the ways of life being espoused. For ex-
ample, the first document Politisk styrning – administrative 
självstandighet, has been described as primarily hierarchical. It is 
also the document in which the speaker adopted the greatest 
formality in terms of technical definitions and concepts and 
made the greatest demands upon its reader in terms of ease of 
reading. There were no interviews cited from director generals 
reported in this document and its evidence was primarily drawn 
from legal experts, statistics and historical material. Alterna-
tively, in the second document Regering, myndigheternas en myn-
digheternas ledning which was found above to espouse the most 
individualist arguments, there was much less devotion to his-
torical accounts and even less to political science definitions, 
with the focus upon management and budgetary concepts. In 
this document the speaker adopted a more matter of fact way 
of writing about management techniques with the detail, par-
ticularly of budgetary reforms, putting the heaviest demands on 
the reader. Sources of evidence included both interviews with 
agency directors and statistical information. In the final docu-
ment, I medborgarnas tjänst, which contained the most egalitarian 
arguments in the Swedish case, although also hierarchical argu-
ments, the speaker adopted a number of academic and histori-
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cal sources for evidence, as in the first document, but also of-
fers a much more accessible and direct way of presenting this 
information. Sources of evidence included not only academic 
sources but also interview citations from agency director gener-
als and civil servants themselves.  
 
6.8.3 The relationship between official accounts and scenes of use 
Consistent with GGCT’s diagnosis of the Swedish cultural con-
text as highly egalitarian and then hierarchical, Swedish official 
agency talk has also revealed strong group themes and argu-
ments. However, the official accounts were more consistently 
and prominently hierarchical than egalitarian. The primary con-
cerns were steering and clarifying the relationship between the 
administration and the political sphere. Even in I medborgarnas 
tjänst, where some egalitarian themes appeared, the construction 
of agency reform continued to include hierarchical themes such 
as recommendations for the contribution of experts in training 
civil servants or upon formalizing informal contacts. In addi-
tion, the way of speaking about agency reform in Sweden was 
elite and favoured audiences with expert knowledge about the 
political system, legal matters and history. It should be noted 
there were themes and watchwords in Swedish documents that 
sounded egalitarian such as the universalizing themes of democ-
racy, or references to informal contacts, but these were often 
used to espouse hierarchical solutions. The prominence of hier-
archical themes and arguments, rather than egalitarian, is sur-
prising because the Swedish political culture was rated highest 
upon egalitarianism and is widely described as being so. One 
explanation for this incompatibility in the findings may be that 
the group feel in Swedish political administrative culture is 
more hierarchical than has previously been thought. Like the 
historically interventionist role (since 1940s) of government in 
Swedish society, which has required enormous commitment to 
planning and control, it may be that there is also a tradition of 
hierarchical order within Swedish public administration that has 
escaped much academic focus upon the collective character of 
Swedish government. An alternative explanation is of course 
that the hierarchical features of Swedish official accounts have 
been a response to the strong independence of Swedish agen-
cies. Their autonomy has been described as excessive and be-
yond the reach of government and parliament (Pierre, 2004). 
This may account for the emphasis upon management steering, 
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but it does not really address the consistent calls for a strong 
state and the detailed attention to roles or formal rules that 
were observed in the documents. Such findings correspond to 
descriptions of Sweden as a highly administered society (Heclo 
and Madsen, 1987; Huntford, 1971). 
While the apparently egalitarian features of Swedish political 
culture are unable to account for its official agency accounts, 
other features of the scenes of use do correspond with the 
kinds of themes and arguments produced. Not least, the consti-
tutional status of Swedish agencies entwines them in discourses 
about democracy and formal rules more generally. This made it 
difficult for speakers to ignore an account of their role within 
the democratic system or of legal interpretations of the Consti-
tution. While sounding universal anyway, the construction of 
the Swedish universal audience as committed to democracy ob-
tains greater particularity with the recognition of agencies con-
stitutional status. Democracy is also a theme that has special, 
even necessary utopian connotations, for the social democratic 
image of society that has been so influential in Sweden (see 
Castles, 1978). Besides the relationship between these features 
of the scenes of use and the kind of official accounts produced, 
it also became apparent that the commission system itself has 
its own reporting traditions. It requires lengthy analyses and the 
demonstration of thorough, systematic knowledge of the prob-
lem at hand. It is common that academics will be members of 
commissions and there is an expectation that the findings will 
be presented in a rational expert way. Such a context fosters a 
way of speaking that is elite and prone to hierarchical concerns 
such as defining clear roles for the administration and political 
sphere.  
Finally, and relevant to the commission system as well, the 
system of consensus democracy in Sweden requires knowledge 
that is presented in an independent way and thereby can foster 
consensus. Arguably quasi-logical argumentation is most ap-
propriate to this function because of its logical appearance, 
which can then also avert appearing political or confrontational. 
 
 7 Australia: agencies enhancing customer 
service and promoting whole of  gov-
ernment. 
 
 
This stage we have just completed, involved setting up the organization it-
self, defining and moving toward personalized service and establishing busi-
ness opportunities (Vardon, 1998: 2). 
 
The clear principle underlying the concept of the agency is the government's 
commitment to put the needs of people for high quality delivery above the 
boundaries of Commonwealth departments and agencies (Hansard, 1996, 
7622). 
 
Their special status is used to symbolize a whole of government approach. 
They can be thought of as frontier agencies (MAC, 2004:39). 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Agency reform at the national level in Australia has been con-
ceived of as the creation of organizations separate from de-
partments but subject to the financial legislation of the wider 
public service. Their chief executives are directly accountable to 
ministers with the departments playing an advisory role regard-
ing agency activities. There have been two kinds of initiatives 
that have been interpreted by Australian commentators as 
agency reform. The first includes a large service delivery agency, 
Centrelink, which on the basis of business partnership agree-
ments, administers benefits for different government depart-
ments. The second category is executive agencies, which were 
defined in the 1999 Australian Public Service Act. These or-
ganizations have tended to be small and they have no distinc-
tive contractual relationships with departments, but instead are 
subject to the same performance reporting arrangements as 
other departmental organizations. Both arrangements indicated 
a departure from the existing structural landscape of, on the 
one hand, statutory authorities with distinct financial arrange-
ments and big departments with a number of organizational 
units on the other hand. Together with the devolution of more 
financial and personnel decisions across the core public service 
generally, both agency arrangements also indicated a preference 
by the ruling Conservative Coalition government since 1996 for 
more arms length relationships with individual entities as op-
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posed to departments. This preference would already appear to 
be subsiding with, among other modulations, only four of the 
original nine executive agencies still existing (Wettenhall, 2003). 
The Australian political and administrative scene brings to-
gether features of the Westminister system of government and 
the American traditions of federalism and a senate (Galligan, 
1995). Its adversarial parliamentary system, and a policy-making 
tradition that is more pluralist than corporatist, have fostered 
competition between (most) political interests rather than delib-
eration and consensus. Australian culture has been character-
ized as highly individualist (Hofstede, 2001). This is reflected in 
the consistent presence of individualist themes and watchwords 
in documents describing agency reforms, although greater 
prominence to the hierarchical way of life can be identified in 
recent official accounts describing agencies. More specifically 
executive agencies have been constructed using primarily hier-
archical themes and arguments in order to promote whole of gov-
ernment arrangements. 
In this chapter I first discuss the use of the term agency in 
the Australian context (6.2). I then describe the Australian 
scenes of use in which agency accounts have appeared (6.3 and 
6.4). In section 6.5 I provide a description of agency reform in 
Australia as well as an overview of the reform period. It will be-
come evident that reforms that affected the whole of the Aus-
tralian public service are to some extent equivalent to what has 
been considered agency reform in The Netherlands. In section 
6.6 and 6.7, I analyze official accounts of Centrelink and execu-
tives agencies, as presented in the official documents I have 
been able to identify. Finally, in section 6.8, I conclude with a 
discussion of the translation of agency reform talk in Australia 
and its correspondence to the cultural context.  
 
7.2 A word (s) on agency terminology 
 
In the Australian administrative political context there is noth-
ing particularly innovative about the term agency. It is a term that 
has been used widely to describe different kinds of government 
and private sector organizations over a long period of time. It 
has also been quite common to use this term to speak about 
government departments (Halligan, 1998). When it is used, dis-
tinctions are often made between central agencies, those de-
partments that coordinate the activities of other departments 
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such as the Department of Finance or the Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, and line agencies, including departments 
that have a number of delivery units within their terrain or cre-
ate policy to be implemented at the national or state level.   
The terms service delivery agency and executive agency have entered 
the Australian vocabulary of government more recently. In the 
first instance the term service delivery agency was used in Aus-
tralian states such as Victoria and Adelaide during the early 
1990s to describe new arrangements that required the delivery 
of services to occur in business like units within departments (Co-
star and Economou, 1999). At the national level, the creation of 
a one stop shop Centrelink has also been described in law as a 
service delivery agency. This is an organization responsible for 
the administration of a number of different kinds of social se-
curity payments for different departments. By virtue of law it is 
separate from any particular department but falls within the 
policy portfolio of the Minister for Social Security. This organi-
zation has at various times been likened by Australian officials 
to the UK Next Step Agencies, to the New Zealand Crown En-
tities or the Canadian Special Operating Agencies (Newman, 
1997: 2; Vardon, 1997b; DOFA, 1998).  As Vardon has stated: 
“Even the New Zealanders are slightly begrudging us the con-
cept that we have, even though we stole a bit of it from them, 
but certainly its been developed” (Vardon, 1997b:1).  
The term executive agency is very new to the Australian context 
and first appeared in the Australian Public Service Act of 1999. 
It is also defined as an organization separate from a govern-
ment department, but generally only has its form (as a separate 
organization) legislated, not its task, unlike the case of the ser-
vice delivery agency Centrelink.25 There were originally nine ex-
ecutive agencies created as a consequence of this legislation and 
they have been described by commentators as an Australian 
variation, albeit with only limited significance, of the interna-
tional fashion towards agency reform (Wettenhall, 2003, 11; 
Rowlands, 2003, 4). The chief executives of these organizations 
are directly accountable to the responsible minister.  
Since 1997, the term prescribed agency has also received legisla-
tive meaning at the national level. This is a term used in the new 
Financial Management and Accountability Act of 1997 and re-
                                                 
25 An exception is the Meteorological Executive Agency that has long had 
legislation describing its activities despite being a departmental organization. 
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fers to organizational units within departments. For the pur-
poses of the act the definition prescribed agency makes it possible 
to speak about financial decisions and responsibilities being de-
volved to the chief executive of organizations within depart-
ments (Financial Management and Accountability Act, 1997). It 
also requires that these organizations report in budget papers 
and financial statements to parliament as an individual financial 
entity rather than as part of the department. Most organiza-
tional units with chief executives in government departments 
have obtained this status. Prescribed agency status also applies 
to executive agencies and the service delivery agency Centrelink.  
 
7.3 Scenes of use I: reconstructing the political and ad-
ministrative context 
 
Compared to the other countries in this study, the Australian 
political and administrative context is relatively young. Settled 
as a jail by the British in 1788, its institutions were initially cen-
tralized and autocratic (Singleton et al., 2000:5-6). They were ut-
terly English and constituted the application of their naval and 
military colonial experience to the barbarous conditions of the 
Australian environment and its first convict settlers (Hughes, 
1987). Far from the revolutions and debates for democratic suf-
frage in Europe and America, or even the pioneering spirit of 
the latter, self government was given in Australia before any 
sustained efforts were made to obtain it (Singleton et al., 
2000:5). The Australian colonies were among the first to adopt 
the practices of representative and responsible government, 
well ahead of Europe for example (Castles, 1985:42). The wide 
and largely barren open spaces, together with a small popula-
tion and limited private capital, provided a necessary and seem-
ingly natural role for government in both public works and 
commercial activities. Doctrines of laissez-faire were anathema 
in Australia’s early stages of political and economic develop-
ment. Indeed, there was little philosophical inspiration for de-
mocratic institutions at all, such as the Constitution for exam-
ple, rather government and politics was seen in crude instru-
mental terms as something to engage in order to get something 
out (Singleton et al., 2000:6; Encel, 1969:74). Such origins ac-
count in part for observations that it is not: 
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(A) country of great political dialogue or intense searching after problems (or 
recognition of problems that exist). There is little grandiose ideology and 
politics is usually considered a dirty business at that (Horne, 1964: 22) 
 
Yet while the new world status of Australia has been argued to 
foster an open manner, egalitarian spirit and according to na-
tional legend a fair go even to the underdog26, (not least because 
there were few real elites in the first place), this has not been re-
flected in commitments to social welfare. Based in part on (the 
preservation of) labour scarcity and thereby high wages and full 
employment, Australian workers already in the late 1800s had 
attained some of the highest standards of living in the world, 
both in terms of wage levels and home ownership (Castles, 
1985:95). This working man’s paradise by means of wage regula-
tion distracted the national conscious from the plight of non-
workers and a role for government in universal welfare provi-
sion. Since such strategies could bring with it wage impedi-
ments. To this extent, notions of solidarity and the social collec-
tive were limited and provided a legacy for small government, 
which has since been realized.  It has also been accompanied by 
an anti-mind style in public life where intellectuals and aca-
demic ways of speaking are generally avoided, and under the 
Howard government even berated, as part of the chardonnay set.  
 
7.3.1 The political system 
The principles of federalism characterize the Australian political 
system, whereby there are two levels of government with 
shared and overlapping powers (Galligan, 1995:34). Some 
commentators speak of sovereignty being divided between na-
tional and territorial governments who have a degree of auton-
omy (Singleton et al., 260), but formally this is not entirely cor-
rect because of the recognition of concurrent powers which 
gives the Commonwealth the capacity to impinge upon the bal-
ance of powers with the states (Galligan, 1995:34). There are 
also a number of other centralizing features in the Australian 
case, particularly in the realm of finance, that enable the na-
tional government to influence a number of state government 
decisions (Lijphart, 1999).  This is not to deny, however, that 
the Australian states can and do play a major independent role 
and that Australians tend to identify themselves more with their 
                                                 
26 According to the White Australia Policy which existed until 1973, this fair 
go could be interpreted as only applying to white and preferably Anglo 
Saxon Australians. 
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state governments than the distant and removed Canberra (Gal-
ligan, 1995:52). There are six state governments in Australia 
which were formally separate British colonies, as well as two 
territory governments that have less autonomy than the states. 
In addition, there is a local government level in Australia al-
though this is not recognized in the Australian Constitution. In-
stead, local government has been established on the basis of 
state government legislation and is thus limited to those func-
tions that the state governments deem appropriate. 
There are bicameral parliaments at most state (all but one), 
territory and national levels of government. At the national 
level this consists of both a House of Representatives where 
members are elected according to a preferential voting system 
based upon two parties with single member districts, and a Sen-
ate where seats are proportional to state population and mem-
bers are elected according to proportional representation. The 
voting system in the House of Representatives is designed to 
support major parties (Weller and Young, 2000:162) and his-
torically the Labour party or a coalition of Conservative and 
Liberal parties have formed the Government through a major-
ity in the parliament. The preferential voting system does, how-
ever, enhance the power of minor parties because even if they 
are unlikely to win a seat in their own right, they may be able to 
bargain their preferences in return for concessions from the 
major parties (Singleton et al., 2000:215-216). The system of 
proportional representation in the Senate has enabled the elec-
tion of minor parties such as the Greens and Democrats. It can 
operate as a check on executive dominance since it is possible 
that the Government will not have a majority in this house. 
Since the late 1960s it has become the norm that minor parties 
hold the balance of power in the Senate (Singleton et al., 
2000:130). With the recent fourth term of John Howard's Con-
servative Coalition government, however, the government has 
attained a majority in the Senate for the first time since the early 
1980s.  
Despite the mediating effects of the Senate, the Australian 
parliament has been described as an unruly bear pit in which 
politics is a ruthless adversarial contest between disciplined par-
ties (Uhr and Wanna, 2000:10). Parliamentary proceedings have 
been known to become boisterous in a contest of gladiatorial 
proportions. Flamboyant language and personal attacks are not 
uncommon and even celebrated by some. Adversarial politics 
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has been paired with a preference for simple direct language 
rather than detailed technical policy debates "in a country where 
the majority prefer to be thrifty with their expression" (War-
huft, 2004:xii). Indeed, too many big ideas and terms are prone 
to criticisms of "big noting and the high falutin" (Warhuft, 
2004:xii).  
 
7.3.2 The core executive 
By virtue of the majority achieved in the House of Representa-
tives, the formation of government in Australia is the direct re-
sult of elections. Within government, the cabinet represents the 
very centre of political power and, consistent with the West-
minister system, its members also hold a seat in parliament 
(Singleton, 2003:138). The cabinet is composed of the leading 
ministers from the governing party/parties, who are also usually 
drawn from the House of Representatives, although it is possi-
ble that they hold a seat in the Senate. Given that party support 
and loyalty are such important factors in determining leadership 
in the Westminister system, it is these factors rather than abili-
ties to analyze policies that most characterize ministers. With 
few exceptions such as the role of the Attorney General, Aus-
tralian government ministers tend to be informed amateurs 
rather than professionals or experts in their policy field (Single-
ton et al, 2003:140). This is somewhat distinct from the more 
professional status of ministers in The Netherlands.   
In Australia, it has been rare that all ministers will be mem-
bers of the cabinet and instead a select group will undertake this 
role. There has also been a move towards distinguishing be-
tween senior ministers and junior ministers with the former be-
ing cabinet members. The way cabinet members and ministers 
are selected differs with the governing parties/party. For Lib-
eral-National Party Coalition governments, it is usually the 
prime minister (who is the elected party leader of the majority 
Liberal Party) that selects the cabinet team, although choice is 
constrained by attending to State representation, the coalition 
partner, seniority and leading figures in the parties. For the La-
bour party, the government ministry is selected following the 
results of voting by Labour parliamentary members. Again con-
sistent with the Westminister tradition, Australian ministers are 
subject to the convention of individual ministerial responsibil-
ity, but the cabinet is meant to be built around collective deci-
sion making and solidarity.  
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During the last twenty years there have been a number of 
debates in Australia and in other Westminister systems (see 
Hennessy, 2001) about the institution of cabinet government 
and the capacity of prime ministers to dominate this decision 
making body (Weller, 1985; Campbell and Halligan, 1992; 
Keating and Weller, 2000). This is in part a consequence of 
changes in the inter-relationships between policy areas, as well 
as the personalization of executive leadership and their public 
prominence to the electorate as a result of developments in 
media communication (Keating and Weller, 2000:58). It can be 
argued that this last factor is more significant for prime minis-
ters in majority systems than in consensual systems, simply by 
virtue of the greater executive dominance in majority systems.  
In addition, the personal style of a prime minister is also of sig-
nificance (see Campbell and Halligan, 1992:1-34; Singleton et 
al., 2003:162). The prime minister is chair of cabinet meetings 
and has thereby opportunities to control the agenda for discus-
sion, the kinds of contributions allowed to members, and mo-
ments of decision making. In Australia, the growth of the prime 
minister's personal staff has also been identified as contributing 
to his influence more generally, although personal advisors are 
also on the rise for other cabinet ministers (Campbell and Hal-
ligan, 1992:7). Other indications of the prime minister's power 
in Australia include that the secretary of the Department of 
Prime Minister and Cabinet, essentially a department to serve 
the cabinet, has come to be seen as having a personal responsi-
bility to the prime minister rather than the cabinet (Campbell 
and Halligan, 1992:7). It is certainly not merely a department to 
serve the cabinet and in recent years this has been reflected in 
the appointment of secretaries to this department who have 
considered their role to serve the Prime Minister.  
 
7.3.3 Policy making style 
The inclusion of interest group opinion in the creation of policy 
has historically occurred through the party system itself in Aus-
tralia. This is most evident in the relationships of the Australian 
Labour Party with the trade union movement and with the non-
Labour parties' linkages to business, mining and agricultural in-
terests (Marsh, 2003:192). There has been and continues to be 
the inclusion of agricultural, business and other professional 
group representation on the boards of some statutory corpora-
tions but this has never occurred in the same kind of systematic 
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kind as in The Netherlands or Sweden. Indeed, inclusion of in-
terest group representatives on boards is often conceived of as 
involving expert opinion rather representing special interests, 
although the latter is of course always present. One exception 
to this pluralist tradition occurred during the Hawke-Keating 
Governments of the late 1980s early 1990s. During this period 
consultation with unions and agreement for an Incomes Accord 
in exchange for wage restraint was a feature of economic policy, 
as was the creation of tripartite councils representing sectors of 
industry to advise the government (Singleton et al., 2000: 302).  
 
7.3.4 The central administrative structure 
There are presently 18 departments in the Australian Public 
Service, three of which, the Department of Finance and Ad-
ministration, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 
and the Department of Treasury, have responsibilities for coor-
dinating activities across the administration. There is also the 
Public Service Merit Protection Commission, which is respon-
sible for promoting leadership, employment policies and devel-
opment throughout the administration. The present structure 
of the administration follows machinery of government 
changes in 1987 towards a smaller number (there were previ-
ously 28) of departments (Singleton et al., 2000:186; Wettenhall, 
1989b). The changes have been argued to create a more effec-
tive environment for devolving management functions since 
oversight of devolution becomes more manageable (Hamilton, 
1990). They have also meant that most portfolio areas can be 
represented within a smaller cabinet team, promoting cabinet's 
capacity to ensure their decisions impact the whole of the ad-
ministration. 
Prior to the creation of Centrelink or executive agencies, 
Australia already had a long tradition (at least by Australian 
standards) of arms length government in the form of statutory 
authorities, public corporations and companies. These types of 
organizations can be traced back to the period of self-
government following colonial rule in the Australian States 
(around the 1850s) (Wettenhall, 1990:3). The lack of a vigorous 
private sector that could provide the resources for infrastruc-
ture, together with the long distances and harsh physical envi-
ronment of Australia, provided the conditions for a strong tra-
dition of state ownership in a variety of commercial sectors 
(Wettenhall, 1990; Encel, 1960). Wettenhall uses the term non 
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departmental public body (NDPB), that are covered by the new 
Financial Management and Accountability Act of 1997 or the 
Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997, to define 
statutory authorities, corporations and companies. 27  In the lat-
ter case, these bodies are incorporated by separate statutes as 
financially autonomous institutions (statutory or public corpo-
rations) or constituted under provisions of corporation law in 
the case of public companies (Wettenhall, 2000:69). Wettenhall 
(2000: 75) has noted a preference for remaining public business 
activities to occur in the public company form under the How-
ard government. He has identified a number of problems with 
recording the numbers of these bodies in light of recent admin-
istrative changes. The Minister of Finance, recently cited the 
figure of 170 statutory authorities (Wettenhall, 2004:72). Else-
where it has been noted that there are 105 bodies covered by 
the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act including 
29 Commonwealth Companies (Department of Finance and 
Administration, 2005). 
There has been some disagreement in Australia as to 
whether Centrelink constitutes a new type of organization or 
rather reflects the long ongoing tradition of statutory authorities 
and corporations in Australia (see Wettenhall, 2003; Rowlands, 
2003; Mulgan, 2002). Those who emphasize its agency-like 
character focus upon the contract-like arrangements that the 
organization has pursued with a number of government de-
partments (Rowlands, 2003). This is not a feature of the tradi-
tional statutory authorities operating in Australia. For the pur-
poses of this study, it has also been the associations of Centre-
link with agency arrangements elsewhere such as Canada and 
New Zealand, which have been important in defining it as an 
agency (Newman, 1997; Vardon, 1997b; DOFA, 1998).   
 
                                                 
27 Australian commentators are also eager to point out that this departure 
from the Westminister of tradition of departments occurred prior to ar-
rangements for statutory authorities/corporations in the UK (Wettenhall, 
1990:10). 
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7.4 Scenes of use II: Australian culture and GGCT 
 
It has not been possible to identify secondary literature that ap-
plies GGCT to the national political and administrative context 
in Australia. In addition, there is insufficient time series data to 
make a replication of the study describing the GGCT mix rep-
resented in Sweden and The Netherlands. It is, however, possi-
ble to draw some conclusions about Australian political and 
administrative culture from some of the same statistical infor-
mation used to characterize the other countries in this study. 
This provides some indications of the way Australian political 
administrative culture compares with the other countries. For 
instance both the 2003 and 2005 Australian Social Studies Sur-
vey provided responses to questions about group membership 
and citizen participation within Australia. It shows that Austra-
lian citizens are much less often members of a group than ei-
ther the Swedes or the Dutch – as recorded in World Values 
Surveys from 1981, 1990 and 1999 - and that when they are, 
they are less often active members. This can be interpreted as a 
lower group rating in the Australian political context. 
In addition, Australian citizens have been shown to partici-
pate in unofficial strikes more often than their Dutch or Swed-
ish counterparts (World Values Survey, 1981, 1982, 1990, 1995, 
1999). This would suggest a stronger tendency to demonstrate 
resistance and actually resist the rules of authorities, or in other 
words a lower grid score. Sometime ago it was noted that au-
thority is generally despised in Australia (Horne, 1964). Horne 
has written: “Politicians and government officials are distrusted 
and the police are often hated, although there is more uncon-
scious acceptance of authority – perhaps indifference to author-
ity – than Australians recognize” (Horne, 1964:22). This aver-
sion for authority has in some ways been accompanied a casual 
approach to authority figures, which in itself can also be associ-
ated with the new world status of Australia. Unlike Sweden or 
even the UK for example, there was historically no administra-
tive class tradition in Australia (Hood et al., 2004:171). Consis-
tent with the anti-mind characterization of Australia, figures 
used to indicate low grid in the other countries such as discuss-
ing and seeking to persuade friends about politics were not, 
however, higher in Australia. This would have provided 
stronger evidence for a low grid score, and by contrast may also 
indicate degrees of fatalism. Other research into Australian cul-
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ture has indicated that it is highly individualistic. Hofstede 
(2001:215) for example rates Australia only second to America 
in his assessment of individualism, which has been described as 
conceptually similar to GGCT’s classification of the concept 
(Hofstede, 2001:39). Although his study was focussed upon the 
private sector it does suggest and provide indications that we 
can also expect the public sphere in Australia to have a strong 
individualist flavor. From this overview of evidence it is argued 
that the Australian political administrative system represents a 
case of a strong individualist culture. 
Certainly the competitive features of the adversarial political 
system in Australia, based upon a two party system whereby the 
winner takes all is consistent with characterizations of the indi-
vidualist way of life which rewards winners without compro-
mise. Similarly, the more pluralistic approach to policy making 
also fits with a view of the world wherein competition for re-
sources provides the best means for allocating them. The sys-
tem of individual ministerial accountability and even the possi-
bility for prime ministers to dominate the supposedly collective 
decision making of the cabinet can also be interpreted as con-
sistent with the individualist way of life. This is because the ca-
pacity of the prime minister to dominate the cabinet has been 
the consequence of individual electoral success, rather than hi-
erarchical prerequisites about status and role allocation, within 
the political system. 
 
7.5 Australian agency reforms in brief 
 
There have been two agency initiatives at the federal level of the 
Australian Public Service. The first of these was Centrelink, a 
service delivery agency first announced in the 1996 national 
budget. This organization was formed through an amalgama-
tion of activities that had previously been the responsibility of 
the Department of Social Security (DSS), the Department of 
Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs 
(DEETYA), and to a lesser extent, the Department of Health 
and Family Services (DHFS). It belonged to the portfolio of the 
Minister of Social Security, but functioned outside departmental 
borders. The bulk of the agency's operations were to be derived 
from the activities of the DSS and its tasks consisted primarily 
of administering the payment of financial assistant programs in-
cluding employment and sickness benefits, as well as childcare 
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rebates and student assistance (Rowlands, 2003). The agency 
also has been responsible for registering, assessing and referring 
job seekers. It is a large organization employing more than 
20,000 people and its creation left just 700 employees in the 
Department of Social Security (Rowlands, 2003:123).  
 The second type of agency initiative has been called execu-
tive agencies. This was a new type of organization created in the 
Australian Public Service Act of 1999. Executive agencies oper-
ate separately from departments and are directly subordinate 
and accountable to the minister of the agency portfolio. As will 
be described below it has not been entirely clear what the moti-
vations for these agencies have been. Since their introduction, 
however, there have been nine executive agencies created in-
cluding the National Archives, the Bureau of Meteorology and 
the CrimTrac Agency (provides expert support in national secu-
rity and police matters) (Wettenhall, 2003:9). With the re-
election of the Howard Government in 2004, there would seem 
to have been a change in position regarding these organizations 
and four executives agencies were reabsorbed into the depart-
mental organization (Halligan, 2005). 
7.5.1 The contours of Australian agencies 
 
Centrelink28 
Specific legislation entitled The Commonwealth Service Deliv-
ery Act (CSDA, 1997) provided the means by which Centrelink 
was granted its separate status from departments. It also de-
fined the agency's other features such as its management board 
and the role of the chief executive. This act was passed through 
parliament with little dissent, although one substantive amend-
ment was made to a provision which would have allowed the 
agency to engage staff outside of the conditions recognized in 
the Public Service Act (Rowlands, 2003:125). Many provisions 
of the CSDA, including the management board, emulated pro-
visions traditionally adopted for statutory corporations in Aus-
tralia, although unlike statutory corporations Centrelink re-
mained subject to the same type of personnel and financial 
regulations as organizations within a government department 
(Boxall, 1997). Indeed, the chairperson of the management 
                                                 
28 Much of the discussion of Centrelink in this section has relied upon Row-
lands (2002). 
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board of Centrelink was legally recognized as equivalent to a 
secretary of a department in Australia. This required that the 
organization also had the capacity to serve the chairperson in 
this role with the same kind of administrative capacities as a 
government department, for example with audit units, lawyers 
and personnel experts.  
In addition, like organizations within a department, and 
unlike statutory corporations, Centrelink has been unable to en-
ter into contracts in its own right, nor has it the power to hold 
property (Rowlands, 2003:127). However, the act did provide 
that the chief executive of Centrelink be able to enter into ar-
rangements with the principal officer of a commonwealth author-
ity (the equivalent of a departmental secretary) for the provision 
of commonwealth services (CSDA, 1997:paragraph 7). These 
arrangements have generally come to be known as business 
partnership agreements (BPA). Finally, another important dis-
tinction between Centrelink and a department is that Centrelink 
has had no direct access to the Australian government budget 
(Rowlands, 2003, 128). Instead, it must earn its revenue almost 
entirely from payments under the service agreements (Row-
lands, 2003:128). 
It is useful to describe more fully some of the provisions in 
the CSDA since the act also prescribes a number of governance 
arrangements with regards to reporting to the minister, receiv-
ing directions from the minister and for the appointment of 
management positions. Originally the act defined the board of 
Centrelink as being responsible for deciding the "goals, priori-
ties, policies and strategies" of the agency, as well as overseeing 
the agency's performance (CSDA 1997: paragraph 12). In addi-
tion, the chairperson of the board was required to deliver the 
annual report of Centrelink to the minister around July every 
year. This report is also tabled in parliament and, like the annual 
reports of departments, must comply to the parliamentary stan-
dards of reporting as defined by the Joint Committee of Public 
Accounts (JCPA). The members of the management board, 
with the exception of the chief executive officer, were to be ap-
pointed by the minister, and were prescribed to include a chair-
person, the chief executive officer, and at least four other 
members, two of which cannot be principal officers of com-
monwealth authorities eg. heads of departments (CSDA, 1997, 
paragraph 16). Following from Centrelink's initial creation it 
was generally the practice to select some board members from 
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the private sector, as well as the secretaries of the two main 
purchasing departments (formerly DSS and DEETYA), al-
though other kinds of compositions were possible under the 
act. The board was granted the powers to appoint the chief ex-
ecutive officer of the agency, although this was to be done in 
consultation with the minister. Following the re-election of the 
Howard government in October 2004, the separate board of 
Centrelink was dismantled, and is to be replaced by an advisory 
board within the new Department of Human Services. This is a 
board to advise the minister upon the activities of all of the six 
delivery organizations within the department.  
The act also established some conditions for the contacts be-
tween the minister and the (now dismantled) board, and more 
specifically for the giving of ministerial directions, (policy) noti-
fications or making ministerial requests for information. Except 
for in the case of information requests, the minister must al-
ways make directions or notifications in writing to the board 
and the particulars of these must be published in the annual re-
port of Centrelink. In addition, the act requires that the minister 
seek consultation with the board before giving directions, and 
that alternatively, the board advise upon the impact of these di-
rections (CSDA 1997: paragraph 10). Mulgan (2000:17) has 
noted that there “were no formal written instructions made in 
the first year of Centrelink's operations and only two in the sec-
ond year”. This may suggest that contacts occur in more infor-
mal ways. Both the chairperson and the minister were able to 
convene a board meeting at any time, and a meeting had to be 
convened on receipt of a written request signed by at least two 
members. It is also expected that with the creation of the new 
advisory board within the Department of Human Services there 
will be some provisions regarding formal contact between the 
board and the minister, although at the time of writing this had 
not yet been made public. 
Although very much the public face of Centrelink, the chief 
executive officer of the agency was originally subordinate to the 
board, and had responsibility for the day to day administration 
of the agency (CSDA, 1997: paragraph 16). The chief executive 
reported to the board of Centrelink, who also decided her re-
muneration and allowances. Originally the chief executive offi-
cer of the agency had no formal accountability requirements to 
report to the minister, although this has been reversed with the 
changes in 2004 denoting the chief executive, rather than board 
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chair person, as statutory officer. This grants the chief executive 
“a range of powers, functions and responsibilities for the finan-
cial management of Centrelink, as well as a number of reporting 
requirements" under financial accountability legislation (Row-
lands, 2003:129-130). From the time of agency creation until 
November 2004, Sue Vardon maintained the role of chief ex-
ecutive in the agency. She became a very public figure, speaking 
regularly to the media and various other audiences about the ac-
tivities of Centrelink. She resigned in 2004 after the govern-
ment's announcements of their plans to scrap the Centrelink 
board.  
While the CSDA Act authorized the creation of arrangements 
for service between Centrelink and other government organiza-
tions, it did not provide any guidelines as to how these agree-
ments should be pursued, nor upon the content of such an 
agreement. Instead, the rationale of purchaser/ provider as envis-
aged by both the Department of Finance and Administration 
and the National Audit Office acted as a basic framework for 
setting up the agreements between Centrelink and the purchas-
ing departments (see DOFA, 1995; ANAO, 1997). Broadly 
speaking, in the Australian terminology purchaser/provider ar-
rangements describe situations in which the purchaser defines 
what should be delivered by a particular provider, and where 
the provider delivers the agreed outputs or outcomes at an 
agreed price (DOFA, 1995:1). While the institutional relation-
ship between purchaser and provider might vary from clarifying 
the relationship within an organization such as a department, to 
separating the roles of purchaser provider into discrete bodies - 
even providers outside of the public service - a contract like 
agreement is the basic arrangement governing this relationship. 
In its first year of operation, these agreements were referred to 
as strategic partnership agreements, but after 1998 became 
known as business partnership agreements (BPA). The empha-
sis upon partnership was presented, by commentators in both 
Centrelink and DSS, as distinct from a purely commercial pur-
chaser-provider relationship, and recognized the shared mission 
between Centrelink and its purchasers (Blunn, 1997:4).  After 
all, since Centrelink is not a separate entity from the Australian 
Commonwealth "the service agreements under section 7 of the 
CSDA Act are not real contracts as legally speaking the Com-
monwealth cannot contract with itself" (Rowlands, 2003:127). 
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The contents of the first service agreements between Centrelink 
and DSS were agreed upon "by a very small team working with 
minimal input from 'program branches' in each organization" 
(Rowlands, 2003:168). Nevertheless, the ANAO has noted that 
the agreements between Centrelink and all her purchasers (the 
DSS, DEETYA and DHFS) followed a series of workshops 
where the main principles and elements of the agreements were 
defined (ANAO, 1997:44). These principles included a com-
mitment to clear measures of success and clear lines of ac-
countability, as well as the need for balance between Centre-
link's requirement of flexibility and the purchaser's need to con-
trol policy direction (ANAO, 1997:44). Among other things, 
these agreements have focussed upon identifying the pro-
grammes Centrelink is responsible to deliver, the performance 
measures and monitoring systems used to assess delivery, the 
payment of Centrelink for services delivered and the timing of 
reporting (ANAO, 1997:45). There are also provisions for how 
to deal with ministerial directions that contradict with estab-
lished arrangements within the agreements. Other institutional 
arrangements that have been set up to support the establish-
ment of the service agreements include the creation of a num-
ber of committees, at both operational and senior management 
level, to facilitate the business relations between Centrelink and 
DSS (Rowlands, 2003:168). 
In its first year of use, the National Audit Office (ANAO) 
was in general positive about the strategic partnership agree-
ments that had been put in place, although it was concerned 
about the distinctions in the structure of the agreements with 
different departmental purchasers (ANAO, 1997:46-47). These 
differences were thought to increase the level of complexity for 
Centrelink, which must manage these different kinds of ar-
rangements. However, in the following years the ANAO has 
been critical of the failure to include unit costs for different ser-
vices into the agreements (ANAO, 1999:13; Rowlands, 
2003:170-171). This is particularly significant since all of 
Centrelink's revenue is derived from the prices established 
within its purchaser provider agreements. To date such revenue 
has been calculated by the use of a global price for all services 
provided within a particular agreement (Rowlands, 2003:169). 
In 1999, the ANAO also was critical of Centrelink's 
performance and noted that inaccurate decision making in the 
processing of payments was a significant problem. Both 
academic commentators and the ANAO have attributed this to 
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tors and the ANAO have attributed this to the emphasis placed 
upon customer service within Centrelink (Howard, 2003; 
ANAO, 2001:23). 
In his own analysis of the Centrelink agreements with DSS 
Rowlands (2003:168) has noted that they have become far more 
lengthy and detailed.  In the first year, for example, the agree-
ment comprised of 10 pages describing the core agreements, 
with various protocols and memoranda to the core agreement giving the 
document a length of some 84 pages. This was more than dou-
bled in the second year, when the business partnership agree-
ment of 1998, which was intended for three years, became a 
246 page document. The size of this agreement becomes an 
even more significant problem when it is pointed out that by 
the year 2000 Centrelink had some 22 business partnership 
agreements with a range of departments, as well as state and lo-
cal governments (Tannahill, 2000:10). These agreements with 
the states and local governments have been allowed, despite no 
clear legal grounds for Centrelink to have such agreements with 
organisations outside of the Commonwealth (Rowlands, 2003: 
126). Although Centrelink's purchasers have grown considera-
bly since its creation, the great bulk of Centrelink business con-
tinues to be conducted with DHS (formerly FaCs and DSS in 
the lifetime of Centrelink). In terms of funding, FaCS provided 
92% of Centrelink's work, while the Department of Employ-
ment and Workplace Relations (formerly DEETYA) provided 
5%, and all other purchasers accounted for just 3% of Centre-
link's total work (Rowlands, 2003:124). 
 
Executive agencies 
Executive agencies were created in the Australian Public Service 
Act of 1999. This legislation followed initiatives already pursued 
by the previous government to replace and simplify the earlier 
Public Service Act of 1922. It is rather broad legislation recog-
nizing public service values, establishing the rights and obliga-
tions of APS employees, defining the powers and functions of a 
number of actors such as the Public Service Commissioner and 
providing a framework for fair employment. Among its provi-
sions is the category of executive agency, which can be created on 
the advice of the prime minister through an order of the gover-
nor general. Executive agencies are defined as separate from 
government departments in Australia and are, instead, directly 
subordinate and responsible to the minister of the agency port-
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folio. According to the Public Service Act, the head of an 
agency is deemed accountable to the government, the parlia-
ment and the public in the same way as the secretary of a de-
partment (APSA, 1999:35). In contrast to managers of govern-
ment organizations within departments, and like the secretaries 
of departments, the head of an executive agency is appointed, 
and can be terminated at any time, by the minister of the agency 
portfolio. To this extent, their position outside of departments 
has located them much closer to the political realm. The act 
prescribes, however, that minister's appointments and termina-
tions must be first preceded by a report and advice from the 
secretary of the department relevant to the minister’s portfolio 
(Australian Public Service Act, 1999:36). In this way, and, 
through the policy advice role of the secretary of the depart-
ment, departments continue to maintain influence over the 
management of executive agencies. 
Other features of the Australian executive agency status in-
clude the provision that the remuneration of heads of executive 
agencies is to be determined by the responsible minister after 
consultation with the Remuneration Tribunal. The APSA also 
requires that executive agency heads, like secretaries of depart-
ments, provide an annual report of the organizations' activities 
to the minister at the end of the financial year. In both cases, 
this report must also be presented to parliament and must be in 
accordance with the parliamentary standards set out in the 
guidelines of the Joint Committee of Public Accounts. In this 
respect, the accountability requirements of departmental units 
and executive agencies are exactly the same. Rowlands (2003) 
has pointed out that there is no distinctive performance report-
ing regime required of executive agencies, such as that included 
within the service agreements of Centrelink. Indeed, perform-
ance matters or contract like arrangements are not referred to at 
all in the few documents about executive agencies which have 
been published. It should be noted, however, that like organiza-
tions within departments, executive agencies are required to 
comply to the accrual-based outcomes and outputs framework 
that were first introduced to the whole of the APS in 1997 
(DOFA, 1998). This requires that executive agencies do em-
brace and report performance measurements in its annual re-
port.  
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7.5.2 An overview of the reform period 
The creation of service delivery or executive agencies at the common-
wealth level of the Australian government has only been a fea-
ture of the reform platform since the election of the Conserva-
tive Coalition government in 1996. As shall be described, it has 
also only played a limited role in the reform trajectory and has 
been defined as types organizationally separate from depart-
ments. There was a long tradition of statutory corporations in 
Australia but this had generally been accompanied by a com-
mitment to service delivery and policy being performed to-
gether within (mega) departments (Halligan, 1998). Despite the 
introduction of some agencies, the tradition of big departments 
has continued with more across the board changes being intro-
duced to devolve financial and personnel decisions to units 
within departments and with demands for outcomes in per-
formance reporting. In a way these changes go further than the 
requirements put upon agencies in The Netherlands, which are 
also departmental organizations, but without the terminology or 
conceptualization of these units (also often confusingly referred 
to as agencies in the Australian context) being separate or at a 
distance from departments. The arrangements to have Centre-
link and executive agencies separate from departments has also 
been somewhat modulated since the beginning of the Conser-
vative government's office, with the removal of Centrelink's 
board in 2004 and the re-categorization of four executive agen-
cies back into the departmental organisation (Wettenhall, 2004).  
Before discussing further the period of reform since 1996, it 
is important to note that a trajectory of reform had already been 
pursued prior to that time, although it was one without refer-
ence to arms -length arrangements or the international fashion 
of agencies. This is because this period did include initiatives to 
devolve management decisions to units within departments and 
to require agreements about resource use and performance. 
From 1983 the Financial Management Improvement Program 
(FMIP) was introduced which included a commitment to de-
volving more management decisions to departments (from the 
Department of Finance and other co-ordinating depart-
ments/agencies), and managers within those departments 
(Keating and Holmes, 1990; Management Advisory Board, 
1992; Zifcak, 1994). The initiative included the introduction of 
a running cost appropriation that consolidated a number of 
administrative expenses and made them the prerogative of de-
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partmental managers. In addition, shifting running costs over 
the budget year (up to 2%) and keeping efficiency savings were 
made possible (Keating and Holmes, 1990, 176-179). These ar-
rangements were introduced together with performance report-
ing and the setting up of corporate plans - that included agree-
ments about resource uses - within departments (Management 
Advisory Board, 1992:325-381).  
Although the initial impact of the reform was experienced 
primarily at the higher echelons of the departments, it was the 
intention that it should also include devolution within depart-
ments and by 1992 there was evidence that this was occurring 
(Management Advisory Board, 1992: 102-112). Reformers dis-
tanced themselves from agency initiatives in the UK and New 
Zealand at this time however because devolution was not to 
occur in a context in which implementation was considered 
separate from policy. Indeed, "bringing these together has been 
one of the central planks of FMIP and Program Management 
and Budgeting (PMB)" (Management Advisory Board, 1992: 
252). As one commentator involved in the reform explained:  
 
the Australian view is that public servants should have an eye for the big pic-
ture, they should all feel in some way responsible for achieving (policy) out-
comes cost effectively, while being held accountable only for those things 
over which they have control (Holmes quoted in Management Advisory 
Board, 1992:252, my emphasis). 
 
Just prior to the change in government in 1996, however, some 
movements towards separation between policy and implemen-
tation were being noted (Aulich, 2000:162-163). Besides pursu-
ing more responsiveness to political demands from the public 
service through the FMIP, the Hawke-Keating governments 
during the period from the early 1980s until 1996 also changed 
the tenure of higher civil servants and created a political tier in 
the administration (Halligan, 1997). This occurred through re-
designating the head of department to department secretary, a 
position with a fixed contract rather than as in the past, perma-
nency. Contracts were also used for the newly created senior 
executive service employees providing the means for greater 
flexibility but also greater politicization of the administration. 
The legacy of Labour's changes to the administration was 
identifiable with the arrival of the new Conservative govern-
ment in 1996 who immediately removed six of the existing de-
partmental secretaries. Aside from this first decisive sweep at 
the administration, however, the new government was initially 
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vague, some suggest uninterested, in a vision for the public sec-
tor (Halligan, 2000:51). The most vocalized intentions were at 
first privatization, savings and workplace reform. This is re-
flected in the initial announcements for Centrelink in the 1996 
budget that, although it included mentioning the creation of a 
service delivery agency, was most striking because it was "expected 
to produce approximately AUD $146 million in savings over 
the three years between 1997-2000" (Budget Review, 1996). 
Similarly, the lead up to the legislation that would include provi-
sions for executive agencies was dominated by discussion about 
intentions to deregulate employment conditions in both the 
public and private sectors. In a country that had already re-
duced its commonwealth public sector substantially since 1986, 
the loss of 16,000 public service positions as a result of privati-
zation in the first two years of the Howard government (Aulich, 
2000:162, Halligan, 2000:54), had undoubtedly distracted atten-
tion from the agency character of some initiatives. Centrelink, for 
example, also announced 2700 staff cuts in 1998 and another 
2300 in the following years (Centrelink, 1998). 
According to research by Rowlands the creation of Centre-
link as a separate agency was the initiative of the heads of gov-
ernment departments in the field of welfare (DSS and 
DEETYA) pre-empting the incoming government's demands 
for savings (Rowlands, 2003:117-120). Separation from depart-
ments was a desirable solution for these actors because it did 
not require a loss of turf from one to the other department. 
This was also reflected in the initial board structure of the or-
ganization which gave representation to both departments 
(Rowlands, 2003: 130-131). Separation from departments came, 
however, to fit with the emerging philosophy of the govern-
ment for the public sector. This included emulating the private 
sector through purchaser-provider arrangements, through 
benchmarking with private sector activities and encouraging a 
contestable environment in the public sector more generally 
(Aulich, 2000:163; Halligan, 2000:52). Following from the crea-
tion of Centrelink there were also official statements endorsing 
separation of policy and implementation and associating Cen-
trelink with agency initiatives elsewhere in New Zealand and 
the UK. Also pointing to the one stop shop feature of Centre-
link, the Minister for Social Security stated in 1997 that com-
pared to: 
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service delivery agencies overseas, notably the UK and New Zealand…the 
new Agency takes the concept of single-point Government delivery service 
further. Unlike overseas counterparts, the Agency will not operate solely as 
an administrative entity within (my emphasis) a department of state, or be lim-
ited to single portfolio responsibilities (Newman, 1997:2). 
 
In addition, the head of the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, Max Moore-Wilton is cited as emphasizing in 1997 
that; 
 
We are seeing today a very clear movement towards the separation of policy 
advice and service delivery. This separation [in his view] was "absolutely 
fundamental to the future health of public service in this country (Rowlands, 
2003: 89). 
 
It was only after the fact of Centrelink's creation however that 
these rationales appeared in the Australian context.  
Executive agencies were initiated through a clause in the new 
Australian Public Service Act of 1999, this act replaced a previ-
ous one from 1922 and was being prepared for change by the 
previous government. The Coalition government announced 
their reasons for changing this act in a discussion paper from 
late 1996 Towards a Best Practice APS. It has been cited as one of 
the first attempts by the government to outline their intentions 
for the parts of the public sector that were not to be privatized 
(Halligan, 2000:51). The primary focus of the report was the 
need to reduce personnel regulations and to devolve more 
powers of employment conditions to managers. It also identi-
fied the private sector as the primary benchmark for activities in 
the public sector (Reith, 1996:4, 6). The National Council of the 
Institute for Public Administration in Australia criticized the 
report for its lack of examination of the basic institutional ar-
rangements for management (Rowlands, 2003:87). For the pur-
poses of this study Towards a Best Practice APS was most surpris-
ing because it did not include any mention of executive agen-
cies, although this was to become a feature of the legislation 
that eventually followed in 1999.  
References to executive agency status were scarce during the 
parliamentary debates and committee procedures for the act. 
During the committee proceedings there were just three main 
points of concern raised about the original paragraphs on ex-
ecutive agencies. These included proposals by the Australian 
National Audit Office that the annual report guidelines required 
for executive agencies be more specified (JCPA, 1997:23), and 
that the explanatory memorandum of the bill provide a clearer 
explanation of the purpose of executive agencies. Both of these 
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recommendations led to small changes in the final draft of the 
act. The third area of concern related to the ministerial discre-
tion being granted for the appointment, termination and remu-
neration of heads of executive agencies. These matters were 
raised by the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) and 
resulted in some minor checks to this discretion in the final Act. 
The checks included the requirement that the minister receive 
advice from the relevant departmental secretary about termina-
tion and appointment, and that he or she consult with the Re-
muneration Tribunal about remuneration (APSA, 1999). In the 
act itself it is stated that the purpose of the executive agency 
structure is to “provide a degree of separation from departmen-
tal management where that is appropriate to the agency func-
tions and something less than a statutory authority is war-
ranted” (APSP, 1999: paragraph 9.2). In addition, some effects 
of agency status including that "distinctness from wider de-
partmental priorities will increase the opportunities for an 
agency to further its goals". And, more obviously, that it will 
"provide flexibility in the appointment, tenure and arrange-
ments of the head of the agency (APSP, 1999: paragraph 9.2). 
Aside from these statements made during the legislative 
process, there are few other public official accounts given of 
the purpose of the reform prior to its introduction. There is a 
six page discussion paper from the development team in the 
Department of Finance and Administration from 1998 which 
describes lessons learned from the establishment of agencies in 
New Zealand, the UK and Canada but its link with the creation 
of executive agencies is not explained (DOFA, 1998; Rowlands, 
2003:89; Wettenhall, 2003). Indeed, the development team no 
longer exists. This document does include Centrelink as an ex-
ample of an Australian service delivery agency. At my request, 
an unpublished document was also supplied by the Public Ser-
vice Commission, which gave examples of when executive 
agency status might be appropriate, although again, these ex-
amples are brief and without explanation (Public Service Com-
mission, 2003). The examples listed are: 
• When agency functions cross portfolio lines, making it in-
appropriate to place it in a portfolio department; 
• When it is desirable to separate substantial service delivery 
functions to allow a policy department to focus on core 
business; 
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• When the agency is administering a joint Commonwealth – 
State initiative; or 
• When it is used as an interim step to corporatization. 
 
Executive agencies were already being created in 1998 in antici-
pation of the changes to the law and some of these organiza-
tions e.g. meteorology, crimtrac, archives, were designed with a 
management board, although the chief executive remained re-
sponsible to the minister for daily operations.  
Prior to the passing of executive agency legislation, the gov-
ernment had cemented its arrangements for financial manage-
ment that would apply to the whole of the central administra-
tion including Centrelink and executive agencies. These ar-
rangements included new financial management legislation, an 
accrual based outcomes and outputs budgeting and reporting 
framework, and whole of government accrual financial statements 
(Boxall, 1997). The new financial legislation devolved further 
management responsibilities to chief executives (heads of agen-
cies/organizational units) retaining only the bare essential rules 
and regulations" (Boxall, 1997:4). It delegates most spending 
decisions (as well as whether agency activities are conducted in-
ternally or externally) to the chief executive and, among other 
things, requires them to have their own audit committee and 
fraud control plan in place (FMAA, 1997). To this extent, it is 
quite similar to the status of agencies in The Netherlands but 
covers much of the departmental sphere. After an announce-
ment in 1997, the first accrual budget was presented in 1999. 
This required all agencies to plan, budget, manage and report on 
accrual basis (DOFA, 1998). They also had to specify outputs, 
set prices for outputs and outcomes, as well as the contribution 
of outputs to outcomes. This information is presented in an-
nual reports that compare planned outcomes and outputs 
against the actual results. Together with the devolution of per-
sonnel decisions, one commentator has noted that the effect 
has been an individualization to organizational units and per-
sons such that coordinating departments have become super-
fluous with even the role of the Department of Finance being 
diminished (Halligan, 2005; Campbell, 2001).  
Just as quickly as all these reforms have been put in place, the 
shift towards devolving responsibilities would now also appear 
to be tempering, and even reversing to some extent. Perhaps 
one indication of a turn in the tides was a controversy in 2003 
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about how many departmental organizations and agencies were 
using their own logos (Burgess, 2003b:42). The prime minister 
of Australia banned this activity of "having different brands" 
…"because we are one Government" (Burgess, 2003b:42). Fol-
lowing critique from parliament, regarding the new financial ar-
rangements, a Budget Estimates Framework Review has been 
established by the Department of Finance to streamline the 
new financial framework (Halligan, 2005). In addition, Centre-
link's board was dissolved after the re-election of the Coalition 
government for their fourth term in 2004. A portfolio advisory 
board is to be established instead to oversee the six delivery or-
ganizations of the newly created Department of Social Security. 
This decision followed the release of the Uhrig Report into the 
board arrangements of statutory organizations (and included 
Centrelink as a case study) which found that greater clarity in 
board arrangements was needed (Wettenhall, 2004; Uhrig, 
2003). In addition, only four of the nine executive agencies that 
had been created since 1998 still remain, with the others disap-
pearing back into their departmental fold. These changes have 
been presented as a means to ensure more effective ministerial 
responsibility for policy together with operations, to ensure bet-
ter coordination, and, as a part of a more general commitment 
to the whole of government (Shergold, 2004, 2005). An overview of 
some of the management reforms during the period discussed 
is presented in table 7.1. 
 
7.6 The rhetoric of agency reform  
 
The initiation and motivation for agency reforms in Australia 
have proved difficult to trace through official government 
documents. This is because both of these reforms have been in-
troduced without a government white paper, or any other sub-
stantial official documents that have sought to explain or de-
scribe the reform. Significantly, the voice of government de- 
partments has been almost completely silent on these reforms 
in documents available to the public. Instead, we find in the 
case of Centrelink only short announcements in the budget 
prior to its creation of a “new as yet unnamed one stop shop 
service delivery agency”, or, in the case of executive agencies 
only specific questions from parliamentarians during the legisla-
tive process to create them. The condensed nature of these ref-
erences to agencies is in stark contrast to the wealth of govern-
Australia 289 
ment literature available in Sweden and to a lesser extent in The 
Netherlands prior to the introduction of their agency reforms. 
Change has simply been made by the presentation of new legis-
lation to a parliament in which the government has the majority 
in the House of Representatives. 
 
Tabel 7.1. Public management and agency reforms in Australia – A chro-
nology of events. 
 
There are, however, official speeches that have been made 
about the introduction of Centrelink, and a Management Advi-
sory Commission report on whole of government, which in-
cludes references to both Centrelink and executive agencies. 
The speeches about Centrelink have been performed by both 
1983 Financial Management Improvement Programme (FMIP) to devolve 
resource decisions and adopt resource contracts with departments is intro-
duced, management of results. 
1987 Machinery of government (MOG) changes that reduced the number 
of departments to 17 mega-departments. 
1987 The Public Service Board is abolished and appointment powers for 
departmental secretaries are vested in the Department of Prime Minister & 
Cabinet (part of MOG). 
1988 Department of Finance evaluates FMIP. Devolution occurred from 
Department of Finance to other departments but still limited devolution 
within departments. 
1989 The introduction of performance pay for the senior executive service 
and senior offices. 
1992. Management Advisory Board & Management Improvement Advi-
sory Commission publish their evaluation of a decade of reforms. 
1996 Budget announcement that a new service delivery agency is to be cre-
ated. 
1997 Commonwealth Services Delivery Act Agency Act passed, creating 
Centrelink. 
1997, September. Prime Minister John Howard opens Centrelink 
1997 Financial Management and Accountability Act passed creating pre-
scribed agencies.and enabling the shift to Accrual budgeting.  
1998 First audit report of Centrelink published by the National Audit Of-
fice. 
1999 Australian Public Service Act passed creating executive agencies. 
1999 Introduction of first accrual budget across central government. 
2003 Uhrig Report criticized accountability arrangements of boards of 
statutory authorities. 
2003 Prime Minister announces ban on individual agency logos 
2004 4 executive agencies return to departmental fold and Centrelink 
board dismantled. 
2004 Connecting Government report published. 
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politicians and by the director of Centrelink during the period 
from 1997. For the purposes of the rhetorical analysis in this 
chapter a selection has been made from the speeches given spe-
cifically about Centrelink after, or at the time, of its creation. It 
should be noted that there is a plethora of speeches about Cen-
trelink from the chief executive of the organization. I have tried 
to become familiar with a number of these speeches and, in 
consultation with academics in Australia, have selected one 
main speech for the analysis. This is quite representative since 
the speeches have been rather repetitive. I have also selected a 
speech from the prime minister of Australia that was made at 
the launch of Centrelink.  
Official government speeches that make specific reference 
to executive agencies are even scarcer than references to Cen-
trelink. Indeed, aside from comments in legislation and legisla-
tive committees, there would appear to be complete official si-
lence about the nature and purpose of this reform. Similarly, 
there has only been brief reference to the re-absorption of 
some of these agencies back into departments. This has oc-
curred in media releases announcing the Howard government’s 
fourth ministry and in speeches from Peter Shergold, the Secre-
tary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (Sher-
gold, 2004, Shergold, 2005). The commitment to whole of govern-
ment, however, which has been prominent in the fourth term of 
Howard’s government and can be associated with the shift away 
from executive agencies, has been described in an official report 
Connecting Government by the Management Advisory Committee. 
This is the third document that I have analyzed and was 
brought to my attention by one of my national experts29. 
 
7.6.1 Document one - The Prime Minister's address at the official 
launch of Centrelink, 24 September, 1997 
The Prime Minister John Howard presented this speech at the 
Great Hall in Parliament House, Canberra. The ministers for 
Social Security and for Department of Employment, Education 
and Training were present, as well as their departmental heads 
and members of the press. In addition, the speech was televised 
to staff at all Centrelink offices throughout Australia. On the 
day of this televised speech union members of Centrelink went 
                                                 
29 Dr David Rowlands, an expert consulted for this study, pointed me to this 
document after sending me a copy of Peter Shergold’s speech. 
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on strike for 2 hours, to protest against the staff cuts that were 
expected to ensue from the savings the organization was being 
asked to achieve in its first three years of creation (Everett, 
1997).  
The transcript of John Howard’s speech is 5 pages in length. 
It first describes the need for one organization, rather than 
many, to be responsible for payment of government benefits, as 
a long-standing need that will promote more efficient service. 
Cursory comments are made primarily about the size of Centre-
link and it is described as a modern, innovative reform with a 
human face. The speech also focuses on the policy area of so-
cial security more generally and makes brief reference to the 
philosophy of the government in this area. Social security is to 
provide a safety net for those most in need, but it should be de-
signed in a way to discourage dependence.  
 
7.6.1.1 Ethos and the construction of the audience 
The self-presentation of the speaker is one long familiar with 
the desires of the Australian community and the Australian tra-
dition of social security. Examples are brought together of both 
desires from the electorate for an organization such as Centre-
link, as well as references being made to its correspondence 
with the values of a responsible Australian community. Indeed, Aus-
tralia and the Australian community are regularly cited through-
out the transcript. The universal audience being constructed is 
one that is caring and decent and that will "provide a social se-
curity safety net and underpinning to those in the community 
who need help" (Howard, 1997:3), but also one that promotes 
honesty, independence and hard work (Howard, 1997:3-4). 
These last attributes are reflected in statements about following 
up abusers of the social security system and in promoting mu-
tual obligation to those who do receive benefits (Howard, 
1997:3). Such activities are described as part of being a respon-
sible community. Although the speaker concedes his is a 
"proudly private enterprise government”, this is accompanied 
by statements that this still includes a role for the public sector. 
This can be interpreted as an appeal to all people that this gov-
ernment is committed to the public sector, albeit a limited one. 
Finally, statements that this reform is not just for individuals 
but also for families can be interpreted as an appeal to the 
whole of the Australian community (Howard, 1997:3).   
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Among the particular audiences the speaker is addressing, is 
the audience of taxpaying voters. The appeals to this audience 
are reflected in statements that seek to assure the audience that 
the reform of Centrelink will promote efficiency and will be 
pursued with sensible use of tax-payers money. These appeals 
can be illustrated in statements regarding tracing fraud and 
abuse in the system, where it is said: 
 
And we owe it to the millions of honest Australian citizens who don't try 
and abuse or rort the system to ensure that in all the manifestations of gov-
ernment, those who would seek to do so, are properly pursued in accor-
dance with the due processes of the law (Howard, 1997:3). 
 
Or in the following statement where an appeal to the universal 
audience is also shown to be consistent to the desires of the 
particular audience of tax payers: 
 
We need to deliver services in an efficient and friendly manner but, nonethe-
less with an eye to our overall obligations to the taxpayers of Australia who 
pay for the services and the support which is delivered to others within the 
community (Howard, 1997: 4) 
 
Taxpayers and voters are being constructed as hard working 
people and they are being assured that their money will be used 
wisely since only those assessed as needy will be offered assis-
tance by Centrelink. The rest, like all decent Australians, will 
have to work for their success.  
Finally, there is a particular audience of Centrelink staff be-
ing constructed throughout the transcript. This is significant 
given that the speech was accompanied by union strikes. It is 
stated for example, "And those who work in the various agen-
cies of the government and those who will work for Centrelink 
in the modern face of a reformed and innovative service deliv-
ery system your work is highly valued" (Howard, 1997:2). Or al-
ternatively, it is a major reform that "will have a lasting impact 
on the morale of those who work in this area. And we're talking 
about a very large number of people whose work is greatly val-
ued…" (Howard, 1997:5). Both of these statements demon-
strate the speaker's appreciation of Centrelink employees and 
constructs them as highly regarded persons. It suggests that 
striking would be unreasonable and unnecessary since they are 
already highly valued. Finally, there is an indication that Centre-
link will also be good for them because "it will give a new sense 
of career and a new sense of career opportunity to the thou-
sands of people who work for Centrelink" (Howard, 1997:2). 
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These statements can all be interpreted as appeals to the staff, 
and voters more generally, listening to the live telecast of How-
ard's speech. 
 
7.6.1.2 The premises of argumentation 
Agreements about the structure of reality in this transcript be-
gin from the truth that the provision of public services has long 
been characterized by dependency and fraud, and that this can 
be changed. This is a truth because it can be related to a system 
of facts about the self-seeking interests of individuals who will 
take advantage of welfare possibilities. It is suggested they will 
be discouraged from working because of the possibilities for fi-
nancial support and that they will use the system, if there is not 
adequate control of it. Statements from which this truth can be 
drawn include the following: 
 
We need, as far as possible, to take away the notion of dependency from the 
delivery of services. (Howard, 1997: 4) 
 
the minister….. has pursued…eradication to the maximum extent possible 
of fraud and abuse within the social security system (Howard, 1997:3). 
 
Another way in which the truth regarding the motivations of 
individuals is reflected is in reference to the value that social se-
curity is for the needy. Given this principle, it can be asserted 
that those not eligible, particularly the fraudulent, are not needy. 
Of course this rests upon the presumption that policy has ade-
quately protected the needy. Finally, the connection between 
dependency and fraud with a truth about incentives is also indi-
cated quite directly when Howard states the  
 
need to look at such things as service delivery through Centrelink as a part-
nership….which encourages people and gives them the incentive to work 
hard and to achieve and to get ahead and to succeed"…(Howard, 1997:4). 
 
While the truth that public services have been susceptible to 
abuse (because of people's motivations) can hardly be inter-
preted as having a direct implication for the argument that Cen-
trelink is a desirable innovation, it still operates to enhance the 
desirability for a new kind of approach to service delivery. The 
need for an innovation such as Centrelink is more obvious when 
there is agreement about the weaknesses of the past. 
A fact that can be identified as acting as a starting point for 
the argumentation includes the fact of existing dissatisfaction 
with social security services and the claim that all recipients 
have to visit a number of agencies in order to obtain their bene-
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fits. This is reflected in statements about "hearing complaints 
about the number of agencies you had to visit" (Howard, 
1997:2), or in the argument that "the consolidation of ser-
vices"…" will lead to less public dissatisfaction" (Howard, 1997: 
2). Accepting the fact that visiting a number of different organi-
zations has been a problem for people, makes it possible to ac-
cept that bringing services together is a good thing. 
Among the presumptions in the argumentation, is the pre-
sumption that the services being brought together will reduce 
the need for individuals to go to several other organizations. 
There is also the presumption that social security policy already 
adequately protects the needy. Finally, with the claim that Cen-
trelink will provide more efficient service as a one stop shop, is 
the presumption that there are no extra costs to create the 
agency and that staff will embrace it enthusiastically.  
Related to the truth about individual incentives, a value 
premising the desirable in the argumentation is the value that 
dependency is bad. This is reflected in statements that dependency 
should be removed from the delivery of services and in the re-
quirement that recipients of social security do something for 
the assistance they receive. This is expressed as follows: 
 
we have a right, as a responsible community, to ask those who are receiving 
help, where it is reasonable to do so, that they do something in return for 
that assistance and something that is commensurate with the help and their 
circumstances (Howard, 1997: 3).  
 
This statement reveals a vision of public services that would 
disallow dependency and require recipients to have an obliga-
tion to the community for their assistance. Its presence in the 
text acts to promote the view that Centrelink will be part of a 
responsible approach towards the needy - that is, an approach 
that discourages dependency. The value that dependency is bad 
is also accompanied by the value that workers or rather taxpay-
ers are good and need to be considered in policies about social 
security. Howard recognizes this value in his recognition of the 
"need to deliver services…with an eye to our overall obligations 
to the taxpayers of Australia who pay for the services and the 
support which is delivered to others within the community" 
(Howard, 1997: 4). Finally, in association with the value that 
dependency is bad, and the truth of individual's motivations, is 
the value that government support should only be offered to 
the needy. This is a value representing the desire for limited 
government. 
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Hierarchies of values premising the argumentation include 
the superiority of people who work for their money (and pay 
taxes) above those who receive benefits, and the superiority of 
the private sector above the public sector. In the first instance 
the superiority of tax-payers over those who receive benefits is 
reflected in statements that those who receive social security 
benefits have an obligation to taxpayers. This is somewhat con-
cealed in the use of terminology as mutual obligation whereby it 
is stated that those who receive assistance, should be required 
do something in return. It becomes more obvious however in 
descriptions of recipients of social security as dependent (How-
ard, 1997:4), and therefore inadequate compared to those who 
do not receive benefits, who work, and are therefore good and 
independent.  
A hierarchy of values that emphasizes the superiority of the 
private sector over the public sector is reflected in statements 
that emphasizes that the public sector can be of value if it oper-
ates like the private sector. This is pointed to in statements such 
as the following: 
 
Reform and renewal and innovation is not only confined to the private sec-
tor of the Australian economy. It we are to realise the true potential of Aus-
tralia as we move into the 21st century we must constantly look to ways of 
not only improving the efficiency with which the private sector operates but 
also the efficiency and the compassion with which services to the less fortu-
nate, in particular in our community operate (Howard, 1997: 4). 
 
Here we are being advised that the public sector can be just as 
good as the private sector if it also conforms to principles 
(identified as private sector principles in the text) like renewal, 
innovation and efficiency. There is also a particular history of 
the public sector being painted in this statement since it would 
suggest that renewal, innovation or efficiency have never before 
been characteristics of the public sector. Other ways in which 
the hierarchy between the public and private sector is articu-
lated are in references describing the activities of the public sec-
tor as business activities. We are told for example that "if only 
they (beneficiaries) could go to one place and have all their busi-
ness done in that one spot it would be a lot more efficient" 
(Howard, 1996:2). The allusions to improving the public sector 
through Centrelink continually rely upon references to terms, 
like business or efficiency, which are then also equated with the 
private sector in the text. Setting up a correspondence between 
the private sector and the desirable operations of the public sec-
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tor rests upon the view that the private sector ranks higher 
upon the hierarchy of ways of delivering services than the pub-
lic sector. By contrast, the values of the public sector are never 
explicitly identified in the transcript, rather Howard simply 
states that "(M)ine is a proudly private enterprise government" 
(Howard, 1997:1). 
A preference for quantitative loci is demonstrated in the way 
that Centrelink is shown to be a good initiative in the argumen-
tation. This occurs through emphasizing the size of the reform 
and is evident in the following citation: 
 
In administrative terms, this is probably the biggest single reform under-
taken in the area of service delivery during the past 50 years. And it is a very 
special tribute to the ministerial leadership of my colleagues….(Howard, 
1997: 1). 
 
Other examples of quantitative loci throughout the transcript 
include references to the number of Centrelink staff, the geo-
graphic spread of its offices, as well as the enormity of Centre-
link services. We are told for example that: 
 
Centrelink will provide services and payments to over 7.8 million Austra-
lians, including 1.6 million pensioners, almost two million families receiving 
family allowance and 800,000 unemployed people (Howard, 1996:4). 
 
Other quantitative loci include that Centrelink will be more ef-
ficient, more human, will make more sense and bring more 
hope (Howard, 1997:2,3). The effect of the presence of these 
loci upon the persuasiveness of argument, by virtue of the 
common places that more is better, should not be underesti-
mated (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2003:85). 
Alternatively there is also an appeal to the qualitative locus 
of difficulty. This occurs by observing that the creation of or-
ganization such as Centrelink has long been desired but has 
never been able to get off the ground. A suggestion is made 
that the task has been a difficult one that acts to promote its 
appeal to the audience. The difficulty of creating Centrelink is 
emphasized in the following way: 
 
And over the years, at various stages, attempts were made to do this and 
suggestions were made that it would actually happen. But it has taken the 
past 18 months and the arrival of a new government and, if I may say so, 
new Ministers to bring it about" (Howard, 1997:2).  
 
Or 
 
But ladies and gentleman, the size and dimension of this reform should not 
be underestimated. It represents something that previous generations of ad-
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ministrators at the Commonwealth level have dreamt of doing but haven't 
been able to do" (Howard, 1997:4). 
 
Finally, there is also some use of the qualitative locus of unique 
throughout the argumentation since Centrelink is described as a 
unique Australian way of delivering reforms or as a carving out a 
completely different horizon (Howard, 1997:2) in government.  
 
7.6.1.3 Techniques of argumentation 
Quasi-logical techniques are completely absent from the argu-
mentation adopted in this speech. Instead the argumentation re-
lies upon techniques based upon the structure of reality, such as 
the pragmatic argument, and techniques that structure reality, 
such as metaphor. 
A pragmatic argument is one that seeks to evaluate an event 
or change in terms of its favourable or unfavourable conse-
quences. In the presentation of the creation of Centrelink, the 
primary way in which it is argued to be good is with reference 
to its good effects. These include reducing the need to go to 
many services, to bring about more efficiency, to provide a hu-
man face, a new sense of career opportunity to staff, and to 
work against dependency (Howard, 1997:2, 4). Since there is no 
detailed explanation as to how these effects relate to the crea-
tion of Centrelink, aside of course from the idea that it involves 
a shift of a number of functions to one organization, the audi-
ence is again being asked to accept a coexistence between Cen-
trelink and these positive effects. The emphasis upon the 
claimed effects of Centrelink forces an evaluation of it to take 
place with reference to these effects, and since they are pre-
sented as positive, they promote the attractiveness of Centre-
link.  
In addition, the audience's willingness to accept these ef-
fects, is promoted by a further twist in argumentation of a more 
personal nature. Howard connects the very creation of Centre-
link with his own personal experience and knowledge, as well as 
with the integrity of the government. This is reflected in the 
following citation and is known by Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca as the technique of interaction between the person and 
his act (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2003: 293). Howard 
states: 
 
From the moment I entered Parliament in 1974 and began talking to con-
stituents about their various problems in my electorate in Sydney, I began 
hearing complaints about the number of agencies you had to visit….And 
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what focused my mind at the time was that so many people felt that if only 
they could go to one place and have all their business done in that one spot 
it would be a lot more efficient (Howard, 1997:2).  
 
The reasonableness of the claim that Centrelink has been cre-
ated to reduce irritation for beneficiaries is being supported by 
the person John Howard and his own political career and 
knowledge. A more direct appeal to the audience leading them 
to evaluate Centrelink with reference to John Howard occurs 
towards the end of the transcript when it is stated: 
 
And I am somebody who’s very dedicated to sensible reform and change 
where necessary in all sectors of the Australian community (Howard, 
1997:5). 
 
Centrelink is being presented as a good thing since John How-
ard would only support reforms that make sense. On other oc-
casions the creation of Centrelink is also being associated with 
the Coalition government more generally. For example, it is said 
to be regarded “as a very important face of my Coalition gov-
ernment as we move into the 21st century” (Howard, 1996:2).  
Or “I am very excited and proud to be the head of the govern-
ment which has been responsible for such a major public sector 
reform” (Howard, 1997:5). Both of these associations act not 
only to promote Centrelink as a good reform, but also to repre-
sent the Coalition government as a successful government. 
Finally the metaphors used to make Centrelink appear like 
an attractive reform include references to it bringing about a 
human face. This attributes the bodily features of a person to 
Centrelink and can be interpreted as an attempt to distinguish it 
from being de-personalized, an attribute often associated with 
bureaucracy or big organizations. It gives the impression that 
Centrelink is being created to help its users.  
A dormant metaphor in the argumentation is observed in 
the use of the term efficient throughout the document. This is 
never defined in the argumentation and is given a reason for the 
reform such that it becomes a part of Centrelink's identity 
without explanation of what it means to be more efficient and 
how this will occur.  
 
7.6.2 Document two - Three stages of an evolving model to a One Stop 
Shop - Challenges at each stage, 1998 
This document is a speech by Sue Vardon, who was chief ex-
ecutive at the time of its presentation. The speech was per-
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formed at a National Conference of the Institute of Public 
Administration Australia (IPAA). This is a professional associa-
tion whose members are primarily made up of senior public 
servants from the three tiers of government in Australia, as well 
as academics (www.ipaa.org). The theme of the conference was 
Service Delivery to the Community: A critical time for reflection and the 
audience consisted primarily of practitioners and some academ-
ics.  
The transcript of the speech is 15 pages long. It begins by 
describing the creation of Centrelink and distinguishing this 
from the way other government organizations are designed and 
operate. The audience is presented with the development of the 
organization over time and this development is distinguished by 
different phases. The speaker argues that the one stop shop 
status of Centrelink has been an overwhelming success in pro-
moting the delivery of customer service and that it will continue 
to improve its customer orientation through both developing a 
personalized and holistic approach, as well as through the use of 
information technologies. Indeed, these product innovations 
are envisioned to promote the recognition of Centrelink as "a 
world leader in management and organizational reforms" (Var-
don, 1998:12).  
 
7.6.2.1 Ethos and the construction of the audience 
The self-presentation of the speaker is one of a business man-
ager as is reflected in the terminology of Centrelink as a busi-
ness, as operating in a contestable environment and having cus-
tomers. The concepts and terminology adopted throughout the 
transcript reflect primarily business management ideas and 
techniques, as well as familiarity with information technology. 
At the same time, these concepts are presented as compatible 
with promoting relationships between citizens and government 
and between government and the community. It is said for ex-
ample that the changes proposed will make it easier for citizens 
to do business with government or that customer service im-
provements in the local office are making differences to the 
community. To this extent, the speaker is making customer ser-
vice appear appealing to a universal audience. 
Other features of the transcript that may be interpreted as an 
appeal to the Australian universal audience include the overview 
of key drivers to achieve customer satisfaction. These include 
the client being treated as an individual and dealing with caring 
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staff with positive attitudes (Vardon, 1998:3). Although it may 
be suggested that these features are appealing to all people, it 
can be argued that for an individualistic society such as Austra-
lia, these attributes are particularly valued. There are also vari-
ous references to the large size of Australia, the services that are 
offered in rural and regional areas, and reference to particular 
Australian towns and communities (Vardon, 1998:5, 7). This 
demonstrates the speaker's familiarity with the Australian peo-
ple and lends legitimacy to the emphasis upon technology since 
it can be presented as helping communities and promoting con-
tact with them.  
Given the emphasis upon business management ideas and 
concepts including key drivers, business re-engineering and work flows 
it can also be argued that the particular audience being con-
structed is a business management audience. Aside from the use 
of more general business terms throughout the transcript such 
as customer and business, this includes quite direct references 
to management consultant texts such as harvesting best practice, 
finding the internal entrepreneurial spirit and getting quick wins. 
Constructing a business management audience may also be ap-
parent from the use of comparisons with the business world, 
for example the information technology ideas presented by the 
speaker are “applications" that "have been observed in a range 
of call centre environments - insurance companies, public utili-
ties, commercial telemarketing operations" (Vardon, 1998:6). In 
this account, Centrelink's customers are also not distinguished 
from the kinds of customers that businesses deal with, suggest-
ing that it is not really Centrelink's customers the speaker is ad-
dressing. For example, it is said that customers can use informa-
tion technology when they choose to update their details (Var-
don, 1998:6) or that with the new service delivery model, ser-
vices will be tailored to meet people's need (Vardon, 1998:11). 
None of this recognizes that Centrelink's customers are gener-
ally disadvantaged groups who cannot choose which payment 
they obtain or the regulations under which they obtain it.  
Another particular audience the speaker is addressing is the 
staff of Centrelink. Both the motivational tone taken by the 
speaker to encourage best practice and the many references to 
what new arrangements have required of staff and made possi-
ble for them, is indicative that this audience has also been in-
cluded in the constructions of the speaker. The staff of Centre-
link are constructed as having experienced great challenges over 
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the last years through requirements of savings and the reorgani-
zation of Centrelink. They are described as being less satisfied 
with their job but still committed to Centrelink. Congratulations 
to them are prominent throughout the text such as "It is to the 
great credit of the public sector that our staff particularly came 
through" (Vardon, 1998:3-4). Attention is devoted to the ef-
forts they have made to achieve better customer service and an 
element of competition is introduced noting that if all offices 
achieved the productivity of leading offices (Vardon, 1998:4), 
national targets would be met in no time. Concern is also ex-
pressed for staff satisfaction noting that "the service offered to 
external customers will only ever be as good as the service staff 
receive from each other" and a survey is cited regarding this 
matter. Finally, various training possibilities are identified in 
customer service and in leadership, it is noted the "Customer 
Service Officer Traineeship….will give people a nationally rec-
ognized qualification" (Vardon, 1998:9). These references seek 
to obtain the trust of Centrelink staff that their efforts will be 
rewarded and to motivate them to work better together to 
achieve better customer service.  
 
7.6.2.2 Premises of argumentation 
It has not been possible to identify the truths that premise the 
argumentation. The fact that customer service has been bad in 
the past is an important premise of the argumentation. This fact 
is reflected in the emphasis upon improving customer service 
throughout the argumentation. It is perhaps the most cited term 
in the speech and there are various references to doing research 
into improving customer service and setting up customer ser-
vice principles. There is however no mention of how customer 
service was managed in the past except for the following cita-
tion: "One of the key challenges of the creation stage was un-
doubtedly cultural change and improving customer service" 
(Vardon, 1998:2).  
Another fact that can be discerned from the argumentation 
is that Centrelink is operating as a business in a contestable en-
vironment. This fact is evident in such statements as: "The De-
partmental secretaries reserve the right to find alternative pro-
viders if Centrelink cannot deliver to agreed levels" (Vardon, 
1998:2) or that "moving into a contestable environment, many 
of our staff fear privatization" (Vardon, 1998:4). This fact is 
never supplemented by information regarding Centrelink's 
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competitors and, as we shall see, accompanies the central value 
in the argumentation that Centrelink should work as a business, 
not that it is one. By starting from the fact that Centrelink is 
operating in a contestable environment, however, it becomes 
legitimate to speak of the various business improvements being 
identified in the speech. 
Among the presumptions that can be identified as starting 
points in the argumentation, is the presumption that it is only 
good customer service that will make Centrelink's clients happy 
rather than the policies it is implementing.  This is reflected in 
various statements about the desire for better customer service 
and how Centrelink is trying to achieve this. Vardon speaks of 
the conduct of various customer service surveys in order to in-
form how Centrelink can improve its work, as well as listing 
various customer service goals such as giving accurate informa-
tion and prompt service. The relationship between social secu-
rity policy and the happiness of the people that Centrelink deal 
with is never recognized throughout the argumentation. In fact 
policy is never identified at all, which is a consequence of pre-
senting Centrelink as a business.  
A second presumption that can be identified from the argu-
mentation being pursued, is the presumption that the customers 
of Centrelink will have the ability to use and have access to 
Centrelink’s new and envisioned product innovations. This 
starting point of argumentation can be discerned from the em-
phasis throughout the document upon these product innova-
tions, which are primarily technological innovations. They in-
clude: “online claim forms, email broadcast facilities tailored to 
specific groups of customers, interactive voice response (IVR) 
units, electronic lodgement of forms and multimedia pay-
phones” (Vardon, 1998:5). Reference is also made to kiosks 
with integrated phone functionality, these would enable cus-
tomers to "update their own data, choosing the time and place 
that this happens themselves" (Vardon, 1998). The description 
of these high tech product innovations are presented in the part 
of the text describing the second and third stages of Centre-
link’s evolution. Information technology is argued to promote 
Centrelink’s achievement of better customer service and is used 
to demonstrate that Centrelink has embraced a way of working 
that is different to its old fashioned past, and "near paperless" 
(Vardon, 1998:5). 
Australia 303 
All of these claims and the argumentation that technology 
will promote customer service rest upon the presumption that 
Centrelink customer’s are able to use these new high tech prod-
uct innovations. There is no reference to the difficulties that the 
elderly, the long-term unemployed or indigenous people - all 
important customers of Centrelink - might be expected to en-
counter with increased use of information technology. As will 
become clearer in further analyses of this text, the silence on 
this matter is in part related to an almost complete absence of 
any detailed or personalized reference to Centrelink's customers. 
These persons are primarily known as customers in the text, 
and sometimes as citizens or Australians, this is illustrated by 
following citation, "many Australians want to do business over 
the Internet". The presumption that anonymous Centrelink 
customers will be able to use the product innovations that are 
envisioned to promote customer service, also invokes a silence 
about what Centrelink might be able to do to alleviate barriers 
to the use of these innovations.  
Premises of argumentation based upon the desirable include 
the desire or value of customer service. The improvement of 
customer service as a primary value throughout the argumenta-
tion is evident from the prominence in the text that is lent to 
customer service, and the almost complete absence of other 
priorities. There is some limited reference to the need to know 
more about costs or the desire to increase productivity, that 
might suggest other motivations for creating Centrelink, but 
these occasions are so few and are never presented as being an-
tagonistic to customer service. Numerous mention is made of 
the conduct of surveys to measure customer satisfaction and it 
is stated: "Customers need to receive the most accurate, recent 
and comprehensive answer to their enquiries at the first point 
of contact" (Vardon, 1998:5). Customer service is also the cen-
tral aim of a more personalized service in the organization through 
one main contact (Vardon, 1998:5, 10). 
The value of customer service is actually part of a preference 
for business like values more generally in the argumentation. 
This is evident in the continual characterization of Centrelink as 
a business rather than a government service. One citation at the 
very beginning of the transcript points implicitly to this agreed 
upon value. It states: 
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When the government set up Centrelink, it started with a vision to make it 
easier for citizens to do business with the federal government (Vardon, 
1998:1).  
 
This is rather exceptional citation because it is one of the three 
occasions in the document when the term citizen is used; all 
other reference to users of the service are customers. Neverthe-
less, in this citation citizens are doing business with government. 
The preference for business techniques and ideals is quite ex-
plicitly declared in the adoption of such terminology as outlets, 
brand names and customer to describe the activities of Centre-
link throughout the transcript. However, the value-laden char-
acter of these terms is, at the same time, quite implicit. Indeed, 
the way in which these terms are adopted in the text gives the 
impression that it is not just desirable that Centrelink works in a 
business-like way, but rather, it is a fact that Centrelink is a 
business. This is illustrated by the following citation; 
 
Centrelink has over 400 outlets - including 22 Call Centres - around Austra-
lia, providing services to some 6.2 million customers. We send out 81 mil-
lion letters and receive 19.2 million phone calls each year. Our offices have 
over 520,000 booked appointments each month.………Establishing a busi-
ness as large as this and enhancing a customer service ethic in each and 
every one of our people has been a challenge.. (Vardon, 1998:2) 
 
Other phrases which act to characterize Centrelink's work as a 
business activity include the expressions doing business with gov-
ernment, establishing business opportunities, and, a way of doing busi-
ness which was completely different from previous experiences. This last 
phrase is particularly important in make the business status of 
Centrelink appear a fact because it suggests that the delivery of 
government services has always been a business activity. Perel-
man and Olbrechts-Tyteca (2003) recognize that when "in-
serted into a system of beliefs for which universal validity is 
claimed, values may be treated as facts or truths". They argue 
however that to make values appear as facts, the details about 
Centrelink being a business for example should not be specified 
since this would reveal the ideological character of government 
being a business. The absence of details about the identity of 
Centrelink's customers or its monopoly status therefore pro-
mote the fact-like character of being business like and conceal 
its value character. 
There are other elements in the document, however, that do 
reveal that a premise about the desirability (not the fact) of 
business like government has been a starting point of argumen-
tation. This is most evident in references to pre-Centrelink days 
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and also to the uniqueness of Centrelink. The creation of Cen-
trelink is described as "the unlocking of relationships between 
government departments at all levels" and new "opportunities 
to redesign the way governments deliver services to its citizens" 
(Vardon, 1998:1). In a list of attributes learned it is claimed that 
"we are moving from a situation where we (Centrelink) received 
large amounts of money with relatively undefined costs to a 
price per service per customer situation"(Vardon, 1998:4). 
These descriptions, as well as the priority given to customer 
service throughout the text promote, and indeed, depend upon 
the view that being business- like in the delivery of government 
services is a good thing.  
The argumentation departs from a hierarchy of values where 
being business- like is superior to being government- like, or in 
this document bureaucratic. This hierarchy is reflected in de-
scriptions of the past and what Centrelink has changed from. It 
involves associating being business like with improvement and 
being bureaucratic as limited. This hierarchy is not surprising 
given the desire to make a business - like value, customer ser-
vice, central. Some ways in which the past or government ac-
tivities are described include the following statement about the 
relationship between Centrelink and its departmental clients: 
 
We are mutually dependent with them on streamlining our process to make 
service delivery easier for both staff and customers. This requires a move 
from traditional bureaucratic interaction to genuine cooperation (Vardon, 
1998:8). 
 
Clearly being bureaucratic in this statement is traditional, unde-
sirable and not enabling cooperation. It may be interpreted that 
the use of certain terms throughout the argumentation also sets 
up an anti-bureaucracy standpoint such as the emphasis being 
placed upon offering a personalized service or wanting a near paper-
less-one only contact with customers. In both cases stereotypes of 
bureaucracy such as being impersonal or requiring lots of form 
filling are being posed to give greater appeal to what Centrelink 
intends to be e.g. personalized and without paper. More gener-
ally, the intensity with which the speaker focuses upon cus-
tomer service and satisfaction lends it superiority to all other 
types of relationships that might exist between individuals and 
government services. Indeed, other kinds of relationships are 
presented in this document as having equivalence with a cus-
tomer relationship, as is reflected in statements about the citi-
zen doing business with government. Another example of how 
Chapter 7 306
the speaker does this is by stating that customer service changes 
such as introducing baby changing facilities in outlets are "mak-
ing a difference to communities" (Vardon, 1998:3). 
The use of quantitative loci is evident in the descriptions of 
the organization Centrelink, as well as from the references to 
figures from surveys and benchmarking studies. In contrast to 
Centrelinks' earlier status within a department, where we are 
told it had just one function and one department, we are also 
advised that Centrelink now has many functions and many de-
partments (Vardon, 1998:1). Numbers are also used to illustrate 
the focus upon customer service in Centrelink, since we are 
given the numerical details of a number of surveys and bench-
marking studies. For example Centrelink's national survey of 
customer satisfaction is said to comprise of "1400 customers", 
"100 questions" and "run three times a year" (Vardon, 1998:2), 
while there are also surveys conducted for individual customer 
service centres comprising of "55, 000" completed customer in-
terviews.  
Qualitative loci are prevalent in the argumentation and are 
adopted primarily at the beginning of the speech when Centre-
link is being compared to its earlier existence. In these para-
graphs the audience is exposed to the way that Centrelink is dis-
tinct. We are told it is a one stop shop, it is separate from the de-
partment, it has a board with an independent chairman and no direct 
access to public funds but rather service - contracts. All of these dis-
tinctions relate to the value of Centrelink being business -like, 
as discussed above, but they also act to promote Centrelink’s 
prestige in the opinion of the audience by highlighting its 
unique character. From a rhetorical perspective, a focus upon 
the unique is considered one of the common places in which 
the speaker is able to gain the agreement of the audience. As 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain, this is because “(T)he 
unique is original, stands out from other things and for this rea-
son it is remarkable and pleasing to the masses” (Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2003:90).  
 
7.6.2.3 Techniques of argumentation 
Quasi-logical techniques adopted by the speaker include defini-
tion and comparison. This is used to obtain the audience's ad-
herence to the view that Centrelink has been and will be able to 
continue to improve customer service. Based upon information 
collected in value creation workshops with customers and staff, 
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a list of key drivers for customer satisfaction are presented as 
having been identified in phase one of Centrelink's evolution 
(Vardon, 1998:3). These include the following: 
• Be understood and treated as an individual; 
• Receive complete, accurate and reliable information; 
• Deal with skilled and knowledgeable staff; 
• Receive prompt, efficient and responsive service; 
• Have confidence in the process, to get the results 
and the right answer the first time; 
• Tell their story once; and 
• Deal with caring staff with positive attitudes (Var-
don, 1997:3). 
Although this is a rather abstract list, that few would refute, it 
still acts to bring formality to the argumentation and provides a 
basis for assessing how well customer service is being satisfied. 
It may be argued that it also has a factual presence (not quasi-
logical) in the argumentation because it has been based upon 
what customers of Centrelink have said they want. This defini-
tion becomes useful later in the argumentation because it is 
compared, albeit rather superficially, with plans for stage three 
of Centrelink's development. The speaker is then able to dem-
onstrate, or rather state, that their plans for new service delivery 
models in stage three, such as a one main contact or life events model, 
will enable Centrelink to focus upon the individual, let them tell 
their story once and so on (Vardon, 1998:10 -15). Together 
with information technology that enables customers to test a 
number of scenarios regarding their circumstances, these plans 
are the basis for arguing that Centrelink will offer a more person-
alized customer service (Vardon, 1998:11). 
Argumentative techniques based upon the structure of real-
ity are most prominent in the argumentation and include the ar-
gument of unlimited development and arguments of authority. 
Unlimited development is an argumentative technique which 
insists in always going further in a certain direction and is ac-
companied by a continuous increase of value (Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2003:287). The very title (Three stages of an 
evolving model to a one stop shop) and organization of the in-
formation presented in this transcript (in three development 
phases) represents this technique of claiming always to be going 
further. The audience is ushered through three successive 
phases of Centrelink's development beginning with the already 
completed stage of its creation, to the present stage of consoli-
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dation and then finally to a future phase when a new service de-
livery model will be implemented. These phases are presented 
as part of a process of continually enhancing customer service 
and the continuing evolution of Centrelink (Vardon, 1998:2). 
The argumentation identifies what has been learned in the con-
solidation phase and where the organization is now moving. A 
range of techniques and ideas such as benchmarking, a new 
leadership model, or new service delivery model, are all identi-
fied as enabling the organization to go further. This is illustrated 
by the following citation:  
 
We're also using value creation workshops to get people who are in an inter-
nal service role to listen to their customers, find out what it is they value and 
begin to deliver services which add value…In this way, we'll also ensure that 
the service to external customers continues to improve (Vardon, 1998: 8). 
 
Another way in which the claim of continuous development is 
presented is demonstrated by the discussion of the consolida-
tion stage, which is the beginning of going further. It is said: 
 
This stage, which we have just completed, involved setting up the organiza-
tion itself, defining and moving toward personalized service and establishing 
business opportunities. In other words it was a transitional process (Vardon, 
1998, 8). 
 
In arguing about continuous development, the speaker also uses 
a negative picture of the past, such as "this requires a move from 
traditional bureaucratic interaction to genuine partnerships co-
operation" (Vardon, 1998, 8: my emphasis). As we shall see there 
are also a variety of traveling metaphors adopted to enhance 
this idea that continually improving is possible, not least, moving 
down a path, being on the road to, or even identifying our best migra-
tion path. 
Complementing the technique of unlimited development is 
also the argument of authority throughout the argumentation 
which borrows prestige from a person, object or document in 
order to obtain agreement from the audience (Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2003:305-310). In this case the authority be-
ing used to establish that Centrelink will continue to improve 
customer service is technology itself. References to technolo-
gies occur primarily in the discussion of Centrelink's consolida-
tion phase. This takes up approximately seven pages of the 
document with five of these pages being almost totally devoted 
to describing technological initiatives. Some of these initiatives 
include offering more services through the Internet, using in-
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teractive voice response (IVR) units in a number of call centres 
and video conferencing facilities for customers in isolated rural 
areas. In part the argumentation about technology can be seen 
as the causal link since it relies upon the fact that using more 
technology will lead to better customer service in Centrelink. 
However, the extent of examples provided and the focus upon 
the description of the technologies themselves would suggest 
the speaker is using their presence alone to establish agreement 
from the audience. We are told for example about intelligent 
two way electronic commerce, about the IVR (interactive voice 
response) experience and how using these are all about harvesting 
best practice (Vardon, 1998:5). All of these references seek to ob-
tain agreement that Centrelink is improving its work practices 
simply by virtue of the fact that it has or intends to use techno-
logical advances. To this extent the argumentation in the text 
reflects an assertion dependent on the authority of technology.  
In order to increase the presence of such a fact-consequence 
relationship between Centrelink and improvements in customer 
service, argumentative techniques that seek to establish struc-
ture of reality are also adopted. In particular, we find a number 
of illustrations being used in order to strengthen the view that 
Centrelink will and has been improving customer service. These 
illustrations include references to conducting surveys about cus-
tomer satisfaction and also benchmarking of customer service 
in different Centrelink offices. The document states: 
 
Major externally conducted surveys of customer satisfaction at both the na-
tional and local level have been carried out to provide a firm basis for under-
standing and responding to customers' needs and expectations of good ser-
vice delivery (Vardon, 1998:2). 
 
And,  
 
A biannual national survey of customer satisfaction (contracted to Yan 
Campbell Hoare Wheeler) was put in place by DSS in November 1996 and 
has been run three times since then to provide an ongoing benchmark of 
customer satisfaction…..The survey's questions are based on the major driv-
ers of customer satisfaction identified in the National research and from 
November this year will also include questions on the main commitments in 
Centrelink's customer charter. The results are provided at office level and are 
also aggregated to area and national level to provide a very accurate picture 
of customer satisfaction (Vardon, 1998:2).  
 
Furthermore, the audience is also advised of the completion of 
a number of value creation workshops which have involved 
staff listening to some 8100 customers about what they expect. 
These kinds of activities are said to have made clear the "key 
Chapter 7 310
drivers of customer satisfaction and helped to shape Centre-
link's strategic direction" (Vardon 1997:3). All of these illustra-
tions provide an indication to the audience that Centrelink is 
doing a lot to improve customer service, and by their very pres-
ence promote the idea that enhanced customer service has been 
achieved. It is significant to that results regarding customer’s ac-
tual experiences with Centrelink are never supplied only their 
opinions about what they want are identified. 
Metaphors are also used to structure the reality in the argu-
mentation and include as mentioned above a number of travel-
ing terms, which make an association between the changes that 
Centrelink is introducing and traveling towards a better place. 
Such phrases in the argumentation include being on the road to, 
leading the way in customer service, identifying the major drivers of 
customer satisfaction and Centrelinks strategic directions (Var-
don, 1998:3, 4, 12, my emphasis). They all act to bring the audi-
ence to see that Centrelink is and will improve its work. There 
are also other physical features being attributed to the activities 
of Centerlink which make them appear more tangible and real. 
A gardening metaphor is used in the description of Centrelink 
harvesting best practice (Vardon, 1998:4, 12) and a sewing meta-
phor in them offering a seamless service (Vardon, 1998:5), this is 
one without holes.  
The description of Centrelink offering a personalized service is 
also metaphorical and makes it possible to associate the pay-
ment of benefits with special attention for the individual. In-
deed, this is the single most important way in which this argu-
ment is made throughout the transcript, since for the rest indi-
viduals do not really appear accept as customers. With reference 
to the use of information technology the adoption of the term 
personalized service wherein customers are able to access and sup-
ply information when they choose, or test different scenarios, is 
particularly significant (Vardon, 1998:5-8,11). This is because it 
distracts the audience away from the possibility that these facili-
ties could lead to less attention for the individual and less access 
to the organization, since it reduces contact with individual 
people in the organization. It can also be argued that the de-
scription of Centrelink as a business with outlets, a brand, a one stop 
shop are all metaphors since Centrelink is not a business or a 
shop but a government organization. 
Finally the argumentation relies upon the dormant metaphor 
of the customer. This is a dormant metaphor because aside 
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from the term customer the audience is offered little insight 
into what this object in the text actually is. By using the term 
customer, an association is made with people shopping and 
choosing their products at Centrelink. An association with the 
unemployed, elderly or indigenous is lost, thereby also making 
many of the initiatives of Centerlink such as technology or 
working on signage appear like good, reasonable, quick win ini-
tiatives. The customer can also be considered a dormant meta-
phor in the argumentation because it acts as a motivation for 
the reform.  
 
7.6.3 Document three – Connecting Government: Whole of Government 
Responses to Australia’s Priority Challenges 
The report Connecting Government describes arrangements and 
strategies for facilitating coordination and cooperation between 
government agencies (organizations within departments, as well 
as executive agencies and Centrelink) across departmental 
boundaries. It was prepared by the Management Advisory 
Committee (MAC) and published in 2004. The MAC is a forum 
of departmental secretaries and agency heads representing all 18 
Departments, the Public Service Commission and 5 other agen-
cies, among them the new director of Centrelink, Jeff Whalan. 
It is chaired by the secretary of the Department of Prime Minis-
ter and Cabinet, Dr Peter Shergold. Under the Australian Public 
Service Act of 1999, the MAC was established to advise the 
Australian government on matters relating to the management 
of the Australian Public Service. It has a rather broad advisory 
function and its reports are often best practice guides directed 
at an audience of managers within the public sector itself.  
The report is 254 pages long consisting of a preface from 
the secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 
and seven chapters. Its findings are based upon 10 case studies 
which are presented and discussed in appendixes, as well as a 
literature review. The main objective of the report is to demon-
strate the way that whole of government arrangements, which are 
narrowly defined as agencies (in its general understanding) 
working across portfolio borders responding to particular is-
sues, have become a government priority (MAC, 2004:4). It is 
also the intention of the committee to “offer(s) a checklist of is-
sues to consider” for ensuring successful whole of government 
work (MAC, 2004:1, 4). Significantly, both Centrelink (referred 
to as agency arrangements) and executive agencies (referred to 
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in the report as special purpose agencies and frontier agencies) 
appear in the report as two kinds of options, among other 
available structures, for pursuing whole of government activi-
ties. Following an introductory chapter on the whole of gov-
ernment priority (chapter 1), each chapter focuses upon one as-
pect of whole of government arrangements and the strategies 
or options available for making this aspect conducive to suc-
cessful coordination and/or collaboration. The features dis-
cussed include structure and processes (chapter 2), culture and 
skills (chapter 3), information and communication infrastruc-
ture (chapter 4), budget and accountability arrangements (chap-
ter 5) and engagement beyond the Australian government 
(chapter 6). In addition, there is also a chapter devoted to man-
aging crisis (chapter 7).  
In my analysis I have focused upon chapters 1 and 5, as well 
as sections in chapter 2 on achieving better cross portfolio co-
ordination through agencies that serve many departments (such 
as Centrelink) and special purpose agencies (executive agencies). 
These chapters have been selected because they bring together 
an overview of the report and its goals (chapter 1), as well as 
describe the role of Centrelink and executive agencies (chapter 
2) within the government’s whole of government agenda. I have also 
considered the case study report on the executive agency, the 
Australian Greenhouse Office, in my analysis. Chapter 5 has 
been selected because it identifies arguments about the financial 
system of the administration, including that of Centrelink’s and 
executive agencies, and how it can address the priority of whole 
of government. This chapter is particularly significant because it 
identifies the lack of consistent financial systems as a barrier to 
coordination and collaboration, and argues for a more active 
role for the Department of Finance in guiding whole of government 
projects. It can be considered an example of the recent shift in 
Australia away from devolving management responsibilities to 
individual units. 
 
7.6.3.1 Ethos and the construction of the audience 
The self presentation of the speaker is one of a guide or con-
sultant providing managers with an overview of the features of 
whole of government work and how to promote its success in prac-
tice. This is reflected in the simple language adopted through-
out the report, which is sustained even on quite specialist mat-
ters such as the budget and accountability framework (chapter 
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5). A user friendly focus may also be discerned from the very 
brief descriptions of examples provided from the case studies, 
and the use of summary boxes and checklists to highlight to 
readers what they need to know about particular features of 
whole of government work (MAC, 2004:1-2, 19-20, 35, 38, 75-
76). The focus upon the particular audience of managers within 
the public sector is openly announced on the first page of the 
document where it is stated: “The report offers a checklist of is-
sues to consider, which agencies should adopt as routine” 
(MAC, 2004:1). Similar kinds of appeals to managers are also 
made in other statements such as: “the Management Advisory 
Committee (MAC) initiated a review of relevant experience to 
identify better, practical ways of working across organisational 
boundaries” (MAC, 2004: 3 my emphasis); and “The report is 
supplemented by Good Practice Guides to assist those involved on 
the ground in whole of government activity” (MAC, 2004: 3, my 
emphasis). Credibility and trust for the speaker among public 
managers is pursued by demonstrating knowledge of specific 
cases in the document, as well as by references to theories and 
academic work (MAC, 2004: 12-13), but then in a very broad 
brush, pragmatic way. There is no justification given for the se-
lection of cases for example, nor are there specific theoretical 
definitions offered for the features assessed in the cases. A 
summarized literature review is also provided in the appendix to 
the document and provides easy to read evidence of some of 
the best practice tips being proposed, as well as an overview of 
relevant issues (MAC, 2004:223-233). 
There are recurring references to the central role ascribed to 
the prime minister and cabinet in coordinating whole of gov-
ernment priorities, as well as repetition of statements about the 
requirement of the APS to be responsive to elected government 
(MAC, 2004:2-5, 8-9, 12, 21-23). This can be interpreted as part 
of reminding the particular audience of managers of their obli-
gations, but it can also be interpreted as constructing a particu-
lar audience of the prime minister and cabinet itself. Indeed, the 
report has literally been prepared for the secretary of the De-
partment of Prime Minister and Cabinet. The centrality of min-
isters and government in the report is expressed in such state-
ments as: “Making whole of government approaches work bet-
ter for ministers and government is now a key priority of the APS” 
(MAC, 2004, 2, my emphasis). It is also stated that “The cabinet, 
under the prime minister’s leadership, is the principal coordina-
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tion forum of the executive arm of the Australian government” 
(MAC, 2004: 21) and there are many references to whole of gov-
ernment activities that have been, or will be, initiated by the 
prime minister or the Department of Prime Minister and Cabi-
net (MAC, 2004: 8-9, 21-23). The way that these kinds of 
statements give a strong and positive presence to the activities 
of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, and actually 
prescribe an active role to them as opposed to other central de-
partments, could be interpreted as speaking to the desires of 
this department. At the same time, this central role is also 
sometimes presented as a taken for granted feature of the Aus-
tralian tradition and context, thereby making the interests of 
such a particular audience, an appeal to the universal audience 
in Australia. An example includes the following reference that 
appeared after a discussion of the UK arrangements for whole 
of government outcomes where both the Cabinet Office and 
Treasury are said to have played a role: 
 
In Australia, the centre of government – the Prime Minister and Cabinet – is play-
ing an increasing role in coordinating whole of government responses and 
prioritising whole of government issues (MAC, 2004, 12, my emphasis). 
 
It can also be observed that the requirement that the APS be 
responsive to government is often followed in the document by 
statements that whole of government priorities will ensure respon-
siveness to the community since it entails more integrated ser-
vices. Such considerations in the document can be considered 
to be appeals to a broader, more universal audience, since it 
seeks to illustrate that the priority of whole of government, as 
envisioned by the prime minister and cabinet, will also bring 
benefits to the general public. Statements that illustrate such 
appeals include: 
 
There is also recognition that whole of government activities can be respon-
sive to community needs for better coordination of services or policies 
(MAC, 2004: 3). 
 
As in the previous documents, presence is also given to obser-
vations that public demands for “services…to be tailored to 
their particular needs” (MAC, 2004:2) have increased. In this 
document, however, it is whole of government responses rather 
than a business rationale that can address this issue. More gen-
erally, the concern for coordination (a term sometimes pre-
sented in the document as synonymous with whole of govern-
ment) is described as having a strong tradition in Australia and 
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as being aligned with responsiveness to the community and citi-
zens. This occurs by demonstrating knowledge of past initia-
tives that are presented as examples of whole of government 
activities (MAC, 2004:6-9) and by citing a rather famous Royal 
Commission report authored by a well respected former public 
servant and Australian public figure, Nugget Coombs. This 
Royal Commission is presented and cited in the document as 
follows: 
 
A landmark Australian report promoting new whole of government ap-
proaches was the Royal Commission on Australian Government Admini-
stration (RCAGA), published in 1976. It argued that a new style of public 
administration was required which placed more emphasis on 
 
…availability of a comprehensive service at the local level …[which] gives 
the citizen a greater sense of being in touch with the decision-makers rather 
than an amorphous, unreachable department. (MAC, 2004: 7) 
 
The presence of such statements acts to assure the audience 
that whole of government arrangements will not only promote 
good management or the interests of government, but also the 
community as a whole. It constructs a universal audience that is 
not only concerned with the demands of government as dic-
tated by the political system, but also with the demands for ac-
cess and (customer) service from the Australian community. 
References to the Coombs Royal Commission on Australian 
government administration can also be identified as a special 
appeal to the universal audience in the Australian political and 
administrative context by virtue of its renown among actors in 
that context. Similarly, the presence of a theoretical basis (how-
ever brief) as well as the more general knowledge demonstrated 
about whole of government initiatives in numerous cases and in 
academic literature in Australia and elsewhere (Canada and the 
UK) function to promote the universal esteem of the speaker.  
Other ways in which appeal is made to a universal audience 
include references to the relationship between a whole of gov-
ernment approach and the national interest, whether it be in 
terms of promoting the Australian economy (MAC, 2004:5), 
dealing with problems of the environment, an aging community 
or national security (MAC, 2004:4). Although not prominent in 
the body of the entire text, it can also be observed that the in-
clusion of cases charged with strong national feelings such as 
the Australian Olympics (MAC, 2004:211-222) and the re-
sponse to the Bali bombings (MAC, 2004: 190-199) act to 
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strengthen belief in the speaker that taking a whole of govern-
ment approach must indeed be a priority for all Australians.  
 
7.6.3.2 Premises of argumentation 
Agreements upon which the argumentation for a whole of gov-
ernment priority are premised include the truth that the world 
has become more complex. This truth can be derived from ob-
servations about the various causes that have required a “whole 
of government” response such as the “complexity of social 
problems” (MAC, 2004, 4-5). It is summarized “(T) he world is 
more complex and there are new challenges such as security 
and counter terrorism” or “managing a sustainable environ-
ment”. Technology and globalization are also cited as reasons 
and evidence of this more complex world. As in the third 
Swedish document, the notion that the world has become more 
complex can be considered a truth because it represents an as-
sociation with bodies of theory such as governance or network 
theory that also identify the need for shared objectives and co-
operation. Indeed, the literature review at the end of the docu-
ment as well as descriptions and citations discussing the ele-
ments of a whole of government approach include titles with 
the terms network theory, governance and the UK’s joined up 
government in them (MAC, 2004:12). Consistent with a net-
work theory approach is also a chapter devoted to engagement 
with actors outside of government and reference is made to the 
need for establishing social coalitions and for horizontal management. 
It will become more evident below, however, that while associ-
ating complexity with a theoretical system and truth, Australian 
official rhetoric still asserts the need for vertical management 
from central government. There is also less explicit reference to 
mutual inter-dependency than in the third Swedish document.  
The agreed upon facts that can be observed in the 
argumentation include the fact that the Australian public 
expects services (from government) to be “tailored to their 
particular needs” (MAC, 2004, 2) and that this in turn requires 
“more concerted action”. The fact of increasing expectations 
from the public, together with (the fact of) globalization and 
(truth of) complexity, is part of demonstrating the imperative for 
a whole of government response.  Another fact that would appear to 
be agreed upon throughout the document is that the 
government is doing, and has already done a lot, to promote 
whole of government activities. This includes the creation of 
the Cabinet Policy Unit and more recently the Cabinet 
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Policy Unit and more recently the Cabinet Implementation Unit 
(MAC, 2004:8, 13), as well as the creation of organizations such 
as Centrelink and executive agencies (MAC, 2004: 38-39). It is 
stated for example; “The establishment by the Howard gov-
ernment of the Cabinet Policy Unit (CPU) reporting to the 
prime minister is a sign of the growing importance of whole of 
government coordination” (MAC, 2004: 23 my emphasis).  Similarly, 
the creation of the National Oceans Office (which was, but is 
no longer, an executive agency) is described as “the quintessen-
tial whole of government idea” (MAC, 2004: 40). Finally, an-
other fact premising the argumentation is that the outcomes 
and outputs budget has been a success and offers the flexibility 
to provide appropriate arrangements for whole of government 
projects (MAC, 2004:75).  
Among the presumptions that premise the argumentation, is 
a very broad presumption that it is possible to arrive at gener-
alizations about best practice from particular cases (Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2000:350). This presumption is reflected 
in the central role that case studies play throughout the argu-
mentation in demonstrating both examples of whole of government 
approaches and also providing the basis for recommendations 
about conditions of success as presented in brief best practice 
checklist boxes (see MAC, 2004: 1, 29,35, 38, 39). It is also 
stated in the second chapter of the report that the Department 
of Prime Minister and Cabinet “should use their experience (of 
whole of government projects) as a basis for spreading advice 
on best practice in whole of government work through a web 
presence” (MAC, 2004:23). Alternatively another presumption 
present throughout the argumentation, but only analyzed in the 
first chapter of the report, is that managers and leaders will be 
able to identify the kinds of incentives and rewards that are 
necessary to promote behaviour that corresponds with a whole 
of government approach (MAC, 2004:14). This presumption 
underlies arguments about how to promote cultures that can 
conduct successful whole of government projects. There are 
also the presumptions that it is possible to plan ahead and as-
cribe clear distinct roles for such arrangements. These presump-
tions are prominent in repeated recommendations that good 
planning and clear accountability arrangements promote the 
success of whole of government. Finally, related to knowing 
about incentives and planning, is another presumption about 
leaders being able to show the way to success (MAC, 2004: 19). 
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This is reflected in the central role attributed to the prime min-
ister and cabinet in the whole of government agenda, and the 
call for a more active guidance role for the Department of Fi-
nance in developing budgetary arrangements for whole of gov-
ernment projects. 
With regards to premises about the desirable in the argu-
mentation, it is clear from the title of the report, and also in its 
introductory statements, that a whole of government approach 
is a priority. The primary value of whole of government is illus-
trated by opening statements such as the following:  
 
Making whole of government approaches work better for ministers and 
government is now a key priority for the APS. There is a need to achieve 
more effective policy coordination and more timely and effective implemen-
tation decisions, in line with the statutory requirement for the APS to be re-
sponsive to elected government (MAC, 2004: 2). 
 
It is clear from the above, and from other statements through-
out the argumentation, that the priority of whole of govern-
ment is primarily about making coordination and executive 
control central values in the argumentation.  It is said for exam-
ple that the use of whole of government “in the Australian con-
text has generally implied an emphasis on breadth (whole) and 
on government (especially Cabinet and the ministry), emphasizing 
that public sector agencies are focussed on the government’s 
policy and operational agenda” (MAC, 2004:3, my emphasis). 
Other statements reflecting a preference for the central role of 
cabinet and government in setting the agenda for whole of gov-
ernment projects and agencies more generally include refer-
ences to it “reflecting the elected government’s overall policies 
and priorities” (MAC, 2004:4). At the same time, the report also 
recognizes other values and priorities such as being able to re-
spond to citizens (MAC, 2004:3, 7) and tailoring services to the 
public’s needs (MAC, 2004:2). Finally, meeting cost objectives 
(MAC, 2004: 9, 10), having clear accountability relationships 
(MAC, 2004: 15, 83) and transparent reporting (MAC, 2004: 76, 
78, 88) are other values described in the report. These sorts of 
values are generally expressed in sections and chapters on the 
budget and accountability framework. 
Among the hierarchies of values ascribed to in the report is 
the value of vertical management or accountability above hori-
zontal management. This hierarchy is also often expressed as a 
preference for the government to direct whole of government 
arrangements and for the value of coordination above collabo-
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ration. These different features of whole of government are 
however often presented throughout the report as compatible, 
even inter-changeable. This is most obvious by the replacement 
sometimes of whole of government with the term coordination 
(MAC, 2004:6), and at other times with other terms such as 
horizontal management (MAC, 2004: 3, 22, 23). Both the pref-
erence for vertical accountability arrangements, for government 
as the central coordinating actor, and the pursuit of equivalence 
between coordination and compatibility is illustrated by the fol-
lowing citation: 
 
A particular challenge is to improve cross-agency coordination and collabora-
tion while maintaining vertical accountability (MAC, 2004:15 my emphasis). 
 
This equivalence is however not always conformed to and there 
are numerous occasions when the preference for vertical man-
agement/accountability, or for the government as the central 
coordinator are expressed. This occurs despite recognition in a 
few instances that “clear vertical accountability…may make col-
laboration across organisational boundaries difficult” (MAC, 
2004: 6). Indications of the greater value placed upon vertical 
accountability as opposed to horizontal arrangements and col-
laboration include the following references: 
 
For very important issues it is likely that the government or the prime minis-
ter will identify an imperative to tackle a problem through a whole of gov-
ernment approach (MAC, 2004:11). 
 
It is when issues span one or more portfolios that coordination (horizontal man-
agement) can become particularly difficult. In principle, the Cabinet and the 
prime minister, or ministers acting bilaterally coordinate across portfolios 
(MAC, 2004:22). 
 
It should be noted that these kinds of statements appear in the 
document alongside others that indicate that collaboration is 
about informal sharing or being accessible to communities, al-
though these kinds of statements are far fewer in number than 
references emphasizing central government coordination (co-
ordination appears more than 100 times while collaboration just 
40). They are also never presented as contrary to vertical man-
agement or central government coordination. This is aided by 
identifying examples of horizontal management at the top of 
government (such as having two ministers responsible for the 
same activity) (MAC, 2004:15), together with vertical manage-
ment over the administration. 
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A hierarchy between whole of government projects above 
individual units contributing to it, can also be observed in the 
presentation of the value of whole of government. It is stated 
for example that: 
 
The distinguishing characteristic of whole of government work is that there 
is an emphasis on objectives shared across organisational boundaries, as op-
posed to working solely within an organisation (MAC, 2004: 3). 
 
Similarly, a proposal in the document to reward behaviour that 
contributes to whole of government objectives as opposed to 
the aims of particular organizations is also indicative of this hi-
erarchy. There are, however, important limitations to its opera-
tion in the argumentation that are related to the narrow charac-
terization of whole of government objectives as being only suit-
able to particular projects. For example, it is argued that a 
whole of government approach is not suitable to all circum-
stances and that priorities of cost and time need also to be as-
sessed, and may take priority. This is expressed as follows: 
 
A strong message from literature and case studies analyzed for this report is 
that whole of government approaches to complex problems should only be 
undertaken when necessary….there is also a warning about judicious use. It 
is costly and time consuming and competing political and community agen-
das can undermine its objectives (MAC, 2004: 10).  
 
Another limitation to the value of the whole of government ar-
rangement above, the individual organizational unit, is evident 
in the ambiguities in recommendations for financial reporting 
on whole of government projects. On the one hand, statements 
that the outcomes and outputs framework has the flexibility to 
record single (consolidated) outcomes for the projects as a 
whole would suggest that this is considered desirable (MAC, 
2004: 77, 78). On the other hand, however, three of the four 
appropriation models presented as candidates for whole of 
government reporting all maintain separate reporting of indi-
vidual agency contributions, and then attribute the (accumu-
lated) whole of government outcome to an individual agency. 
The one model which did allow for single outcome reporting 
(called the single outcome) was described as having the disad-
vantage that “accountability is diffuse” (MAC, 2004: 83). More 
generally, this is consistent with the preference discussed above 
for vertical accountability above horizontal accountability and 
collaboration. As elsewhere throughout the document, how-
ever, tensions between the whole and the individual unit are 
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played down by statements such as the following which suggest 
compatibility is possible: 
 
The challenge is to balance agencies’ ability to manage and account for these 
[whole of government] measures while at the same time addressing parlia-
ment and stakeholders needs to see the whole picture (MAC, 2004:77). 
 
Direct reference to tensions between vertical accountability and 
horizontal arrangements, coordination and cooperation or ver-
tical accountability and reporting on the whole, are all avoided 
by lack of detailed discussions or examples of such instances in 
the body of the report. Instead there are only claims that these 
two kinds of accountability arrangements have been success-
fully combined. 
Both quantitative and qualitative loci can be identified 
throughout the report. In contrast to earlier Australian docu-
ments which emphasized the qualitative loci of the difficult and 
unique, the quantitative locus in this document emphasize the 
enduring. The quantitative locus of durability relies upon a 
higher value being placed upon that which is eternal (Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2003, 87) and can be observed in de-
scriptions of whole of government as a “longstanding feature of 
Australian public administration” (MAC, 2004:6). This is sup-
ported by a brief historical description of initiatives to promote 
service integration or coordination across government (MAC, 
2004:6-9). Aside from the claim that the creation of the prime 
minister’s office not long after Federation (1900) was one of the 
first attempts at whole of government coordination, all the 
other examples cited occur after the 1970s. Most significant, for 
the purposes of this study, is the description of Centrelink and 
its one stop shop character as part of this long tradition of co-
ordination. It is stated: 
 
Centrelink is an example of a government provider which delivers a range of 
income support and employment services. One-stop shops are a single point 
of service for clients. One stop shop concepts were first raised over 25 years 
ago in the Coombs report and were reflected in the emerging client focus 
across all portfolios in the 1980’s (MAC, 2004:37). 
 
This description of Centrelink which seeks to establish its 
credibility because it is part of a (quantitative locus) enduring 
tradition is in stark contrast to the previous document which re-
lied upon its (qualitative locus) new and unique character. Other 
quantitative loci used in the document include claims that 
whole of government approaches enable more effective policy 
(MAC, 2004:2), more cooperation, make government services 
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more responsive and accessible (MAC, 2004: 5), enable more 
integrated service delivery arrangements (MAC, 2004:5, 10) 
provide more timely implementation (MAC, 2004,:2), and even 
encourage the establishment of “more enduring outcomes 
structure” (MAC, 2004:79). 
There are also continuities in the kinds of qualitative loci 
adopted in this and previous documents. In particular, the 
qualitative locus of the difficult is prominent and is reflected in 
the various references to the challenges (MAC, 2004: 2, 4, 9, 77) 
facing government today and the warning that a whole of gov-
ernment approach should not be taken lightly” (MAC, 2004, 2). 
The descriptions of frontier agencies (used when referring to 
executive or special purpose agencies) having to deal with con-
tentious and complex issues may also be interpreted as relying 
upon the locus of difficulty to condition the audience to see 
these as good arrangements. Consistent with a preference for 
the enduring, however, there is mention of the possibility for 
these structures to be wound back after a period to “more per-
manent structures” (MAC, 2004, 39). In addition, the qualitative 
locus of timeliness is sometimes used in this document to con-
dition the audience to accept that whole of government ar-
rangements are especially important now. This locus is reflected 
in such statements as “the imperative for a whole of govern-
ment focus is stronger than ever before” (MAC, 2004:9). It is 
also reflected in the use of the phrase the imperative on a number 
of occasions to impart a sense of urgency to pursuing whole of 
government projects. The locus of timeliness is a qualitative lo-
cus valuing the precarious or fleeting and is actually the exact 
counterpart of the locus of the enduring. The way these two 
kinds of loci are brought together can be seen in the statement; 
“While not new, for the reasons outlined earlier, the imperative for 
a whole of government focus is stronger than ever before” (MAC, 
2004: 9 my emphasis). 
 
7.6.3.3 Techniques of argumentation 
Both the quasi-logical techniques of definition and comparison 
can be identified in the argumentation. Definition is used to fo-
cus the audience’s attention upon the priority of “whole of gov-
ernment”. In the introductory chapter to the report, a definition 
of whole of government is presented as follows: 
 
Whole of government denotes public service agencies working across port-
folio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated government re-
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sponse to particular issues. Approaches can be formal and informal. They 
can focus on policy development, program management and service delivery 
(MAC, 2004:4). 
 
This definition is further refined with the speaker advising that: 
 
(C)oordination has been a longstanding feature of Australian public admini-
stration with three main types of whole of government activity: 
 
between Australian government agencies; 
between different levels of government; and 
between the public, private, non-profit and community sectors 
(MAC, 2004:6). 
 
The use of definition operates to bring formality to the argu-
mentation and thereby promote its esteem in the eyes of the 
audience. It also enables the audience to see the forthcoming 
material presented in the report as examples of whole of gov-
ernment activities. Another function of definition is that it can 
enable the speaker to exclude certain elements or ideas from the 
focus of argumentation. It can be observed that this particular 
definition distracts from possible difficulties in identifying shared 
goals (as opposed to imposed goals) and its (possible) incom-
patibilities with an “integrated government response”. To this 
extent the definition aids in concealing tensions (and the hierar-
chies of values) between coordination and cooperation, and, 
vertical and horizontal management. It is noteworthy to men-
tion that there is very little further reference or explanation re-
garding informal approaches to whole of government, the term 
just appears sometimes in the case studies. Other definitions 
that do appear in the chapters analyzed include the definition of 
outcomes, outputs and administrative items (MAC, 2004:76-
77). This occurs in the chapter on the budget.  
The quasi-logical technique of comparison is also adopted to 
organize the material presented throughout the report and in 
the case studies although, as will be discussed further below, the 
prescriptions for best practice from these case studies are pri-
marily based upon other types of argumentative techniques. 
The technique of comparison can be observed from the identi-
fication in the first chapter of a “series of common principles 
and challenges that need to be met for whole of government 
initiatives to be successful” (MAC, 2004:12).  These common 
principles have been drawn from an academic publication and 
are presented in a diagram in the first chapter of the report. 
They include four main elements; culture and philosophy, new 
Chapter 7 324
accountabilities and incentives, new ways of developing policy 
and designing programs/delivering services, and, new ways of 
working. Each element is broken down into different features 
such as shared outcomes and reporting under new accountabili-
ties, or a collegiate approach for new ways of developing policy. 
It is “(A)gainst this framework” that the speaker then identifies 
the “main challenges” or rather criteria, that need to be ad-
dressed to promote whole of government in Australia such as 
considering the budget and accountability framework, culture 
and capability, new ways of working etc. These criteria then be-
come the means for assessing best practice throughout the 
chapters and case studies. 
This occurs by devoting a chapter to each of the main crite-
ria and by presenting each of the case studies according to their 
responses to the criteria; how they adapted structure and proc-
esses, culture and capability, information management and in-
frastructure, the budget and accountability framework, and 
wider connections outside of the APS. They can be considered 
as a kind of measure against which each of the cases can be de-
scribed and evaluated, with commentary being given regarding 
when the response was effective or not. The measure is, how-
ever, never really elaborated since addressing issues of structure 
or culture can, and does occur, in different ways in the whole of 
government cases. Therefore the comparison is somewhat in-
complete but still enables the speaker to present the findings in 
a way that adheres to a mathematical system of reasoning. This 
is because in each case the presence of each of the best practice 
criteria, however vague, are assessed. It may be suggested that 
the argument by comparison is also supported by arguments of 
authority in this case because the best-practice criteria are 
drawn from an academic article about UK experience, itself a 
kind of proof that they must be valid criteria. 
Argumentative techniques based upon the structure of real-
ity are prominent in the report and include argument by author-
ity, the causal link and unlimited development. These kinds of 
arguments rely upon achieving solidarity between accepted beliefs 
and the ideas one wishes to promote. The references to the 
Coombs Royal Commission report (MAC, 2004: 7, 37) and its 
association with the whole of government initiatives being pre-
sented in this report can be identified as argument by authority. 
This is because this earlier (prestigious) report is being used to 
show that the government’s whole of government priority is a 
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good thing and must be concerned for ensuring the respon-
siveness and accessibility of the administration to the commu-
nity, since a citation from the Coombs report shows this to be 
important (see further causal link below). Its very presence in 
the report is part of indicating that coordination and whole of 
government are part of the Australian tradition. It often appears 
together with reference to Centrelink and thereby aids the audi-
ence to see that such arrangements really are about doing the 
best to respond to citizens or customers. 
The causal link is used to demonstrate more specific connec-
tions between whole of government initiatives and working in a 
best practice way. Indeed, it is used to demonstrate why the 
government prioritizes a whole of government approach, the 
effects that can be expected from the initiatives described, as 
well as to identify the specific factors that will promote success-
ful whole of government initiatives. In the first chapter of the 
report, the causal link is apparent in the description of “external 
and internal drivers” for a whole of government approach 
(MAC, 2004: 4-6). The external drivers or causes of a whole of 
government approach include: 
• The complexity of some social problems; 
• Globalisation and the need to remain competitive and 
achieve productivity gains (“greater integration and 
shared infrastructure offers one of the opportunities for 
such gains”); 
• Technological change; 
• The demand from customers and clients to be more ac-
cessible; and 
• Government requires close links with external advisors 
and must have the capacity to assess this advice (MAC, 
2004: 4-5) 
 
Among the internal drivers or causes identified for having a 
whole of government priority is the risk that previous priorities, 
such as devolution, may subvert collaboration. It is stated: 
 
There is some risk, however, that devolution of authority to agency heads 
and clear vertical accountability for agency outcomes may make collabora-
tion across organisational boundaries more difficult (MAC, 2004: 6). 
 
At the same time another contrary link is made between the 
flexibility fostered by devolution and the capacity it can provide 
for finding innovative solutions. It is stated:   
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The flexibility fostered by devolution, however, could also be used to ex-
plore innovative solutions to complex problems, including solutions to re-
quiring among cooperation among agencies with external groups (MAC, 
2004:6). 
 
In these citations, a shift is made from identifying the internal 
cause of the whole of government priority (past policies for 
devolution) to causes for successful solutions of complex 
(whole of government) problems (the flexibility attained from 
devolution).  
In the chapters I have analyzed the consequences expected 
to follow from whole of government arrangements are primar-
ily identified in the discussions about cross departmental part-
nerships: agency arrangements (including Centrelink) and Spe-
cial Purpose Agencies (including executive agencies). Under the 
sub-heading Cross-departmental partnerships: agency arrangements, it is 
explained that this whole of government structure, which in-
cludes Centrelink, “will typically occur because of an ability to 
provide a better, less costly and more convenient service” 
(MAC, 2004:36). There are no further explanations as to how 
this will occur except for a listing of the features of this type of 
arrangement as including: opportunities for efficiencies (dupli-
cation otherwise exists) (MAC, 2004:37) 
It is noteworthy that a motive for the creation of Centrelink 
is described as follows: “(I)ntegration was a the heart of the 
Centrelink development” (MAC, 2004, 37). It is also described, 
with reference to the Coombs report, as being part of an 
emerging client focus (MAC, 2004:37). This is part of the external 
driver argument that whole of government arrangements such as 
Centrelink have been created to promote accessibility and ser-
vice to the community (see above). Causes for the creation of 
executive agencies are also identified 
 
Some special purpose agencies have been created outside normal depart-
mental structures to deal with issues that are important, contentious across a 
range of stakeholders and not yet mature in the way in which they are per-
ceived by the public or managed within government. Their special status is 
used to symbolize a whole of government approach (MAC, 2004, 39). 
 
These kinds of organizations such as the Australian Green-
house Office (AGO) are described as being able to “reassure 
external stakeholders that it is an expert body, neutral between 
the contending interests of a range of external stakeholders” 
(MAC, 2004: 39). Its separateness is argued to bring about (the 
appearance of) neutrality and thereby balance the tensions be-
tween different interests. Other kinds of effects attributed to 
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the creation of AGO include “the opportunity to develop real 
depth of skill in a very complex subject and… factual frame-
work to underpin discussions of policy options at secretarial, 
ministerial and cabinet level” (MAC, 2004: 39). It is to make 
possible the presentation of  “one consistent view of (complex) 
policy”, rather than many views separated into different organi-
zations, and to ensure that “policy learns from implementation 
experience”. Again there is little further explanation as to how 
all these things will happen except that these bodies are special 
purpose agencies bringing together resources from different 
parts of the administration.  
Other causes or conditions for best practice in whole of 
government initiatives identified throughout the report include 
early planning (MAC, 2004: 15, 17, 41, 88), identifying clear 
lines of accountability (MAC, 2004: 15, 38, 22) and support and 
clear articulation of goals from leadership in the APS. State-
ments regarding good planning as a cause for success occur in 
all the chapters analyzed. For example in discussions of budget 
arrangements it is stated: “Planning is considered an important 
aspect, as many challenges are able to be resolved early in the 
process” (MAC, 2004: 15) or the “key to maximising flexibilities 
of an outcomes budget is early consideration of arrangements” 
(MAC, 2004: 75). Similarly, in the discussion of executive agen-
cies, or in this report frontier agencies, planning as a cause for suc-
cess is presented as follows: 
 
A key to the successful creation of a frontier agency is in early planning. 
Planning should focus on inculcating a new set of values related to the new 
agency’s charter and could encompass physical co-location, single IT and fi-
nancial systems, and staff development work to develop a new culture and 
set of values relevant to the new agency’s charter (MAC, 2004:41). 
 
In this citation, some reference is also made to the focus of 
other chapters in the report and their influence upon good 
whole of government arrangements such as shared information 
systems and a shared culture, but one that is open to different 
perspectives (MAC, 2004:14). 
Reference to accountability arrangements bringing about 
successful whole of government initiatives also appear 
throughout the report and can be illustrated by the following ci-
tation: “(T)here is strong agreement that clearly defined ac-
countability arrangements are important for successful whole of 
government work” (MAC, 2004: 15). This cause also often ap-
pears in the best practice checklists presented in various chap-
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ters and corresponds to emphasis upon clear tasks and roles for 
different actors occupied with whole of government work 
(MAC, 2004: 38). There is also specific mention of leaders play-
ing a central role in setting clear whole of government goals and 
thereby ensuring its success. It is stated for example,  
 
The clear articulation of guiding government philosophies and priorities by the 
prime minister and senior ministers is in itself a powerful mechanism to en-
courage coherence in policy advice and service delivery across the govern-
ment administration (MAC, 2004: 22 my emphasis). 
 
Another way in which APS leaders are argued to bring about 
successful whole of government projects is by providing role 
models of collaboration (MAC, 2004, 25) and being able to 
show the way forward: 
 
Experience has shown that secretaries are often able to resolve the way for-
ward on difficult whole of government issues more quickly and effectively 
than lower-level committees (MAC, 2004: 19). 
 
In the presentation of budget and governance arrangements, 
the recommendations that the Department of Finance be con-
sulted (early) to give advice on these features may also be at-
tributed to the requirement for leadership and guidance in order 
to achieve successful whole of government arrangements 
(MAC, 2004: 75, 88).   
Finally, it can be noted that other causal links are mentioned 
broadly at the beginning of the report, although not further 
specified in the chapters that I have analyzed. This includes the 
“use of incentives and rewards” to promote collaborative be-
haviour in whole of government projects and “increasing mo-
bility across organisational boundaries” to broaden public sec-
tor perspectives (MAC, 2004: 14). These can be interpreted as 
further initiatives that can be used to promote the success of 
whole of government.  
Another argumentative technique which can be observed in 
the document on at least two occasions is the argument of 
unlimited development. This is a technique which seeks to ob-
tain the audience’s agreement by showing them that there is al-
ways the possibility to go further in a certain direction and in-
crease value on the way (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 
2003:287). In describing the priority of whole of government 
and the desire to learn about best practice from case studies in 
the report, the committee makes reference to the capacity for 
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continual improvement in future whole of government ar-
rangements. It is stated for example: 
 
The increasing pressure on the APS demands that its history in whole of 
government work is understood to ensure that it is not necessary to ‘rein-
vent the wheel’ , yet work practices are continually improved (MAC, 2004:1). 
 
Similarly in the discussion of the evolution of the outcomes and 
outputs framework it is noted that “The Australian outcomes 
and outputs framework has been progressively refined on the 
basis of experience” (MAC, 2004: 78). The argument of con-
tinuous development is not central to the findings in the report 
about what constitutes best practice. It does however play a role 
in obtaining the audience’s agreement that whole of govern-
ment initiatives, and in the above citation its outcomes and 
output budget, have been good things.  
Arguments that seek to structure reality are also very promi-
nent in the report and apparent in both specific examples and 
illustrations identified in various chapters and in the use of 
metaphors. Given that the report has been built upon case 
studies, it is perhaps not surprising that it is littered with exam-
ples (MAC, 2004: 5, 6-9, 11, 12, 36, 39) although not all of the 
examples provided in the body of the report, such as Centre-
link, are among the case studies investigated. Perelman and Ol-
brechts-Tyteca distinguish between argument by example and 
argument by illustration, with the former acting to establish a 
rule/argument, while the latter acting simply to illustrate a rule 
that the speaker has already established (Perelman and Ol-
brechts-Tyteca, 2003:350-360). These two types of argumenta-
tive techniques can be difficult to distinguish. In both cases, 
however, a passage is being made from the particular features 
of case to some general point. Three cases in the argumentation 
that can more clearly be interpreted as examples to establish a 
rule include reference to the UK approach to whole of gov-
ernment outcomes (MAC, 2004, 12), to Australian budget and 
governance arrangements such as in Victoria (MAC, 2004, 79-
80, 83-86), and to the National Heritage Trust (MAC, 2004, 84). 
In the first instance of the UK approach to whole of govern-
ment, the argument is being established that such initiatives 
should be centrally coordinated. It is stated: 
 
Countries differ in the approach taken to drive a greater whole of govern-
ment orientation, consistent with different government philosophies and 
approaches to public sector management. Key differences appear in the de-
gree to which the approach is driven from the Centre…..In the UK, whole 
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of government outcomes and cross cutting targets are centrally set and 
monitored…..In Australia, the centre of government – the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet – is playing an increasing role in coordinating whole of gov-
ernment reponses…(MAC, 2004: 11-12). 
 
The example of the UK is being given to demonstrate that it is 
reasonable that a central actor, in the Australian case the De-
partment of Prime Minister and Cabinet, take a leading role in 
coordinating whole of government activities. The use of the 
UK as a legitimate example for Australia’s reform activities to 
follow is presumably supported by beliefs that both countries 
are part of a similar Westminister tradition. In the descriptions 
of examples of the Victorian Government’s “high level whole 
of government outcomes” (MAC, 2004: 79-80) and of accounts 
of arrangements in the cases such as the National Heritage 
Trust and National Illicit Drug Strategy (MAC, 2004, 84-86), 
the rule is being established that whole of government out-
comes do not need to be measured in a consolidated way. In all 
of the cases provided, measurement of targets takes place at the 
level of individual agency contributions, with in some instances 
a relationship being established to some higher level outcome. 
There is some admission that measurement of a consolidated 
outcome would be possible and even have some advantages, 
but all the examples in the document and the value of account-
ability lead the audience to accept that this is unnecessary.    
Finally, the National Heritage Trust example is also used to 
demonstrate some problems with whole of government pro-
jects since it is observed that “the lack of financial management 
information systems (FMISs) across the Australian Govern-
ment” has created some problems for cooperation (MAC, 
2004:86-87). This provides the reasoning for a proposal for the 
Finance department to develop and maintain standard tem-
plates, as well as adding to early arguments for giving Finance a 
guiding role in establishing governance arrangements for whole 
of government projects (MAC, 2004: 87).  
References to other cases in the argumentation that can be 
interpreted as illustration, since they correspond with argu-
ments established through other means such as the causal link, 
include cases of cross departmental partnerships and frontier 
agencies. For cross departmental partnerships, the cases of the 
Australian Taxation Office, Australian Customs Service and 
Centrelink (MAC, 2004: 36-38) are used to illustrate that these 
types of bodies are a way to achieve whole of government ob-
jectives for service delivery and policy implementation. In all 
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cases descriptions are given of how these organizations serve 
different departments, thereby apparently, achieving less costly 
and/or more convenient service (see causal link above). In the 
case of Centrelink (and Australia Post), the descriptions include 
references to providing an integrated service thereby being more 
responsive and accessible to customers (see causal link above) 
(MAC, 2004: 5, 37). In illustrating the rule that separate agen-
cies will provide a means for cooperation for contentious is-
sues, since they are neutral, the cases of the Australian Green-
house Office and National Oceans Office are briefly described 
(MAC, 2004: 39-40). Accounts of their scientific expertise act to 
enable the audience to see that they will promote neutrality and 
cooperation.   
More generally, references to specific cases are used 
throughout the report to establish that the Australian govern-
ment is and has always done a lot to promote whole of gov-
ernment. They also act to divert attention from tensions be-
tween the different goals (see hierarchy of values) and proposed 
effects of whole of government since the kinds of cases pre-
sented together as examples of whole of government illustrate 
the pursuit of one or other of these values. As part of demon-
strating whole of government as a strength of the (enduring see 
loci) Australian tradition, quite different sources and cases are 
brought together (MAC, 2004: 7-9). There is the Coombs 
Commission citing comprehensive service as giving “the citizen a 
greater sense of being in touch with decision makers” (MAC, 
2004: 7), the 1987 machinery of government changes helping to 
“integrate policy, programme and service delivery” (MAC, 
2004: 7), coordination of the states increasing cooperation and the 
Business and Community Partnership initiative.   
Among the numerous metaphors used throughout are the 
terms integrate (MAC, 2004: 9, 7,12), broadening perspective 
(MAC, 2004: 20, broad outcomes (MAC, 2004: 58, 82, 83, 85, 
89), seeing the big or whole picture (MAC, 2004: 58) and whole of 
government itself. All of these terms are used to bring the audi-
ence to see that the various activities being pursued or pro-
posed by the government are, as in the title, connecting the parts 
of government and thereby promoting coordination and coop-
eration. While terms like broad, whole and big picture come 
from physical attributes, the term integrate has its origin in 
mathematics, and provides a means of conceiving of units as 
parts of a whole. There are also references to greater flexibility 
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(MAC, 2004: 11, 70, 80, 82, 41) increasing mobility (MAC, 2004: 
19), key priorities (MAC, 2004: 4, 5, 7-10, 13-16, 19) balancing 
agencies abilities (MAC, 2004:52, 81), sharpening responsibilities, 
strong agreement (MAC, 2004: 15, 20) and heightened require-
ments (MAC, 2004: 22). In the presentation of the outcomes 
and outputs framework, the term transparency is used to describe 
its role in ensuring good whole of government arrangements 
(MAC, 2004: 76, 80, 85). As in earlier Australian documents 
sewing metaphors such as tailored (MAC, 2004: 7, 10, 20) and 
seamless services (MAC, 2004: 4, 20, 21, 42) as well as, driving 
metaphors such as drivers (MAC, 2004, 34) of the shift to whole 
of government can be observed. Furthermore, an association is 
made with the battlefield or new adventures/lands when de-
scribing special purpose or executive agencies as frontier agencies 
(MAC, 2004: 20, 26, 44, 46).  
Finally, the term whole of government may be interpreted as a 
dormant metaphor. This is because, although it is given an ex-
press definition in the document, it clearly takes on more mean-
ings throughout the argumentation and even becomes a reason 
of itself for some of the initiatives being described. Whole of 
government is for example equated sometimes with greater co-
ordination, and at other times collaboration. It is also used to 
describe both horizontal and vertical management arrange-
ments. According to a computer search the term itself is used 
some 600 times throughout the document. In descriptions of 
frontier agencies it is even identified as a reason for their crea-
tion since they are “the quintessential whole of government 
idea” (MAC, 2004: 45). An overview of the rhetoric of Austra-
lian official agency accounts is presented in table 7.2. 
 
7.7 GGCT and the rhetoric of Australian agency reform 
 
Australian agency rhetoric reflects primarily individualist 
ways of life, although in the third document some hierarchi-
cal arguments can also be observed. In the case of the prime 
minister’s speech at Centrelink’s launch this rhetoric focused 
not so much upon arguments about the agency itself or 
agency arrangements but rather arguments about social secu-
rity systems and policy. A preference for arrangements that 
provide strong incentives for individual’s to work can be 
identified. There is thus also some reference to hierarchical 
themes such as compliance to social security legislation. 
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Table 7.2 Overview of Australian argumentation (continues on next pages) 
 
 Prime Minister's address official 
launch Centrelink 
Three stages of an evolving model 
to a one stop shop  
Connecting Government 
   Ethos 
Particular audience 
 
Taxpaying voters 
 
Centrelink staff 
Business manager - key drivers, busi-
ness re-engineering, entrepreneurial 
spirit 
 
Centrelink staff 
Agency managers 
 
Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet 
Ethos 
Universal audience 
The Australian community 
A safety net for those in need. 
 
For individuals and families 
Customer service for the community 
and for citizens doing business with 
government 
 
Key drivers of customer service 
 
Australian community regions 
Tailored services for community 
members 
 
The Coombs report and govern-
ment access to citizens 
 
Australian tradition of government 
 
National causes such as the Olym-
pics and security 
   Premises 
Truth 
 
Social security tampers with the in-
centives of individuals to work. 
 
 Complexity of policy problems (en-
vironment, security) 
 
Facts 
 
Dissatisfaction with existing ser-
vices. Fact that beneficiaries go to 
number of agencies and are un-
happy about this 
Customer service has been bad in the 
past 
 
Centrelink operates in a contestable 
environment 
Expectations for tailored services 
 
The Government has been doing a 
lot to promote whole of govern-
ment 
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Table 7.2 Overview of Australian argumentation (continues on next pages) 
 Prime Minister's address official 
launch Centrelink 
Three stages of an evolving model 
to a one stop shop  
Connecting Government 
   Existing financial system is flexible 
enough to serve whole of govern-
ment arrangements 
Presumptions 
 
 
 
 
 
Creation of Centrelink will reduce 
the running around of beneficiaries. 
 
The needy are protected by social 
security arrangements. 
 
 
 
 
It is delivery not policy that can satisfy 
customers 
 
Centrelink customers will be able to 
use its IT applications 
 
It is possible to generalize about 
best practice from particular cases 
 
Leaders know the kinds of incen-
tives necessary to promote whole of 
government behaviour and can plan 
for whole of government arrange-
ments 
 
Leaders will show the way to suc-
cess 
Values Dependency is bad Customer service and business like 
values 
Coordination, executive control, re-
sponding to citizens and customers 
savings and accountability 
Hierarchy of values 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Superiority of those that work over 
those that receive benefits 
 
Superiority of the private sector 
over the public sector 
The business like present is superior to 
the bureaucratic past 
Coordination over cooperation, ver-
tical management over horizontal 
management, clear lines of account-
ability over cooperation, low costs 
above cooperation 
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Table 7.2 Overview of Australian argumentation (continues on next page) 
 Prime Minister's address official 
launch Centrelink 
Three stages of an evolving model 
to a one stop shop  
Connecting Government 
Loci 
 
Primarily quantitative loci more ef-
ficient, more human, size of 
Centrelink 
 
Qualitative loci the unique Austra-
lian way, difficulty of reform 
Quantitative loci the size of Centrelink 
and statistics 
 
 
Qualitative loci Centrelink as unique, 
the challenge 
Quantitative loci, the enduring 
(Centrelink and the Australian tradi-
tion eg, more coordination, more ef-
fective policy 
 
Qualitative loci, 
Timeliness (urgency) 
Difficulty (frontier agencies) and 
whole of government challenge 
   Techniques of argumentation 
Quasi-logical  Definition and comparison (key drivers 
customer service) 
 
Definition (whole of government, 
outcomes, outputs and administered 
items) 
Structure of reality 
 
Pragmatic argument (effects of Centre-
link for efficiency, staff, the public) 
 
The person and the act (Centrelink is 
good because of the good sense of 
the person John Howard) 
 
Argument by authority information tech-
nology 
 
Unlimited development (evolution of Cen-
trelink and customer service) 
 
Argument by authority principles whole 
of government success 
 
Unlimited development (whole of gov-
ernment success and learning, refin-
ing outcomes) 
 
Causal link (internal and external 
drivers) 
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Table 7.2 Overview of Australian argumentation  
 Prime Minister's address official 
launch Centrelink 
Three stages of an evolving model 
to a one stop shop  
Connecting Government 
Creating structure 
of reality - meta-
phors 
 
A human face, a new horizon and 
efficiency 
 
On the road, leading the way, harvest-
ing, seamless service, personalized ser-
vice, customer 
 
Integrate, broad, whole picture, 
flexibility, mobility, key priorities, 
balancing, transparent, sharpening, 
strong, tailored, seamless, drivers, 
frontier, whole of government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illustration: that Centrelink is improving 
customer service 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illustration: cross departmental agen-
cies work to promote whole of gov-
ernment, frontier agencies can man-
age contentious issues 
 
Example: Australia following the 
UK in having a central coordinator 
of whole of government 
 Alternatively, in the few arguments made about the agency ar-
rangements, we find a preference for efficiency from consolidation 
of services. In accounts from Centrelink’s director we find primar-
ily individualist and low grid arguments about the agency’s service 
delivery. These are arguments about the agency’s contestability, its 
focus upon personalized customer service, benchmarking and in-
novation. In the third document, there is a mix of primarily hierarchical 
and some individualist arguments observed. 
7.7.1 GGCT and the address at the official launch of Centrelink 
It has been difficult to assess the argumentation in this transcript 
from the themes and watchwords ascribed to GGCT  because 
much of the content of the document focuses upon loci of size, 
the unique and the difficult. In addition, many of the arguments 
espoused to promote Centrelink are primarily arguments about so-
cial security policy rather than about public management reform. 
These are arguments for a basic social security safety net that 
stresses the desire to promote the independence of beneficiaries of 
social security and that encourages people to work hard for their 
(financial) success. Such preferences are reflected in the following 
kinds of statements and can be interpreted as an individualist bias 
for arrangements that stress that individuals are self-interested 
choosers and require financial incentives to work: 
 
we need as far as possible, to take away the notion of dependency from the de-
livery of services. We need a balance between compassion and responsibility 
(Howard, 1997: 4). 
 
we need to look at such things as service delivery through Centrelink as a part-
nership, a partnership between all sections of the Australian community to see 
that we have a society which encourages people and gives them the incentive to 
work hard and to achieve and to get ahead and to succeed…”(Howard, 1997: 5).  
 
There are also statements about following up upon fraud within 
the social security system and these can be interpreted as protect-
ing an individualist way of life through hierarchical measures to en-
sure compliance. 
With regard to the organization of Centrelink, there are two 
main arguments that can  be discerned. On the one hand, Centre-
link is argued to bring about “less public dissatisfaction” because it 
enables people “to have all their business done in that one spot” 
(Howard, 1997:2). This can be interpreted as an individualist ar-
gument because it refers to the customer (business) relationship 
that Centrelink link has with its clients, although the term cus-
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tomer does not appear in the transcript. On the other hand, Cen-
trelink is presented as a desirable arrangement because it: 
 
(i)n one very big stroke…cuts through (that) duplication. Centrelink consoli-
dates in an efficient, modern fashion the major service delivery activities of the 
Federal Government (Howard, 1997, 5).  
 
This is an argument that big organizations with many services are 
preferable to smaller organizations with limited focussed tasks be-
cause they can reduce waste through duplication. In his earlier 
work Hood has noted that consolidation has not been the property 
of any single political tendency and has been propounded by both 
industrial capitalists as well as communists (Hood and Jackson, 
1991:116). I have interpreted this consolidation argument as part 
of the broader individualist way of life being propounded in the 
text, although it clearly the preference for big organization also has 
affinities with the hierarchical way of life. 
 
7.7.2 GGCT and Three stages of an Evolving model to a One Stop Shop 
– Challenges at each stage 
The construction of agency reform presented in this transcript cor-
responds most with the remedies and watchwords of the individu-
alist way of life. There are three features of the argumentation that 
give it an individualist character. These include the presentation of 
Centrelink as a business subject to market - like forces, in the con-
struction of Centrelink customers as individuals requiring person-
alized service and choice in product range, and in the focus upon 
innovation through technology. It is significant that in this indi-
vidualist account there is actually very little direct reference to in-
dividual incentives of staff, customers or politicians. 
The presentation of Centrelink as a business throughout the ar-
gumentation occurs with direct references to it as a business oper-
ating in a contestable environment and in the focus upon customer 
service. The fact of existing competition is presented as a motiva-
tion for staff to perform and keep their business and enhance cus-
tomer service (Vardon, 1998: 4). Other ways in which arguments 
about market like forces are being used to promote the agencies 
activities include statements about prices and the use of bench-
marking in the organization, for example: 
 
During a recent benchmarking study we identified those offices which are lead-
ing the way in productivity…as a result of this study we have established a na-
tional productivity target for the end of 1999 based on the existing performance 
of our top offices (Vardon, 1998:4). 
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It is being suggested that these price signal and competition ar-
rangements will ensure that Centrelink will perform. 
Individualist themes also appear in the argumentation through 
the description of customers and customer service more generally. 
Centrelink customers are described as individuals freely choosing 
their products and requiring personalized tailored services. In the 
discussion of technological applications, for example, it is stated 
that "Centrelink is moving down a path where our customers can 
update their own data, choosing the time and place that this happens 
themselves" (Vardon, 1998: 6) or, we are "giving customers greater 
choice of access" (Vardon, 1998:12). Both of these statements re-
flect a bias for arrangements in which the individual has some 
freedom to choose preferred products and satisfy their own self-
interest.  
A third feature of the argumentation that perhaps reflected an 
individualist bias was the emphasis upon technology throughout 
argumentation. This is used to demonstrate the speaker's willing-
ness to use a number of bold applications to innovate and offer 
more choice to customers. It reflects a kind of unbridled enthusi-
asm for always trying something new and is consistent with the in-
dividualist way of life's focus upon solutions and always seeking 
techniques to get better (Hendriks, 1996:62). Some of the ways in 
which technology is presented as a solution and innovation for the 
agency are: 
 
Centrelink is moving towards the electronic gathering of customer data by ex-
ploring new technologies and industry best practices, and trialing methods 
which allow customers to have entry in to Centrelink payment systems… (Var-
don, 1998:5).  
 
Finally, there is another feature of the argumentation that I have 
been unable to ascribe to a particular way in life, in part because it 
has not been mentioned by various commentators on grid group 
cultural theory. This is the argument that the delivery focus of 
Centrelink will enable policy makers to learn from delivery and 
thereby improve policy. Given that this argument suggests a bot-
tom up approach to policy making, it maybe interpreted as reflect-
ing a low grid argument. It is also expressed in the document using 
egalitarian sounding words like mutuality, although to support the 
business contract between the agency and departments. Vardon 
states: 
 
….One of the consequences of Centrelink delivering services to similar cus-
tomer groups is that we not only help our clients with improvements to service 
delivery but we are also able to assist with policy feedback. In addition, we are in 
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a position to observe two different departments working with the same cus-
tomer group and the need for them to more closely align their policies (Vardon, 
1998:8).  
 
7.7.3 GGCT and Connecting Government: Whole of government responses 
to Australia’s priority challenges 
The arguments in this document correspond most with the fa-
voured themes and watchwords of the hierarchical way of life, al-
though some individualist and egalitarian themes can also be iden-
tified. Consistent with the hierarchical way of life there is reference 
to the broader problems of society as expressed in statements 
about the complexity of some policy issues and a central role is as-
cribed to the government for defining solutions in matters of crisis 
(MAC, 2004:17). These statements are, however, limited to certain 
kinds of situations and no broad commitment is made to steering 
society. Instead, a whole of government approach is presented as 
having a project like character that should only be applied “when 
there are clear benefits” to be made (MAC, 2004:1). 30Various op-
tions for pursuing whole of government are identified and advice 
on best practice is given. These features of the argumentation 
which emphasize tailoring whole of government arrangements to 
particular problems, as opposed to some systematic view of the 
administration may be interpreted as more consistent with an indi-
vidualist way of life, despite the other hierarchical features of the 
document. 
Hierarchical elements in the argumentation can be discerned from 
the central role ascribed to the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet in coordinating whole of government arrangements. Al-
though it is recognized that other departments have an obligation 
to promote whole of government, the document clearly identifies a 
key role for the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. Simi-
larly a hierarchical bias is present in the repeated reminders that 
the administration is required to be responsive to ministers and the 
government. These themes are expressed in statements such as: 
 
…the centre of government – the Prime Minister and Cabinet – is playing an in-
creasing role in coordinating whole of government responses and prioritising 
whole of government issues (MAC, 2004:12) 
 
                                                 
30 One exception is in the presentation of cabinet arrangements as exemplary of 
a long standing tradition of whole of government or rather coordination in Aus-
tralia. This is part of showing whole of government as an enduring feature of 
the administration. It does not include statements about cabinet steering society, 
however, nor does it play a central role in the best practice advice for the case 
studies discussed.   
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More generally, the preference for, or at least maintenance of ver-
tical management, as opposed to horizontal management, can be 
ascribed to a hierarchical way of life. 
Similarly, the concern for maintaining clear lines of accountabil-
ity in whole of government arrangements is consistent with the hi-
erarchical way of life. In statements about cross-departmental 
agency arrangements (such as Centrelink), indirect references to 
accountability can be discerned from the emphasis upon clear role 
definition. This is expressed as follows: 
 
At the heart of best practice for agency arrangements is the careful definition of 
the task, agreement on the respective roles and resourcing, attention to legal 
powers or constraints….(MAC, 2004:38) 
 
In accounts of budgetary and governance frameworks for whole of 
government it becomes clear that the preference for clear roles is 
also related to being able to ascribe costs in a transparent way which 
is consistent with an individualist way of life (see Hood, 2003:113).  
Another theme in the document that may be ascribed to the hi-
erarchical way of life, is the emphasis upon early planning. Plan-
ning fits with the hierarchical bias for obtaining more managerial 
grip over the problems facing the administration. It is a term fea-
tured in most chapters of the report and would seem to be the key 
to success in all cases of whole of government arrangements, even 
though these arrangements are said to be suited to complex policy 
issues, and thus, less amenable to early and clear planning. Below is 
an example of how planning is described as promoting the success 
of frontier agencies: 
 
A key to the successful creation of a frontier agency is in early planning. Plan-
ning should focus on inculcating a new set of values related to the new agency’s 
charter and could encompass physical co-location, single IT financial systems 
and staff development work to develop a new culture and set of values relevant 
to the new agency’s charter (MAC, 2004: 41). 
 
The need for planning is also used throughout the documentation 
to justify the role of central agencies, such as the Department of 
Finance and Administration, to guide whole of government initia-
tives at an early stage (MAC, 2004:75).  
Finally, the argument that frontier agencies have been created to 
provide neutrality and expertise in the coordination of contentious 
issues (MAC, 2004:39) can be interpreted as indicative of the hier-
archical way of life. This is because hierarchists are most likely to 
put their trust in expert knowledge to resolve the problems facing 
government and society.  
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As has already been noted, an individualist bias in the argumen-
tation may be discerned from the perspective that there are various 
options for addressing whole of government arrangements. This is 
reflected in the analysis of different kinds of structures that may be 
instrumental to whole of government goals, as well as different 
kinds of budgetary arrangements (chapter 2 and chapter 5). A cita-
tion not previously mentioned actually expresses this best: 
 
A whole of government orientation and capacity to work collaboratively does 
not imply a ‘group think approach’. Indeed, the application of diverse perspec-
tives on particular issues is an important element in providing good policy ad-
vice to government (MAC, 2004:47). 
 
Other individualist themes include brief mention of the desire to 
be able to provide tailored services to customers (MAC, 2004:1) 
and in arguments that consolidation of services will promote cost 
savings and efficiency (MAC, 2004: 36). It is noteworthy that in 
the account of “cross departmental partnerships agency arrange-
ments”, which includes Centrelink, the language changes to refer-
ring to such arrangements as providing organizational flexibility rather 
than coordination (MAC, 2004:36).  Another individualist theme in 
the argumentation is the recommendation that incentives and re-
wards be adopted to promote whole of government behaviour 
(MAC, 2004: 14). In the chapters I have analyzed this was given 
only fleeting reference, although it plays a more prominent role in 
the chapter on culture (chapter 3). 
Egalitarian themes and arguments emphasising mutuality and 
participation were more fleeting in the argumentation but may be 
ascribed to the identification of consultation as important in pro-
moting whole of government initiatives. This occurs in the first 
chapter of the report when describing the history of whole of gov-
ernment in Australia. It is stated: 
 
Until the 1990s many integrated initiatives were top-down, focusing upon policy 
coherence. In the last few years there has been a new suite of whole of govern-
ment projects aimed at coherent delivery of support to communities, regions 
and individuals, with an emphasis on community consultation and participation 
(MAC, 2004:8). 
 
More generally the use of terms such as collaboration, cooperation 
and horizontal management throughout the document all promote 
the view that the speaker is interested in processes and forms of 
organisation that embrace mutuality. As has been discussed in sec-
tion 6.6.11 above, these kinds of adjectives are generally used to 
apply to arrangements affecting the elite of the administration such 
as within cabinet or between departmental secretaries (see also 
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MAC, 2004:28). The references to the importance of informal rela-
tionships, however cursory, can also be interpreted as indicative of 
the presence of some egalitarian themes. Criticisms of past policies 
such as devolution are presented in egalitarians ways such as point-
ing to its consequences for collaboration (as opposed to coordina-
tion). This is expressed as follows: 
 
There is some risk, however, that devolution of authority to agency heads and 
clear vertical accountability of agency outcomes may make collaboration across 
organisational boundaries more difficult (MAC, 2004: 6). 
 
It should be noted that this argument is also immediately coun-
tered by the speaker in observing that devolution may also provide 
the flexibility for finding innovative solutions to whole of government 
problems. 
Finally, as in the second document analyzed in this chapter, 
there is reference made to the capacity of both Centrelink and ex-
ecutive agencies to provide feedback to policy makers in order to 
improve policy. This can be interpreted as a low grid argument for 
bottom up policy making. In chapter 1 for example it is noted that 
bringing together policies and programs is a challenge for many 
agencies, particularly given conditions of complexity, and that; 
 
One of the solutions is to try to form feedback loops between service delivery 
and the policy process to unlock the lessons learnt in service delivery (MAC, 
2004:10). 
 
Similarly, getting “feedback on program design” (MAC, 2004: 38) 
is one of the best practice tips listed when using agency arrange-
ments such as Centrelink, while in presenting the former executive 
agency the Australian Greenhouse Office it is stated: 
 
By bringing together the major greenhouse programs, it ensures that policy 
learns from implementation experience and that the total effect of Australia’s ef-
forts to constrain emissions can be accounted for (MAC, 2004:39).  
 
In contrast to other statements in the document that the admini-
stration is to be responsive to central government policies, these 
statements suggest some leeway for central government to be re-
sponsive to the policy and delivery problems encountered by the 
administration. They indicate some egalitarian themes in the 
document. 
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7.8 Conclusion: The translation of agency reform in Austra-
lia 
 
Official accounts of agency reform in Australia comprise state-
ments about both Centrelink and the creation of executive agen-
cies. Statements about Centrelink have constructed it as a one stop 
shop consolidating functions and thereby promoting personalized 
customer service and efficiency. The use of technology within 
Centrelink has also been prominent in official talk which has de-
scribed it as an innovation promoting customer service. In the 
early years of Centrelink’s creation, its business like character was 
most prominent in the agency accounts as expressed in descrip-
tions of its contestability, brands and outlets. More recently, however, 
this terminology has subsided with greater emphasis being lent to 
the way it integrates services and facilitates whole of government. While 
consolidation of services was always identified as a feature of Cen-
trelink, in the early years it was part of a business like feature while 
later it has been part of coordination more generally. It is signifi-
cant to note that while providing seamless, tailored customer service 
and using information technology have remained features of the 
official talk describing Centrelink throughout the period studied, 
this has been accompanied by shifts in emphasis from it being new 
and unique, to being an example of a long standing Australian tra-
dition. Alternatively, the few statements that I have been able to 
analyze about executive agencies have emphasized their neutrality 
and expertise. They are presented as having a special status distinct 
from normal departmental structures, although their uniqueness 
may only be temporarily necessary, as the speaker identifies a pref-
erence for permanent or enduring structures. 
In the documents I have analyzed, the separate or semi 
autonomous status of Centrelink has not played a particularly 
prominent role in showing it to be a desirable arrangement. It was 
mentioned fleetingly in early documents to indicate its unique 
business like status, and in the third document to show it as an ex-
ample of organizational flexibility enabling the integration of services. 
Instead, at least in the early years of Centrelink’s creation, it has 
been the autonomy, or rather independence of Centrelink’s cus-
tomers that has been more prominent. On the other hand, the 
separate status of executive or rather frontier agencies is used in 
accounts to demonstrate their neutrality. The main arguments con-
structing agency reform in early statements about Centrelink can 
be listed as follows: 
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• Centrelink offers a unique and new service delivery 
model; 
• The consolidation of services promotes personalized 
customer service; 
• The consolidation of services promotes efficiency; 
• The consolidation of services promotes ease of access 
to customers; 
• The consolidation of services enables policy to learn 
from delivery; 
• Contestability will promote the attainment of high lev-
els of customer services; and 
• The creation of Centrelink has been part of battle 
against ‘dependency’ upon social security. 
 
In more recent accounts of the whole of government priority in Austra-
lia, Centrelink and executive agencies have appeared as examples 
of organizational forms to promote coordination across govern-
ment. This has been expressed in statements identifying integration 
as at the heart of Centrelink and frontier agencies as quintessential whole of 
government arrangements. The kinds of arguments accompanying 
these accounts of agency reform have included: 
• Successful coordination to respond to complex prob-
lems requires direction from the centre of government; 
• The administration has a statutory obligation to be re-
sponsive to cabinet and government; 
• Devolution of management freedoms presents risks to 
successful coordination and collaboration; 
• Devolution enables innovative responses to be made to 
complex problems; 
• Uniform financial systems are necessary for coopera-
tion and coordination; 
• Financial incentives and rewards promote whole of 
government behavior; 
• Centrelink is exemplary of a long standing tradition of 
coordination in Australia; 
• Consolidation through organizations such as Centre-
link promotes ease of access to customers; 
• The separation of frontier agencies from departments 
promotes neutrality and thus the ability to manage con-
tentious issues; 
• The special purpose character of frontier agencies have 
enabled expertise to be consolidated thereby also pro-
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moting an ability to manage contentious issues and 
speak with one voice about them; and 
• Specialization of delivery into one agency (Centrelink 
or executive agencies) provides the opportunity for 
policy to learn from implementation. 
 
From the statements and arguments presented in this chapter, 
both continuities and discontinuities can be observed in the official 
meanings associated with agency reform. The discontinuities are 
not only related to shifts in the official rhetoric about agencies but 
also in the type of agency (Centrelink or executive agencies), being 
discussed. For Centrelink, the continuities in meaning have in-
cluded its consolidating character, purpose to promote efficiency 
and customer service, although its contestability and unique busi-
ness - like character have disappeared, or were dis-continued with 
the rise of whole of government priorities. For executive agencies, I 
have only been able to present statements from one point in time 
and these have highlighted their separateness for the purposes of 
expertise and neutrality. In both cases, irrespective of whole of 
government, the role of agencies to feedback their particular deliv-
ery knowledge to policy was identified. In addition, with the whole 
of government priority, both agencies have been presented as part 
of a connected administrative apparatus responding to central gov-
ernment demands and policy complexity. This was not a feature of 
earlier statements about Centrelink which was presented as existing 
almost solely for service delivery, its customers and business op-
portunities. 
 
7.8.1 The rules of speaking 
The official accounts describing Australian agency reform analyzed 
in this chapter has been produced by quite different speakers, and 
in different forms such as in a speech or advisory committee re-
port from within the administration. Nevertheless, they have all 
sought to attain credibility for their arguments by demonstrating 
concern for the Australian community as a whole through, for ex-
ample, references to how Centrelink represents a commitment to a 
responsible community (Howard, 1997) and regional areas (Var-
don, 1998), and how whole of government initiatives, including 
Centrelink and executive agencies, are part of pursuing Australia’s 
national priority problems (MAC, 2004). Customer service issues, 
whether expressed in terms of easy access (Howard, 1997) or tai-
lored services (Vardon, 1998; MAC, 2004) have also consistently 
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been used to demonstrate that agency arrangements are good for 
the Australian community in general. The construction of a uni-
versal audience that seeks and demands good customer service is 
continually present. In all of these accounts the speakers adopt a 
simple, direct style of speaking, with few technical terms, although, 
as will be discussed further below, business consultant jargon is 
prominent in the speech by Centrelink’s then director, Sue Var-
don. There is also little attempt to use scientific evidence as ex-
pressed through applying theories or justifying selection of cases, 
and when references to these things do occur in the third docu-
ment, it is in a pragmatic way rather than seeking to demonstrate 
application of an explanatory system. To this extent the knowledge 
being embraced by the speaker is matter of fact about what consti-
tutes best practice, and even rejects an ethos that adopts specialist 
vocabulary.  
The kinds of particular audiences being constructed by the 
speakers in the different documents vary considerably. The speech 
by Prime Minister John Howard is primarily concerned to empha-
size, even stimulate concerns of taxpaying voters, while that of Sue 
Vardon’s focuses upon demonstrating fluency in the language of 
business consultants. Her presentation of Centrelink as a business 
appeals to an audience that embraces primacy of the private sector, 
a view that was being propounded by the Australian government at 
that time (see Halligan, 2000:52). Both speeches also include some 
reference to the staff of Centrelink, recognizing their efforts, as 
well as identifying the career benefits likely to follow from the 
creation of Centrelink. The construction of this audience may be 
interpreted as operating both to applaud and motivate Centrelink 
staff, as well as to signal to outsiders that it would be incorrect to 
think that they are being disadvantaged from Centrelink’s organ-
izational arrangements. Finally, in the Management Advisory 
Commission document, the speaker is constructing the particular 
audience of managers within the administration, as well as appeal-
ing to the opinions of the higher echelons with the Department of 
Prime Minister and Cabinet, including the Prime Minister himself. 
These appeals are evident in the specific addresses to managers 
which seek to advise them of the available strategies that the De-
partment of Prime Minister and Cabinet recognize as promoting 
whole of government.  
The conditioning of the audience, or rather pathos of Austra-
lian rhetoric about agency reform shifts from provoking emotions 
about the individual, whether it be as a hardworking tax payer, de-
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pendent beneficiary or personalized customer to provoking emotions 
about a unified response to complex policy problems. In the first 
two documents, agency reform or rather Centrelink is conceptual-
ized as a business enabling the audience to accept that it can ad-
dress public dissatisfaction and promote customer service. This 
conceptualization also legitimates a focus upon the value of cus-
tomer service itself and the primacy of individual enterprise as op-
posed to dependence. Good feelings about Centrelink are stimu-
lated by celebrating its business - like character as indicated by ref-
erences to its contestability, brand and outlets. In the third docu-
ment, it was the challenges of complex problems, the tradition of 
executive control, as well as the knowledge of leaders and experts 
that made coordination an important feature of agency arrange-
ments and the context in which they work. While the earlier 
documents emphasized the unique features (qualitative loci) of 
Centrelink, it is the Australian tradition of coordination (quantita-
tive loci – the enduring) that is used to enable the audience to see 
that agency arrangements are a good thing. Irrespective of whether 
it was to promote the values of business or coordination, the locus 
of difficulty was always prominent in Australian accounts of 
agency reform, which conditioned the audience to see it as good 
because it responded to challenges.  
Australian accounts about agency reform relied primarily upon 
logos based upon the structure of reality or that structures reality. 
There was limited application of quasi-logical argumentative tech-
niques and when this occurred it was arguments by definition and 
comparison that were used. In both the second and third docu-
ments, for example, definition was used to describe respectively 
the key drivers of customer service and the whole of government 
priority. The effects or motivations for agency reform were usually 
always argued using the technique of the causal link or the prag-
matic argument. These relied upon the reasonable belief that Cen-
trelink would promote efficiency or the executive agencies would 
be able to respond to contestable policy issues because they are 
specialist and neutral. Both the techniques of unlimited develop-
ment and argument by authority appeared in the second and third 
documents. These were used to demonstrate that Centrelink would 
continue to improve its business, that the outcomes budget was be-
ing continually refined and that government initiatives were good 
because they adopted information technology and relied upon aca-
demic knowledge about best practice in the UK. Alternatively, in 
the first document it was the credibility of the person John How-
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ard, through the technique of the person and the act, which was 
being used to convince the audience that Centrelink was a sensible 
reform. The metaphors used in the documents included efficiency, 
tailored, seamless and personalized services, best practice, as well as, broad-
ening, integrate and whole of government. It is significant to note that 
while there were changes in the metaphors across all the docu-
ments, tailored services remained a metaphor in the third document, 
together with somewhat contrary metaphors such as broadening or 
focusing upon whole of government.  
 
7.8.2 The cultural features of official accounts 
The cultural character of Australian rhetoric consistently corre-
sponded with some of the favored themes of the individualist way 
of life, although in the third document this was secondary to the 
prominence lent to hierarchical themes and arguments. A shift 
could be observed in the period studied from sole reliance upon 
individualist themes to describe administrative arrangements (hier-
archical themes were noted in the description of social security 
policy in the first document) in the first two documents, to rheto-
ric that borrowed from all three active ways of life, but where hier-
archy was most prominent. The consistent presence of individual-
ist themes and arguments was however still evident in the repeated 
attention to the satisfaction and expectations of customers in all 
the documents, and with the identification of efficiency as an ef-
fect of Centrelink. Alternatively, the greater presence of hierarchi-
cal themes in the third document was expressed in, among others, 
arguments about the need for central coordination from the execu-
tive and with the identification of expertise in frontier agencies to 
resolve contentious issues. In contrast to Centrelink, there were 
only hierarchical themes associated with frontier or rather execu-
tive agencies in the documents studied. 
Themes and arguments reflecting an individualist bias in the 
rhetoric included references to the satisfaction of customers, the 
provision of personalized and tailored services, the consequences of 
consolidation in Centrelink for efficiency, the conceptualization of 
Centrelink as a business in a contestable environment, the emphasis 
upon innovation and technology, and, references to incentives and 
rewards for whole of government behavior. In the third document ana-
lyzed, an individualist bias can also be ascribed to the shopping list 
account of available options for best practice, whole of govern-
ment approaches. This is consistent with narrow accounts of the 
problems facing the public sector, rather than a principled view 
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about the relationships between government and society, and it 
was also maintained even when recognizing the complex problems 
facing society. In accounts of structures such as Centrelink and ex-
ecutive agencies, these options were considered forms of organiza-
tional flexibility. Another feature of the whole of government docu-
ment that may be attributed to an individualist bias was the desire 
for transparent cost and outcome structures for individual units. 
Most of the argumentative techniques used to present individualist 
themes were based upon the structure of reality or sought to struc-
ture reality. Pragmatic arguments and the causal link were used to 
demonstrate efficiency and the authority of information technol-
ogy was used to show the audience that Centrelink was an innova-
tion. In addition, the technique of unlimited development was 
used in convincing the audience that Centrelink would continue to 
improve its customer service and that the outcomes structure of 
the (whole of government) budget would be continually refined. 
The kinds of metaphors that were used in the first two documents, 
where individualist themes were the most prominent, include trav-
eling metaphors, efficiency, a human face, as well as, personalized, tailored 
and seamless services.  The locus of the unique was also used to 
support these individualist themes. 
Hierarchical themes and arguments in the rhetoric included the 
subordination of the administration to the political sphere, the 
need for central coordination, as well as the emphasis upon clear 
roles and early planning. These kinds of arguments were expressed 
in statements about the obligation of the administration to re-
spond to the executive and in the consequences of good planning 
and clear role definition for successful whole of government ar-
rangements. They all appeared in the third document which was 
primarily characterized by arguments based upon the structure of 
reality and arguments that structure reality, although quasi-logical 
techniques seeking to show conformance to whole of government 
best practice could also be identified. The example of coordination 
in the UK was used to establish the rule that central coordination 
was legitimate, while the causal link was adopted to demonstrate 
that early planning and the expertise of frontier agencies will pro-
mote whole of government success. The metaphors used in the 
document which explicitly support these kinds of arguments in-
cluded whole of government, seeing the big picture, broad, integrate, balanc-
ing, strong, sharpening (responsibilities), vertical management and key pri-
orities. Other metaphors that appear in the document include flexi-
bility, transparency, as well as tailored and seamless services.  
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A few egalitarian themes and watchwords are also present in 
the third document in statements about the desire for more hori-
zontal coordination, collaboration and cooperation. It can also be 
associated with references to informal relationships. The most im-
portant group blame in the document, that uses egalitarian terms 
emphasizing mutuality, is the recognition that devolution of au-
thority to individual units has the risk of hindering collaboration. 
This may be interpreted as an argument featuring an egalitarian 
bias. It uses the technique of the causal link, which is based upon 
the structure of reality. A metaphor in the document supporting 
mutuality includes references to the desire for horizontal management.  
 
7.8.3 The relationship between official accounts  and the scenes of use 
The Australian cultural context has been diagnosed as highly indi-
vidualistic and this corresponded with the cultural flavor of the ac-
counts used to construct agency reform. In particular, appeals to 
the Australian universal audience consistently articulated a com-
mitment to tailoring or personalized customer service, even in the 
third document when hierarchical themes were prominent.  The 
view of society as composed of atomized groups of customers and 
taxpayers can also be related to the liberal welfare state tradition of 
Australia and its small scale of public welfare by comparison to 
Sweden and The Netherlands. It also reflects a political tradition 
that conceives of political engagement in instrumental terms, e.g. 
to get something out of it, rather than for other democratic values. 
Other features of the accounts that may be ascribed to the 
scenes of use described in this chapter included the predominance 
of speech presentations by individual actors such as the Prime 
Minister and the Director of Centrelink itself. Aside from legisla-
tive and audit documents, these were the only kinds of official 
documents that could be identified for describing the Centrelink 
reform, and even these were after it was introduced. Similarly, 
there were also only limited documents providing accounts of ex-
ecutive agencies, with their appearance being a side role in the 
document analyzed rather than something requiring great explana-
tion. Both these features of the accounts, the possibility for indi-
vidual actors to construct the reform for their own purposes and 
audiences without reference to any established official blueprint, as 
well as the lack of substantial justification for the reform, are con-
sequences of the political system in Australia. The executive is not 
required to provide detailed justifications for their reforms, except 
for by introducing new legislative arrangements in a parliament in 
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which they have the majority in the lower house. Finally, the 
prominence of arguments based upon the structure of reality in 
Australian accounts may be associated with the adversarial political 
system in Australia that thrives on short sharp one-liners, rather 
than detailed principled analyses. 
 
  
 8 Comparing official agency talk: the influ-
ence of  context or story? 
 
 
 (a)t väsentlig steg redan tagits mot ett styrssystem som mer riktar uppmärksam-
heten mot verksamheternas mål och resultat (SOU 1985:40:63). 
 
[that essential path already taken towards a steering system that directs more atten-
tion towards the activities’ goal and result. My emphasis] 
 
Het beheer bij de rijksoverheid is volop in ontwikkeling. Op de fundamenten 
die sinds 1985 met de operatie comptabel bestel zijn gelegd, wordt in dit rapport 
verder gebouwd (Ministerie van Financièn, 1991:I) 
 
[Management within the central government is developing in abundance. The 
foundations that were laid in 1985 with the operation accounting system, are fur-
ther built upon in this report. My emphasis] 
 
This stage, which we have just completed, involved setting up the organization 
itself, defining and moving toward personalized service and establishing business 
opportunities (Vardon, 1998:8 My emphasis).  
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous empirical chapters, detailed analyses of official 
agency accounts in The Netherlands, Sweden and Australia were 
presented, together with some initial observations about the role 
of the national scenes of use in shaping these accounts. Agency con-
structions would appear to vary significantly across the countries 
from being an accountable alternative to ZBOs in The Netherlands, 
to promoting democracy (in one way or another) in Sweden, to 
promoting customer service in Australia. The durability and mix in 
the cultural flavor of these national accounts also varied across 
country and time. In this chapter it becomes possible to compare 
not only the differences in official agency accounts, but also to 
identify similarities. Patterns in differences and similarities across 
high group consensus cultures vis a vis low grid consensus cultures 
provide further evidence of the role of the scenes of use in shaping 
official accounts. Alternatively, similarities in agency accounts 
across all cultural contexts would indicate that there has been an 
agency story traveling independent of context. 
This chapter will first return to the cultural character of official 
agency accounts in The Netherlands, Sweden and Australia. In sec-
tion 8.1 I will compare these cultural flavors as well as the network 
of statements that have supported them. This enables an initial 
evaluation of the limits of national official discursive formations 
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and their differences and similarities. National styles of speaking will 
then be analyzed further in section 8.2 by assessing the durable 
features of ethos, pathos and logos in the different cultural politi-
cal, administrative contexts. In section 8.3 I will return to the cul-
tural and political administrative features of the national scenes of 
use and these will be compared. This will include a comparison of 
the forums from which officials have described agency reform, the 
actual speakers delivering accounts and their audiences. Corre-
spondence of the cultural flavor of talk with the cultural context 
will be checked and discussed. Together with national styles of speak-
ing this section will enable an evaluation of the role of the cultural 
political and administrative context in shaping official agency ac-
counts. In section 8.4 the analysis will shift to a consideration of 
the influence of cultural stories upon official talk. It will describe 
and compare ethos, pathos and logos when the three of the active 
ways of life featured in agency accounts and they way these rules 
of speaking changed when shifts in cultural flavor occurred. It will 
be shown that there have been similar individualist and group sto-
ries traveling across cultural contexts but that these have been em-
braced to different degrees in the countries under study. High 
group stories have featured more in high group consensus con-
texts while individualist stories have featured more in the low 
group adversarial context. Finally, in section 8.5 an analysis will be 
presented of the way that national styles of speaking and the rules 
of telling culturally flavored stories have interacted to produce of-
ficial agency accounts. The chapter will then be concluded in sec-
tion 8.6 with the observation that while there have been some 
striking similarities in official agency talk the differences have been 
extensive, significant and durable. 
 
8.2 The cultural character of official agency accounts and 
their network of statements 
 
The national official accounts of agency reforms analyzed in the 
previous chapters have revealed a plethora of statements about 
agency reform, the conditions and motivations for its introduction, 
and the kinds of benefits it is to bring about. It has been noted that 
in each country different preoccupations featured in official agency 
talk such as accrual accounting and ministerial accountability in 
The Netherlands, the constitution and democracy in Sweden and 
customer service in Australia. Some durability could be observed 
in the cultural character of official agency accounts in each of the 
Comparing official agency talk: the influence of context or story? 355 
countries. In both Australia and Sweden this was observed in the 
consistent presence of respectively individualist themes and argu-
ments, and hierarchical or high group themes and arguments. 
Dutch accounts were characterized by some rotation in the promi-
nence of the individualist and hierarchical ways of life over time. 
The cultural mix of themes and arguments in each of the official 
documents in each of the countries are presented in table 8.1. The 
first cultural type identified in each box, was more strongly repre-
sented, or rather more numerous in the document analyzed.  
 
Table 8.1. An overview of the national official documents and their cultural 
character 
 
The Netherlands Sweden  Australia 
Verder bouwen aan beheer  
 
 
 
Individualist, hierarchi-
cal 
some egalitarian 
Politisk styrning -
administrativ 
självständighet 
 
Hierarchical, some 
egalitarian watch-
words 
Prime Minister’s speech at 
the launch of Centrelink 
 
 
Individualist 
Verantwoord verzelfstan-
dingen 
 
 
Hierarchical, individua-
list, some 
egalitarian watchwords 
 
Regeringen, myndigheter-
na och myndigheternas 
ledning 
 
Hierarchical, indi-
vidualist, some egali-
tarian watchwords 
Three stages towards an 
evolving model 
 
 
Individualist 
 
Verder met resultaat 
 
Individualist, hierarchi-
cal, some egalitarian 
watchwords 
I medborgarnas tjänst 
 
Egalitarian, hierarchi-
cal, individualist 
Connecting government 
 
Individualist, hierar-
chical 
 
In order to make an initial evaluation of the similarities and differ-
ences in the official agency accounts and their cultural character, it 
is useful to map out and compare the main national statements. A 
comparison of the national network of agency statements enables 
the identification of the different national limits of official agency 
talk and the discursive formation in which similarities have oc-
curred. It can also aid further insight into the different rhetorical 
situations in which official agency accounts have been produced. 
In the following sections I will present an overview of the main of-
ficial agency statements across the countries. Given the wealth of 
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statements collected, I have distinguished between those that refer 
to the relationship between the political and administrative sphere, 
statements regarding internal administrative arrangements, and 
those characterizing the relationship between the administration 
and external actors. 
 
8.2.1 Statements describing the relationship between politics and the admin-
istrative sphere 
The statements describing the relationship between politics and 
the administrative sphere included concerns about the appropriate 
roles of actors within these spheres and statements about ensuring 
accountability. I have also included statements regarding the 
broader goals of the political- administrative system.  
Compared to the other countries, it is the wealth of statements 
about the relationship between politics and the administration in 
Sweden that becomes immediately apparent. Although sometimes 
adopting different interpretations, many of the Swedish statements 
used constitutional prescription (formal rules) to describe the ap-
propriate relationship between, and roles of, the political and ad-
ministrative sphere. These included prescriptions about agencies’ 
subordination to the political sphere and their independence. In 
stark contrast to the other countries, Swedish agency accounts in-
cluded recommendations for very clear and direct political action 
to intervene within the administrative sphere, such as through 
budgetary steering (whether precise and detailed or overarching) 
and the active recruitment of agency general directors. In The 
Netherlands, agency reform was also presented as desirable be-
cause of the possibility of ministerial intervention into agency ac-
tivities, but no specific kinds of arrangements for doing so were 
identified. Further differences between Sweden and the other 
countries included references to the broader goals (such as legality, 
democracy and effectiveness) that should govern the entire politi-
cal administrative system. There were also statements about actors 
in the political sphere being able to make better political decisions 
on the basis of agency budgetary reporting in Sweden. 
In all of the countries reference was made to the importance of 
accountability and the claim that agency reform could in some way 
promote or protect this. There were however important differ-
ences in the way that agency reform or arrangements would pro-
tect accountability. For example in The Netherlands it was stated 
that the mere presence of agencies, unlike ZBOs, within depart-
ments was enough to ensure the protection of ministerial account-
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ability. This was because there would be no legal barriers to minis-
terial intervention. Particularly in Verantwoord Verzelfstandigen, but 
also in other Dutch documents, distinctions between organiza-
tional type and its consequences for accountability were repeatedly 
mentioned. Furthermore, the Dutch stated that more content 
would be given to ministerial accountability through agency reform 
since performance information would be reported to parliament 
and ministers would have to be answerable for this. A similar kind 
of statement was also observed in Sweden, although it was the 
government that was to be made accountable to parliament for the 
achievement of agency goals in the budget. In Australia, the term 
accountability only appeared in the third (not speech) document 
Connecting Government and compared to the other countries, was 
conceived in more narrow ways such as ensuring the clear attribu-
tion of costs within the budget. There was no concern about hold-
ing the government or a minister accountable for Australian 
agency activities.  
A second similarity across all the countries, although again ex-
pressed in different ways, included statements regarding the sub-
ordination of the administration to the political sphere. These 
statements were presented together with concerns about political 
accountability, particularly in Sweden and The Netherlands. As al-
ready noted above, the Constitution played an important role in 
defining the relationship between the political and administrative 
sphere in Sweden.  In all Swedish documents there was recognition 
that the administration was subordinate to the government, al-
though only in I medborgarnas tjänst was this presented as sometimes 
being in conflict with subordination to the law. The contesting in-
terpretations of constitutional prescriptions in the Swedish docu-
ments meant that sometimes subordination to the law was seen as 
overriding subordination to the government. In The Netherlands 
references were made to the primacy of politics to express the desire 
for the administration to act in accordance with the commands of 
ministers. The preference for agencies over ZBOs was part of the 
desire to ensure that the administration could be made to do what 
ministers instruct. In Australia, the relationship between the politi-
cal sphere and administration was described primarily in Connecting 
Government, where it was said the administration was required by 
law to be responsive to the government. In table 8.2 an overview is 
presented of the main statements referring to this sphere in each 
country. 
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Table 8.2. A comparative overview of statements about the relationship between the administration and the political sphere 
The Netherlands Sweden Australia 
• The lines of accountabil-
ity between agencies and 
ministers are transparent 
because agencies remain 
within the ministerial 
departments. 
• Agencies are more ac-
countable to ministers 
than ZBOs, because 
unlike ZBOs, there is no 
legal barrier preventing 
intervention in agency 
operations. 
• The reporting of agency 
results gives the parlia-
ment greater insight into 
agency products and ser-
vices, and, requires min-
isters to be accountable 
for these. 
• The constitution prescribes agencies as subordinate to the political 
sphere. 
• The constitution presents no hinder to the active and precise steering of 
agencies by the government. 
• Since the government is responsible to parliament and parliament to the 
people, it is a necessary condition of democracy that the government ac-
tively steer agencies and have a clear oversight of their activities. 
• The constitution prescribes only limited independence to agencies in spe-
cific applications of the law, but these laws can also be overridden by 
government legislation. 
• Agencies have acquired independence that exceeds constitutional pre-
scription. 
• The constitutional basis for agency independence is to guarantee legality, 
agencies are therefore subordinate to the government but also the law. 
• The government should set overarching goals for particular sectors rather 
than individual agencies, in order to avoid the risk of fragmentation. 
• Increasing the effectiveness of the administration promotes democracy 
and democratic institutions. 
• Effectiveness taken too far will have negative consequences for democ-
racy and legality. 
• Requiring agencies themselves to propose areas for savings will provide a 
better basis for political decision-making. 
• More time in the budget will promote better reporting from agencies and 
better political decision-making. 
• The active recruitment of director generals and changes to their tenure 
will ensure compliance to political intentions. 
• Informal relations enable politicians to identify their intentions to the 
‘sensitive ear’ of administrators. 
• The administration is 
required by law to be 
responsive to the ex-
ecutive. 
• Establishing clear lines 
of accountability in 
whole of government 
arrangements is desir-
able and requires the 
maintenance of distinct 
accounting units in the 
budget. 
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The main similarities and differences in official agency statements 
regarding the relationship between the political and administrative 
sphere are presented in table 8.3. It is noteworthy that most of the 
statements describing the relationship between the political and 
administrative sphere in official agency accounts supported hierar-
chical themes and arguments about steering and political control. 
The exception was reference to agency reform promoting indi-
vidualist financial accountability through outcomes budgeting in 
Australia. 
 
Table 8.3. Similarities and differences in statements about the political and ad-
ministrative sphere 
Similarities Differences 
• Agency reform pro-
motes accountability 
(N, S, A) 
 
• The administrative 
sphere is subordinate 
to the political sphere 
(N, S, A) 
 
• Political accountability in N, S 
versus financial accountability 
in A 
• Organizational type promotes 
accountability, N 
• Constitutional prescription, S 
• Political steering through 
budget and recruitment, S 
• The administration subordi-
nate to the law, S 
N = The Netherlands, S = Sweden, A = Australia 
 
8.2.2 Statements regarding internal arrangements within the administrative 
sphere 
Official agency accounts describing internal arrangements within 
the administrative sphere included statements about agency reform 
promoting efficiency and cost consciousness and, by contrast, 
statements in Sweden and Australia about the risks of individual 
performance for the administration as a whole. In The Netherlands 
and Australia, there were also statements about exposing agencies 
to forms of competition. I have included a statement from Austra-
lia regarding policy learning from delivery in this section because it 
was presented, briefly in the documents Three stages of an evolving 
model to a One Stop Shop - Challenges at each stage and Connecting Gov-
ernment, as if rational feedback would occur within the administra-
tive system (eg. between agencies and departments) without any 
political influence or consequences. In some ways this statement is 
similar to a Swedish statement in the section above about budget 
reporting improving political decision making since both recognize 
the capacity to learn from the administration. In Sweden, however, 
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this was conceived of as part of clarifying the relationship between 
the political and administrative sphere, since agency reporting was 
to provide political actors with a better capacity to make priorities 
in the budget. Alternatively, in Australia feedback loops between 
delivery and policy were generally presented in stories about im-
proving delivery and customer service and (apparently) had noth-
ing to do with politics. In table 8.4 an overview of the statements 
describing the internal arrangements in the administrative sphere 
are presented. 
 
Table 8.4. Statements regarding the internal arrangements within the adminis-
trative sphere 
The Netherlands Sweden  Australia 
More freedom to make fi-
nancial decisions will 
(unlike cash based ac-
counting) enable manag-
ers to make more effi-
cient decisions. 
 
New more flexible finan-
cial arrangements will 
(unlike cash based ac-
counting) enable finan-
cial incentives to be in-
troduced to encourage 
more efficient decisions. 
 
Accrual accounting en-
ables the calculation of 
cost prices, thereby 
promotes cost con-
sciousness and provides 
the means for identifying 
financial incentives.  
 
Benchmarking of per-
formance promotes effi-
ciency. 
More freedom to managers 
in pursuing overarching 
goals will promote effec-
tiveness. 
 
Introducing interest 
sanctions and returns 
into the financial system 
will promote cost con-
sciousness. 
 
The delegation of free-
doms and focus upon 
individual performance 
may lead to behavior 
that does not promote 
the whole of the admini-
stration.  
 
Market influences upon 
employment conditions 
have reduced civil ser-
vant’s independence and 
their commitment to 
public values and tradi-
tions. 
Contestability pro-
motes keeping busi-
ness 
 
The consolidation of 
services promotes ef-
ficiency. 
 
Devolution of man-
agement freedoms 
presents a risk to suc-
cessful coordination 
and collaboration. 
 
Financial incentives 
and rewards promote 
whole of government 
behavior. 
 
The consolidation of 
services enables policy 
to learn from service 
delivery. 
 
 
As is evident from the table, in all countries official agency ac-
counts were composed of similar statements about agency reforms 
promoting efficiency or effectiveness. Indeed, in The Netherlands 
and Sweden, this was identified as one of the primary benefits of 
their agency reforms. It was stated that the autonomy granted to 
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agency managers through new financial and budgetary systems 
would bring about more efficiency and effectiveness. In Australia, 
Centrelink (but not executive agencies) was also argued to promote 
efficiency but this was presented as a consequence of the consoli-
dation of a range of services into one organization. The presenta-
tion of Centrelink as a business with brands, outlets and customers 
overshadowed such matters of efficiency in Australian accounts, 
but at the same time made it possible for the audience to see it as a 
taken for granted part of keeping business. Statements that efficiency 
would be a consequence of agency reforms can therefore be con-
sidered a similarity across the countries although for different rea-
sons and with higher degrees of prominence in The Netherlands 
and Sweden, as opposed to Australia.   
Related to the priority of efficiency, in both The Netherlands 
and Sweden, a second similarity can be noted in statements made 
about financial measures promoting cost consciousness. In The 
Netherlands the calculation of unit costs for agency products was 
said to promote cost consciousness and thereby efficiency, while in 
Sweden statements were made about the introduction of interest 
rate rewards and sanctions upon the financial accounts of agencies 
promoting cost consciousness. In Sweden, these sanctions and re-
wards can also be interpreted as introducing incentives for good 
financial behavior within agencies, while in The Netherlands there 
were also other kinds of incentives for good performance pro-
posed. For example, in Verder bouwen aan beheer, it was suggested 
that agencies be able to keep their efficiency wins and in Verder met 
resultaat financial rewards and sanctions for individual performance 
were identified as means for promoting results orientation (Minis-
terie van Financiën, 1998:28). In the Swedish documents there 
were no references to individual financial incentives to promote ef-
ficient behavior. In the Australian documents about Centrelink, 
price per service was also mentioned although this was again part 
of doing business rather than specifically attaining efficiency or 
productivity. There was no mention of financial incentives for staff 
in the documents describing Centrelink although they were to be 
motivated and become customer orientated through training 
courses and career opportunities. Alternatively, in the Connecting 
Government document financial incentives were identified as a 
means for promoting whole of government behavior in Australia. A 
third similarity in the statements about internal administrative ar-
rangements therefore includes the reference to financial incentives 
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in all countries, but only individual financial incentives in The 
Netherlands and Australia.  
A fourth similarity between Dutch and Australian accounts, but 
not the Swedish, was the inclusion of statements about competi-
tion. In both cases the references were brief and with little descrip-
tion of how competition had been used. For example the Dutch 
evaluation document Verder met resultaat found that the use of 
bench marking and quasi-market arrangements could explain im-
provements in the efficiency of agencies, although little informa-
tion was provided about which benchmarking arrangements.  Al-
ternatively, in Australia, Sue Vardon announced in her speech Three 
stages of an evolving model to a One Stop Shop that contestability would 
promote Centrelink’s ability to keep customers. Again there was 
no information provided about alternative providers of Centre-
link’s services and the statement was made within the broader 
story of Centrelink as a real business not a government organiza-
tion.  
A fifth and contrasting similarity to many of the above-
mentioned statements, were the references in Sweden and Austra-
lia to the possible negative effects of agency reform for the ad-
ministration. In both countries the granting of freedoms to agen-
cies, and in Sweden the focus upon individual agency performance, 
was said to have presented a risk to achieving benefits for the 
whole of the administration and for coordination. These state-
ments appeared in the most recent documents analyzed in Sweden 
(I medborgarnas tjänst, 1997) and Australia (Connecting Government, 
2004), and followed earlier statements about the various benefits 
of agency reform for efficiency and performance. They were also 
presented in accounts that identified the need to be able to re-
spond to complex issues in an international policy environment. In 
both countries they constituted a shift from earlier arguments 
about agency reform, although in Australia such statements ap-
peared together with the recognition that organizational flexibility 
through agency arrangements could also promote the capacity to 
identify innovative solutions to complex problems.  
Differences in official statements describing the way agency re-
form effected internal administrative arrangements occurred pri-
marily in Australia and Sweden, with all the statements in The 
Netherlands having some similarities in one or both of the other 
countries. In Australia, distinct statements were made about organ-
izational flexibility promoting the ability of the administration to 
respond to complex issues, and about their agency re-
Comparing official agency talk: the influence of context or story? 363 
 
form/Centrelink constituting the consolidation of services.  In 
Sweden, distinct statements were made about the effects of market 
values within the administration reducing civil servant independ-
ence in agencies and the commitment to public values.  
An overview of the similarities and differences in official state-
ments about internal administrative arrangements are presented in 
table 8.5. It is noteworthy that many of the statements regarding 
the impact of agency reform upon internal administrative ar-
rangements, and particularly financial or business arrangements, 
provided evidence of an individualist cultural flavor in official ac-
counts. The exceptions were group blames upon market values in 
Sweden and upon the risks of an individual agency focus for coor-
dination and cooperation in Sweden and Australia. 
 
Table 8.5. Similarities and differences in statements regarding the internal ar-
rangements within the administrative sphere 
SIMILARITIES DIFFERENCES 
• Agency reform promotes effi-
ciency or effectiveness (N, S, A) 
• Autonomy granted to managers 
will bring about effi-
ciency/effectiveness (N, S) 
• Cost prices will promote cost con-
sciousness (N, S) 
• Individual financial incentives will 
promote performance (N, A) 
• Forms of competition eg. bench-
marking to promote performance 
(N, A) 
• The focus upon individual agency 
performance and delegation pre-
sents the risk of fragmentation (S, 
A) 
 
• Consolidation of services will 
bring about efficiency (A) 
• Organizational flexibility may 
promote the attainment of in-
novative solutions to complex 
problems (A) 
• Market values have brought 
about a threat to civil servant’s 
independence and commit-
ment to public values (S ) 
• No individual financial incen-
tives (S) 
• No mention of competition 
(S) 
• No fear of fragmentation with 
internal autonomization (N) 
N = The Netherlands, S = Sweden, A = Australia 
 
8.2.3 Statements regarding the relationship between agencies and the exter-
nal environment 
Official accounts of agency reform were also composed of some 
statements about the relationship of agencies with their external 
environment. These only appeared in Sweden and Australia, with 
Dutch official references to actors or events outside of the political 
administrative system being either completely absent or mentioned 
very briefly through references to customer satisfaction indicators 
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in Verder met resultaat. Statements regarding the relationship be-
tween agencies and the external environment were most promi-
nent in Australia where both customer service and the creation of 
executive agencies to manage contentious policy issues such as en-
vironmental problems were identified. There was also one refer-
ence to agency reform promoting citizen’s access to government, 
although little explanation was given to how this was distinct from 
customer access in Australia. Another statement about agency re-
form specific to Australia was the role of Centrelink in eradicating 
dependency on social security. In responding to contentious issues, 
the separation of executive agencies in Australia was constructed 
as promoting their neutrality and enabling the administration to 
speak with one voice to the external environment. An overview of 
the statements about the relationship between the administration 
and the external environment are presented above in table 8.6.  
 
Table 8.6. An overview of statements regarding the relationship between the 
administration and external actors/ environment 
Sweden Australia 
• Agencies require sufficient 
independence to respond 
to the demands of citizens 
and their democratic right 
to influence the conditions 
affecting their wellbeing. 
• The independence of 
agencies promotes legality 
in decision making. 
 
• Consolidation of services promotes 
ease of access to customers and citi-
zens.  
• Devolution provides organizational 
flexibility to respond to complex is-
sues. 
• The creation of Centrelink has been 
part of the battle against dependency 
• Separation of executive agencies 
promotes their neutrality  
• Separation of executive agencies 
from departments promotes the 
ability to manage contentious issues. 
• Special purpose character of execu-
tive agencies consolidates expertise 
and enables them to speak with one 
voice about contentious issues. 
 
In Sweden, most statements about actors and the environment ex-
ternal to the political administrative system occurred in the docu-
ment I medborgarnas tjänst. This document challenged (hierarchical) 
conceptions of democracy in earlier Swedish accounts of agency 
reform and argued that sufficient agency independence was neces-
sary to enable the administration to respond to citizen desires and 
give them influence. There were also statements about the inde-
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pendence of agencies promoting the legality and fairness of deci-
sions made about citizens. To this extent, statements about the re-
lationship between the administration and the external environ-
ment in Australian and Swedish accounts were entirely different. 
They also supported both high and low group cultural themes.  
 
8.2.4 An initial evaluation of similarities and differences in official agency 
accounts 
This initial overview of statements about the official accounts of 
agency reform in The Netherlands, Sweden and Australia reveal 
different networks of statements. Differences in the degree to 
which certain kinds of official statements constituted all of what 
was said about agency reform in the different national documents 
can be clearly distinguished. It can be observed that Dutch official 
agency accounts have been almost exclusively focused upon inter-
nal administrative arrangements, Swedish accounts have been pri-
marily concerned about the relationship between the political 
sphere and the administration, while Australian accounts have lent 
greater focus to relationships between the administration and ex-
ternal actors. Such differences were also apparent in the stronger 
emphasis given to the hierarchical way of life in Swedish accounts 
where there was more focus upon political steering and constitu-
tional rules. Alternatively the individualist way of life was stronger 
in Dutch and Australian accounts where there was respectively al-
most exclusive focus given to internal administrative arrangements 
in The Netherlands and both internal and external administrative 
relationships in Australia.  
Yet there were still other similarities observed in the statements 
produced. These included a hierarchical emphasis upon political 
accountability and steering in Sweden and The Netherlands and 
group concerns about the consequences of agency reform for co-
ordination and cooperation in Australia and Sweden. In The Neth-
erlands and Sweden there were a number of similarities in the indi-
vidualist descriptions about their financial reforms, such as claims 
they would promote agency performance through cost conscious-
ness and greater managerial autonomy. While in The Netherlands 
and Australia individualist similarities also occurred with references 
to competition and individual financial incentives. Finally, in all 
countries the individualist way of life appeared in claims that 
agency reform would promote efficiency in one way or another. I 
will return to these similarities when assessing the rules of telling 
culturally flavored stories in section 8.5. 
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8.3 National styles of speaking: the link to context 
 
The durable rhetorical features of national agency accounts can be 
ascribed to the context in which these accounts have been con-
structed. This is because similar patterns in rhetorical strategies 
over time, irrespective of the speaker, suggest a typical way of 
speaking in a particular context. In this study the durable features 
of official agency talk across the countries have been labeled their 
national styles of speaking. The role attributed to context in determin-
ing this style is strengthened when patterns in rhetoric can be iden-
tified across the high group consensus/low group adversarial di-
vide. Indeed it can be shown that similar rhetorical strategies were 
adopted in the high group consensus cultures vis a vis the low 
group adversarial cultures, although there were also some impor-
tant distinctions between Dutch and Swedish official talk. As will 
be shown below the high group consensus contexts consistently 
embraced more group themes than the low group context and less 
individualist themes. In addition they favored political values, a 
more scientific ethos and quasi-logical argumentative techniques 
over time. These rhetorical features sustained the high group, and 
more particularly hierarchical flavor, of their official agency ac-
counts. Alternatively, private sector values, a more informal way of 
speaking together with more arguments based upon the structure 
of reality were characteristic of agency talk in the low group adver-
sarial culture. These features sustained the stronger presence of the 
individualist flavor in Australian official agency accounts. In both 
Sweden and Australia, the consistent character of ethos, pathos 
and logos over time could be quite clearly associated with particu-
lar GGCT flavors. This was most strongly reflected in the con-
struction of their universal audiences and in the repeated patterns 
of their pathos. By contrast, Dutch rhetorical features were less 
consistent over time, making the diagnosis of a national style of 
speaking more difficult. 
 
8.3.1 Similarities and differences in the ethos of official agency accounts 
The universal audiences constructed by the speakers in each coun-
try were different. In the Netherlands the speaker sought to give 
agency reform broader appeal by expressing concern for ministe-
rial accountability and through assuring the audience that its find-
ings had been the outcome of consultation with speaking partners. 
Alternatively, in Sweden the universal audience was consistently 
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constructed through demonstrating a commitment to democracy, 
as well as knowledge of the Swedish institutional arrangements and 
history. In both cases the universal constructions could clearly be 
associated with national political and administrative features, such 
as a strong tradition of ministerial accountability or agencies with 
constitutional status, and there was a commitment to public or po-
litical values. By virtue of their consistent presence in both Dutch 
and Swedish official documents, the replication of social science 
principles in justifying case study selection (in The Netherlands) or 
in identifying political theories and concepts (in Sweden) may also 
be interpreted as the speaker seeking to establish universal credibil-
ity in these high group consensus cultures.  
In Australia, the universal audience was constructed in all the 
documents by reference to tailored customer services as a primary 
desire of the Australian people, there was little discussion of actual 
administrative arrangements. Academic evidence was also used in 
the third Australian document Connecting Government, but in a more 
user-friendly way than either the Dutch or Swedish accounts. In 
contrast to the Dutch or Swedish documents, there was no at-
tempt to demonstrate a scientific rationale for statements about 
agencies in any of the Australian documents and the speakers 
adopted fairly simple, direct language, demanding little intellectual 
effort from their audience. In table 8.7 a comparison of the univer-
sal audiences of official accounts in each country is presented. The 
black italicized words represent the similarities of respectively pub-
lic values and scientific rationales in the high group consensus cul-
tures. 
 
Table 8.7. Ethos – the universal audiences compared 
The Netherlands Sweden Australia 
Ministerial account-
ability (public value) 
Consultation 
 
Scientific rationale 
Democracy (public 
value) 
Political and administra-
tive history 
 
Scientific rationale 
Customer service 
(private sector 
value) 
 
 
Simple and direct 
approach 
 
All of the differences in universal audiences indicate that making 
agency reform appear good and acceptable required the construc-
tion of a different community of minds in each of the countries. In 
the high group consensus cultures there was a patterned commit-
ment to public values and scientific logic. In the low group adver-
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sarial culture, Australia, there was much less reference to the public 
nature of agency reforms and instead private sector values featured 
together with an informal way of speaking.  
Against the background of the cultural flavors found most 
consistently to characterize agency talk over time in each of the 
countries, it is useful to reflect upon how these might correlate 
with the construction of the universal audience. Indeed one of the 
advantages cited for combining GGCT with the New Rhetoric was 
the link that could be made between the broader political character 
of a national context and the universal audience (see section 4.3). 
In the Netherlands, reference to consultation and speaking part-
ners clearly corresponds most with the mutuality themes favored 
by egalitarians. This was given cursory reference in two of the 
Dutch documents. By contrast, ministerial accountability is more 
difficult to situate according to the ideal stories identified in chap-
ter 3. At the level of the government and political cultural context 
individual ministerial accountability has been associated with the 
individualist way of life in this study, however in Dutch official 
agency accounts it has been used to describe the relationship be-
tween the political and administrative sphere. More specifically it 
has featured in hierarchical stories about political control of the 
administration and to this extent has consistently supported the 
presence of hierarchical themes and arguments in Dutch agency 
accounts. Therefore it can be said that ministerial accountability 
has constituted a hierarchical feature of Dutch official accounts al-
though it is likely that it has been its ambiguity that has enabled it 
to provide universal appeal. After all ministerial accountability 
represents a number of broad political ideals inherent to many 
democratic systems. Indeed one cannot help but wonder if it is 
applicable to a range of cultural contexts and thereby all three ac-
tive GGCT ways of life. This aside, consistent reference to the hi-
erarchical advantages of ministerial accountability and to egalitarian 
speaking partners would indicate some correspondence with diag-
noses of Dutch culture although it is the hierarchical flavor, rather 
than egalitarian flavor, that has been more prominent in the con-
struction of the universal audience. 
In Sweden the universal audience was constructed as commit-
ted to democracy and historical accounts of the Swedish political 
and administration. While democracy was identified as an egalitar-
ian watchword in chapter 3, like Dutch ministerial accountability, it 
more often supported hierarchical stories about political control 
and role differentiation in Swedish agency accounts.  It is also a 
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rather broad idea with an ambiguous character that clearly enables 
it to capture universal appeal, rather than one way of life. Alterna-
tively, the consistent presence of historical accounts in Swedish of-
ficial documents is more easily reconcilable with a strong group 
commitment. It sought to construct a collective memory about the 
origins of Swedish institutions and to legitimate concerns for far 
reaching and distinct public values. The academic nature of the 
analyses (as reflected in the use of theoretical categories from po-
litical science) gave the speaker an expert character. Indeed in both 
the Netherlands and Sweden a similar expert voice was achieved 
and used to attain credibility through the expression of commit-
ment to scientific rationales. Hood has argued that an expert ethos 
is typical of the hierarchical way of life. As in The Netherlands, 
these features of Swedish ethos correspond most to the hierarchi-
cal way of life rather than the egalitarian culture, which was rated 
higher in both countries. Nevertheless it can still be said that the 
universal audiences in both high group contexts exhibited a high 
group cultural flavor. The cultural diagnoses of the universal audi-
ences are presented and compared in table 8.8. 
 
Table 8.8. Comparing cultural diagnoses and predictions with the universal au-
dience 
 The Netherlands Sweden Australia 
Political cul-
ture 
Egalitar-
ian/Hierarchical 
Egalitar-
ian/Hierarchical 
Individualist 
Durable cul-
tural flavor 
of ethos 
Hierarchi-
cal/Egalitarian 
expert 
Hierarchical 
expert 
Individualist 
motivator 
Hood’s 
characteri-
zation ethos  
Authority figure Authority figure Individual bat-
tling collective 
pressures 
Universal 
audience 
Hierarchi-
cal/Egalitarian 
Hierarchical 
 
Individualist 
 
 Ministerial ac-
countability 
Democracy 
 
Customer ser-
vice 
 Scientific ethos 
 
Scientific ethos 
 
Informal, sim-
ple & direct 
 Speaking partners Politi-
cal/administrative 
history 
 
 
In Australia, the universal audience was consistently constructed as 
committed to customer service. This is an unambiguous individu-
alist theme, matching the highly individualist Australian political 
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context, which was presented in a very informal way. The speakers 
consistently adopted the character of a motivator rather than sci-
entific expert. Patterns observed in the construction of the univer-
sal audiences across high group consensus context and low group 
adversarial contexts were not replicated in the construction of par-
ticular audiences. Indeed, some similarities in this category were 
observed between both high group consensus contexts and low 
group adversarial contexts. In all countries a particular audience of 
managers  was constructed.  
Among the most striking similarity across high group consen-
sus contexts and low group consensus contexts was the construc-
tion of a particular audience of management consultants in The 
Netherlands and Australia. In the Dutch evaluation document 
Verder met resultaat, the Australian document Three stages to an evolving 
model to a one stop shop, and, to a lesser extent, Connecting Government, 
the speakers sought to motivate managers with consultant speak 
and best practice guides. Terminology throughout the documents 
included learning by doing, identifying the key drivers, best practice and 
finding quick wins. It was characteristic of these documents to make 
some reference to administrative heroes or champions that were 
“seeking their farthest limits”, and, to provide their readers with 
summarized self-help tables or boxes. Another consistent feature 
of these documents was reference to the provision of other guide 
books available from the speaker on the matters being discussed. 
The second Swedish document also sought to provide practical so-
lutions to the problems of managers but it never adopted the same 
overt business consultant tone.  
A second similarity observed in both The Netherlands and 
Sweden was the construction of a particular audience of finance or 
accountancy experts in the Dutch document, Verder Bouwen Aan 
Beheer, and in the budget chapter in the Swedish document, Reger-
ing, myndigheterna en myndigheternas ledning. The speaker demonstrated 
their financial expertise through use of technical financial and 
budgetary terms and quite detailed accounts of the working of the 
systems and their steady refinements. It was also typical of these 
documents to focus upon the problems in the financial system and 
how they could be made more effective or efficient and results ori-
entated. The identification of financial incentives for improving fi-
nancial decision-making was another common feature of these 
texts in constructing the particular audience of finance/accountant 
experts. It is noteworthy to mention that while the budget was also 
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discussed in accounts of agency reform in Australia it was never 
presented in the same detailed or technical way.  
Other particular audiences that were constructed in both Swed-
ish and Australian accounts included the staff or civil servants 
within agencies themselves, and citizens. In both cases, however, 
the similar audiences of civil servants/staff was still characterized 
differently. In Australian documents, the speakers gave special rec-
ognition to Centrelink staff as hard working, providing valuable 
contributions and being offered career opportunities through 
agency reform. Alternatively, Swedish statstjänstemannen (public ad-
ministrators, literally state service men) were constructed in I med-
borgarnas tjänst as being burdened by the shifts towards private sec-
tor management practices. These were presented as a threat to the 
integrity of public administrators. Swedish civil servants were ap-
praised for their ability to manage conflicting goals rather than ca-
reer prospects. In contrast to the motivational pats on the back 
that the Australian Prime Minister and Centrelink director relayed 
to Australian staff, it was expert legal opinion and studies that were 
used to demonstrate the loss of integrity for statstjänstmannen [civil 
servants, literally State Service Man], as well as the need for a dis-
tinctive conception of civil service work.  With regard to the con-
struction of the particular audience of citizens, it is observed that 
in Australia these were primarily identified as tax-payers, voters or 
consumers in their accounts of agency reform. The Connecting Gov-
ernment document made one reference to arrangements such as 
Centrelink enabling citizens to be more in touch with government, 
thereby recognizing some desirability for citizens to participate or 
at least be close to decision making. Alternatively in the Swedish 
document I medborgarnas tjänst citizens were identified as the pri-
mary actor for which the administration and democracy was to 
serve. In the Dutch documents, there were no references to citi-
zens or customers in their constructions of agency reform, and 
only limited references to staff.  
Specific to the Swedish documents was the construction of par-
ticular academic audiences that were familiar with political science, 
constitutional law and administrative history. This was reflected in 
the use of political science terminology and theories, and, in the 
accounts of Swedish administrative history. Although some of 
these features can be interpreted as part of the universal Swedish 
audience, in many cases, and especially in Politisk styrning – adminis-
trative självständighet [Political steering – administrative independ-
ence], the detail of analysis was to satisfy a specialist. The provision 
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of statistical evidence was also prominent in the first and second 
Swedish documents and was then described over many pages with 
diagrams. This was in stark contrast to the business statistics pre-
sented in two or three sentences by Sue Vardon in her account of 
Centrelink’s customer service approach. Specific to the Dutch ac-
counts of agency reform was the construction of a particular audi-
ence concerned with the organization of internal government and 
the delineation of distinct organizational categories and arrange-
ments. In table 8.9 an overview and comparison of the particular 
audiences constructed is presented. Where possible a cultural fla-
vor is also ascribed to the characters constructed. 
 
Table 8.9. An overview and comparison of the construction of particular audi-
ences 
The Netherlands Sweden Australia 
Agency managers Agency managers Agency managers 
Business consultant 
(individualist) 
Legal/pol history expert 
(hierarchical) 
Business consultant 
(individualist) 
Financial expert 
(hierarchical) 
Financial expert 
(hierarchical) 
 
Organizational expert 
(hierarchical) 
Citizen 
(egalitarian) 
Public administrators 
Voter and customer 
(individualist) 
Agency staff 
 
In contrast to the universal audience constructions, and with the 
exception of Sweden, the particular audiences constructed in-
cluded cultural elements that had not been diagnosed as predomi-
nant in the different political contexts. Indeed, the construction of 
such a strongly individualist particular audience in the form of 
business consultants was surprising in the high group consensus 
context of The Netherlands. 
 
8.3.2 Similarities and differences in the premises of argumentation or pathos 
The audiences in each country were in general conditioned by the 
speaker to accept agency reform through a range of different facts 
and values such as the wild growth of ZBOs in The Netherlands, 
the problem of agency independence and constitutional prescrip-
tion in Sweden, and social security fraud in Australia. The most 
considerable differences were observed in the identification of val-
ues and the hierarchy of values. There were some similarities in the 
premises of argumentation across all the countries, or across dif-
ferent cultural contexts, as was reflected in the desirability of effi-
ciency in all countries, and the problem of complexity in both 
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Swedish and Australian documents. In Sweden and Australia there 
was evidence of a durable pathos in the form of the loci that was 
consistently adopted to sensitize their audiences to agency reforms. 
The consistent adoption of these loci would suggest that they are 
part of the national style of speaking. As will be shown they corre-
sponded respectively to high group and individualist themes. The 
Dutch were more ambiguous in their use of loci and lacked a fa-
vored qualitative locus over time. 
The adoption of the values of efficiency or effectiveness was an 
important similarity across all the countries. This was used to pre-
sent agency reform as a desirable solution. In addition official ac-
counts in all countries made reference to the problem of account-
ability, which prepared the audience for thinking that agency re-
form could resolve such matters. Accountability was however used 
differently in the national documents. In the Netherlands and 
Sweden emphasis was upon improving ministerial or government 
accountability through agency reform, while in Australia it was to 
ensure clearer financial accounting units. Another premise that ap-
peared in all countries was the presumption that governments or 
ministries would know how to steer or coordinate agencies. Such 
premises were apparent from claims that better performance or ef-
ficiency would be the consequence of agency reforms. It was most 
prominent in the presumptions of early Swedish documents which 
were preoccupied with government steering in general, as well as 
in the Australian document, Connecting Government, which empha-
sized the centrality of the cabinet and their role in leading and co-
ordinating the administration.  
In both Sweden and Australia the similar truth of complexity 
was used to sensitize the audience to the need for greater collabo-
ration and coordination within and among agencies.This was to 
justify changes in agency arrangements that focused upon the whole 
of the administration. In I medborgarnas tjänst complexity was pre-
sented together with an emphasis upon inter-dependency, which 
unlike in Australia raised questions about the capacity of the gov-
ernment to steer. As will be shown in more detail below all of 
these similarities in the rhetorical features of agency accounts 
across different cultural contexts apply to particular kinds of cul-
tural stories about agency reform. 
In all the countries, and almost all the documents, both quanti-
tative and qualitative loci could be identified. Dutch official ac-
counts were distinct for the variation in the loci adopted over time. 
Agencies were presented both as new and unique in documents 
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published by the Ministry of Finance, interchanged with the Minis-
try of Home Affairs accounts which presented them as offering 
purely quantitative benefits such as more accountability and effi-
ciency. Indeed this Dutch document, Verantwoord Verzelfstandigen 
[Accountable Autonomization], provided the only example of 
premises that relied solely upon quantitative loci. Its exclusively 
quantitative focus could be explained because the speaker was 
seeking to convince the audience that agency reform was a means 
to preserve the convention of ministerial accountability, rather 
than being focused upon it as a change in the Dutch administra-
tion (see Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2003:85-87). The locus 
of the unique was also adopted in Australia to promote the intro-
duction of Centrelink, but in Sweden the unique was used primar-
ily to describe the Swedish administration as a whole rather than 
agency reform. 
The Swedish rhetoric was distinct for its consistent use of the pre-
carious or rather threat to democracy (or to public service values), 
in sensitizing the audience to the urgency of the reforms being 
proposed. This locus did not appear in any of the other countries. 
It was power structures such as the expansion of bureau-
cratic/expert power and organized interests in post industrial soci-
ety that posed the threat to the government’s democratic steering. 
Such a concern for power structures has been defined as egalitar-
ian by Hood, nevertheless in the Swedish document these threats 
were to be kept at bay by more and precise hierarchical steering 
from the government. More generally concerns about threats to 
tradition or institutions have been considered a group concern by 
GGC theorists (Hendriks, 1996:60; Thompson et al., 1990:26). 
The egalitarian way of life for example has been typified as seeing 
vulnerability and collapse as eminent (see section 3.5.2). Similarly 
hierarchical societies have been described as needing to recall 
many reference points in the past to legitimate activity (Douglas, 
1987:80). Both features were typical of Swedish talk. In addition 
the locus of timeliness was important in the early Swedish docu-
ments Politisk styrning – administrativ självständighet, Regering, myn-
dighterna en myndigheternas ledning. It aided the speaker in demonstrat-
ing that the time for making changes to established relations be-
tween the politics and the administration was ripe. This occurred 
through references to the inability to change the relationship in 
earlier periods and with the acknowledgement that constitutional 
debate now made it possible in Sweden. In Regering, myndigheterna en 
myndigheternas Ledning the locus of timeliness was used in observing 
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that the changing environment of agencies had not (yet) been re-
sponded to with changes in the agencies (SOU, 1985:40, 31). In 
Australia, the locus of timeliness was also used in the document 
Connecting Government, but this was to show that the complex global 
world had made the need for “whole of government arrange-
ments” “stronger than ever before” (MAC, 2004:9).  
Contrasting loci such as that of the unique and the enduring 
were used in Australian documents to describe Centrelink. Never-
theless the Australian style of speaking was distinct from that in 
other countries for its consistent adoption of the locus of the diffi-
cult. This appeared in all of the Australian documents and was 
used by the speaker to show the audience that the reforms being 
described or proposed were good because they were difficult, or in 
the Australian words, a challenge. The challenge is a concern that 
can be deemed typical of descriptions of the individualist way of 
life which views the world as conquerable and presenting the crea-
tive individual with endless possibilities (Hendriks, 1996:61; 
Thompson et al., 1990:26, see also chapter 3). In contrast to high 
group contexts, the individualist society has been argued to have a 
weaker memory. “This must be so because the competition drives 
out some players and brings upstarts to the top, and with each 
change of dynasty, public memory gets rearranged” (Douglas, 
1987:80). Arguably the locus of the difficult (challenge), and also 
of the unique, is instrumental to continually sensitizing the audi-
ence to different ways of doing things. The locus of the difficult 
did appear in the other countries such as in the Dutch document 
Verder met resultaat but never in the same consistent way over time.  
Finally, it was only in Australia that the locus of the enduring 
was used to demonstrate that Centrelink was good because it was 
part of a long-standing tradition of coordination. While this was a 
call to tradition, the document only recorded a few examples since 
the beginning of the federation in 1900, the official beginning of 
Australian national political history. This was in contrast to the 
Swedish accounts describing arrangements since the 1600s. An 
overview of the main similarities and differences in the pathos of 
national agency accounts is presented in table 8.10. 
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Table 8.10. Comparison and overview of similarities and differences in the 
premises of argumentation. 
 The Netherlands Sweden Australia 
Differences Facts about ZBO 
problem 
 
Facts about 
agency independ-
ence 
Facts about so-
cial security 
fraud 
 Clear principles en-
sure order in prac-
tice 
Constitutional 
prescription 
 
Dissatisfaction 
customers 
 
Locus   
 
 
Precarious (egali-
tarian) 
 
The challenge 
(individualist) 
 
Similarities     
Truth  Complexity Complexity 
Facts Ministers know how 
to steer  
Politicians know 
how to steer  
Leaders know 
how to steer 
    
Values Efficiency Effectiveness Efficiency 
 Ministerial Ac-
countability 
Government Ac-
countability 
Financial Ac-
countability 
Loci Unique (individual-
ist) 
 Unique 
(individualist) 
  Timeliness Timeliness 
 Quantitative Quantitative Quantitative 
 
8.3.3 Similarities and differences in the techniques of argumentation or logos 
The techniques of argumentation adopted across the countries ex-
hibited patterns across the high group consensus contexts and low 
group adversarial contexts. In particular, quasi-logical argumenta-
tion was more prominent in The Netherlands and Sweden, while 
arguments based upon the structure of reality more often charac-
terized official agency accounts in Australia. This finding corrobo- 
rates earlier observations about the kinds of rational information 
that is instrumental to consensus democracies and identifies a style 
of speaking which is distinct to those scenes of use (Andeweg and 
Irwin, 2002). In all of the countries, there were also metaphors ob-
served which revealed both similarities and differences. Different 
metaphors included the term verzelfstandigen in The Netherlands, 
democracy, democratic steering, the strong state and organic meta-
phors in Sweden, and the more extreme business metaphors in 
Australia. Among the similar metaphors there was flexibility and 
traveling metaphors adopted in all countries, freedom and steering 
in The Netherlands and Sweden, transparency in The Netherlands 
and Australia, and, balancing, the whole and sharpening responsibili-
ties in Australia and Sweden.  
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Quasi-logical techniques such as definition and comparison 
were used in documents produced in all of the countries, although 
as already mentioned, with different prominence. In the Dutch 
documents it was used to show that proposals for agency reform 
constituted a form of results management, and that the conditions 
for results had been achieved. It was also used to demonstrate that 
internal autonomization was a preferable and more accountable 
way to adopt accrual accounting within the administration. In 
Sweden, definition and comparison were used primarily to demon-
strate that more precise steering of agencies from the political 
sphere would be consistent with constitutional prescription. Defi-
nitions were also enunciated in the document I medborgarnas tjänst 
where words such as fragmentation and legality were defined, as 
well as terms such as results orientated management. While multi-
ple definitions often featured in the Dutch and all Swedish docu-
ments, they were only used in the last two Australian documents 
and then once or twice. In the speech about Centrelink’s evolution 
definition and comparison were used to demonstrate that key driv-
ers for customer service would ensure greater customer satisfac-
tion and improvements in service delivery. Alternatively, in the 
Connecting Government document definitions of whole of govern-
ment, as well as the features of the budget were presented.  
The quasi-logical argument of the division of the whole into its 
parts was only applied in the Dutch and Swedish documents. This 
was used in The Netherlands to demonstrate that agency reforms 
constituted changes to the budgetary system at the micro level and 
did not disturb the macro principles of the system. It was also used 
to show the audience that the problem of choice for type of 
autonomization could be analyzed according to certain think step 
principles. In Sweden, the division of the whole and its parts was 
used to demonstrate that formally Swedish agencies were subordi-
nate to the political sphere. It was used to show that proposals for 
agency reform constituted a change from detailed to overarching 
steering, thereby enabling more management autonomy for re-
source decisions, while still ensuring political responsibility for goal 
setting. Finally, Swedish accounts of agency reform also used the 
division of the whole into its parts to demonstrate the relationship 
between the values of democracy, effectiveness and legality, and 
the necessity of keeping these in balance when pursuing agency re-
forms.  
Arguments based upon reasonable belief, or rather the structure 
of reality, were also applied in all of the countries. They included 
Chapter 8 378
arguments of authority, of unlimited development, and the prag-
matic and causal link arguments. Arguments by authority were only 
identified in the Swedish and Australian documents and used re-
spectively, the prestige of the constitution or academics, and the 
prestige of technology to persuade the audience that proposals for 
agency reform should be accepted. Significantly, the argument of 
unlimited development could be identified in all of the countries 
and was adopted when demonstrating to the audience that finan-
cial reforms or changes to performance measurement constituted 
continuous improvements. This, together with the use of the 
causal link to demonstrate that agency reforms would bring about 
more efficiency or effectiveness was among one of the most strik-
ing similarities in the argumentative techniques adopted across the 
countries. 
Techniques that structure reality, and particularly metaphors 
which I will focus upon here, were identified in all of the docu-
ments constructing agency reform. Similarities in the metaphors 
adopted across all the countries included references to the flexibility 
of agencies or agency arrangements. In Sweden and The Nether-
lands, use was made of the terms freedom to enable the audience to 
associate their agency reforms with good, positive arrangements. 
In addition, both of these countries adopted terms such as steering, 
as well as grip and command in The Netherlands, to demonstrate that 
the freedom of agencies could still be controlled by the political 
sphere for purposes of accountability. In Australia, a similar kind 
of metaphor visualizing control could not be identified although in 
Connecting Government emphasis was placed upon having strong lead-
ers and strong governance arrangements, but never a strong state as 
in Sweden. Only in Sweden was steering used not only with refer-
ence to the state but also to society.  
Other metaphors adopted across countries include the use of 
the term transparency in The Netherlands and Australia. In The 
Netherlands this was used to show that clear organizational types 
would promote accountability, while in Australia it was used to 
show that the outcomes budget could facilitate clear lines of ac-
countability. Another term to enable the audience to see that 
agency or whole of government arrangements are accountable in 
Australia included sharpening responsibilities.  In Sweden and Aus-
tralia the term balance was used to describe finding the correct rela-
tionship between the administration and the political sphere, as 
well as between values such as effectiveness and democracy in 
Sweden, while in Australia it was used to describe finding appro-
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priate measurement systems that met parliament’s needs as well as 
that of stakeholders. It was also used to talk about meeting appro-
priate levels of efficiency as well as providing seamless services. 
Both Sweden and Australia adopted the terms broadening, mobility 
and the whole to show that their administrative systems were re-
sponding to problems of complexity and the need for cooperation 
or coordination. The whole in Sweden was however used to refer to 
the administration as a whole, while in Australia it was used to 
speak about particular whole of government projects. Finally traveling 
metaphors could be observed across all the countries although 
they tended to be different kinds of traveling metaphors. In the 
Netherlands reference was made to rigging up one’s sails, while in 
Australia it was key drivers, being on the road, and leading the way that 
emphasized the progress of their reforms. Some traveling meta-
phors were also identified in Sweden, although they were not as 
numerous, for example mention was made of being on the path and 
the term modernization was used to enable the audience to see that 
budgetary proposals were part of an ever evolving development. 
Finally, some similarities were observed in the dormant metaphors 
of efficiency or effectiveness in at least one of the documents in 
each of the countries.  
Significant differences in the metaphors adopted could also be 
identified. In particular, the business metaphors used in Australia 
to describe Centrelink were extensive. They characterized its ser-
vices as brands, its offices as outlets and social security beneficiaries 
as customers. The references to personalized and tailored services used 
in Three stages of an evolving model to a One Stop Shop and the Connecting 
Government document can be interpreted as part of the broader 
business metaphor that was used to promote agency reforms and 
activities in Australia. Neither of these terms appeared in either the 
Dutch or Swedish documents, nor was there more than a fleeting 
reference to the customer in the first Swedish document. There 
were also the metaphors of giving government a human face or being 
in touch with government in the Australian document, associating 
government activities with the features of a person. The business 
metaphors in particular gave Australian official accounts their 
strong individualist flavor. 
By contrast, many of the Swedish metaphors were drastically 
different to business terms, and, included organic metaphors de-
scribing the state as a tree or civil service culture dissolving or liter-
ally being watered down. There was also the frequent use of the term 
democracy which I interpreted as a dormant metaphor in Swedish 
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documents because it was continually identified as a reason for 
agency reforms, but with very little account of what more democ-
racy was or what consequences it would entail. Other metaphors 
distinct to the Swedish case included the intention to map the 
problems facing the administration, like a geographer or world 
conqueror. Together with the frequent use of the steering metaphor 
and references to the strong state, it can be said that Swedish meta-
phors gave a group flavor to their agency accounts, and more of-
ten a hierarchical flavor than an egalitarian flavor. 
Finally, the most important and distinct metaphor in the Dutch 
case was the description of bodies at arms length from the admini-
stration as the activity of autonomization. This enabled the autonomy 
of agencies to be viewed as a controlled autonomy (Smullen, 
2003), and also to distinguish it in favorable ways from external 
autonomization (ZBOs), since it was internal.  In contrast to Aus-
tralia and Sweden, it is more difficult to identify some distinctively 
Dutch character of the metaphors that were used in their docu-
ments, except for the contrasting nuances that are represented by 
the term autonomization itself, and the different traveling meta-
phors mentioned above. An overview of the logos of official ac-
counts is presented in table 8.11.  
 
Table 8.11. Comparison and overview of similarities and differences of national 
logos  
 The Netherlands Sweden Australia 
Similarities Primarily quasi-
logical 
Primarily quasi 
logical 
 
 Flexibility Flexibility Flexibility 
 Traveling meta-
phors: rigging up 
sails 
Some traveling 
metaphors: 
on the path 
Traveling meta-
phors: on the 
road 
 Some business 
metaphors 
 Business meta-
phors 
 Steering (Democratic) 
Steering 
 
 Transparency  Transparency 
Differences   Primarily argu-
ments reasonable 
belief 
 Autonomization Strong state Outlets, brands 
  Organic meta-
phors 
Government as 
human face 
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The comparison of the rhetorical features of agency accounts in 
high group consensus contexts vis a vis the low group adversarial 
context strengthens evidence about the role of context in shaping 
official agency accounts. In particular, it has been shown that in 
both The Netherlands and Sweden (high group consensus con-
texts), the universal audience was constructed as committed to 
public values and a scientific rationale. In presenting themselves to 
the audience the speakers sought credibility by assuming an expert 
and elite character. They also always used quasi-logical argumenta-
tion. Alternatively in Australia, the low group adversarial culture, 
the universal audience was constructed as committed to the private 
sector values of customer service and the speaker sought credibil-
ity by being simple and informal. Australian speakers always 
adopted arguments based upon the structure of reality. In both 
Sweden and Australia it was possible to identify very clear national 
styles of speaking about agency reform over time. This was re-
flected in the expert speaker in Sweden, the pathos of the precari-
ous (threat) and the predominance of quasi-logical argumentation. 
In Australia the national style consisted of an informal speaker, the 
pathos of the difficult (challenge) and the predominance of argu-
ments based upon the structure of reality. The Dutch case has 
been more ambivalent with the speaker adopting both an expert 
and consultative character, the pathos also swung from the unique 
to quantitative loci and while quasi-logical argumentation was most 
prominent, arguments based upon the structure of reality were also 
frequently adopted. In table 8.12 an overview of the national styles 
of speaking in each country is presented.  
 
Table 8.12. An overview and comparison of the national styles of speaking in 
official agency accounts 
 The Netherlands Sweden Australia 
Ethos Expert 
Mediator 
Expert Personal Motivator 
Pathos  Unique/ 
Quantitative 
The precarious The challenge 
Logos Quasi logical 
 
Control meta-
phors 
Business meta-
phors 
Quasi logical 
 
Control meta-
phors 
Organic metaphors 
Based upon struc-
ture of reality 
 
Business meta-
phors 
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In table 8.1 above it was already noted that the durable cultural 
features of agency talk in each country exhibited a mix between hi-
erarchy and individualism in The Netherlands, primarily hierarchi-
cal themes and arguments over time in Sweden, and primarily indi-
vidualist themes and arguments over time in Australia. An exami-
nation of the national styles of speaking in each country also cor-
roborates these cultural features of the official agency talk in each 
country. Expert speakers in both The Netherlands and Sweden are 
consistent with Hood’s description of a hierarchical ethos, given 
the prominence of quasi-logical argumentation in these high group 
countries and its compatibility with an expert style, these argumen-
tation techniques are also arguably typically of a hierarchical way of 
speaking (see section 8.5.2 below). The commitment by the Dutch 
speaker to consultation can be interpreted as an egalitarian feature 
of Dutch agency talk, while the mix of control and business meta-
phors highlights the mix of hierarchical and individualist argumen-
tation. Aside from the already mentioned hierarchical features of 
Swedish ethos and logos, the Swedish pathos of the precarious 
(threat) can be interpreted as typical of an egalitarian narrative be-
cause of its focus upon power structures. The numerous control 
metaphors identified in the Swedish case also contribute to the hi-
erarchical features of Swedish talk, although the organic metaphors 
are more difficult to define into a certain way of life. Finally the 
features of the Australian national style of speaking are all consis-
tent with a strong individualist flavor, the informality of the 
speaker, motivational style, as well as the pathos of the difficult 
(challenge) and business metaphors all conform to characteriza-
tions of the individualist way of life. More generally, it can be said 
that group themes and cultural flavors such as the hierarchical 
have clearly been more prominent in the high group consensus 
contexts, while the individualist themes have been more prominent 
in the low group adversarial context. There has nevertheless been a 
substantial lack of egalitarian themes in all countries and most sig-
nificantly in the high group cultures. The correspondence between 
the durable cultural flavors of agency talk and cultural political and 
administrative context are examined in the next section.  
 
8.4 Comparing the scenes of use: the correspondence be-
tween talk and context 
 
One of the explanations for the character of official agency ac-
counts considered in this study has been the role of the scenes of 
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use, or rather the cultural political and administrative, context in 
shaping national agency talk. While the analysis thus far has been 
concerned with comparing the cultural flavor of official agency 
talk, the patterns in the national styles of of speaking across high 
group consensus contexts vis a vis low group adversarial contexts 
would already indicate that context has influenced the kind of talk 
produced. It has been found that high group consensus contexts 
favored more group themes, an expert speaker, quasi-logical argu-
mentation and control metaphors, while the low group adversarial 
context favored more individualist themes, a motivational speaker, 
arguments based upon the structure of reality and business meta-
phors. This would indicate that there is some correspondence be-
tween the respectively high and low group cultural character of the 
countries and the cultural flavor of their official agency accounts.  
In addition, the more numerous individualist themes in Dutch 
official accounts vis a vis Swedish accounts, together with its more 
ambiguous (individualist/hierarchical) national style, may be at-
tributed to the higher ratings of individualism ascribed to the 
Dutch context than in Sweden. It is however the lack of egalitarian 
themes in the high group, and more specifically, high egalitarian 
cultures that has been most surprising. As has been noted in both 
the Dutch and Swedish empirical chapters, this observation raises 
some questions about the relevance of the GGCT diagnoses of 
political culture to the administrative arrangements in these high 
group consensus countries. The correspondence between the cul- 
tural flavor of official accounts and national political culture are 
compared in table 8.13. 
 
Table 8.13 Correspondence between political culture and the cultural flavor of 
official accounts 
 The Netherlands Sweden  Australia 
Political 
culture 
Egalitarian/ hierarchi-
cal (individualism 
higher than Sweden) 
Egalitarian/ hier-
archical 
Individualist 
Cultural 
flavor 
official 
accounts 
Individualist/ hierar-
chical some egalitarian 
watchwords 
Hierarchical/ 
egalitarian some 
individualist 
themes 
Individualist 
some group 
themes 
 
In chapters 3 and 4 the GGCT proposition that social relation-
ships and attitudes, as reflected in talk, are mutually reinforcing 
was presented. It was to provide a possible contextual explanation 
for talk since it was expected that the same prominence, or con-
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stellation of ways of life of the political culture would also be ex-
hibited in their national official agency talk. The way that the cate-
gories of grid or group applied to the political and administrative 
sphere was not always clear. Instead I tried to identify some struc-
tural features that appeared to correspond to the ideal descriptions 
of each of way of life, such as the consensus or competitive fea-
tures of the political system. This approach was most difficult 
when assessing corporatist policy-making traditions or the struc-
ture of the administration, but I still remained open to the view 
that these features also reflected the broad political culture of the 
countries under study. Since such consistency in the cultural mix 
throughout the political administrative system would verify some 
of the grander claims made about the applicability of cultural 
mixes to different levels of scale (see section 3.5.3). The mix of 
contextual features that I identified in each country are presented 
and compared in table 8.14. 
 
Table 8.14. Overview and comparison of the cultural and political administra-
tive sphere 
 
Furthermore it was thought that the concept of the universal 
audience would provide evidence of the broader political culture 
 The Netherlands Sweden Australia 
Culture Egalitarian/ hierar-
chy (More individu-
alist than Sweden) 
Egalitarian/hierarchy Individualist 
Political.  
system 
Consensus 
 
Consensus Adversarial 
Core ex-
ecutive 
Weak prime minis-
ter office 
 
Strong min. ac-
countability 
Strong prime minis-
ter office (traditional 
status) 
 
Collective Govern-
ment 
Strong prime 
minister office 
(status through 
competition) 
 
Min account-
ability 
Policy 
style 
Corporatist  
 
Corporatist (central-
ized and unified) 
More pluralist 
Admin. 
structure 
Agencies marginal  Agencies dominate Mix Centrelink 
significant in 
structure, Ex-
ecutive agen-
cies marginal 
Agency 
status 
Accounting status Constitutional status Parliamentary 
statute 
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being addressed since even when talk was produced in a smaller 
policy making community with its own cultural character, refer-
ence to the broader culture would still be apparent. To some ex-
tent this was observed in The Netherlands where the egalitarian 
theme of consultation was one of the (cursory) features of their 
universal audience. In Sweden this was less the case with the egali-
tarian watchword democracy being adopted primarily in hierarchi-
cal ways. In Australia there was clear correspondence between the 
universal audience and the strong individualist characterization of 
the political culture. Thus it can be said that the relevance of the 
apparently dominant culture in the political sphere was less impor-
tant in accounting for agency talk in the consensus democracies 
than in the adversarial democracy. This refutes suggestions that the 
same kinds of cultural mixes will be replicated at lower levels of 
analysis. Nevertheless it was observed that other political adminis-
trative contextual features such as ministerial accountability or 
ZBOs in The Netherlands, and the constitutional status of agen-
cies in Sweden were central themes in their agency talk. To this ex-
tent it was clear that context did play a role in shaping their official 
talk, although not because they were egalitarian features of the cul-
ture. Indeed the cultural character of agency talk in the high group 
consensus contexts would suggest that the rhetorical situations in 
which agency reform were constructed, particularly in the case of 
Sweden, were more hierarchical than the egalitarian diagnosis of 
the political culture. 
The greater distinctions between diagnoses of political culture 
and the cultural flavor of agency talk produced in the consensus 
contexts are arguably not surprising given the tendency for a 
greater distance between the political and administrative spheres in 
consensus democracies. It was already noted in the Dutch chapter 
for example that de-politicization of issues was a common feature 
of political decision making and involved referring matters to an 
expert committee at a distance from the political sphere. This was 
functional to promoting a consensus style at the political level 
since party compromises could be made about what appeared to 
be politically neutral facts. An expert way of speaking, and accord-
ing to GGCT a hierarchical ethos, has already been identified by 
political scientists as a typical way of speaking in consensus de-
mocracies (Andeweg and Irwin, 2002). In this study the rhetorical 
situations or forums in which agency reform was constructed were 
briefly described. There was a clear distinction between the high 
group consensus contexts and the low group adversarial context, 
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with the forums from which the speakers delivered their accounts 
in the former contexts being much further from the political 
sphere. In The Netherlands this included expert committees coor-
dinated from within different departments, while in Sweden it was 
consistently the commission system which has generally been de-
scribed as an independent policy making body. Both forums were 
addressing elite political actors.  
By contrast, the speakers in the Australian case delivered their 
accounts from the apex of the administration, for example from 
offices equivalent to departmental secretary, or indeed in the case 
of the Prime minister from the political sphere itself. The actual 
audiences to the Australian forums included in at least two of the 
cases the general public. These features of the rhetorical situations 
in which agency reforms were constructed in high group consen-
sus contexts vis a vis low group adversarial contexts clearly have 
implications for their relevance to the broader political culture. 
The closer the forum to the political sphere, such as in the Austra-
lian case, the more likely it is to reflect the broader political culture. 
It may be suggested that it is typical of high group cultures, and 
particularly egalitarian political cultures, to privilege policy forums 
at a greater distance from the political sphere. To this extent the 
cultural political context has played a role in shaping agency rheto-
ric in high group consensus contexts although this is not directly 
reflected in the cultural flavor of their agency talk. 
In addition, the actual speakers that have been privileged to 
speak about agency reform in the different political cultures can 
also be argued to have shaped the cultural flavor of talk. It was ob-
served that in the high group consensus contexts it was primarily 
groups of experts that were responsible for describing agency re-
forms while in the low group adversarial context it was more often 
politicized individuals. This can also be argued to have had impli-
cations for the expert or political flavor of the accounts. Further-
more the composition or character of the speakers changed to a 
greater or lesser degree in all countries. In the Netherlands it has 
been finance experts that have dominated agency accounts al-
though other civil servants with different expertise were repre-
sented on the document published by the Ministry of Home Af-
fairs. The changes in the speakers together with the forums from 
which they spoke, was also accompanied by changes in the cultural 
flavor of their talk. When financial officials dominated there was a 
more individualist cultural flavor to the agency talk. The composi-
tion of the speakers in Sweden also changed quite dramatically 
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over time. In the first document, Politisk styrning – administrativ 
sjalvstandighet, there were more parliamentarians (and some academ-
ics) present on the commission, while there were more financial 
experts from within the civil servants involved in the preparation 
of Regeringen myndigheterna en myndigheternas ledning, and more aca-
demics involved in the preparation of I medborgarnas tjanst. As in 
The Netherlands when financial officials were prominent among 
the speakers in Sweden there were more individualist arguments. 
Swedish financial speakers never obtained the same dominance in 
the commission system, as Dutch financial speakers delivering ac-
counts from the Ministry of Finance. Alternatively when political 
speakers dominated Swedish accounts there were more hierarchi-
cal themes and when academics spoke there were more egalitarian 
themes.  
In Australia it can be said that all the speakers were political ac-
tors to the extent that they were either a member of government 
(the Prime Minister) or actors that obtained their function through 
political appointment. This is arguably a reason as to why the cul-
tural flavor of their talk changed less dramatically over time. When 
there was a change in cultural flavor to more hierarchical argu-
ments in Australia, this occurred when there had also been a 
change in the actual audience receiving the account. There was a 
change from an audience of the general public in earlier accounts 
to an audience of political elites in the Department of Prime Minis-
ter and Cabinet in the third document Connecting Government. These 
observations would suggest that the scenes of use have influenced 
the cultural flavor of agency talk not only through the character of 
the broader political culture, but also through the rhetorical situa-
tions and speakers that they have privileged to describe agency re-
forms. If we consider the various rhetorical situations in each of 
the countries whereby it was primarily dominant expert speakers 
from different forums addressing political and administrative elites 
in The Netherlands, a mix of expert speakers addressing political 
and administrative elites in Sweden from the same forum, and dif-
ferent actual political speakers addressing primarily the general 
public in Australia, it is not surprising that they were respectively 
focused upon internal relationships, political and administrative re-
lationships and external relationships (see section 8.2 above). In 
turn the rhetorical focus clearly had implications for the cultural 
flavor of talk. The forums, actual speakers and audiences ad-
dressed in official agency reform accounts are noted in table 8.15. 
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Table 8.15. Overview and comparison of the rhetorical situations  
 
 The Netherlands Sweden Australia 
Docs. Verder 
bouwen 
aan beheer 
Verantwoord 
verzelfstan-
digen 
Verder 
bouwen 
aan resul-
taat 
Politisk styrn-
ing – adminis-
trative 
självständighet
Regering, 
myndighe-
terna en 
myndighe-
ternas led-
ning 
I medebor-
garnas tjänst
Prime 
Minis-
ter’s 
speech 
Three 
stages to 
an evolv-
ing 
Connecting 
Government 
Forum Ministry 
Finance 
Ministry 
Home Af-
fairs 
Ministry 
Finance 
Commission 
system 
Commis-
sion sys-
tem 
Commission 
system 
Launch 
of Cen-
trelink 
Address to 
IPAA 
Confer-
ence 
Management 
Advisory 
Board 
Actual 
Speaker 
Primarily 
financial 
officials 
Mix of offi-
cials from 
different 
ministries 
Primarily 
financial 
officials 
Primarily poli-
ticians 
Primarily 
financial 
officials 
Primarily 
academics 
Prime 
Minister 
Director 
of Centre-
link 
Departmental 
secretaries & 
some agency 
Directors 
Actual 
Audi-
ence 
Adminis-
trative and 
political el-
ites 
Administra-
tive and po-
litical elites 
Agency 
manag-
ers, Ad-
ministra-
tive and 
political 
elites 
Political and 
administrative 
elites, organ-
ized interest 
groups 
Political 
and 
administra
tive elites, 
organized 
interest 
groups 
Political and 
administra-
tive elites, 
organized 
interest 
groups 
Centre-
link staff 
and gen-
eral pub-
lic 
Practitio-
ners and 
academics 
Department 
of Prime Min-
ister & Cabi-
net 
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The comparison of correspondence between the cultural political 
context and the cultural flavor of talk thus far would indicate that 
identifying the role of the cultural political and administrative con-
text in shaping agency talk is more complicated in the high group 
consensus cultures than in the low group adversarial context. This 
is because the lesser prominence of egalitarian themes than hierar-
chical themes in the high group contexts has the consequence that 
direct correspondence between the predominant political culture 
and cultural flavor talk was not found. Indeed turning the GGCT 
proposition of mutuality around it can be said that the prominence 
of the hierarchical flavor in Swedish accounts and in the Dutch 
case the mix of individualist and hierarchical flavors of agency talk 
would indicate that they have been produced in contexts that are 
respectively hierarchical and hierarchical/individualist. Such a find-
ing can be consistent with the diagnosis that Dutch and Swedish 
political cultures are highly egalitarian, if the political culture is dis-
tinguished from the culture of the rhetorical situations in which 
agency reforms have been constructed in these countries. Given 
their distance from the political sphere, it seems likely that the fo-
rums responsible for describing agency reforms in the high group 
consensus cultures vis a vis the low group adversarial contexts are 
more likely to exhibit a different cultural flavor than the political 
sphere. Indeed these egalitarian political cultures have previously 
been characterized as preferring more expert and thus hierarchical 
kinds of knowledge. In addition, the speaker would also appear to 
play a role in shaping the cultural flavor of talk. This was most ap-
parent when finance officials spoke since in even in high group 
consensus contexts this led to more individualist stories. In the 
Dutch case the character of the actual speaker, such as financial of-
ficials, provides an alternative explanation for the cultural flavor of 
talk than the individualist ratings of the political culture. It can be 
argued that individualist talk was more present in The Netherlands 
than Sweden, and obtained its most vivid business consultant fla-
vor in Verder met resultant primarily because of the extent of the 
dominance of financial officials. Nevertheless it can still be said 
that the Dutch high group cultural context has played a role in 
shaping agency talk to the extent that it has privileged financial ex-
perts to speak. As in Sweden, it has also still produced more group 
themes in its official accounts than the low group adversarial con-
text, Australia. 
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8.5 The rules exhibited by cultural themes: the role of sto-
ries 
 
The comparison of the rhetorical features of agency accounts has 
thus far focused upon similarities and differences at the national 
level of agency talk. This has revealed some distinctive national 
styles of speaking that were durable over time in the countries un-
der study. It has also been possible to identify ways of speaking 
that were typical of high group consensus contexts as compared to 
low grid adversarial contexts. While national styles of speaking can 
account for both similarities in agency talk across similar cultural 
and political administrative contexts and their differences to offi-
cial agency accounts in different cultural contexts, they cannot ac-
count for the similarities observed in official agency talk across dif-
ferent contexts. These may be explained by similarities in the rules 
of speaking at the level of cultural themes and stories. Similarities 
in the rhetorical features of the same culturally flavored stories 
across different contexts would suggest that it is the stories them-
selves, rather than context that has been responsible for shaping 
official agency accounts. The rules of telling culturally flavored sto-
ries will be assessed by comparing the ethos, pathos and logos of 
the different ways of life when they appeared in the official ac-
counts across the countries. It will also be assessed by analyzing 
how the rules of speaking changed when there were cultural shifts 
in official agency accounts. Such an analysis of the cultural stories 
provides the opportunity to assess Hood’s suggestions for the 
ethos, pathos and logos (see section 3.6, table 3.5) that are charac-
teristic of each way of life. These can be compared with the em-
pirical findings observed in the countries under study. Findings of 
particular rules of speaking that are consistent for the ways of life 
across the countries would contribute theoretically to GGCT. This 
is because uncovering such rules would refine existing classifica-
tions of the cultural ways of life. I have only focused upon the 
three active ways of life in this section. 
 
8.5.1 The individualist way of life and rules of speaking 
Individualist stories were defined in this study by such themes as 
striving for efficiency, the use of (financial) incentives and cost 
prices, the introduction of competition and a focus upon customer 
service. As was noted in section 8.2 some of these themes were 
observed across all countries, although most were observed in 
Australia with greater frequency over time. Individualist stories 
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tended to focus upon internal relationships within the administra-
tion or relationships between the administration and the external 
environment. It is noteworthy that when individualist stories ap-
peared in both The Netherlands and Sweden, the actual speakers 
delivering the accounts included a predominance of financial offi-
cials. In Australia, by contrast, individualist accounts were deliv-
ered by a range of different kinds of officials close to the political 
centre. There were some consistencies in the construction of the 
particular audience when telling individualist stories across the 
countries.  
When individualist stories appeared in Sweden and the Nether-
lands they included a particular audience of financial experts. 
Given the description of the ideal stories used in this study, it can 
be said that these kinds of speakers were actually hierarchical, even 
though they may have presented some individualist themes. In 
other words the ethos was hierarchical but pathos and logos may 
have been individualist. In Australia and The Netherlands there 
was also a particular audience of business consultants constructed 
when individualist stories were told.  
This business consultant ethos was observed in the documents 
Verder met resultaat and Three stages to a one stop shop, it exhibited an 
entirely different motivational tone to the other documents ana-
lyzed in The Netherlands. It was only in Australia that taxpayers, 
voters or customers were constructed as particular audiences to 
individualist accounts. In all the countries individualist stories also 
constructed a particular audience of managers and made some ref-
erence to their desire for different financial arrangements or best 
practice advice. Only in Australia was there some correlation be-
tween the construction of the universal audience and individualist 
themes, this entailed the construction of a universal audience 
committed to customer service. 
The pathos of individualist stories also exhibited some similari-
ties across the countries. In particular the locus of the unique was 
adopted in both The Netherlands and Australia to sensitize the 
audience to the individualist virtues of agency reform. Further-
more a very prominent self-help tone was used to motivate audi-
ences through catchy slogans like learning by doing and with self help 
tips for best practice. In Sweden the pathos of the threat to de-
mocracy, or rather the precarious, continued to characterize the 
argumentation of Swedish documents, even when individualist sto-
ries were being propounded. 
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The most striking similarity in individualist stories across all 
countries was the adoption of more arguments based upon the 
structure of reality. In Sweden and the Netherlands, this was most 
strongly exemplified in the documents Verder met resultaat and 
Regering myndigheterna en myndigheternas ledning, which both exhibited 
individualist themes. The argument of unlimited development was 
adopted in all countries to make individualist claims about agency 
reform attractive. This occurred when the speaker sought to con-
vince the audience that organizational changes such as Centrelink, 
or changes to the financial system and performance measures in 
The Netherlands and Sweden, would constitute a further step in 
the continuous improvement of these arrangements. Similarly, the 
causal link or pragmatic argument was consistently adopted to 
show that efficiency or effectiveness would be achieved by the in-
troduction of changes to agencies’ financial or organizational ar-
rangements. One exception to the observation that most individu-
alist stories always adopted similar logos based upon the structure 
of reality was the use of the quasi-logical arguments of definition 
and comparison to assess customer service in Sue Vardon’s ac-
count of Centrelink. 
Similar metaphors could also be observed across the countries 
when the individualist way of life appeared in official agency ac-
counts. In particular the term flexibility, as well as traveling meta-
phors about moving along a road, path or waterway were typical of 
individualist stories. In Sweden the term modernization was also used 
to make their individualist claims. While similar metaphors were 
adopted in all countries in order to accentuate the individualist 
possibilities of reform, they were far more encompassing in Aus-
tralia. Australian individualist stories included a whole series of in-
dividualistic metaphors such as the provision of personalized or tai-
lored customer service or the presentation of social security provi-
sion as having a brand. These kinds of metaphors made the associa-
tion of Centrelink with a business so intertwined that it was diffi-
cult to conceive of it as anything else. Finally, it should be noted 
that transparency was a metaphor used to support Australian indi-
vidualist stories about maintaining individual cost units in the as-
sessment of budget outcomes, although as we shall see below, it is 
used to support hierarchical arguments in the Dutch case about 
distinct organizational types. Transparency clearly has been given 
different meanings in these contexts. In table 8.16 the rhetorical 
features of the individualist stories across the countries are com-
pared with Hood’s suggestions. There is some correspondence be-
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tween the suggestions of Hood and the characteristics of the indi-
vidualist stories observed in this study. In particular the traveling 
metaphors can broadly be associated with the idea of public man-
agement as an individual skill since they invoke questions about 
how the traveler is to manage their form of transport, identify di-
rections and even short cuts. It is more difficult to identify corre-
spondence between an ethos where the speaker presents 
him/herself as a loner battling collective pressures. The typical way 
that the business consultant presented him/herself in Dutch and 
Australian accounts was through encouraging individual motiva-
tional, for example both speakers identified heroes of management 
and used catch cries like learning by doing. In my analysis of the 
documents I have identified a self-help ethos in the texts but Hood 
has identified this as pathos.  
 
Table 8.16. An overview and comparison of the rules of telling individualist sto-
ries across the countries 
 Hood The Neth-
erlands 
Sweden Australia 
Ethos Lonely 
figure bat-
tling the 
collective 
Financial ex-
pert 
(Hierarchi-
cal) 
Financial ex-
pert 
(Hierarchical) 
 
  Business 
consultant 
 Business con-
sultant 
  Managers Managers Managers 
Pathos Self help The unique The unique The precarious 
Logos  Continuous 
development 
Continuous 
development 
Continuous de-
velopment 
metaphors  Flexibility Flexibility Flexibility 
 Public 
manage-
ment as 
individual 
skill 
Rigging one’s 
sails 
Taking the 
path 
On the road 
 
 
8.5.2  The hierarchical way of life and rules of speaking 
Hierarchical stories were characterized by such themes as steering, 
planning, clear delineation of roles such as the separation between 
policy making and operations, and the application of formal rules. 
These stories tended to focus upon the relationship between the 
political and administrative sphere or upon the relationship with 
the external environment. Hierarchical stories appeared in the 
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Dutch documents Verder met beheer, Verantwoord verzelfstandigen, the 
Swedish documents Politisk styrning – administrativ självständighet, Re-
gering myndigheterna en myndighternas ledning, and in the Australian 
document Connecting Government. In all of these, except for Verder 
bouwen aan beheer where individualist arguments were also promi-
nent, the argumentation included some reference to the need for 
agency reforms in the context of broader problems of society such 
as complexity or specialization, or given broad political principles 
or goals such as the primacy of politics and the position of gov-
ernment in relation to society. In both The Netherlands and Swe-
den hierarchical stories appeared in all of the documents irrespec-
tive of the membership of the commissions speaking. They were 
more prominent in The Netherlands however when the Ministry 
of Home Affairs was responsible for the report and when experts 
from a range of ministries were represented. In Sweden they were 
most prominent when the commission was composed of politi-
cians while in Australia they were most prominent when groups of 
civil servants presented a report to their administrative superior, 
rather than the general public.   
The ethos of hierarchical stories revealed the construction of 
similar particular audiences of experts in The Netherlands and 
Sweden. These included an academic audience, financial experts, 
or experts on the organization of government. By contrast, the 
particular audience constructed for Australian hierarchical argu-
mentation was the politically superior office of the Department of 
Prime Minister and Cabinet. Hierarchical accounts featuring an 
elite expert audience were, in the most consistent and detailed 
ways, exhibited in the Swedish accounts with their long reports 
featuring extensive discussions of problem analysis, history of the 
administration, political theories and terminology. The ways of 
speaking in these reports and their very length did not make them 
accessible to a general public even though formally outside voices 
may be given opportunities to comment on the contents. The fo-
cus upon political history and theories can also be interpreted as 
concurring with the Swedish universal audience which was an au-
dience committed to democracy and the constitution.  
There was a tendency to adopt more quantitative loci when 
sensitizing the audience to hierarchical conceptions of agency re-
form across the countries. This was exemplified in the Dutch 
document Verantwoord Verzelfstandigen which relied solely upon 
quantitative loci to convince the audience that agencies were a su-
perior means to ensuring the primacy of politics and protecting minis-
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terial accountability. It was also evident in the Australian document 
Connecting Government which adopted the locus of the enduring 
when, in contrast to earlier accounts of Centrelink as unique, de-
scribed it as part of a “long standing Australian tradition”.  
The Swedish documents also provided a number of examples of 
more is better in their conditioning of the audience although they 
also used the locus of the precarious and timeliness to make their 
hierarchical arguments persuasive. Furthermore the premise that 
authorities such as the government, ministers or cabinet or de-
partment of finance would know how to steer or regulate agencies 
was a typical way that the audience was conditioned to believe that 
hierarchical solutions would be beneficial. 
The adoption of hierarchical themes and claims were generally 
accompanied in all countries with greater use of the quasi logical 
argumentative techniques. This even occurred in Australia where 
quasi logical argumentation was the exception. Especially in the 
Dutch and Swedish examples of hierarchical accounts it was typi-
cal of the speaker to present proposals for agency reform within a 
system of arrangements such as micro changes to the financial ar-
rangements while maintaining macro principles, or, ensuring that 
agency independence did not disturb the democratic chain of ac-
countability to the people within Sweden. These kinds of themes, 
which were described to justify steering of agencies, used the 
quasi-logical argument of the division of the whole into its parts. 
Definition and comparison were also used in these countries to 
show that formal rules had been applied such as constitutional 
laws in Sweden or the conditions for obtaining agency status in 
The Netherlands. In Australia, where quasi-logical argumentation 
was rare, definition and comparison was used to show whether 
principles of best practice had been applied in case studies in the 
document Connecting Government. There were some exceptions to 
the use of quasi-logical argumentation to make hierarchical claims, 
for example the argument that informal relationships could be 
used to clarify the intentions of politicians to administrators in 
Sweden was based upon reasonable belief. This is however an ex-
ceptional example in itself because informal relations were consid-
ered an egalitarian theme in this study, although it was used in hi-
erarchical ways in Sweden. For example to promote political con-
trol in Regering, myndigheterna och myndigheternas ledning and clearer 
lines of accountability in I medborgarnas tjänst. An overview and 
comparison of the rules of telling hierarchical stories across the 
countries is presented in table 8.17. 
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Table 8.17. An overview and comparison of the rules of telling hierarchical sto-
ries across the countries 
 Hood The Nether-
lands 
Sweden Australia 
Ethos Authority Financial ex-
pert 
Organizational 
expert 
Financial ex-
pert 
History ex-
pert 
Business con-
sultant 
(individualist) 
Pathos Teacher 
and pupils
More is better More is bet-
ter 
The enduring 
  The unique 
(individualist) 
Timeliness Timeliness 
   The precari-
ous 
 
Logos  Quasi logical Quasi logical More quasi 
logical 
  Steering Steering Integrate 
Connecting gov-
ernment 
 Public 
manage-
ment as a 
captained 
team 
game 
 Strong state Strong leaders 
(individualist) 
 
  Internal 
autonomization
Whole Whole 
  Command Balance Balance 
  Grip Sharpening Sharpening 
 
The metaphors used to make hierarchical themes and argu-
ments appealing across the countries also demonstrated similari-
ties. These included the use of the terms steering in Sweden and The 
Netherlands, the terms vertical accountability in The Netherlands 
and Australia, and the terms broad, sharp, strong, balance or imbalance 
and whole to describe relationships within the administration in 
Sweden and Australia.  In The Netherlands, distinctive metaphors 
to make hierarchical claims included autonomization, grip and trans-
parency. In contrast to the use of transparency to describe the (indi-
vidualist) relations between cost units in Australia, in the Dutch 
account transparency was used to describe clearly defined organ-
izational types such as ZBOs and agencies.  The most overtly hier-
archical and group metaphors appeared in Sweden and The Neth-
erlands with respectively terms such as the strong state, steering soci-
ety, and in the Dutch case getting command and grip of the admini-
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stration. There were few similar control metaphors identified in 
the Australian documents, the term steering never appeared and 
instead the speakers identified coordination and integration as im-
portant or the need for strong leaders. An emphasis upon leadership 
could also be consistent with the individualist way of life which 
features individual skill or advancement through competition (and 
skill).  
There was clear correspondence between Hood’s suggestion 
that the hierarchical speaker would present him/herself as an au-
thority and the expert speakers identified in The Netherlands and 
Sweden. Again it is more difficult to comment upon the corre-
spondence with the pathos of the teacher to a pupil and the em-
phasis upon quantitative loci identified in the hierarchical stories. 
The control metaphors however do encourage associations with 
Hood’s descriptions of hierarchical metaphors describing the need 
for a captain to steer the ship or rather team. 
 
8.5.3 The egalitarian way of life and rules of speaking 
Egalitarian themes and arguments were assessed in this study as 
emphasizing participation, mutuality and informal contacts, as well 
as highlighting a concern for deliberation and power structures. 
Hood has also identified democracy as a watchword in egalitarian 
stories. These characterizations presented some problems because, 
as was shown in the Swedish chapter, apparently egalitarian themes 
like democracy or informal contacts were often used to support 
hierarchical solutions such as more precise and detailed political 
steering (see section 8.5.2 above). Similarly collaboration was an 
important theme in the Australian document Connecting Government 
but this was secondary to (hierarchical) coordination. 
A second problem with assessing the rules of egalitarian stories 
has been their lack or only fleeting use across the countries. This 
provided only limited material for a comparative assessment, with 
most egalitarian themes appearing in the third Swedish document, 
I medborgarnas tjänst. Thirdly, there were some low grid and high 
group themes that could be consistent not only with egalitarianism 
but also the individualist or hierarchical way of life. At the conclu-
sion of this section I will briefly point to these cases.  
Egalitarian watchwords and themes were observed in the ethos 
of Dutch and Swedish accounts. The construction of the universal 
audiences in these countries alluded to egalitarian themes such as 
the commitment to consultation in The Netherlands and to de-
mocracy in Sweden. It has already been noted however that the 
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Swedish group commitment to democracy was ambiguous since it 
featured hierarchical solutions in two of the documents, such as 
greater political control. Nevertheless it can be argued that the 
Swedish speakers sought to attain credibility through the egalitar-
ian baggage of the term democracy. The durability of these fea-
tures in Dutch and Swedish accounts over time were ascribed to 
the national style of speaking in those countries. Changes in the 
construction of the particular audience, together with the adoption 
of egalitarian stories, also occurred in Sweden. In the document I 
medborgarnas tjänst, which featured the most egalitarian themes, the 
speaker adopted a more direct and informal style than in previous 
Swedish documents. The evidence to attain credibility was also 
composed of more interview material from managers than in pre-
vious Swedish documents.  
In Connecting Government, the Australian document with some 
egalitarian themes, group constructions of the audience were most 
apparent in some changes in the universal audience. In contrast to 
previous documents this included a commitment to solving diffi-
cult national policy problems such as national security, together 
with a commitment to customer service. Egalitarian themes were 
most prominent in Sweden when academics dominated commis-
sion membership. They appeared in all countries, including Austra-
lia, when groups were speaking. 
The sensitization of the audience to egalitarian stories relied 
primarily upon the premise of complexity in the policy environ-
ment in both Australian and Swedish documents. This fact was to 
move the audience to see the need for greater mutuality between 
agencies in the form of collaboration or more horizontal account-
ability. It was also the precursor to accepting group arguments, 
both egalitarian and hierarchical, that called for a greater focus 
upon the whole and for governance more generally. It is difficult to 
distinguish loci which were specific to egalitarian stories. This is 
because in Connecting Government the quantitative locus of the en-
during was used, which I have interpreted above as typical of a hi-
erarchical story, while in I medborgarnas tjänst it was the qualitative 
locus of the unique that was used to describe the distinctiveness of 
public sector tasks as opposed to private sector tasks. Both loci 
were adopted to promote collective traditions. In Sweden the pa-
thos typical of national styles of speaking had some egalitarian 
traits. This included the locus of the precarious, or threat to de-
mocracy, as well as the threat to democracy from growth of corpo-
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ratist or administrative power. A concern for power structures has 
been defined as typical of an egalitarian story.  
Egalitarian themes and watchwords in the logos of accounts 
were most clearly adopted in the form of blame upon past indi-
vidualist solutions. In both Sweden and Australia this occurred 
with the claim that the focus upon individual agency performance 
and accountability presented risks to collaboration and encouraged 
fragmentation. Egalitarian concerns for the citizen were observed 
in Sweden with the argument that greater independence for agen-
cies would enable citizens to have a greater influence upon policy 
outcomes (SOU, 1997:57, 22). Furthermore there was the egalitar-
ian argument that greater deliberation about the role of civil ser-
vants, rather than a code of conduct, would best encourage com-
mitment to a public service ethos. All of these claims were made 
using arguments based upon the structure of reality (the causal 
link). In table 8.18 a comparison of the rules of telling egalitarian 
stories across the countries is presented. 
 
Table. 8.18. An overview and comparison of the rules of telling egalitarian sto-
ries across the countries 
 Hood The Neth-
erlands 
Sweden Australia 
Ethos Member of 
persecuted 
solidaristic 
group 
Mediator 
(speaking 
partners) 
Expert with 
less formality 
(hierarchical) 
Business 
consultant 
(individualist) 
Pathos Outrage against 
abuse at the 
top 
 The precari-
ous (threat to 
democracy) 
The enduring 
Logos   Causal link Causal link 
Meta-
phors 
Public man-
agement as 
non-captained, 
non-
competitive 
group sport 
 Whole Whole 
   Organic 
metaphors 
eg. living 
conscious, 
watering  
Citizens be-
ing in touch 
with gov-
ernment 
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In addition metaphors were particularly important for such 
egalitarian claims. Indeed sometimes it was the metaphor alone 
that gave official accounts their egalitarian quality. Focusing upon 
horizontal relationships was a common theme to both I medborgarnas 
tjänst and Connecting Government, with the Swedish document em-
phasizing greater mutuality within the budget and the Australian 
document encouraging more communication across the higher 
echelons of departments. In Connecting Government there was some 
reference to citizen participation but this occurred in a cursory way 
through statements such as agency reforms enabling the citizen to 
have more access to and be more in touch with government ser-
vices.   
There was some consistency in the adoption of organic meta-
phors to accentuate the egalitarian quality of stories. This was evi-
dent in the metaphors adopted in I medborgarnas tjänst but is also 
apparent in the term whole which was used to promote egalitarian 
(and hierarchical) themes about mutuality. Examples of the way 
organic metaphors were used in egalitarian stories included argu-
ments about deliberation encouraging a living consciousness among 
public servants that their primary duty is to the citizen (SOU 
1997:57,147). There was also the visualization of the state as a tree 
and concern that a public service tradition was watering away with 
the introduction of more market like arrangements. Given the lack 
of national comparative material it is more difficult to associate 
these organic features with egalitarian stories as such, since these 
may also be ascribed to Swedish culture and landscape more gen-
erally (see Mels, 2000).  
Finally there were some low grid arguments concerning open-
ness and policy feedback. In both cases greater participation and 
more bottom up communication was encouraged. These themes 
may be consistent with both individualist and egalitarian stories. 
They concerned closed policy making circles in Sweden and policy 
makers learning from service delivering in Australia. They adopted 
arguments based upon the structure of reality.  
The ethos in egalitarian stories according to Hood, a member 
of a persecuted group, was not identified in this study. Instead the 
only construction of an audience that seemed to use egalitarian 
ideas to promote credibility was the emphasis upon speaking partners 
to attain the agreement of the Dutch universal audience. I have de-
scribed this ethos as a mediator. There was also some correlation 
between Hood’s description of egalitarian pathos as outrage at 
abuse at the top and the Swedish pathos the precarious. This was 
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because the precarious in Sweden was characterized by concerns 
about the threat to democracy from the growing influence of (cor-
poratist) interest groups and a specialist bureaucracy. The meta-
phor of the whole would seem to fit most neatly with Hood’s de-
scription of egalitarian metaphors encouraging a view of public 
management as a non-captained, non-competitive team sport.  
 
8.5.4 Shifts in cultural flavor and the rules of speaking 
Aside from focusing upon the rules of speaking at the level of cul-
tural stories, the shifts in cultural stories can also be used to pro-
vide evidence of consistent rhetorical features across countries 
when certain stories are being told. This is particularly important 
because while it is difficult to distinguish between the influence of 
context or story when cultural themes match context (eg. is quasi 
logical argumentation the consequence of story or context in high 
group countries?), shifts at the level of stories provide further evi-
dence of patterns in rhetorical features at the level of cultural sto-
ries themselves. In all countries there were changes in the extent to 
which certain stories were embraced over time. In Australia and 
Sweden, however, the shifts were more clearly towards a new cul-
tural commitment such as the arrival of hierarchy in Australian talk 
or the arrival of individualism in Swedish talk. In the Netherlands 
the shifts were more dramatic as was reflected in drastic changes in 
pathos or metaphors, but this occurred within the same existing 
mix of ways of life. It can be suggested that a shift in Dutch talk 
had already occurred in The Netherlands with the initial creation 
of agency reform because this represented a shift from past ZBO 
arrangements. The initial creation of agencies or rather internal 
autonomization was the Dutch equivalent of joining or connecting 
up government. 
In Australia the adoption of more hierarchical (and group) ar-
guments occurred together with the construction of a particular 
audience of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. There 
was the pathos of the enduring to describe Centrelink as opposed 
to the pathos of the unique in earlier documents. In addition there 
were more quasi-logical arguments than in previous Australian 
documents. The adoption of clearly hierarchical metaphors how-
ever was limited to references to vertical coordination and having 
strong leaders. Nevertheless as in Sweden the metaphor of the whole 
was adopted to promote the group themes in the document. These 
changes in the rhetoric were consistent with changes in emphasis 
towards more hierarchical argumentation in The Netherlands, 
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where this was also accompanied by more quantitative loci and 
more quasi-logical argumentation than the individualistic Dutch 
documents. In both Australia and Sweden the shift to more group 
arguments occurred together with similar pathos and logos about 
respectively complexity and the flaws of past individualist ar-
rangements. This shift echoed the changes in the international 
agency story, described in chapter 2, after a period of promoting 
individual performance and efficiency.  
In Sweden the shift to more individualist arguments occurred 
together with shifts in logos. The other rhetorical features of 
Swedish accounts, ethos and pathos, proved less variable when the 
story changed in the Swedish context than in the other countries 
under study. Nevertheless there was a clear shift towards more ar-
guments based upon the structure of reality when there were low 
grid arguments in Swedish documents. Most important of these 
were the adoption of the argument of unlimited development, 
traveling metaphors and the metaphor of flexibility when deliver-
ing individualist stories. Also in The Netherlands it was clear that 
the more individualist arguments were accompanied by more ar-
guments based upon the structure of reality and the pathos of 
unique. It was also evident that the individualist stories in the high 
group countries, like the initial construction of agency reform in 
the international community, emphasized autonomy as a solution 
together with the focus upon results.  
The similar patterns in the rhetorical features accompanying 
shifts in stories provide strong evidence that certain stories, not 
just context, shape official accounts of agency reform. It has been 
shown that individualistic stories featured financial speakers, the 
pathos of the unique, arguments based upon the structure of real-
ity and both traveling and business metaphors. By contrast, hierar-
chical stories featured more group speakers addressing political el-
ites, more quantitative pathos, quasi-logical argumentation and 
control metaphors. The metaphor of the whole was adopted to 
support both hierarchical and egalitarian themes. Patterns in egali-
tarian stories were difficult to identify in this study because of their 
lack. Nevertheless when they did appear it was evident that the 
metaphors were most important in promoting egalitarian ideas. 
These included organic metaphors. The patterns identified in cul-
turally flavored agency stories in this section were to some extent 
consistent with Hood’s suggestions of ethos, pathos and logos. In 
particular the metaphors fitted neatly with his descriptions of typi-
cal cultural characterizations of public management. The most cor-
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respondence was observed in his descriptions of typical ethos, pa-
thos and logos for hierarchical stories. The ethos and pathos that I 
have identified as typical of the favored stories of each way of life 
is an original contribution of this study. 
For the purpose of identifying the role of stories in shaping of-
ficial agency accounts, the likeness in the themes characterizing in-
dividualist stories was most significant. The high group consensus 
countries in particular were exceptional in their emulation of the 
initial accounts of agency reform in the international community. 
These were already described in chapter 2. Similarly the adoption 
of more group themes in the low group adversarial context, as well 
as the later Swedish document, mimicked the shift towards agency 
and management autonomy as a problem. To this extent the iden-
tification of similar cultural stories across different cultural political 
administrative contexts can be attributed to the spread of interna-
tional stories to national contexts.  
 
8.6 Translating agency reform: the interaction between cul-
tural context and the rules of telling culturally flavored 
stories 
 
The analysis of the preceding sections indicated that both the cul-
tural political and administrative context, as well as certain cultur-
ally flavored stories, have contributed to the construction of offi-
cial agency accounts. Indeed, it can be argued that they have inter-
acted to produce three quite different national accounts of agency 
reform. The cultural flavor of the national official accounts under 
study also changed over time, but within the limits of a broader na-
tional style of speaking. It is now possible to discuss how the in-
fluence of the cultural political and administrative context has in-
teracted with certain cultural stories to produce three distinct tales 
about agency reform. Most significantly it can be shown that dif-
ferent official accounts were constructed because different cultur-
ally flavored stories were adopted to different degrees across the 
countries. The high group consensus contexts embraced individu-
alist stories to a lesser degree than the low group adversarial con-
text, while the low group adversarial context embraced group sto-
ries to a lesser degree than the high group consensus contexts. 
This was primarily reflected in the number of cultural themes 
adopted and the nature of the metaphors across the countries. The 
notion that change in talk was tempered by consistent cultural 
preferences over time was most strongly reflected in the universal 
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audiences which remained the same in almost all the documents in 
all countries, with the exception of the most individualistic Dutch 
document Verder met resultaat. It has already been shown that this 
ethos was primarily hierarchical (rather than egalitarian) in the high 
group consensus contexts, and individualistic in the low group ad-
versarial context. By contrast, the pathos and logos of talk was 
subject to greater variation. These rhetorical features were most 
sensitive to the influence of different cultural stories.  
Irrespective of the mix of cultural flavors exhibited in the na-
tional official accounts, it was shown that some continuity in talk 
always remained. This was reflected in the national styles of speaking 
in each of the countries. Expert speakers, quasi logical argumenta-
tion and control metaphors were most typical of the high group 
consensus, while an informal speaker, arguments based upon the 
structure of reality and business metaphors were most typical of 
the low group adversarial context. In both Sweden and Australia 
typical national pathos were also identified over time such as the 
pathos of the precarious in Sweden and the pathos of the chal-
lenge in Australia. The Dutch had the least consistent national style 
with dramatic changes in their pathos and metaphors occurring to-
gether with shifts in both the speaker and emphasis upon different 
culturally flavor of stories. It can be said that the Dutch accounts 
were most sensitive to changes affected by stories. This was re-
flected in their ability to shift from the locus of the unique to 
purely quantitative loci, and from strong control metaphors like 
command and grip, to strong business metaphors. It was also evident 
in shifts in the particular audience from experts to an audience of 
business consultants. The national styles of speaking across the 
countries were shown to correspond to the high group cultures of 
The Netherlands and Sweden, and the low group culture of Aus-
tralia.  
To the degree that national styles of speaking existed in the dif-
ferent countries, these acted to temper the influence of culturally 
flavored stories on official agency accounts. More specifically they 
tempered the adoption of internationally fashionable stories of 
agency reform. Since national style reflected the cultural character 
of the context/rhetorical situation, its tempering influence can be 
interpreted as the cultural context setting the limits of cultural 
shifts. This was most clearly observed in Sweden and Australia. In 
the comparison of the adoption of culturally flavored stories above 
(section 8.5), it was shown that individualist stories were adopted 
least in Sweden and in the most salient ways in Australia. Swedish 
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individualist accounts never adopted the themes of individual fi-
nancial incentives or competition, the locus of the unique was not 
used to promote individualist stories, and their particular audiences 
remained (hierarchical) experts. The egalitarian pathos of the pre-
carious remained in Swedish accounts, even when individualist sto-
ries were told. By contrast, Australian individualist stories exhibited 
vivid business metaphors to the extent that it was sometimes diffi-
cult to conceive of their agency arrangements as anything other 
than a business. The opposite was true when high group stories 
were adopted in low group Australia. Australian officials never 
adopted the same control metaphors as in the other high group 
countries and the speaker maintained an informal style. While 
there was more quasi-logical argumentation when hierarchical sto-
ries were told, these never exceeded Australian arguments based 
upon the structure of reality. There was a shift towards the locus 
of the enduring, but it was accompanied by the more durable locus 
of the challenge. The Dutch case also conformed to this pattern of 
group culture setting the limits in agency talk. While its embrace of 
individualist stories exceeded Sweden it was still more subdued 
than the Australian case. When it exhibited high group stories 
these were also more intense than in the Australian case although 
it was significant that Dutch accounts never adopted the group 
metaphor of the whole. Instead it can be argued that Dutch used 
the term internal autonomization to counter more fragmented ar-
rangements such as ZBOs. 
The Dutch case also highlighted another, to some extent alter-
native, influence upon the interaction between context and story. 
This was the influence of the actual speaker upon the degree to 
which certain cultural stories were adopted. In the Dutch case it 
became most evident that the cultural flavors of the stories em-
braced changed quite dramatically with the speaker. In particular, 
the commitment to individualist stories was strengthened when fi-
nancial officials delivered agency accounts. The most poignant ex-
ample of their influence was exhibited in the evaluation document 
Verder met resultaat, which presented an agency account that even 
echoed the user friendly self help style characteristic of Australian 
talk. The preference of financial officials for individualist stories 
was also exhibited in Swedish accounts which only exhibited indi-
vidualist themes when financial officials were represented on the 
commission. This would indicate that financial officials have been 
responsible for spreading the individualist story to the high group 
consensus contexts. Indeed they achieved the greatest convergence 
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in story across high group contexts with low group contexts, or 
rather between Northern European countries and an Anglo – 
Saxon country, which was observed in this study. Given the re-
semblance of their story with early accounts of agency reform in 
the international community, it can be said that it has been finan-
cial officials that have linked national accounts with an individual-
istic international fashion. This still does not discount that indi-
vidualist stories were adopted to a lesser degree than in Australia 
and high group stories to a greater degree than in Australia. It does 
indicate however that it is not just cultural contexts that have their 
favored stories but also actual speakers. On the one hand the 
speaker is a contextual influence because they have been privileged 
to speak within a certain cultural political and administrative con-
stellation, but on the other hand it is also correlated with certain 
stories because of speaker preferences. They therefore facilitate the 
interaction between (international) stories and context. 
The adoption of other cultural stories was also shown to be as-
sociated with changes in speakers or the rhetorical situations, al-
though the same degree of convergence in cultural stories as oc-
curred with the individualist story was never achieved. It was 
noteworthy for example that high group stories, and particularly 
the hierarchical story, appeared when group speakers were respon-
sible for the accounts in all countries. Even in Australia, where 
change in speaker affected the story the least because of the close-
ness of all speakers to the political sphere, the shift to more hierar-
chical themes occurred when it was a group speaker addressing a 
political elite, rather than individuals addressing the public. In The 
Netherlands the shift to a hierarchical story occurred together with 
the Department of Home Affairs being responsible for the agency 
account, while in Sweden the dominance of academic speakers oc-
curred together with more egalitarian themes. All of these observa-
tions would strengthen the argument that speakers also have fa-
vored stories that are not always consistent with the broader cul-
tural political context. Indeed it was argued that the greater dis-
tance of the speakers from the political sphere in the high group 
consensus contexts exacerbated the likeliness of adopting cultural 
stories distinct from the political sphere. The identification of a 
role for the speaker, or rhetorical situation, in shaping official ac-
counts of agency reforms raises a challenge to claims that it is pri-
marily the reactions to stories that are responsible for changes in 
public management arguments (Hood, 2000:11).  This study would 
suggest that a shift in cultural stories, even those corresponding to 
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international fashion are dependent upon the preferences of the 
speaker. In addition, it can be suggested that the likeliness of 
adopting internationally fashionable stories is increased when the 
speakers, as can be argued for financial officials, are part of a pro-
fessional network active within the international discourse com-
munity. 
 
8.7 Conclusion 
 
This comparative chapter has fulfilled a number of functions. It 
has enabled an assessment of the convergence in official agency 
talk across countries, it has provided the opportunity to evaluate 
the rhetorical features of cultural stories in empirical cases, and 
most importantly it has become possible to assess the role of the 
cultural political and administrative context and/or story in shap-
ing official agency accounts. It has been shown that while there are 
significant differences in the official talk in all countries, patterns in 
the similarities and differences across high group consensus con-
texts versus low group adversarial contexts would indicate that the 
cultural context plays an important role in determining the kinds of 
accounts that are constructed. This was reflected in the expert 
ethos and logos in the high group consensus contexts and the 
more informal argumentative features of the low group adversarial 
context. Group themes and metaphors were more prominent in 
the agency stories of the high group consensus contexts, while in-
dividualist themes and metaphors were more prominent in the sto-
ries of the low group adversarial context. It has however been the 
hierarchical, rather than egalitarian flavor of high group, which was 
most central to the construction of talk in the high group consen-
sus contexts. This was, among other things, also reflected in the 
hierarchical nature of their universal audiences. I have suggested 
that the hierarchical culture, rather than the egalitarian has been 
more characteristic of the rhetorical situations in which agency re-
form was constructed in the high group consensus contexts.  
The distance of the forums and speakers from the political 
sphere in the high group consensus countries reduced the rele-
vance of the predominant (egalitarian) political culture, in explain-
ing the cultural flavor of talk. Instead the relevance of the pre-
dominant egalitarian culture was expressed through privileging 
groups of (hierarchical) expert speakers that produced reports with 
a scientific flavor. This is functional to consensus politics. By con-
trast, in the low group adversarial context Australia, a direct rela-
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tionship was found between the individualist cultural political con-
text and the cultural flavor of talk. This was facilitated by privileg-
ing speakers that were close to the political sphere. In addition, the 
short chains of reasoning exhibited in the low group adversarial 
context can be argued to facilitate competition in this context. 
Aside from their closeness to the political sphere, the character of 
the speaker has also been important in determining the cultural 
flavor of talk. In particular, when finance officials spoke in high 
group consensus contexts, they brought with them more individu-
alist stories. This is a contextual variable to the extent that within 
the existing cultural and political administrative constellation, these 
speakers were privileged to speak. At the same time, it has also 
been argued that speakers have their own favored stories and, to 
this extent, provide an opportunity for certain cultural stories, 
rather than cultural context, to influence official talk. Indeed it has 
been found that not only context but also certain stories have 
acted to shape official agency accounts. The identification of the 
particular rhetorical features of culturally flavored agency stories 
has been a original contribution of this study. It verified some of 
Hood’s descriptions of the typical rhetorical features of the ways 
of life, in particular his description of the hierarchical way of life.  
The most convergence in official agency talk occurred with the 
adoption of similar individualist stories across all countries. To a 
lesser extent there were also similar group stories across different 
contexts. When individualist stories were told in all countries they 
were characterized by the same argumentative techniques such as 
the argument of unlimited development, the metaphor of flexibil-
ity and traveling metaphors. In Australia and The Netherlands 
convergence of individualist stories was also exhibited by the con-
struction of the same business consulting audience and the pathos 
of the unique. When group stories were told in all countries they 
were characterized by more quantitative pathos and quasi-logical 
argumentation. In Australia and Sweden convergence of group 
stories were characterized by the premise of complexity and similar 
metaphors of the whole, sharpening and balancing. When such conver-
gence across different contexts occurred it reflected shifts ob-
served in the broader international community. As discussed in 
chapter 2 initial international solutions characterized by more 
autonomy, results and business performance were replaced by 
concerns about fragmentation and the whole. Nevertheless the de-
gree to which different cultural flavors were adopted across the 
countries was tempered by the political administrative culture. In-
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dividualist stories were adopted to a lesser degree in the high group 
consensus cultures than the low group adversarial culture, while 
group stories were adopted to a lesser degree in the low group ad-
versarial culture than the high group consensus cultures. Australia 
and Sweden provided the most extreme examples in this regard as 
exhibited by their respectively more salient individualist and group 
metaphors. The Netherlands was extreme in the adoption of con-
trasting cultural stories. It is difficult to know whether to attribute 
this to its higher individualism than in Sweden or to the predomi-
nance and shifts in certain speakers. I have attributed it to the ca-
pacity of finance officials to (sometimes) dominate agency talk in 
The Netherlands. 
A final observation to make about the convergence in talk 
across all of the countries is that it has always occurred within a 
different discursive network of statements and a different rhetori-
cal situation. There was also a national style of speaking which was 
distinct to each country, whether it was a preference for the meta-
phor of autonomization in The Netherlands or durable pathos in 
Sweden and Australia. These different contextual circumstances 
have the consequence that while similar rhetorical features and la-
bels may be observed across countries, such as the metaphor of 
the whole or transparent or the term accountability, there is always a 
great probability that they will not attain the same meanings. The 
variations in both the institutional and discursive contexts have the 
consequence that despite some convergence in talk, there will not 
always be convergence in meaning. 
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 9 Conclusion 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This study has focused upon the official accounts of agency re-
form, explanations for these accounts, and the extent to which 
convergence in official agency talk can be observed. It has been 
shown that while there is some evidence for convergence in na-
tional agency talk, the differences in The Netherlands, Sweden and 
Australia are substantial and significant. Among some of the most 
important differences in the official accounts between high-group 
consensus cultures and the individualist-adversarial culture have 
been features of the national styles of speaking and the degree to 
which different culturally tinted stories were embraced.  
In the high group consensus cultures the replication of scien-
tific evidence was important in obtaining credibility with the audi-
ence, as was the use of political ideals to construct the universal 
audience. Quasi-logical argumentation or formal reasoning was a 
durable feature of the argumentative techniques used in official 
documents. Alternatively in the low grid adversarial culture, Aus-
tralia, credibility was obtained by addressing the audience in a 
more informal, uncomplicated way and private values such as cus-
tomer service were used to obtain universal agreement. Short 
chains of deductive reasoning as revealed by the consistent use of 
arguments based upon the structure of reality were adopted.  
These similarities in the national styles of speaking among high 
group consensus cultures and differences from the low group ad-
versarial culture have been ascribed to the cultural character and 
political administrative context of the different countries. More 
egalitarian and hierarchical watchwords and themes were adopted 
in the high group consensus cultures over time, while more indi-
vidualist watchwords and themes were adopted in the low grid ad-
versarial culture.  
There were also some significant differences between the two 
high group consensus cultures in this study. In particular, The 
Netherlands had a greater tendency to embrace individualist 
themes and in general had the least consistent national style. As in 
Australia but unlike Sweden, Dutch officials constructed a particu-
lar audience of business consultants and sometimes adopted the 
pathos of the unique to promote their agency reforms. There are 
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two ways to interpret this finding. First, these more individualist 
themes and styles in The Netherlands can be ascribed to the higher 
degree of individualism within the Dutch culture and political ad-
ministrative system compared to Sweden. Alongside group watch-
words and metaphors as speaking partners and grip, the appearance 
of individualist story lines in Dutch official accounts reflects the 
more heterogeneous political administrative culture in The Nether-
lands. Alternatively, the heterogeneity in Dutch official accounts 
can be ascribed to the different kinds of official speakers (Ministry 
of Home Affairs and Ministry of Finance) that were privileged to 
speak about Dutch agency reform. According to this interpretation 
individualist stories were more prominent in Dutch official ac-
counts because of the dominant role that the Ministry of Finance 
played in both designing and presenting agency reforms in The 
Netherlands compared to Sweden. Indeed in both countries indi-
vidualist stories have appeared when finance experts were mem-
bers of the commissions speaking. In The Netherlands however 
there have been more opportunities for finance experts to domi-
nate official accounts because of the rhetorical situation in which 
agency reform has been constructed. Departmental reports in The 
Netherlands have been more dominated by financial officials than 
the commission system in Sweden.  
The finding that some convergence was observed in official 
agency talk across all countries, irrespective of cultural political and 
administrative context, would suggest that an international agency 
story has to a degree traveled independent of context. This consis-
tent story across time and space was characterized by the use of 
the argument of unlimited development when describing individu-
alist themes and solutions, as well as similar metaphors such as 
flexibility. In both high group consensus cultures such stories only 
appeared when finance officials played a direct role in delivering 
official accounts. They have been the carriers of individualist rules 
of speaking about agency reform in The Netherlands and Sweden 
and have been responsible for translating the international story 
about the agency fashion to official accounts within these national 
contexts. More generally, the different particular audiences within 
each country also revealed that the actual speaker presenting offi-
cial accounts was important in the construction of agency reforms 
in official accounts. The actual speaker played a central role in de-
termining the kind of interaction that took place between contex-
tual influences and the rules of telling stories in the different na-
tional accounts. They were responsible for linking certain stories 
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with the contextual features in which they presented agency re-
form. 
In this concluding chapter I will return to the central focus and 
findings of this study followed by a more direct response to the re-
search question. Then in section 9.3 I will evaluate the theories 
adopted and their strengths and weaknesses in analyzing and ex-
plaining official agency rhetoric. Some suggestions for further re-
search will be made. This will be followed by a more general 
reflection upon the rhetoric produced about agency reform in the 
different countries. Rhetorical analysis can provide insights into 
the kind of knowledge that has been deemed acceptable by policy 
makers and can be used for assessing the state of official public 
administration knowledge. Finally in section 9.4 I will make a final 
comment about the findings in this study and the possibilities that 
they suggest for convergence in official public management talk 
and its meaning.  
 
9.2 The research, central findings and research question 
 
This research has sought to examine the kinds of official accounts 
that have been produced about agency reform in different cultural 
political and administrative contexts and the reasons for similarities 
and differences in national agency reform talk. It has considered 
two explanations for official agency accounts, the cultural and po-
litical administrative context, and the rhetoric, or rather, rules of 
telling different kinds of stories. With regard to the cultural/ po-
litical/ administrative context, my analysis sought to identify the 
extent to which diagnoses of national political culture could ex-
plain the character of official accounts about agency reform. This 
assumed that if a context had been diagnosed as high group, the 
kinds of themes and arguments that would be used to describe 
agency reform would also be high group. Throughout this study I 
have also included an account of the political administrative system 
together with a description of cultural character to describe the 
scenes of use in which official accounts were produced. This was be-
cause according to GGCT the kinds of social relationships or 
modes of organizing present in different political and administra-
tive contexts reflect the prevailing cultural configuration, them-
selves even cultivating or reinforcing particular cultural biases. The 
design of this research also provides an opportunity to check the 
extent to which diagnoses of national political culture can apply at 
the level of the administrative context and to talk.  
 414
At different times throughout my analysis I have tried to show 
how different kinds of structural features within the political and 
administrative context correspond to the political cultural character 
of different contexts. In particular, it was noted that in the coun-
tries with the highest group (egalitarian and hierarchy) ratings, The 
Netherlands and Sweden, there were also consensus democracies 
where mutuality across parties and actors in political decision-
making was characteristic of the system. In Australia where indi-
vidualism is rated the highest, there was also an adversarial system 
whose primary mode of operation is competition between parties. 
Showing the relationship between the political administrative 
structures and cultural character was difficult, however, and not 
always possible. I have nevertheless remained open to the scale 
claim that existing administrative relationships will reflect the pre-
vailing cultural biases in the broader political context. 
A second explanation for the kinds of official accounts pro-
duced has been the identification of regularities in the stories 
themselves or rather the extent to which an international fashion 
can be observed in the stories being told. It was suggested in the 
introduction to this study that stories tend to have a life of their 
own and may be able to travel independently of context. In this 
study such an explanation was assessed by the degree to which 
similar rules of speaking were observed across the countries exam-
ined and the extent to which the same kind of pendulum swings 
occurred in official accounts. It was shown in chapter 8 that de-
pending upon the cultural bias of the stories and themes being 
enunciated, there were certain regularities in the rhetorical features 
of the story being told, and in particular in their pathos and logos. 
This explanation becomes difficult to substantiate, however, when 
cultural scenes of use and the cultural bias of the story match, 
since the rules of speaking can be understood as a consequence of 
the scenes of use which have enabled such a culturally biased story 
to be told.  
As I have tried to demonstrate in the previous chapter, how-
ever, it is possible to conceive of an interaction between the rules at 
the level of the story and the national styles of speaking that charac-
terize different cultural political and administrative contexts. In-
deed, I have shown in the previous chapter that both explanations 
play a role in accounting for the kind of official accounts that have 
been made about agency reform in the countries under study. The 
interaction between these explanations depends upon the position 
of the speaker within the political administrative context, the pos-
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sibilities that institutional arrangements permit to them to domi-
nate the story being told and deploy their own favored stories. The 
closer the speaker is to the political sphere the more likely that his 
or her official account will correspond with the diagnosis of politi-
cal culture. The central role that the speaker plays in influencing 
the interaction between story and context was reflected in the 
variations observed in the ethos of official accounts in each country 
(see section 8.3). 
Against the background of these two rationales, the role of con-
text or story in determining official accounts about agency reform, 
it is now possible to identify some of the main findings of this re-
search. Firstly, high group cultures with consensus democracies 
such as the Netherlands and Sweden were shown to privilege 
groups of expert speakers to give the official descriptions of 
agency reform in detailed reports. Their reports were in most cases 
also prepared for elite audiences such as political, administrative 
and corporate elites in Sweden or for department heads or finan-
cial officials, cabinet and parliamentary expert committees in The 
Netherlands. In both countries it was found that quasi-logical 
techniques were a preferred way of convincing their audiences, al-
though The Netherlands showed a greater propensity than Sweden 
to use techniques based upon the structure of reality. Some impor-
tant reasons for this differences have been identified, not least the 
higher individualism in the Dutch context and the dominance of 
Dutch financial speakers, which will be discussed further below.  
By contrast, low grid cultures with majority based or adversarial 
systems such as Australia (highest in this study on individualism), 
were, at least in the case of Centrelink, shown to privilege individ-
ual speakers. The speakers in this culture tended to be closer to 
political power, whether it was the Prime Minister himself, or 
speakers required to report to the Department of Prime Minister 
and Cabinet. These speakers always included references to audi-
ences external to the political system and in particular voters or 
customers. This occurred even in official administrative reports 
and not only in the speeches examined. They favored argumenta-
tive techniques based upon the structure of reality to promote their 
agency reforms. These observations indicate that that the political 
and administrative context, together with the kind of speakers they 
privileged, had implications for the kind of accounts that were 
produced about agency reform. The influence of contextual fea-
tures was observed in the national styles of speaking. Group con-
sensus cultures, privileging expert committees at a distance from 
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political power, favored a more expert/quasi logical description of 
the reforms, while low grid adversarial cultures gave more possi-
bilities for individual speakers close to political power, who in turn 
favored argumentative techniques based upon the structure of real-
ity or reasonable belief. 
Secondly, this study has provided findings about the corre-
spondence between the cultural, political and administrative con-
text and the cultural flavor observed in the official accounts about 
agency reform. Australia in particular provided the clearest exam-
ple of a correspondence between diagnoses of the political culture 
and the cultural tint of agency reform stories. Consistent with its 
highly individualist culture, Australian official agency accounts ex-
hibited a strong commitment to individualist themes over time. 
The pathos of the difficult (challenge) and a universal audience 
committed to customer service appeared repeatedly in Australian 
accounts and illustrated its individualist style. There were also cor-
respondences between the diagnoses of the Swedish cultural politi-
cal and administrative context and official accounts, but the rela-
tionship was less clearly one - dimensional. If taken as a high 
group (egalitarian and hierarchical) culture, it can be argued that a 
strong correspondence was found between the political culture and 
the official rhetoric. In particular the pathos of the precarious - the 
threat to democracy- and the metaphor of the whole were consis-
tent features of the national style of speaking over time and reflect 
egalitarian/high group preferences. The commitment to democ-
racy in Swedish accounts, however, was more ambiguous. It was 
sometimes used to support hierarchical themes and at other times 
egalitarian themes. In general, it was also hierarchical stories that 
were more consistently adopted over time in official Swedish ac-
counts despite its stronger egalitarian ratings. This may suggest 
that Swedish political culture has been more hierarchical than pre-
viously thought or that there is a difference between the broader 
Swedish political culture and the culture at the administrative level 
at which agency reforms have been initiated and discussed. The lo-
cation of the commission system at a distance from the political 
sphere and its characterization as an independent advisory body 
support the latter explanation of a difference in the cultural charac-
ter between the two spheres.  
The Netherlands has been the most exceptional case in this 
study. Only cursory correspondence has been found between its 
apparently strong egalitarian culture and the cultural character of 
official accounts of agency reform. Group metaphors more gener-
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ally were also less prominent over time in The Netherlands com-
pared to Sweden and the metaphor of the whole never appeared in 
official accounts. Instead Dutch accounts were consistently indi-
vidualist and hierarchical, with one or other of these ways of life 
being most prominent in each of the documents examined. In-
deed, contrasting pathos such as more is better (quantitative loci) 
or the unique (qualitative locus) were observed together with 
changes in the documents, the cultural character of the stories and 
the speakers. This has made it more difficult to identify a typical 
Dutch national style of speaking, aside from a strong preference 
for quasi-logical argumentation and some commitment to scientific 
rationales within ethos. There are a number of explanations for 
this apparent lack of correspondence between official talk and na-
tional political and administrative culture, some of which tend to 
reinforce one another. Firstly, while the Dutch, like the Swedes, 
were diagnosed as high group, they were rated higher on individu-
alism (low grid). This lends them a more paradoxical cultural char-
acter than observed in Sweden, which is undoubtedly reinforced 
by the structural features of the Dutch political administrative con-
text such as its highly fragmented character. In such a context ex-
treme contrasts in official accounts of agency reform are hardly 
surprising.  
Secondly, the location of Dutch speakers within different parts 
of this fragmented system, such as the Ministry of Finance and 
Home Affairs, also provides an explanation as to why there were 
contrasts in the official accounts. When Finance spoke there was 
greater emphasis upon individualist themes and arguments while 
the Home Affairs publication focused more upon hierarchical 
themes and arguments. Given their responsibility for coordination 
within the administration, and in the case of Finance, for financial 
resources, both speakers are arguably more inclined to adopt indi-
vidualist and hierarchical themes. This does not necessitate that 
egalitarianism is not prominent in the broader political administra-
tive system, but rather that it has not been a feature of the smaller 
and closed discourse community at the administrative level at 
which Dutch agency reforms have been described.   
Thirdly, compared to the location of the speakers in the other 
countries, the Dutch speakers were composed almost solely of civil 
servants and most firmly situated as internal to the administration. 
They were primarily addressing parliamentary financial commit-
tees, as well as other departments, and were therefore solely con-
cerned with themes about the internal organization of the admini-
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stration. This is different to Australia where the speakers were ar-
guably closer to political power and always addressing a broader 
audience of voters or to Sweden where an independent commis-
sion was to provide a broad account of administrative problems to 
the government, parliament and agency community. Since the di-
agnoses of political administrative culture used in this study have 
been derived from citizen’s attitudes and arguably reflect a broader 
or higher level of analysis than the rhetorical situation observed in 
the Dutch case, it is also not surprising that correspondence be-
tween national political culture and the cultural flavor of stories 
was not observed. This does however refute grander claims made 
by GGC theorists about the applicability of the same cultural 
mixes to different levels within a social system. By contrast, the 
greater external orientation of the rhetoric in the other countries 
was more applicable to the diagnosis of the cultural political and 
administrative context at a broader level and through citizen’s atti-
tudes. Given the most prominent cultural character (hierarchi-
cal/individualist) of Dutch official accounts it can be said that 
Dutch agency reforms were constructed within a rhetorical situa-
tion that was hierarchical and individualist. As in Sweden where 
differences were also observed between the political culture and 
cultural accounts produced within the administration, the lack or 
limited presence of egalitarian themes and arguments does not dis-
count the stronger presence of an egalitarian culture elsewhere in 
the political and administrative context. Nonetheless it is still re-
markable that the universal audiences in both high group consen-
sus countries were characterized by hierarchical tints in their de-
scriptions of ministerial accountability and democracy. 
It is notable that in both high group consensus countries there 
were greater differences found between the cultural style of official 
rhetoric and the characterizations of cultural political and adminis-
trative context. This can be ascribed to the greater distance be-
tween the speakers in the administration sphere from the political 
arena in these countries and the more politicized character of the 
administrative sphere in Australia. In addition, as noted above the 
infiltration of individualist themes and arguments in the high 
group consensus cultures can be ascribed to the inclusion of finan-
cial experts within the expert committees speaking about agency 
reform in The Netherlands and Sweden. Aside from its stronger 
individualist culture, the greater opportunity that the rhetorical 
situation presented to Dutch finance officials in their own depart-
mental reports, together with the greater individualist orientation 
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of the finance profession can account for the greater penetration 
of individualist stories in Dutch official agency accounts than 
Swedish accounts. Finally, although not thoroughly investigated in 
this study, it can be suggested that the dominant Dutch speaker, 
finance officials, have been more active and embedded within the 
international discourse community of agency reformers, than the 
speakers in the other countries. This would increase the likeliness 
of producing reform stories that were different to the broader po-
litical culture.  
A third finding in this study has been that it is not only political 
administrative culture as reflected in national styles of speaking and 
themes about agencies that can account for the official stories, but 
also the rules of speaking at the level of the culturally tinted stories 
themselves. This was reflected primarily in the pathos and logos 
that were exhibited when different cultural themes were adopted 
across the countries, and in some of the shifts that could be ob-
served in agency stories themselves. It was shown that when cer-
tain kinds of themes and arguments were espoused across all of 
the countries, in particular individualist or hierarchical stories, they 
exhibited some similar rules of speaking such as the argument of 
unlimited development (individualist) or the metaphor of the whole 
(high group). More generally, individualist stories exhibited more 
arguments based upon the structure of reality while hierarchical 
stories exhibited more quasi-logical argumentation. Other regulari-
ties that were observed in the cultural stories included the appor-
tioning of blame upon past (individualist) stories, such as 
coordination, in order to justify new cultural (hierarchical) ways of 
life. The observation of similar shifts in such culturally different 
contexts as Australia and Sweden would indicate that these shifts 
are a property of the stories themselves, rather than the cultural 
context. They can be interpreted as evidence of a similar 
international agency story that has been imported to different 
contexts in order to construct national official accounts of agency 
reform. As was shown in the adoption of individualist stories 
however the degree to which pendulum swings in talk occurred 
was not only dependent upon cultural context, but also the 
speaker. A fourth finding is, however, that while there is some evidence 
to indicate that the cultural character of official accounts were in-
fluenced by the (international) rhetorical rules of speaking about 
certain themes, these were never entirely autonomous and always 
interacted with influences from the national cultural context and 
national styles of speaking. The different cultural stories did not 
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just travel intact but were translated to the national contexts (see 
Sahlin-Anderson, 1996, 2001; Smullen, 2003b). This was most 
clearly illustrated in Australia and Sweden where shifts in the cul-
tural bias of stories, or rather pendulum swings, were limited by 
the national political and administrative culture. In the more indi-
vidualistic Australian political administrative culture this was ob-
served in a voracious embrace of individualist themes and stories, 
with only a limited shift in more recent times to a group focus 
upon the whole. It was also noted in the more prominent presence 
of arguments based upon the structure of reality despite shifts to 
more hierarchical argumentation, although more quasi-logical ar-
guments were adopted than in previous documents. Despite more 
hierarchically tinted themes and arguments in recent Australian ac-
counts, the universal audience continued to be constructed in the 
same way and remained committed to individualist themes such as 
customer service or the pathos of the difficult (challenge). The 
shift to more group themes and arguments did not disrupt national 
cultural commitments to a more individualist style. Similarly in 
Sweden, where a strong group culture was diagnosed, the embrace 
of individualist themes and arguments were rather limited in 
agency rhetoric, while the shift to more group themes and argu-
ments was much stronger. For example when describing individu-
alist themes and arguments the pathos of the unique was never 
adopted in Sweden as in the other countries, while the threat to 
democracy (egalitarian/group pathos) remained a consistent pres-
ence in official accounts. The stronger presence of quasi-logical ar-
gumentation also remained over time despite shifts in the cultural 
tint of official accounts. Finally, the construction of the universal 
audience committed to democracy also persisted over time irre-
spective of shifts in the cultural tint of official accounts. While 
pendulum swings were not really observed in the documents ana-
lyzed for the Dutch case in this study, the different emphases 
given to different cultural themes, were still always accompanied 
by a commitment to an expert scientific audience, even in the most 
individualist document Verder met resultaat. Similarly, quasi-logical 
argumentation was always present which can be attributed to its 
high group-consensus culture. It can be suggested that the empha-
sis upon agency reform or internal autonomization in Dutch ac-
counts constituted a shift from earlier preferences for ZBOs (ex-
ternal autonomization) before the period analyzed in this chapter. 
If this is so internal autonomization was the equivalent of a Dutch 
metaphor for the whole. To the extent that the political culture ex-
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hibits a national style, it sets the limits within which the shifts in 
the cultural character of official stories take place. These limits are 
also dependent upon the speakers privileged and the forums which 
they are speaking from. Since the favored stories of particular 
speakers or professions will also influence the kinds of cultural sto-
ries adopted. 
Finally, a fifth observation to make is that the pendulum swings 
in agency official accounts have occurred more quickly in the more 
individualist-adversarial culture of Australia than in the high group 
consensus countries analyzed in this study. In just a period of 8 
years the pendulum has swung in Australia from individualist 
themes to more hierarchy, while no such swing was observed in 
The Netherlands over a similar period of time. This has been as-
cribed elsewhere (Pollitt & Boukaert, 2004:47) to differences in the 
adversarial and consensus democracy systems which are subject to 
quicker cycles of change as a consequence of the resources as-
cribed to political actors to make change, and more generally to 
the maintenance of competition within the system. It has not been 
possible to confirm from this study that the pendulum swings in 
rhetoric about agency reform in an (highly individualist) adversarial 
system such as Australia have the capacity to be greater, in the 
sense of swinging wider in all directions, than was observed in a 
(high group) consensus system such as Sweden. However, the 
greater prominence of the loci of the challenge and unique or new 
in Australia suggests that it is more susceptible to wider pendulum 
swings than the consensus countries, simply because the appeal of 
always presenting something new demands greater volatility in re-
form proposals. Such a short public memory has been deemed 
typical of individualist cultures while more hierarchical cultures 
such as Sweden exhibited a greater commitment to the history of 
their institutions. The lack of wider swings observed in Australian 
agency reform talk in this study can be ascribed to the reign of the 
same Liberal Conservative government over the period observed 
in this study.  I will now present more direct responses to sub 
questions of the research question that were posed at the outset of 
the study. 
 
9.2.1 How has agency reform been constructed in official accounts in The 
Netherlands, Sweden and Australia? 
Official agency accounts of agency reform in The Netherlands, 
Sweden and Australia were composed of different constellations of 
statements, national rhetorical styles, cultural themes and rules of 
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speaking. In the Netherlands agency reform was constructed pri-
marily as a unique alternative to ZBOs by the Ministry of Finance. 
The kinds of arguments to promote agency reform were primarily 
about the benefits of an accrual accounting system for greater effi-
ciency and cost consciousness, as well as arguments about the pro-
tection and promotion of ministerial accountability through agency 
reform. These latter claims were made primarily through compar-
ing the status of agencies with the legal status of their more nu-
merous counterpart ZBOs. Indeed, many of the Dutch official 
statements about agency reform were primarily focused upon the 
internal organization of the administration. Over time the Dutch 
official story about agency reform consistently exhibited 
individualist and hierarchical elements, although one of these ways 
of life was always presented as more prominent than the other. 
Indeed, Dutch official agency accounts were distinct in this study 
because of the capacity to produce stark contrasts in the pathos 
and logos of the stories being told over time. This was reflected in 
the adoption of both the locus of the unique to only quantitative 
loci, and in metaphors describing agency reform as business redressing 
or about obtaining more grip. When the Ministry of Finance 
delivered its accounts of agency reform, the individualist way of 
life was most prominent and emphasized the unique, while the 
hierarchical way of life prevailed in accounts published by the 
Ministry of Home Affairs and emphasized more is better. The 
rhetoric of Dutch official accounts included the construction of a 
universal audience committed to the convention of ministerial 
accountability in the first two documents, while in all the 
documents there was also a universal commitment to findings 
based upon consultation with speaking partners, as well as 
paradoxically, scientific principles. Irrespective of which stories 
were being told in The Netherlands, Dutch speakers always 
adopted some quasi-logical techniques in each of the documents 
analyzed. In Sweden, agency reform was constructed primarily as a means 
to promote democracy. This entailed contested arguments about 
the prescriptions of the constitution for agency independence and 
their position within the democratic system. Sometimes they were 
constructed as primarily subordinate to the political sphere, while 
other times they were constructed as serving the citizen and as 
primarily subordinate to the law. Much of this argumentation was 
pursued through interpreting the constitution and the constellation 
of statements produced were primarily focused upon the relation-
ship between the political and administrative sphere. Swedish offi-
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cial accounts consistently exhibited a hierarchical tint over time, al-
though this occurred sometimes together with individualist argu-
ments and other times together with egalitarian arguments. The 
speaker in Sweden was always the commission and irrespective of 
its membership, the Swedish national style speaking always con-
sisted of the construction of a universal audience committed to 
democracy. They also tended to use academic theories and con-
cepts to give credibility and provided an account of Swedish ad-
ministrative history. Swedish speakers always used the qualitative 
locus of the precarious (the threat to democracy) to sensitize their 
audiences to the proposals for agency reform being pursued and, 
as in The Netherlands, they always adopted techniques based upon 
quasi-logical argumentation. When there was a greater presence of 
politicians on the commission there were more hierarchical argu-
ments posed about the relationship between the political and ad-
ministrative sphere, and about planning more generally. In addi-
tion, the document with financial officials was the only one to ex-
hibit individualist themes and arguments in Sweden. Alternatively 
when there were more academics present on the Swedish commis-
sions describing agency reform, more egalitarian themes and ar-
guments were adopted. 
Australian official accounts constructed agencies primarily 
through arguments about promoting customer service and re-
sponding to complex policy issues. It included arguments about 
consolidating services for efficiency and customer service, as well 
as arguments about separating agencies from departments to en-
sure neutral responses to complex problems. There was a primary 
focus upon the relationship between the administration and actors 
or events external to the political system in their official accounts. 
The official accounts consistently exhibited individualist themes 
and arguments over time, although in the last document there was 
a shift towards more hierarchical and egalitarian themes and argu-
ments. Irrespective of the cultural tint of stories, the universal au-
dience was consistently constructed as committed to customer ser-
vice in Australia. Australian speakers tended to avoid adopting an 
expert tone in their self presentation and preferred a simple direct 
way of addressing their audiences. They consistently used the locus 
of the difficult, a challenge and the new and unique to sensitize audi-
ences to their agency initiatives. With few exceptions, they also al-
most always adopted arguments based upon the structure of real-
ity. Since all of the speakers in Australia were closer to the political 
sphere there was less variation in the cultural character of their sto-
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ries, although it is remarkable that the hierarchical themes and ar-
guments appeared when a committee presented agency official ac-
counts to their internal administrative superiors.  
 
9.2.2 What have been the similarities and differences in official agency ac-
counts and why are there similarities and differences? 
The similarities and differences in official agency accounts were 
observed at two levels. When identifying a national style of speak-
ing in the official accounts it was noted that in both The Nether-
lands and Sweden there was a tendency across all the documents 
to seek some credibility through giving the speaker a similar expert 
character, whether it was one committed to presenting findings in 
a scientific way or through adopting academic theories or con-
cepts. There was also a greater tendency to use quasi-logical argu-
mentation than in Australia. These similarities can be attributed to 
the high group consensus culture of these cultural political and 
administrative contexts which require knowledge that appears in-
dependent and expert in order to promote consensus. 
There were also some differences noted between Sweden and 
The Netherlands, not least the greater propensity of the Dutch to 
adopt arguments based upon the structure of reality, to adopt 
more individualistic pathos such as the unique, and, to embrace 
individualist themes and arguments more extensively than in Swe-
den. This may be attributed to the diagnosis of the Dutch political 
administrative culture as being more individualistic than the Swed-
ish culture. In addition, it can be attributed to the different kinds 
of official speakers that have been privileged to offer official ac-
counts of agency reform in these different cultural configurations. 
The dominant role that the Ministry of Finance has played in act-
ing as official speaker in The Netherlands has undoubtedly pro-
moted a greater emphasis upon individualist themes and argu-
ments in Dutch official agency accounts and on the internal focus 
of the argumentation. Alternatively, it has been the traditions of 
speaking within the commission system that have ensured a broad 
more hierarchical account of management reform and its conse-
quences for steering and society more generally in Sweden. There 
were different group metaphors adopted in the higher group cul-
tures such as autonomization in The Netherlands or democratic steering 
in Sweden which can also be attributed to the preoccupations of 
different speakers in the different countries. Indeed it is worth 
mentioning that the metaphor of the whole was never adopted in 
Dutch official agency accounts or rather an emphasis upon less 
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fragmentation was reflected in the more diluted term internal 
autonomization. Finally, in both high group consensus countries 
there was still a difference in the universal audiences constructed 
although both identified specific political ideals such as democracy 
and ministerial accountability. 
Aside from similarities and differences in official agency stories 
between the high group consensus cultures themselves, there were 
also important differences between the official accounts identified 
in these cultures and those in the individualist adversarial political 
and administrative culture of Australia. Not least among these was 
the greater prominence of individual speakers providing the offi-
cial accounts of agency reform and the more extensive embrace of 
individualist themes and arguments. These were expressed in ar-
guments about competition and metaphors for a personalized service 
or an agency as an outlet. This stronger commitment to individualist 
themes corresponds to Australia’s stronger individualist culture. 
The Australian style of speaking about agency reform consistently 
revealed a more user friendly, simplified way of presenting findings 
over time. There was also a greater tendency to adopt arguments 
based upon the structure of reality and to adopt the pathos of the 
challenge (locus of the difficult). Unlike the high group consensus 
cultures the universal audience in Australian culture was con-
structed as being committed to a more generic or rather private 
sector ideal, the promotion of customer service. The greater con-
sistency in official accounts about agency reform in Australia can 
be attributed to the closeness of all the speakers to the political 
sphere. 
There were also some similarities across all the countries that 
can therefore not be ascribed solely to the cultural political and 
administrative contexts in which they appeared. In this study I 
have ascribed these similarities to the rules of telling culturally fla-
vored themes and stories.  The identification of the rules of telling 
cultural flavored stories from empirical findings is an original con-
tribution of this study. Similarities across all countries occurred 
primarily in logos and included the adoption of the argument of 
unlimited development, (based upon the structure of reality), and 
traveling metaphors when describing agency reform in individualist 
ways. There was also the tendency to adopt more quasi-logical ar-
gumentation when discussing hierarchical themes and arguments. 
In The Netherlands and Australia, there was some convergence in 
aspects of ethos, pathos and logos when making individualist ac-
counts. This occurred with the construction of a particular busi-
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ness consultant (self-help) audience, the adoption of the unique to 
sensitize the audience and as mentioned above the argument of 
unlimited development. Of course in both countries these similari-
ties can be attributed to higher degrees of individualism vis a vis 
Sweden, which maintained an expert tone of speaking even when 
financial officials were presenting accounts. In Australia it can also 
be attributed to the closeness of the speakers to the political 
sphere and the role of one speaker as Director of a business-like 
arrangement, while in The Netherlands such a construction of the 
audience only occurred when the Ministry of Finance authored an 
evaluation document to inspire more agency creation. It is the role 
of the speaker in linking context and story that has been empha-
sized in this study. In all countries managers were included as a 
particular audience when individualist stories were told, although 
in different ways. 
In addition, there were similarities in some of the features ex-
hibited in hierarchical stories across different contexts. Once again 
it was the themes being discussed as well as the actual speakers 
that governed the production of these similarities. They included 
the greater adoption of quasi-logical argumentation when telling 
high group stories in Australia and similar metaphors such as 
broad, whole, sharpening or balancing in the hierarchical accounts 
produced in the most culturally different contexts in this study, 
Sweden and Australia. In both cases hierarchical stories appeared 
when committees were delivering their accounts to elite audiences, 
e.g. administrative superiors in Australia, political, administrative 
and corporate elites in Sweden. Finally, there were similar egalitar-
ian blames observed in Australian and Swedish documents, when 
shifting away from individualist stories. In both countries the dan-
gers that devolution and focusing upon individual performance 
presented to the whole were identified when moving towards more 
group themes and arguments. The observation that there were cer-
tain rules of speaking about different kinds of cultural themes and 
stories indicates that the story also played a role in influencing na-
tional official agency accounts. Indeed, the kinds of similarities in 
talk that were observed across national contexts and their pendu-
lum swings replicate elements and changes in the agency story that 
has been observed at the level of the international community. To 
this extent it has been the translation of the international agency 
story by their different kinds of speakers within national contexts 
that has been responsible for the observed similarities in official 
agency talk. 
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9.3 Theoretical contributions and evaluation 
 
The application of GGCT and the New Rhetoric in this study 
provides the opportunity to reflect upon their contributions to un-
derstanding empirical phenomena in public management. It also 
provides the opportunity to consider the nature of these theoreti-
cal perspectives and how well they can support international com-
parative research. Indeed, it has been an often cited advantage of 
GGCT that it enables variety in empirical phenomena to be com-
pared (Hood, 2000; Douglas, 1999). It is claimed that it can do this 
even within a social constructivist perspective that recognizes 
shifts in meaning.  In chapter 3, it was explained that GGCT was 
to be applied at two levels of analysis and for two purposes. On 
the one hand it was used to diagnose the national political context 
within which agency reform had been pursued, while on the other 
hand it was used to categorize the kinds of themes and arguments 
that appeared in the different documents. This was to enable the 
assessment of national political culture as an explanation for the 
rhetoric that was produced in the different countries. It relies upon 
the GGCT claim that a cultural way of life is structure with attitude, 
where social structures such as political and administrative systems 
mutually reinforce and, are reinforced through, attitudes, such as 
those reflected in rhetoric. For two of the three countries under 
study, Australia and Sweden, it can be argued that GGCT did pro-
vide a satisfactory explanation for the official agency rhetoric pro-
duced. The Australian political culture is strongly individualist, 
therefore it produced agency rhetoric that was also strongly indi-
vidualist, or Sweden has a strong group political culture and there-
fore the rhetoric it produced was also strong group, even when, in 
both cases, there were reactions in rhetoric. This is not to ignore, 
however, that the cultural type alone was not completely satisfac-
tory in understanding the rhetoric in these cases, particularly in 
Sweden, nor could it explain the Dutch rhetoric. In all of the cases 
it was necessary to point to other structural features of the scenes 
of use, such as the constitutional status of agencies or the domi-
nant presence of ZBOs, in order to understand the rhetoric. Of 
course, it may well be that these features of the political adminis-
trative context are consistent with their cultural character as diag-
nosed by GGCT but it is yet to be shown how such political or or-
ganizational structures fit with the GGCT categories of grid and 
group (see Hendriks, 1998; Hood, 2004). Indeed the finding that 
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official accounts at lower administrative levels did not match the 
cultural mix of ways of life at the political level in consensus coun-
tries, would suggest that existing categorizations of political cul-
tures are not applicable to the administrative level. Rhetorically the 
compatibility or mutuality condition which contends that the cultural 
character of social relationships or attitudes reinforces one another 
requires a high degree of acceptance from the audience. There 
needs to be further research into administrative cultures and how 
they correlate, if at all, with broader the political culture.  
Related to the use of national political culture as an explanation 
for the rhetoric, and its more limited explanatory success in the 
Dutch case, is the GGCT claim that the viable ways of life only go 
out into the corners of their matrix. This is the theoretical claim 
that there will be clear commitments to particular ways of life, al-
though these may occur in combinations with one another. In 
practice, such finely grained experiences of culture will always be 
more difficult to observe although clearly some contexts or situa-
tions are more complex than others. It has been observed in this 
thesis that the Dutch political cultural context presents a number 
of paradoxes and it may well be the case that these create compli-
cations that exceed clear classification into a limited number of po-
lar ways of life. This is a criticism of the simplicity of GGCT 
which has been noted elsewhere (see Hood, 2000:226-230) and 
should be tempered by recognition of the clearer correspondence 
that was found in the less fragmentary systems of Australia and 
Sweden. An associated but alternative reason for the lack of corre-
spondence between Dutch rhetoric and culture may be that the 
level of national political culture was too far from the internal ad-
ministrative level or audience at which Dutch agency rhetoric was 
pitched. Again in a fragmented political administrative system such 
as The Netherlands, this may be of greater consequence than in 
Sweden and Australia, where the cultural shades are arguably less 
dramatically contrasted. Clearly, the level of analysis to which 
GGCT is applied within the scenes of use has implications for its 
ability to explain official rhetoric. 
So far I have commented upon some of the limitations in the 
use of GGCT to diagnose national political culture and provide an 
explanation for official agency rhetoric, but the primary empirical 
contribution of this research has actually been the application of 
GGCT to agency rhetoric. It was shown that GGCT provided a 
very useful tool for capturing and demonstrating great variety in 
the meanings that have characterized agency reform across the 
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countries. Using the three active ways of life it has been possible to 
reveal and categorize the different kinds of stories and arguments 
that were being told about agencies in the different countries. For 
example the individualist themes which were most prominent in 
Australia such as customer service, the hierarchical themes such as 
formal rules and roles prominent in Sweden and the mix of themes 
relating to ministerial accountability and accrual accounting in The 
Netherlands. Together with the New Rhetoric the categorization 
of official rhetoric into GGCT’s ways of life has made it both pos-
sible to speak more clearly about the kinds of convergence in talk 
that has taken place, and also the kinds of differences in talk. It has 
been possible to observe that individualist stories have appeared in 
all countries throughout the period studied, but also to show that 
there have been differences in the selection and number of indi-
vidualist arguments made. As families of types, the ways of life en-
able the researcher to demonstrate and speak about how different 
strains of individualism are adopted in different contexts. This 
brings further nuance and understanding to discussions about 
convergence and the way that management reforms travel. GGCT 
proved very useful in diagnosing and describing shifts in agency 
rhetoric. 
The focus that GGCT brought to the research and its ability to 
capture variety was nevertheless accompanied by a wealth of vari-
ety in talk that could not be captured completely. The empirical 
data revealed a number of themes and arguments that had not 
been discussed or clearly placed before in GGCT literature, such 
as arguments about consolidation or feedback loops between pol-
icy and operations (see chapter 6) or mutuality between agencies 
with a set sector goal in the budget (see chapter 5), thereby requir-
ing me to consider their placement within the matrix. This pre-
sented a problem of classification as I tried to consider how to in-
terpret the data in the language of the ways of life (see also Maess-
chalk, 2004a:367-369). In addition some themes such as democracy 
or ministerial accountability can appear rather general and applicable 
to more than one way of life. Indeed, in terms of rhetoric their 
ambiguity can be distinctly useful. It can be considered a theoreti-
cal contribution of this study that it has attempted to classify or 
identify further arguments and themes that need to be classified 
according to the GGCT typology, thereby opening up new discus-
sion about how it is to be interpreted within public management. It 
was also noted that agency rhetoric in the different countries was 
focused on different levels of the administration, which also is 
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likely to have different implications for the prominence of ways of 
life in arguments. For example the hierarchical way of life is more 
likely when focusing on relations between politics and the admini-
stration and so on. GGCT proponents in public management have 
not yet given much attention to the implication of these kinds of 
differences in levels. No doubt there will remain debate about 
some of the interpretations of cultural stories in this study but this 
promotes further refinement of the theory. As with any theory, the 
other danger of the typology as a lens for interpreting the data is 
that it can distract the researcher from other features of the docu-
ments. Certainly, it is more appealing to focus upon the themes 
and arguments that are easiest to interpret. To some extent, this 
danger has been averted through the addition of rhetorical analysis 
since it has required a quite different gaze at the texts. I have also 
always focused upon the main conclusions of documents and what 
have been important in reaching these, as well as conducting de-
tailed inventory of all texts to reduce my own blind spots to na-
tional ways of speaking.  
Finally, given the greater focus that Hood has sought to give to 
the fatalist way of life in public management (Hood, 2000:145-
167), it must be noted that its identification in official documents 
was extremely limited. One exception was the interpretation of the 
unintended effects of result steering in I medborgarnas tjänst as re-
flecting fatalist skepticism. These were arguments that results 
steering had actually brought about greater detail in steering and 
had resulted in managers writing reports for the sake of auditors 
rather than for future planning or about what is living in the or-
ganization (SOU, 1997:83-85). My inability to identify fatalist sto-
ries is according to some GGCT proponents not surprising since it 
is typical of the fatalist way to be silent and let the other ways of 
life speak for them (Mamadouh, 1999a:400; Hendriks, 1996:62). In 
addition, it was noted in chapter 3 that the fatalist way of life was 
less likely to feature in official rhetoric about agency reform because 
it was at odds with the speaker obtaining a degree of certainty 
about what to do. It is arguably more likely that fatalist stories can 
be found in unofficial arguments as presented by managers within 
organizations themselves or by other actors outside of the political 
administrative system such as the media. Similarly, egalitarian 
themes and arguments were also few and far between in the 
documents I have analyzed. It may also be that these are more 
likely to be espoused by actors outside of the administrative sys-
tem. In addition, the rhetorical situations and actual character of 
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the agency reforms I have studied, such as the financial changes in 
Sweden and The Netherlands, has limited the possibilities for 
egalitarian constructions. 
As with the GGCT typology, the application of the New 
Rhetoric also presented problems of interpretation, particularly be-
cause some of their categories are not mutually exclusive. I have al-
ready discussed this in chapter 4 on research design and noted 
some different possible interpretations in my empirical chapters. 
With respect to argumentative techniques problems with applying 
particular categories generally occurred within the three general ar-
gumentative types, eg. quasi logical arguments, arguments based 
upon the structure of reality (was it pragmatic or causal?) or argu-
ments that structure reality (was it an illustration or example?) and 
not across them, thereby limiting this weakness of the technique. 
One exception was distinguishing between arguments by compari-
son (quasi logical) and arguments based upon authority (based 
upon the structure of reality). In contrast to GGCT, the New 
Rhetoric has a far less extensive record in empirical application and 
a smaller pool of resources to draw from in applying it. To an even 
greater extent than GGCT, this has the drawback that much time 
was spent laboring over the interpretation of the empirical data. At 
the same time, this makes the identification of problems in inter-
pretation that have occurred in this research of even greater sig-
nificance for its refinement. Although it has been widely criticized 
because of interpretation problems, the category of the universal 
audience proved to be extremely useful in speaking about differ-
ences that could be observed in national accounts of agency re-
form. It is a barometer of the kinds of knowledge considered true 
and right in different contexts and together with its potential links 
to national styles of speaking provides its own characterization of 
culture. Indeed by distinguishing between particular and universal 
audiences it was possible to give a more tuned and nuanced de-
scription of culture within a particular rhetorical situation. To this 
extent it can be argued that rhetorical analysis itself can provide a 
better insight into administrative culture and policy communities 
than GGCT. This was demonstrated in the cases of The Nether-
lands and Sweden where it was the rhetoric that revealed differ-
ences from diagnoses of national political culture. These advan-
tages of linking the New Rhetoric with accounts of context makes 
it more desirable to pursue further comparative public manage-
ment and policy research in this vein.  
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The New Rhetoric has also provided further suggestions for re-
fining the GGCT typology and how it can be expected to appear 
in different empirical contexts. The addition of rhetoric to GGCT 
has already been suggested by Hood (2000). In this study I have 
been able to assess his predictions for ethos, pathos and logos, to-
gether with different cultural stories. This has shown that the ar-
gumentative techniques (logos) in particular, and to a lesser extent 
pathos changes with different kinds of stories and that these 
changes are patterned. Individualist stories generally adopt argu-
ments based upon the structure of reality while hierarchical stories 
showed more affinity with quasi-logical argumentation. There were 
also certain metaphors that clearly supported particular cultural 
stories across the countries such as flexibility or travel metaphors 
for individualist stories or the whole for group themes. As has al-
ready been mentioned the differences in the speaker or audience 
construction (ethos) has been particularly insightful in understand-
ing cultural context.  
A final theoretical contribution of this study has been its at-
tempt to conduct a comparative study within a social constructivist 
framework. In seeking to demonstrate the differences in the na-
tional meanings associated with an apparently international fashion 
and common discourse community, the typologies of GGCT and 
the New Rhetoric have provided me with the theoretical tools for 
comparing apples with pears. It has been possible to give quite de-
tailed accounts of the similarities and differences in national offi-
cial accounts of agency reform. This has, however, together with 
the language differences, been extremely time consuming and la-
bor intensive. It has also meant that the comparisons themselves 
require detailed explanation and cannot be very quickly summa-
rized. Together with the inability of GGCT to offer complete ex-
planations for the rhetoric, at least in the simple terms of its ways 
of life, the comparisons also meant that different aspects of the 
scenes of use, as described in the detailed accounts of empirical 
chapters, were identified as contributing to the rhetoric produced, 
for example the presence of ZBOs or the constitutional status of 
agencies. While this clearly reflects the differences in the actual 
scenes of use and is true to the complexity of different contexts, it 
also has the implication that these explanations have not always 
been sought from the comparison as such but from the detailed 
analysis of the single case. One exception was the adversarial ver-
sus consensus democracy divide which, together with and as part 
of national political culture, provided reasons for differences in the 
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adoption of respectively arguments based upon the structure of re-
ality and quasi logical argumentation.  
 
9.4 Reflecting upon official knowledge in public admini-
stration 
 
Another criticism of GGCT has been that it does not relate to the 
practice of public management and the problems facing public 
managers (Hood, 2000:223). Certainly, this criticism could also ap-
ply to the New Rhetoric and, as the previous section demonstrates, 
the main contributions of this research would seem to be theoreti-
cal refinement. It was also argued in chapter 3, however, that both 
of these theories present the possibility for practitioners and policy 
makers to be confronted with and reflect upon the official knowl-
edge that is used to support reform initiatives and their blind-spots. 
While not ignoring that there is also a wealth of other unofficial 
knowledge that informs practice, the findings of this research can 
promote greater consciousness of the boundaries of official 
knowledge and what not to forget completely when the pendulum 
swings. To put it another way neither GGCT nor the New Rheto-
ric provide answers to normative questions about what should be 
done, but their categories do enable us to identify some of the limits 
of certain stories and knowledge.  They open a space for consider-
ing the consequences of these blind-spots and how we can thicken 
certain plots and meanings or reveal subject positions that have 
been silenced. Not only can we reflect upon the appropriate con-
tent of reforms themselves but also on the official role that is envi-
sioned for actors such as policy makers, managers and citizens.  
In the description of the four GGCT stories in chapter 3 some 
blind-spots to these stories were already identified such as the 
hierarchist’s misplaced trust in authority and expertise, the indi-
vidualist’s lack of consideration for corruption or cooperation and 
the egalitarian’s inability to respond to failures stemming from un-
resolved feuds. Similarly, the premises of argumentation and par-
ticularly the category presumptions, in the New Rhetoric help to 
identify some of the aspects of arguments and stories that have 
been less developed or ignored in official accounts. From the ap-
plication of both theories it is possible to see that official accounts 
do continue to place a large degree of faith in the capacity of indi-
viduals in positions of authority to ensure that agency reform does 
meet goals of efficiency or accountability. This was reflected in the 
arguments about ministerial accountability in The Netherlands 
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where agencies were preferable to ZBOs because ministers could 
intervene in the operations of the former and presumably ensure 
that they functioned adequately and accountably (Ministerie van 
Financiën, 1991; Commissie Sint, 1995). In two of the Swedish 
documents it was also apparent in the faith put in politicians to be 
interested in setting and following up upon performance objectives 
and knowing how to identify precise goals or in their capacity to 
keep bureaucracy at bay (SOU, 1983, 1985). It was also reflected in 
the faith in formal laws such as the constitution to provide the ul-
timate guidance on how agency reform should be pursued. Faith in 
authority and expertise was also reflected in Australian arguments 
that executive agencies would be able to speak with one voice and 
give a neutral response to complex policy. All of these presump-
tions are likely to find weakness in practice. 
In individualist stories there was often the presumption that 
civil servants’ incentive systems were understood and that they 
would respond in an appropriate way that was desirable to finan-
cial rewards. This was reflected in Dutch desires to introduce per-
formance pay and in Australian proposals for rewards for coopera-
tive behavior. Such recommendations are blind to the effects that 
these arrangements have upon ethical behavior and the possibility 
for gaming or even corruption. Finally, egalitarian proposals for 
more mutuality within the budgetary system in order to promote 
cooperation (SOU, 1997) or about a deliberative approach to eth-
ics, lack responses to the problem of what to do when agreement 
cannot be found. This study reminds us that all solutions have 
their drawbacks and limits. 
There are four more general observations that can be made 
about the official rhetoric analyzed in this research. Firstly, detailed 
accounts of the practice of agency reform were surprisingly few 
and far between in the official documents analyzed. Instead most 
of the information about practice was presented in a very superfi-
cial way stating for example that benchmarking was present (Min-
isterie van Financiën, 1991) or that governance arrangements were 
clear in agencies (MAC, 2004), whatever that might mean, or that 
the factual activities of agencies could be distinguished from their 
legal activities (SOU, 1985). Such statements, based upon limited 
explanation or even observation, suggest a great deal of confidence 
and certainty in the management arrangements pursued and sug-
gest the need for more fatalistic stories in order to encourage more 
reticence about what to do. The one exception was I medborgarnas 
tjänst, which provided some detailed case studies and interview 
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statements from directors regarding the use of results manage-
ment. However, much of this information was presented in such a 
compressed way, that it was difficult to absorb, let alone appreciate 
these findings.  
A second observation, related to the first, is the very limited 
role and voice that managers and employees of agencies were 
given in the accounts of agency reform. Particularly in the ac-
counts of financial changes managers only appeared to legitimize 
the changes being pursued with claims that they met the problems 
managers had already identified (Ministerie van Financiën, 1991; 
SOU, 1985). This was sometimes expressed using statements from 
managers themselves. While managers and employees did seem to 
feature more in individualist stories (Ministerie van Financiën, 
1991; Ministerië van Financiën, 1998; Howard, 1996; Vardon, 
1997; SOU, 1985), there was little analysis of their motivations 
apart from financial or career opportunities. Such limited concep-
tualization and distance from other features of manager’s work or 
their goals is surely likely to only increase the lack of relevance of 
official accounts to practice. Again the exception was I medborgarnas 
tjänst which did seek to describe some of the conflicting goals pub-
lic managers face and even to encourage more deliberation about 
their role.  
Thirdly, it is clear from the analysis of official accounts that ar-
guments about citizenship and the effects of agency reform for 
citizens remains a very limited and undeveloped concept in official 
circles. Their role was cited most frequently I medborgarnas tjänst 
with statements about the desire to give them greater influence or 
make them a part of a living consciousness within the administration 
(SOU, 1997). In numbers of words/statements in the document, 
they still appeared in a fairly limited way and few practical means, 
aside from law enforcement, were identified for promoting this. 
There was also only limited attempt to discuss how more participa-
tion might be achieved or promoted through agency reform. In the 
other documents where citizens appeared it was primarily as a 
voter in the democratic system (SOU, 1985) or as a customer 
(Howard, 1996; Vardon, 1998) with little reflection upon the con-
sequences of this for the democratic system as a whole or for the 
opinions of citizens about this characterization.  
It may well be that these last two observations cannot be 
changed within official stories, because of the appropriate ways of 
speaking in existing political administrative institutions. If this is 
the case, then it can come from other actors outside of the system, 
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ideally in a dialogue with policy makers. Such dialogue may pro-
mote more enriched or useful meanings for big ideas such as (min-
isterial) accountability, democracy and customer service, than ap-
peared in this study. The way that agency reform has been con-
structed by managers themselves or by other actors outside of the 
political system has not been investigated in this study and is cer-
tainly an area for future research (see Smullen, 2003b). 
Finally, a fourth observation for management practice in this 
study regards the changing nature of official talk and management 
fashions. As noted above it became apparent in many of the 
documents analyzed that agency reform initiatives were advocated 
on the basis of very limited research findings or even upon ques-
tionable findings. The Dutch evaluation document Verder met resul-
taat was an example of the latter. New changes, particularly in Aus-
tralia, were also introduced with again little detailed evaluation or 
analysis of the previous reforms. It sadly remains a common but all 
too relevant criticism that more time and detailed analysis needs to 
be devoted to the assessment of management reforms and fash-
ions before they are implemented. Furthermore, observations of 
the dominance of Dutch financial officials and their role in trans-
lating individualist stories to the high group consensus contexts in-
vites further investigation into the operation of this professional 
network within national and international communities. The simi-
larities and differences in their speaking styles and influence in dif-
ferent contexts are also of interest. 
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9.5 Last word 
 
This study has shown that each national context has its favored 
themes, speakers and ways of speaking about agency reform, but 
also that different kinds of themes and stories have their favored 
style and rules. These have interacted to produce different tales 
about agency reform which, while demonstrating striking similari-
ties when particular acts are played out, are actually being per-
formed in grander plots that are entirely different, with different 
starring roles, and, audiences, and in completely different theatres. To 
this extent, it can be said that like observations about convergence 
in management practice (Pollitt, 2001; Pollitt, 2006) convergence in 
agency reform talk is also striking but limited, while divergences 
are significant, resilient and extensive. It also alerts reformers and 
other actors wishing to promote particular management ideas to 
the ways of speaking which may best obtain acceptance in differ-
ent national political administrative systems. This study has shown 
for example that quasi-logical argumentation is most valued in 
Sweden and The Netherlands, while arguments based upon the 
structure of reality are more likely to win acceptance in Australia. It 
has also revealed that pathos such as the precarious in Sweden, the 
unique in some cases in The Netherlands, as well as the challenge 
in Australia are likely to promote the success of reforms. Given 
that different stories themselves also have their favored ways of 
being told, successfully packaging just any management idea to dif-
ferent audiences is highly unlikely and would require a great deal of 
inventio [invention] from the speaker (Vickers, 1988:62). Such a 
Hercules of rhetoric was not found among the speakers observed 
in this research.  
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Appendix A – Expert questionnaire and list of experts for 
selection of documents 
 
A. 1 Expert questionnaire  
 
(1) Can you please identify the five most important government 
documents that have initiated, described or evaluated agencies 
(national title) in country during approximately the last 
twenty years? Under the title of the document could you also 
identify why this document is selected. 
 
 
(2) Which government documents about (national title)  - if any 
- have focussed most upon agency independence or free-
dom during approximately the last twenty years? 
 
(3) Please identify whether you agree that these documents 
have been of importance and rate them according to the level 
of importance you believe they have had in the discussions 
and initiation of agency reforms more generally. 
 
Name of document Important?  (Y or N) Rating 
A.    
B.    
C.    
 
 
Title of document Type of re-
forms 
Yr 
 
Series or author  
1. 
 
   
2. 
 
   
3. 
 
   
4. 
 
   
5. 
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 (4)  Are there other government documents, not noted in the 
list above or mentioned in your earlier answers, that you 
would identify as initiating important agency reforms in the 
last 20 years? 
 
A.2 List of experts The Netherlands 
 
Walter Kickert, Professor of Public Administration, Erasmus 
University, Rotterdam 
Nico Mol, Professor of Business Economics for the Public 
Sector, University of Twente, Twente 
Drs Ronald Oosteroom, Former Director of the BIFI unit 
Ministry of Finance 
Dr Peter Van der Knaap, Director of Policy Evaluation, The 
Netherlands Court of Audit 
 
A. 3 List of Experts Sweden 
 
John Pierre, Professor of Political Science, University of Goth-
enburg, Gothenburg 
Rune Premfors, Professor of Political Science, University of 
Stockholm, Stockholm 
Lennart Gustaffson, Director, Ministry of Justice 
Dr. Richard Murray, Chief Economist, Swedish Agency for 
Public Management 
 
A.4 List of experts Australia 
 
John Halligan, Professor of Public Administration, University 
of Canberra 
Roger Wettenhall, Professor of Public Administration, Univer- 
sity of Canberra 
David Rowlands, Senior Director, Performance Audit Services 
Group, Australian National Audit Office 
Richard Collis, Officer for Administrative Rearrangements, 
Australian Public Service Commission 
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Appendix B – Chapter 4 inventory of documents 
 
B.1 Description of Verder bouwen aan beheer [Further buil-
ding on management] 
 
B.1.1 Structure of Verder bouwen aan beheer 
 
Chapter 1: Reconsidering financial regulations  
Recent developments and discussions about financial management 
are briefly described. The focus upon efficiency improvements and 
upon accounting legislation is highlighted through references to 
various reports. The government directive for the workgroup is 
described. It is to discuss the desirability of differentiation in fi-
nancial regulations. Consideration is to be made of legal arrange-
ments for change and the procedures that need to apply for 
change and the role of different actors to oversee changes within 
the (budget) procedures. The structure of the report is then de-
scribed.  
Chapter 2: The financial regime  
The workgroup have made an inventory of bottlenecks in the ex-
isting financial regime. They have done this by considering the ex-
perience of government units with different kinds of expenditure 
patterns. An overview of the different types of units considered is 
listed. The 5 bottlenecks that have been identified are then also 
listed. They include problems in the apparatus budget, the one year 
limit, the lack of incentives for efficient operations, the budget sys-
tem and accountability procedures. These problems are then 
briefly explained. The existing principles/features of the financial 
regime are then described, they include, among others, universality, 
ministerial accountability and authorization procedures. The macro 
goals of the financial system and budget system are also identified. 
It is explained that there are tensions between central principles 
and interests and de-central interests. Solutions to bottlenecks 
need to be consistent with macro goals.  
Chapter 3: A vision of financial management   
The need to be conscious of tensions between changes to financial 
management and macro goals is re-stated. A brief history of devel-
opments in financial management is provided. Management was 
largely excluded from attention until the mid 1980s. Changes as a 
consequence of the Operation Accounting System [Operatie 
Comptabel Bestel] are described, as well as the decentralization of 
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(financial) accountability. These developments are referred to as a 
shift towards a new steering model, results orientated manage-
ment. This model is then defined. There is a discussion of the ap-
plication of the model to different types of organizations, no blue-
print is said to exist and application needs to take consideration of 
the possibility of improving efficiency from differentiation. In ad-
dition, the consideration of ministerial accountability needs to be 
made. The consequences of results orientated management for the 
roles of coordinating actors/units are described. In particular the 
roles of accounting units, personnel and financial/economic units, 
the Ministries of Finance and Home Affairs, the Court of Audit 
and parliament. International examples of financial changes and 
agency creation are recorded. These include references to the UK, 
Sweden, Australia, New Zealand, Denmark and Canada.  
Chapter 4: Revising financial regulations  
The chapter focuses upon possible changes that can be made in 
the existing financial regulations without disrupting macro objec-
tives. It discusses changes to the apparatus budget, personnel for-
mation, work conditions and rewards, office space expenses, the 
limits of the one year budget, the possibility to reserve funds over 
time, the introduction of efficiency incentives and wins, as well as 
the possibility for lending. Changes to most, although not all of 
these arrangements (such as loans), are recommended.  
Chapter 5: Streamlining the budget process  
Following from the proposals for changes in the financial regula-
tions described in the previous chapter, this chapter focuses upon 
possible changes in the budgetary process. It seeks to identify ways 
that new flexibility in the financial regulations and a focus upon re-
sults can be better integrated into the budget process. It discusses 
upon budget frames, less consultation about budget agreements, 
incorporating budget reserves, accountability and control, more at-
tention for critical examination of the budget, such as through per-
formance measures.  
Chapter 6: Internal and external autonomization  
Despite changes mentioned in the previous two chapters, an opti-
mal business operation may still require further going special regulations. 
This can apply for example for goods and services where price 
forming is possible and where different forms of autonomization 
could be appropriate. Forms of autonomization are listed and de-
fined including internal and external autonomization. The choice 
between these forms requires assessment of the extent to which 
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limiting ministerial accountability is desirable or possible. It is 
noted that choice is often made for ZBOs because of business de-
sires, at the expense of ministerial accountability. Agency status 
now provides the possibility of satisfying business ways of operat-
ing, as well as protecting ministerial accountability. The agency 
status is described as involving more authority together with more 
accountability. Different possible features for agency status are de-
scribed. The maintenance of ministerial accountability together 
with agency status is described and contrasted with the situation of 
ZBOs. Changes to the Accounting legislation are proposed. The 
features of agencies are discussed in greater depth including ability 
to use accrual accounting, reserve funds etc, as well as having a 
separate account with the Ministry of Finance. Procedures for in-
cluding agencies within the budget system are discussed, as well as 
procedures for their creation. They are to be characterized by ex-
pectations for efficiency improvement and have greater account-
ability requirements in terms of performance measures. 
 
B.1.2 Problematization in the text and word searches  
Terminology: There is frequent reference to the operation accounting 
system and to accounting and financial concepts. These include fi-
nancial regulations such as the apparatus budget, reservation pos-
sibilities and end of year limit, and financial arrangements such as 
different kinds of accounting systems and accounts. The terms ef-
ficiency and results orientation are frequently cited, and the role of 
financial actors frequently discussed. Exceptions to purely financial 
management references are references to ministerial accountability 
and ZBOs. Selection of cases and a typology of organizational 
types used to select the cases is discussed.  
The problems and solutions: A central problem in the text is the ineffi-
ciency of the existing financial regime. In addition, there is the ob-
servation that ZBOs are inappropriately being adopted as a means 
to use obtain greater flexibility and results in financial and business 
operations. The solution to financial problems is to maintain 
macro principles such as ministerial accountability, while adjusting 
micro principles through differentiation in the financial system.  
Characteristic questions and/or statements: The core idea is that through 
the delegation of certain responsibilities for the apparatus budget 
to organizational units, and the creation of incentives in the finan-
cial regime, tasks will be performed more efficiently. The agency is 
intended for units in the public sector where greater efficiency can 
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be obtained via special management rules. An important instru-
ment in acquiring (financial) resources and the generation of effi-
ciency wins, can be to pass on the costs that government organiza-
tions make to the eventual purchasers of goods and services. The 
situation can occur where from the point of view of ministerial ac-
countability, the preference is for performance of tasks within the 
public sector, but that certain business desires, despite changes in 
financial regulations, lead to the choice for external autonomiza-
tion. This is an inappropriate choice. Characteristic of agencies is 
that they have more authorities/capacities than normal organiza-
tional units. Through offering space for changes in the cash posi-
tion of agencies within the rules of the budget, it is guaranteed that 
agencies can freely focus upon results.    
Word counts and searches: Efficiency, results, freedom, autonomy, in-
dependence, space, supple, autonomization, ZBOs, special, new, 
differentiation, flexibility, ministerial accountability, steering, busi-
ness, incentives, competition, more/less, whole, consulta-
tion/speaking partners. 
 
B.2. Description of Verantwoord verzelfstandigen [Accoun-
table autonomization] 
 
B.2.1 Structure of Verantwoord verzelfstandingen 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction  
An earlier report focusing upon the separation of policy and im-
plementation is cited. Better functioning government through such 
arrangements is said to require a consequent and systematic ap-
proach, which this report seeks to provide. The findings in the re-
port are based upon four organizations, the commission sought to 
obtain insight into the concrete problems that play a role with 
autonomization. The speaking partners that have been consulted 
are identified. It is on the basis of these insights that the commis-
sion has identified attention points for future autonomization pro-
jects, in particular for ministerial accountability, steering relation-
ships and instruments.  
Chapter 2: Why autonomization  
Separation of policy and operations is said to bring about transpar-
ency and efficiency, but this requires clear and systematic divisions 
of accountability. The theme autonomization is discussed, it is said 
to have become a fashion and in particular external autonomiza-
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tion has come to be seen as a solution to all kinds of problems. 
The discussions about autonomization have often excluded atten-
tion for the primacy of politics. They have tended to focus upon 
how to autonomize which is unsatisfactory. It is time to return to 
the core of the matter: improving steering relationships and clearer 
organizational forms.  
Chapter 3: Accountability and steering  
Three forms of autonomization are identified and defined. They 
include privatization, external autonomization and internal 
autonomization. The implications of internal and external 
autonomization for ministerial accountability are discussed. It is 
said that external autonomization does not reduce the primacy of 
politics although accountability to the parliament has a different 
content. It is focused upon the possibilities outlined in specific leg-
islation, thus steering only takes place at the head lines. The role of 
parliament in this situation is discussed and possibilities for change 
if legislation is unsatisfactory.  
The differences in the ministerial relationship with internal and 
external autonomized organizations are compared. External 
autonomized organizations are not hierarchical subordinate to the 
minister while internally autonomized organizations are. In con-
trast to externally autonomized organizations, the minister can in-
tervene into the operations of internally autonomized organiza-
tions. The same kind of steering instruments are said to be able to 
be applied to both internal and external autonomized organiza-
tions. A list of different ways to separate an organizational unit 
from a department is presented. In addition, an overview of the 
desirable forms of steering such as performance orientated is pre-
sented.  
Chapter 4: When and how to autonomize  
A range of assumptions that according to the commission can dis-
rupt careful decision making around autonomization, and particu-
larly external autonomization, are presented. They include lack of 
knowledge about new flexibilities within the financial system, the 
idea that autonomization can protect one from budgetary cuts, the 
idea that it can limit political intervention. Think steps for a sys-
tematic approach to decision making about autonomization are 
presented. Legitimate reasons for the choice for external autono-
mization are identified.  
Chapter 5: The necessary steering relationships  
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The main steering relations that are important when a unit is 
autonomized are identified. They include the business operations, 
the financial relations, the personnel and work conditions, infor-
mation provision and organization, regulation, evaluation, public 
control, an interface. Each relationship and the activities associated 
with them are described briefly.  
Chapter 6: Recommendations  
The recommendations of the commission are presented including 
the introduction of the think steps, the more limited use of exter-
nal autonomization, the role of Ministries of Finance and Home 
Affairs in coordinating autonomization. 
 
B.2.2 Problematization in the text and word searches  
Terminology: There are continual references to different kinds of or-
ganizational types, or arrangements, their formal definition, ac-
countability divisions and legal status. Political principles and min-
isterial accountability are also frequently cited together with a focus 
upon steering relationships. There is also some reference to effi-
ciency and financial relationships. The selection of cases upon 
which the findings are based upon is presented.  
The problems and solutions: The growth of ZBOs and lack of system-
atic forethought are central problems in the text. This is presented 
as a problem for transparency and also ministerial accountability. 
Ensuring that ministers are able to intervene in organizational op-
erations is a way to protect accountability. In addition, a systematic 
and principled approach, which means clearly defined organiza-
tional types, to autonomization is thought to protect accountability 
and transparency.  
Characteristic questions and/or statements: The division of accountabil-
ity and the design of steering must be conducted on the basis of a 
systematic approach. Substantive and principle questions over the 
primacy of politics, the position of the state in relation to and 
sometimes in society, and the democratic legitimacy, are not or to 
an unsatisfactory extent raised. A good and carefully designed pol-
icy towards autonomization can contribute to an adequate separa-
tion between policy and operations. From the perspective of the 
autonomized organization, there is in the case of external autono-
mization no direct hierarchical subordination towards the minister. 
The commission believes that the creation of externally autono-
mized organizations should occur in only limited situations. In 
stark contrast to externally autonomized organizations, interven-
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tion can occur in the operations of internally autonomized organi-
zations.  
Word counts and searches: internal autonomization, external autono-
mization, more/less, transparency, efficiency, ministerial account-
ability, accountability, division, steering, free-
dom/independence/space, horizontal and vertical, grip, command, 
complete/limited, whole, consultation/speaking partners. 
 
B.3. Description of Verder met resultaat [Further with re-
sults] 
 
B.3. 1 Structure of Verder met resultaat  
Chapter 1: Objective and justification  
The cabinet announced the need to perform an evaluation on 
agency reform some years after its introduction. The intention of 
agencies was to promote efficiency through results orientated 
management and this report is to evaluate the extent to which this 
has been achieved. In addition, it seeks to learn and obtain insight 
into the experiences of existing agencies. A third objective of the 
report is to assess the extent to which changes at the micro level of 
agency finances have disrupted macro objectives. This question 
also relates to the possibility of extending accrual accounting to 
other organizations that are not agencies. 
The 14 agencies included in the evaluation research are pre-
sented and described and the method of research is explained. The 
findings are based upon a questionnaire and interviews. It is rec-
ognized that while there has been attempt to use objective infor-
mation, there is no control group for the evaluation and its ques-
tions.  The inter-departmental character of the research group is 
described.  
Chapter 2: Motives for the application of agency status  
The formal reasons for the creation of agencies are first described 
with reference to bottlenecks in financial management. The mo-
tives that the researched agencies identified are also presented in a 
table. They included bottlenecks, the agency identity and separa-
tion of policy and operations. Each motivation is described with 
some reference to interview findings. The initiators of the reform 
status is are also listed, they included the political/bureaucratic 
leaders, the former together with the agency, the agency or other.  
First intermezzo  
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In order to learn from agency experiences, attention is focussed 
upon how the creation of agency status was experienced. These 
experiences are to be included in a handbook. A number of fea-
tures of the process of creating agencies are described including: 
informing personnel and creating support, introducing accrual ac-
counting and the opening balance, the changes necessary for ad-
ministration such as training, attention for organizational culture 
and steering. Under each heading various problems and successes 
with introducing agency status are described.   
Chapter 3: Results orientated management  
The introduction of agencies was intended to bring out about 
more results orientated management. This type of management is 
defined. The extent to which the researched agencies exhibited the 
features of results management are listed in a table and then de-
scribed in more detail under sub-headings. The description is bro-
ken by informative boxes presenting information about the theory 
behind agency status. One box focuses upon the separation of pol-
icy and operations and what this entails for agencies and depart-
ments. A second box discusses the roles of owner and principal 
and the possibility that the mother ministry can play both roles. A 
desire for distinguishing these roles is expressed. An analysis of the 
extent to which steering of the organizations have shifted from in-
puts to steering on performance is presented. This was assessed 
primarily by the existence of quasi market practices or output and 
cost prices within the organizations. Shifts in the intensity of the 
relationship of the agencies with financial units in departments and 
the ministry of finance are assessed and the introduction of per-
formance rewards in the organizations is discussed.  
Chapter 5: the conditions of agency status  
The three conditions for obtaining agency status are presented and 
described. The conformance of the researched agencies to these 
conditions is then assessed. First the identification of measurable 
products and services and the existence of performance measures 
are discussed. An overview of the quantitative and qualitative per-
formance measures within the organizations are provided, together 
with the observation that they have been changing over time in the 
organizations. This is identified as part of the continued learning 
process. Second the existence of accountant’s declaration prior to 
agency status is examined, with findings presented. Third the con-
dition that a real possibility to demonstrate greater efficiency exists 
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is examined. This condition is briefly described, but no findings 
from the organization concerned are presented.  
Chapter 6: More efficient operations?  
Before the question of whether agencies have lead to greater effi-
ciency is examined, it is stated that it needs to be considered 
whether it may have contributed to efficiency. A citation regarding 
the greater consciousness of an agency into their work and envi-
ronment is presented. This is followed by the observations that it 
is too early to assess whether greater efficiency has occurred in 7 
of the 14 organizations. Furthermore it is noted for the other 7 or-
ganizations that there are indications that greater efficiency has oc-
curred through lower cost prices, a positive end balance and higher 
productivity. Efficiency improvements based upon cost prices, as 
well as number of complaints, is presented for one of the organiza-
tions under study. An overview of stimulants to efficiency in the 
organizations examined are then identified. These include greater 
flexibility in financial arrangements, greater cost consciousness, 
bench-marking and quasi-market arrangements in some organiza-
tions. Examples of costs over time, tariffs and benchmarking ar-
rangements in different agencies are presented in boxes. The pres-
ence of scientific evidence for efficiency improvements is dis-
cussed. The difficulties in assessing the role of agency status in ef-
ficiency improvements are identified. The findings to questions 
about any existing problems with agency status are presented.  
Tweede intermezzo: cultural change and side effects  
As part of the objective to obtain insights into the experience of 
existing agencies, a discussion of the extent to which cultural 
change and negative or positive side effects have been experienced 
is presented. There is a table identifying how applicable these 
things are to the agencies. Cultural changes such as greater cost 
consciousness, results orientation, business orientation or external 
orientation are noted. Positive side effects are discussed such as 
transparency, the streamlining of their budget procedures and by 
some a stronger identity. Negative side effects were also identified 
including the perception of negative effects from too much auton-
omy, greater attention from mother ministries and the Ministry of 
Finance and the amount of information that had to be provided.   
Chapter 6: Making conditions of agency status more precise  
It is argued that the current conditions need to be improved. The 
limitations of each condition are noted such the condition for 
measurable goods and services needing to be replaced by a re-
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quirement that goods and services be measured by volume and 
performance measures, such as a cost price model. In addition an 
accountants declaration was not found to be adequate to ensure 
good administration. It should be accompanied by a plan for the 
administration and information provision. Finally the third condi-
tion was found to be inadequate. It is argued that the current con-
ditions are too completely focussed upon the agency concerned 
and not upon the external relationship with the mother ministry 
for example. Proposals for making the current conditions more 
precise are listed and then described in more detailed. The propos-
als include a description of business process and cost price model 
and the identification of efficiency indicators.  
Chapter 7: Norms, allocation and control  
The macro objectives of the budget are identified and described. 
The role that agencies have played within each of the objectives is 
then described in more detail. It is found that they have not dis-
turbed existing macro objectives at all. Indeed it is suggested that 
through the use of performance measures such as cost and output, 
they will assist in achieving macro objectives more successfully.  
Chapter 8: Further with results  
The proposal to extent the accrual accounting systems to other or-
ganizations besides agencies is discussed. The experience noted 
over the last years, including agencies, is said to indicate that it is 
desirable to steer more organizations according to agreements 
about performance and cost. This evaluation is said to provide in-
sight into the desirability of extending accrual accounting to 
other/non-agency organizations. The advantages of accrual ac-
counting are listed, together with some of the findings from the 
evaluation. The observation that some agencies experience the 
identity as too autonomous is discussed. To this extent lending ac-
crual accounting to non-agency organizations is desirable. It is also 
argued that the agency status has proven its value in attaining more 
flexible, results orientated and efficient management. It is recom-
mended that it continue to play an important role in the goal for 
results orientation. There is more discussion about broadening the 
use of an accrual accounting system to other organizations but 
with the observation that this is not to be a goal of its own but 
rather a goal to achieving greater results orientation. The recom-
mendation for more precise conditions for agency status and for 
attaining the use of an accrual accounting system is made. 
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B.3.2 Problematization in the text and word searches  
Terminology:  Business-like terms are frequently cited for example 
owner and purchaser, benchmarking, prices, products and services. 
There are also references to learning by doing, business operations, 
business resources/means and business redressing. References to 
the financial character of agency reforms are also frequently cited 
through terms such as the accrual accounting system, the opening 
balance, reserves, and the apparatus budget. The terms results ori-
entation and efficiency also appear frequently throughout the text. 
Finally there are references to the scientific validity of the findings, 
the policy theory behind agencies and the need for the creation of 
support [draagvlak) for agency reforms through consultation.  
The problems and solutions: The primary concern of the text is attain-
ing more efficiency. There would appear to be no doubt that this 
can be achieved through the introduction of accrual accounting.  
Characteristic questions and/or statements: The agency is intended to be 
an instrument for bringing to life the concept of results orientated 
management, and thereby greater efficiency. In this first inter-
mezzo the experiences of the 14 agencies with the actual rigging 
up of the organizations will be discussed. These experiences will be 
reworked into a handbook for agencies. Agencies use a special 
form of results orientated management because they have a unique 
and different financial management system. Of great importance 
for change (in attitudes) is employees of agencies have a personal 
interest, through incentives, for a more performance orientated 
way of working. From the questions and answers of the 14 agen-
cies…can be seen that in the future changes and improvements in 
the performance measures shall be made. One agency sought to 
carry responsibility over as far as possible.  
Word counts and searches: Results orientation, efficiency, freedom, 
autonomy, space, flexibility, transparency, ZBOs, ministerial ac-
countability, owner/purchaser/principal, difficult, new, more/less, 
incentives, competition, cost conscious, difficulty/challenge, steer-
ing, children’s shoes, step by step, rigging up. 
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Appendix C – Chapter 5 inventory of documents 
 
C.1 Description of Politisk styrning – administrativ 
självständighet [Political steering – administrative independ-
ence] 
 
The central conclusion is that there is no constitutional barrier to 
the political steering of agencies. It is also found that agencies have 
acquired independence that far exceeds their constitutional status. 
This has meant that the capacity of government to be accountable 
to parliament for administrative activities is limited. The unclear 
role of boards within agencies has resulted in a lack of clarity re-
garding the relationship between the political and administrative 
sphere. The regulatory role of agencies has expanded exceptionally 
to such a degree that the political sphere is unaware of the kinds of 
regulations being made and how they are used. Some aspects of 
agency independence are said to be controllable through a greater 
use of the existing political powers to steer agencies and through a 
greater activity within parliament to keep the government account-
able for agencies activities. It is more difficult to address the inde-
pendence of agencies that has arisen through complexity and 
through the limits that political decision makers have put on their 
own steering capacity by certain organizational arrangements. 
Three possible roads to address the independence of agencies 
are identified. (1) to return decision making competencies back to 
the political sphere and thereby strengthen their steering capacity 
(2) increase the political influence upon the management organs of 
agencies or (3) increase society’s influence upon agencies through 
decentralization or increase market steering. 
 
C.1.1 Structure of Politisk styrning – administrative självständighet  
Chapter 1: Introduction  
Main objectives of initial commission investigation are listed. The 
motivations for an additional investigation about the independence 
of the administration and the capacity for political steering are de-
scribed. A number of parliamentary motions highlighting concerns 
about the administration are cited. An overview of previous inves-
tigations into the state administration is presented. There were 
previously studies recommending closer cooperation between min-
istries and the administration. Two central issues relating to the 
political steering are identified, firstly the democratic chain is de-
fined wherein public power is united with responsibility and ob-
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tained from the people, and, increasing international concern 
about the influence of bureaucracy as an independent power.  
Chapter 2:  The constitutional foundations for steering  
Constitutional descriptions of public power and its legitimate use 
are listed.  Such values as equality before the law, the protection of 
welfare, equality and minorities are identified. The four available 
methods for using public power are identified these include 
through appointment powers, regulatory powers, the financial 
powers and control powers. Each of these powers were first 
briefly defined, followed by more thorough descriptions. Both ap-
pointment and regulative powers are said to have been delegated 
to the administration in both informal and formal ways. The con-
trol and financial powers are said to be primarily with parliament 
although they rely upon agencies to use these. Also the form of the 
budgetary process is said to be at the discretion of the government.  
Chapter 3: Government’s steering function  
Different constitutional periods are described. Descriptions of the 
government’s role in the most recent constitution are more lim-
ited. The administration’s role is described primarily through their 
responsibility for applying the law. Citations from earlier commis-
sion reports are used to convey concern lack of mention of gov-
ernment’s steering role in the constitution. The dualistic history of 
the Swedish administration is described and its origins.Various 
recommendations that have been made in the past to amend the 
clove between ministries and agencies are discussed. These go back 
to the early 1800s. The constitutional role prescribed to agencies is 
described together with the citation of articles from the constitu-
tion. It is stated that the article regarding agencies’ independence 
aims to guarantee the rule of law, rather than limit government 
control. The constitution is said only to describe agencies role to 
apply the law rather than their other more extensive factual activi-
ties. It is also explained that the parliament is the legislator and that 
the government is responsible for a number of regulations that can 
prescribe and limit competence of administration. To this extent 
the administration is described as a tool of the government and 
agency independence is said to have only weak support in the con-
stitution.  
Chapter 4: The administration’s increasing independence  
The government is said not to use their constitutional power to 
steer agencies. This is because they do not have the resources to 
do so nor do they have ambitions to exercise such extensive con-
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trol. Many decisions have been delegated to the administration. 
Four tendencies that have limited the political spheres’ steering of 
the state are described. These include (1) growth and creation of 
agencies, (2) increasing responsibility and competence for regula-
tion and frame budgets (3) increasing influence of boards and (4) 
increasing influence of actors other than the parliament or gov-
ernment upon the administration. Each of these tendencies were 
described in detail with statistics and interview findings to illustrate 
the growth. There is concern that the shift to more overarching 
steering has left agencies immune for democratic steering.  
Chapter 5: Steering and responsibility  
It is argued that the independence of agencies does not have 
strong support in the constitution and that political power has 
been weakened. Proposals to address the imbalance between the 
administration and political sphere that was established in the 
1800s have never been successfully implemented. A list of inten-
tional reasons as to why agencies are protected from detailed steer-
ing is presented. It is clear however that the consequences of suc-
cessive shifts in delegation to the administrative sphere have not 
been examined for their collective effects on the democratic sys-
tem’s functional competence. Three areas in which uncertainty 
prevails about the rights and responsibilities of the different politi-
cal and administrative tasks (1) the government’s responsibility for 
administrative activities (2) the boards of agencies and (3) the exer-
cise of regulative power. Each of these areas are discussed in more 
detail. Factors contributing to agency independence are described 
as well as the extent to which these can be influenced by the politi-
cal sphere.  
C.1.2 Problematization in the text and word searches  
Terminology: Much reference to political theories and ideas including 
dualism, the people’s sovereignty, post industrial society and bu-
reaucracy as independent power, the democratic chain and roles of 
political actors, constitutional definitions and legal rules through-
out.  
The problems and solutions: The text begins with a description of the 
concern with the administration and lack of democratic insight 
into its operation. There are accounts of the growing complexity 
of the state, interest group influence and the rise of the bureauc-
racy as an independent power in society. There is also exclusive at-
tention for the way parliamentarians have described the problem 
of the administration. The emphasis upon formal rules and in par-
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ticular the prescriptions of the constitution as the source for de-
scribing appropriate distributions of power within the state, 
throughout the text, would indicate that it provides the guide to 
how power is to be distributed. There is primary concern for 
clearly defined roles of the administrative and political sphere. The 
problem of excessive agency independence is noted already in the 
introduction.  
Characteristic questions and/or statements: The democratic steering of state 
activities is presently unsatisfactory. How far will this development 
go (towards agency independence)? We are focused upon the ques-
tions about the administration’s democratic steering and steerabil-
ity. The administration is a tool for the government to steer the 
state. It is true that the political organs formal influence has wid-
ened through the growth of the public sector and regulation, but at 
the same time politicians’ real room to maneuver [politiskhan-
dlingsfrihet] has been curtailed. The administration is subordinate 
to the government.  
Word searches and counts: steering, democracy, independence, free-
dom, space, clove, rule of law, chain, whole, mapping, factual, bal-
ance, tool, clove, sharpening, power, strong/weak, narrow/broad, 
direction, build up, flexibility, citizen, director general, civil ser-
vants, formal/informal contacts. 
 
C.2 Description of Regeringen, myndigheterna och myn-
digheternas ledning [Government, agencies and agency 
management] 
 
This report seeks to identify both direct and indirect ways in which 
the government can steer, particularly in light of financial hardship. 
Since there is no constitutional hinder to government steering, the 
commission is concerned to identify means to increase political in-
fluence upon the administration and therefore also promote effec-
tiveness and democracy. 72 recommendations for change are iden-
tified. In the chapters I have analyzed the report finds that three 
year budget is an important means to promote political influence. 
This is because it enables the government to receive more detailed 
information about the activities of the administration and make 
decisions about changes over a more extended period of time. It is 
also recommended that term of director generals be shortened and 
that the government be able to transfer them more quickly. 
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C.2.1 Structure of chapters examined in Regering, myndigheterna och myn-
digheternas ledning  
Chapter 1: Points of departure  
There are two areas of concern for the commission to develop 
government’s direct steering of agencies and to focus upon man-
agement functions in the administration. An overview of the find-
ings of Politisk styrning- administrativ självständighet is presented. 
It is said that more information about the factual relationship be-
tween agencies and government, about agency boards and about 
director generals, is required. An overview of the constitution and 
its interpretation in relation to agency independence is presented. 
There is also a brief account of the significance of the problem of 
steering. In particular, the growth of bureaucracy and expertise is 
argued to be undemocratic. Distinctions between direct and indi-
rect steering are presented.  
Chapter 3: Budget processes  
Improving the functioning of budget processes is of increasing 
importance given the priority of effectiveness. Constitutional pre-
scriptions about financial powers and processes are discussed. An 
overview of changes to the budget system is presented. It describes 
changes since the early 1970s. The problems of the existing budg-
etary system are also described. These include current financial 
pressures, the freedom left to agencies to make (political) priorities 
about cuts, time pressure which prevents possibility for politicians 
to make real changes to budgetary decisions, agencies lack possibil-
ity or motivation to identify areas for cuts, and quality of their re-
porting is poor. Proposals for improvements to the budget process 
are presented. These include increasing the long sightedness of the 
budget through planning and more political decisions about effec-
tiveness goal of agencies, earlier identification of political directives 
to agencies. Agencies should be given increasing freedom to decide 
about resource use over a longer time period than one year. There 
should be more incitements to more efficient decision making, 
such as requiring agencies to identify how budget frames can be 
cut, the government should set more precise goals. A detailed 
overview of a multiple year budget frame system is presented in-
cluding accounts of document exchange and reporting back as well 
as the kinds of freedoms that should be granted to agencies and 
their managers.  
Chapter 10: Directors and their immediate subordinates  
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The commission finds that, where they exist, boards should have a 
function in the appointment of director generals, this increases 
their responsibility and thus accountability for agencies. At the 
same time it is noted that this should occur after consultation with 
the government. An overview of existing recruitment arrange-
ments is presented. Studies identifying the kinds of people that be-
come directors and how are described. This description uses a 
range of statistics. There is also an overview of discussions to im-
prove recruitment including references to private sector practices. 
The desires for a broader recruitment base and more timely re-
cruitment are expressed. A range of means to increase mobility in 
director general recruitment are identified including a shortening 
of terms, possibility for government to transfer director generals, 
the removal of financial dis-incentives to change function and the 
creation of a new unit to facilitate quick transfers.  
C.2.2 Problematization in the text and word searches  
Terminology: The report begins with reference to a range of political 
science terms, particularly in the description of the need for politi-
cal steering and the growth of the bureaucracy as an independent 
power. There are a number of sections devoted to the interpreting 
the constitution and to legal definitions. In the budgetary chapter 
there are also a number of technical budget terms and financial 
themes, while the chapter on director generals focuses upon em-
ployment conditions.  
Problems and solutions: There is an immediate concern for the reduc-
tion in economic resources and the priority that this lends to effec-
tiveness. Agencies independence has weak support in the constitu-
tion. The state bureaucracy remains insensitive to parliament and 
government’s steering signals. The problem of bureaucracy is an 
international problem about the rising specialization of society and 
corporate influences. The time is now right for developing differ-
ent technical solutions for examination of resource use. The re-
cruitment base of director generals is too narrow. Director gener-
als find current terms too long and heavy.  
Characteristic questions and/or statements: The fundamental demand 
upon the public sector is to function as an effective tool for actual-
izing the parliament and government’s intentions. Reduced budget 
frames have the consequence that effectiveness becomes a more 
important priority. The director general function should be an ex-
pertise of its own rather than another kind of specialist. It is espe-
cially important that the democratic/political powers are not weak-
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ened. It is they alone that ensure that look after the whole and keep 
other powers at bay. The constitution does not regulate how the 
state budget and appropriation system should be formed. It pre-
sents no hinder to renewing the budget. A better decision making 
basis in the budget is necessary for the government to increase the 
precision in their demands upon agencies.  
Word searches and counts: steering, democracy, whole, complete, free-
dom, flexibility, broad/narrow, strong/weak, balance, sharpen, ef-
ficiency/effectiveness, precise, modernization, path, direction, de-
velopment, long sightedness, time pressure, deeper, managers, citi-
zens, civil servants, formal/informal contacts. 
 
C.3 Description of I medborgarnas tjänst [In the citizen’s 
service] 
 
The report considers central principles and overarching questions 
about the role of the administration in its whole. It is concerned 
with the difficulties of steering, fragmentation and internationaliza-
tion and addresses these matters with a focus upon the primary 
values of effectiveness, legality and democracy. In the budgetary 
chapter I analyze it recommends the management by results be 
fundamentally reexamined, that there be a shift towards more mu-
tuality between agencies in the same sector within the budget, that 
there be more openness and expertize in the development of 
budgetary reform and that informal contacts be documented. In 
the chapter on the role of civil servants it finds that there should 
be more deliberation about their role and a greater focus upon 
training. It is also found that the law should be used to ensure that 
civil servants meet their obligations to the citizen. 
 
C.3.1 Structure of chapters examined in I medborgarnas tjänst  
Chapter 1: Main observations  
Origins of Swedish state and increasing complexity are briefly de-
scribed. Distinctions between state and society have become more 
blurred, the state has become an element of a strong society, an 
arena rather than actor. It has become fragmented and difficult to 
steer. The steer-ability of the administration, its fragmentation and 
internationalization are all discussed under separate headings. 
Among the themes discussed under steering is the introduction of 
management by results. It has changed the relationship between 
the administration and political sphere. It is described as inspired 
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by private sector even though there are fundamental differences 
between the nature and goals of public and private sector work. 
There is uncertainty about the impact of these reforms. They have 
contributed to fragmentation and blurred distinction between pub-
lic and private sphere. Examples of fragmentation and internation-
alization are provided.  
Chapter 2: Administrative politics content and tasks  
The foundations of the Swedish administrative politics are de-
scribed with reference to the constitution. Its basic principles are 
listed including requirements for accessibility to public documents. 
The democratic chain is described and reference is made to par-
ticipation in the international community. The characteristics of 
the Swedish administrative model are described including principle 
of collective government, small ministries and independent agen-
cies. The lack of clarity about steering of independent agencies and 
discussion of this in earlier reports is noted together with the rele-
vant constitutional passages. Legal obligations of the administra-
tion are described, as is expertize and knowledge of tasks. The 
communal level is also discussed. Administrative politics is defined 
by a further list of features including structure, management, steer-
ing and control, as well as long term renewal and reform matters. 
The overarching goals of the administration are presented. It is 
said that a balance must be found between the rule of law, effec-
tiveness and democracy.  
Chapter 6: Steering  
The issue of political steering is presented with reference to recent 
attention for its importance and methods for steering are identi-
fied. There is that observation that greater emphasis upon effec-
tiveness has been accompanied by more private sector steering 
techniques and values. The introduction of results steering is iden-
tified as the most extensive change to political steering. Its history 
and origins within the administration are described, as the changes 
it has entailed. Among its effects are found to be greater cost con-
sciousness, increasing attention for results and strengthened 
agency independence. There is also attention for unintentional ef-
fects such as greater (burdensome) detail and precision in the re-
sult demands from the political sphere, or the tendency to provide 
information that is asked for, as opposed to information that is 
important, the tendency to measure what is easy and asked for and 
the effect of promoting individual agencies focus upon their own 
performance as opposed to that of the whole. Lack of interest 
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from ministries and politicians in the detailed reporting from agen-
cies is noted. A range of studies and interview findings are cited to 
support these claims. There is also a discussion of small and closed 
group which has been responsible for the creation of results steer-
ing. Recommendations for cooperation between agencies about 
the kinds of results to be achieved in a sector are described. There 
is also discussion of documenting the informal contacts that sup-
port results steering. Finally frame laws as a means to steer are also 
described.  
Chapter 13: Civil servants’ position and responsibilities  
Brief descriptions of the Swedish tradition of civil service and its 
position of authority within society are presented. The Swedish 
civil service is said to have exhibited positive characteristics very 
early including lack of corruption and effectiveness. It was also 
among the first to introduce freedom of information, keep a na-
tional registry and uphold rule of law ideals. Market values are 
identified as disrupting Swedish public service tradition and also 
contributing to the fragmentation of the state. Citations from legal 
experts are used to support this claim. These market values have 
been introduced through changing personnel legislation and results 
steering. Personnel changes have reduced independence of civil 
servants by making them more dependent upon their superiors. It 
is public values that are said to distinguish civil servants from pri-
vate sector employees, in addition public tasks are described as 
multi-dimensional and special. It is stated that there must be a liv-
ing consciousness that the citizen is the primary principal of civil 
servants. Duties of civil servants are described, as well as the com-
petency to manage special nature of public tasks. Concern is raised 
about the way that effectiveness has come to dominate priority 
making, at the expense of legality. The legal requirements of civil 
servants are described.  
C.3.2 Problematization in the text and word searches  
Terminology: Both political science and historical terms and theories 
are adopted. These are used to describe the tradition of Swedish 
politics, complexity and governance within society, and the democ-
ratic steering chain in the Swedish state. There is also a wealth of 
citations from political scientists. In addition, citations from legal 
experts are prominent in the description of the role of civil ser-
vants is prominent. There are also various references to articles in 
the constitution. 
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Problems and solutions: The state is described as having become an 
arena instead of an actor, it is subject to inter-dependencies be-
tween a wide range of actors. The problem of complexity is identi-
fied and the consequence of inter-dependency that this has. Frag-
mentation is identified as a central problem for the administration 
while the citizen is identified as the primary principal to govern-
ment and the administration. Deliberation is thought to maintain 
the citizen as a living idea, as well as the civil servant. The work of 
the public sector is multi-dimensional and subject to value con-
flicts, it is to this extent distinct from the private sector.  
Characteristic questions and/or statements: Steering of the administra-
tion is a central democratic question. It is also an issue that has 
broadened from vertical conceptions to more horizontal concep-
tions where the administration aids the political sphere in its work 
and also enables the citizen to participate. The Swedish state is a 
tree. Results steering has contributed to the goal of effectiveness 
but has also weakened the powers that hold the state administra-
tion together as a whole. The internal coherence is threatened by 
results steering, as is the Swedish public sector culture. The ad-
ministration is not only subject to government directives but also 
to the law. The effectiveness goal has been taken too far. Organ-
izational identity has been strengthened by results steering, which 
has increased the risk that individual agencies priorities become 
more important than what is best for the state as a whole.   
Word searches and counts: democracy, steering, whole, results steering, 
citizen, civil servant, tree, root, water, dissolve, vertical, horizontal, 
special, effectiveness/efficiency, flexibility, balance, open-
ness/closedness, clear transparent, strong/weak, formal and in-
formal contacts. 
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Appendix D – Chapter 7 inventory of documents 
 
D.1. Description of The Prime Minister’s address at the offi-
cial launch of Centrelink 
 
The primary conclusions to be made from this speech are that the 
creation of the service delivery agency, Centrelink, is to bring 
about an efficient service through the consolidation of services, 
easier access to customers and greater career opportunities for 
staff. It is compatible with the private enterprise passion of the 
government since the agency’s creation has occurred together with 
a commitment to a safety net for those in need, for eliminating 
fraud, discouraging dependence and to that extent ensuring incen-
tives for hard work. These are apparently the attributes of a re-
sponsible community.   
D.1.1 Structure of speech  
1. Thanks to various ministers and the employees of Centre-
link who are viewing via a video hook up are first ex-
pressed. 
2. Identifies the importance of introduction of Centrelink by 
referring to it as an innovation concerned with service de-
livery. In addition, it is described as the biggest single re-
form ever undertaken and congratulations to the responsi-
ble ministers are expressed. 
3. Recognizes the private enterprise passion of the govern-
ment but still expresses commitment to a strong public 
sector providing necessary services. These are described as 
compatible commitments. 
4. Centrelink is described as the culmination of the aspira-
tions of people over a long period of time. The knowledge 
and experience that the Prime Minister has gained from his 
electorate since entering parliament is re-counted. 
5. The advantages of Centrelink are described: a human face, 
more efficient service, less public dissatisfaction, more ca-
reer opportunities for staff. The reach of the organization 
is also referred to.  
6. The visions of mutual obligation and the responsible 
community are described. These are visions in which fraud 
is to be sanctioned and hard work rewarded. 
7. The size of the reform is once again illustrated and con-
gratulations for the reform again expressed. The desires to 
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take away the notion of dependency and give incentives for 
work are also made reference to. 
8. Centrelink is described in contrast to a past in which ad-
ministrative duplication was the norm. It is referred to as 
consolidating in an efficient, modern fashion the major 
service delivery activities of the Federal government. 
9. Pride and congratulations for the achievement of Centre-
link are declared together with the opening of Centrelink.  
D.1.2 Problematization in the text and word searches  
Terminology: The language is simple and direct, with frequent refer-
ence to the terms opportunities, Australian, honest and decent. 
There is an intimate story telling style with personal experience 
featuring in the speech, as well as frequent reference to we.  
The problems and solutions: The reform of social security arrange-
ments are presented as being desired for a long time. This is be-
cause of the prevalence of fraud in the system and because of the 
dissatisfaction among customers with having to go to different 
government offices to arrange their benefits. Centrelink is pre-
sented as desirable because it is compatible with a passion for a 
private enterprise government and will ensure efficient service de-
livery, with career opportunities for staff.  
Characteristic questions and/or statements: Mine is a proudly private en-
terprise government. But this does not gainsay the fact that we re-
gard a strong public sector providing necessary services for people 
as an integral part of modern government and as something that 
delivers necessary support to those in the community who need it. 
From the moment I entered parliament in 1974 and began talking 
to constituents about the number of agencies you had to visit. And 
what focused my mind at the time was that so many people felt 
that if only they could go to one place and have all their business 
done in that one spot it would be a lot more efficient, it would be a 
lot more human and it would make a great deal more sense. And 
it’s a demonstration that there is an Australian way, a unique Aus-
tralian way, of delivering service support to those in the commu-
nity who deserve and need our help and assistance. We need as far 
as possible to take away the notion of dependency from the deliv-
ery of services. Centrelink consolidates in an efficient, modern 
fashion the major service delivery activities of the federal govern-
ment.  
Word searches and counts: opportunities, efficient, horizon, challenge, 
renewal, human face, incentive, unique, private enterprise/sector, 
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business, dependence, taxpayers, staff, customers/clients, Austra-
lian community, new, horizon. 
 
D.2. Description of Three stages of an evolving model to a 
one stop shop – Challenges at each stage 
 
The speech describes the motivations for creating Centrelink and 
its distinction from other types of government organizations. It 
gives an account of the arrangements that have already been taken 
in Centrelink or will be taken to promote its business and cus-
tomer service orientation.  
D.2.1 Structure of the speech 
1. The uniqueness of Centrelink is presented and it is distin-
guished from both public sector organizations in general 
and the way that social security was organized in the past. 
A before and after list of distinctions are presented. 
2. The size and scale of Centrelinks business operations are de-
scribed in a range of figures. 
3. Stage one, the creation of Centrelink is recounted with ref-
erence to initial surveys and value creation workshops that 
were used to inform the transition towards a more person-
alized service. The recognition of staff opinions and needs 
are also identified. 
4. Stage two and the consolidation of Centrelink is described. 
This includes introducing a one person contact and using 
information technologies to ensure a seamless service. The 
use of a range of electronic applications to advance Centre-
link as a business are described, as well as other means for 
ensuring customer loyalty from departments. Training pos-
sibilities for staff are identified. 
5. Stage three of implementing a new service delivery model 
wherein products can be tailored to the customer is de-
scribed. It relies upon a life event model, in which uses in-
formation technology to identify the different needs of 
customers. 
 
D.2.2 Problematization in the text and word searches  
Terminology: Centrelink is consistently presented as a business 
throughout the text. This occurs through direct references to it as 
a business with brands and outlets and to its customers. It is also 
apparent from references to competition, contestable environ-
ment, contracts, major key drivers, business re-engineering, har-
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vesting best practice, benchmarking, personalized and tailored ser-
vices.  
The problems and solutions: The focus upon improving customer ser-
vice would suggest that it has been unsatisfactory in the past. Simi-
larly a contrast is being made between a more traditional bureau-
cratic past characterized by paper shuffling is being replaced by an 
innovative business like approach that is near paperless. This sug-
gest that information technology and customer service are the nec-
essary solutions to existing problems/arrangements. The desires of 
customers are presented as equivalent to the desires of citizens.  
Characteristic questions and/or statements: The purpose in establishing 
Centrelink was to make it easier for citizens to do business with 
the federal government. The departmental secretaries reserve the 
right to find the right to find alternative providers if Centrelink 
cannot deliver to agreed levels. Stage 1 in the development of Cen-
trelink involved setting up the organization, defining and moving 
towards personalized service and establishing business opportuni-
ties. If every part of the organization adopts the best innovations 
already demonstrated by its best performers, Centrelink would be 
operating at the levels required by its plan in three years. The proc-
ess will be a move towards electronic gathering of customer data 
using new technologies and industry best practices, and trialing 
methods which allow customers to have entry into Centrelink 
payment systems with ‘near paperless – one only’ contact with the 
service centres. The need to give staff portable skills against estab-
lished private and public sector standards.  
Word counts and searches: business, customer, efficient, personalized, 
tailored, competition, benchmarking, staff, unique, challenge, Aus-
tralian community, outlets, brands, seamless, on the road, leading 
the way, drivers, paper/paperless, bureaucracy, harvesting, seam-
less, flexible. 
 
D.3 Descriptions of Connecting Government 
 
The document examines the many different ways that whole of 
government activities are performed and the kinds of features that 
contribute to their success. It does this on the basis of 10 case 
studies and a literature review. It identifies both Centrelink and ex-
ecutive agencies as means to connect government activities and 
thus promote whole of government projects. 
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D.3.1 Structure of the document  
Chapter 1: The whole of government challenge  
The priority of whole of government is explained, it is part of 
achieving more effective implementation, obtaining the respon-
siveness of the administration to government and tailoring services 
to individual needs. Whole of government is defined and its use in 
other countries referred to. The external and internal motivations 
are listed including world complexity and recent tendencies to-
wards fragmentation, as a result of devolution. A history and tradi-
tion of whole of government is also documented by means of ex-
ample. Situations in which whole of government approaches are 
suitable are briefly discussed, it is not suitable for all situations and 
should not be taken lightly. The elements of best practice whole of 
government approaches are listed. These include developing a 
supportive culture and skills base, governance budget and account-
ability frameworks, maximizing information and communications 
infrastructure, improving engagement with individuals and com-
munities, building the capacity to respond quickly and effectively 
to emerging issues. Each of these facts are then described more 
thoroughly.  
Chapter 2:  Structures and processes  
The need for coordination is described and the kinds of issues that 
require whole of government methods of coordination are listed. 
Cabinet is identified as the key actor in ensuring and commanding 
policy coordination. The horizontal and vertical features of cabinet 
decision making are listed. The creation of the cabinet policy unit 
responsible for whole of government coordination is listed. Inter-
departmental coordination at the top of departments, committees 
and taskforces are first described. Cross departmental partnerships 
in agencies such as Centrelink are then described. Key features of 
this arrangement are listed, as well as situations when such ar-
rangements are appropriate. A best practice check list is provided 
for this situation and includes clearly defined requirements, a ser-
vice level agreement, information feedback and appropriate train-
ing. Special purpose agencies or rather frontier agencies are then 
also described. Examples of such agencies are given and both the 
conditions and best practice checklist that is appropriate to this ar-
rangement is presented.  
Chapter five: Budget and accountability framework  
The introduction of accrual accounting in 1999 is first discussed. 
Outputs, outcomes and administered items as defined in the 
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budget are briefly discussed. The possibility for variation in the 
way that whole of measure arrangements can be appropriated is 
discussed but concern is raised about the need to balance whole of 
government resource needs together with the bigger picture of 
parliamentary accountability and accountability to stakeholders. 
Problems around the (financial) assessment of the performance of 
whole of government projects are described, in particular the defi-
nition of outcomes is said to have presented a barrier. The pro-
gressive refinement of the budget system is described and its ca-
pacity to manage whole of government projects with broad out-
comes is claimed. Other approaches to appropriation are noted 
particularly with examples from state government experience, but 
also UK experience. Different appropriation models and their pos-
sibility within the Australian system are then listed and briefly de-
scribed. These include single outcome, purchaser provider agree-
ments, having a lead agency and multi-agency package. Further 
case study examples are then described. 
 
D.3.2 Problematization in the text and word searches  
Terminology: Doing business, customers, responsiveness, best prac-
tice checklists, good practice guides, being on the ground, external 
and internal drivers are terms used throughout the text. Cabinet is 
identified as the centre of government and there are various refer-
ences to its functioning and to different instruments for coordina-
tion across ministerial portfolios. This begins with possibili-
ties/structures for coordination at the top. There are some refer-
ences to budgetary terms/ideas but these are presented in simpli-
fied ways.  
The problems and solutions: A central problem is the complexity of 
policy making and the complexity of the world through such 
changes as globalization or environmental problems. There is con-
cern about the individual focus of agencies. Greater collaboration 
and coordination, or rather whole of government, is the central so-
lution.  
Characteristic questions and/or statements:  There is a need to achieve 
more effective policy coordination and more timely and effective 
implementation of government policy decisions, in line with the 
statutory requirement for the APS to be responsive to the elected 
government. The Australian public increasingly expects services to 
individuals, businesses and communities to be tailored to their par-
ticular needs. Recognizing this imperative, the Management Advi-
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sory Commission (MAC) initiated a review of relevant experience 
to identify better, practical ways of working across organizational 
boundaries.  The report is supplemented by Good Practice Guides 
to assist those involved on the ground in whole of government ac-
tivities. Integration of government services was at the heart of 
Centrelink development. In some ways their (executive agencies) 
creation outside the normal departmental structure is intended to 
symbolize their whole of government status. National Oceans Of-
fice (executive agency)…this is a quintessential whole of govern-
ment idea.  
Word counts and searches: imperative, challenge, bridge, freedom, effi-
ciency, flexibility, incentives, competition, responsiveness, busi-
ness, citizen, customer, staff, managers, leaders, strong, pur-
chaser/provider, seamless, tailored, balance, vertical, horizontal, 
coordination, integration, collaboration, balance, connect, sharpen, 
big picture, whole (of government), governance, Australian, 
more/less. 
 Samenvatting 
 
In dit onderzoek is de retoriek rondom de vorming van agent-
schappen in nationale, officiële verhandelingen onderzocht. De 
studie richt zich niet op de praktijk van de vorming van agent-
schappen, maar probeert een verklaring te vinden binnen de cultu-
reel-politieke en bestuurlijke context voor de argumenten die de 
opkomst, en tot op zekere hoogte, de ondergang van agent-
schappen in gang hebben gezet. De vorming van agentschappen 
wordt gezien als een internationaal modeverschijnsel in publiek 
management, met arrangementen en programma’s voor agent-
schappen die verschenen in diverse landen zoals Engeland, Japan 
en Tanzania (O’Toole and Jordan, 1995; Oliver, 2000; Talbot and 
Caulfield, 2002). Het ging daarbij om het vestigen van over-
heidseenheden binnen handbereik van ministeries en het reguleren 
ervan door middel van prestatie contracten (Pollitt, et al., 2004).  
In het wetenschappelijke debat heeft het internationaal ont-
staan van het verschijnsel agentschap de vraag opgeroepen of er 
sprake is van convergentie van hervorming van publiek manage-
ment binnen verschillende cultureel-politieke en bestuurlijke con-
texten. De meningen hierover lopen uiteen. Internationale organi-
saties en adviseurs hebben de neiging gehad de overeenkomsten in 
hervormingspraktijken en de toepasbaarheid van gelijksoortige 
hervormingen in verschillende contexten te benadrukken (zie Pol-
litt, 2001a, 2001b). Een aantal bestuurskundigen hebben daarnaast 
gewezen op de verschillen in de nationale hervormingspraktijken 
en hun relaties met de te onderscheiden nationale hervormingstra-
jecten die bestaan in verschillend culturele, politieke en bestuurlijke 
contexten (Premfors, 1998; Kickert, 1997; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2004). Het is ook geopperd dat er eerder sprake is van convergen-
tie in nationale hervormings-praat dan in de daadwerkelijke prak-
tijk (Pollitt, 2001a). De veronderstelling is dan dat bepaalde verha-
len of manieren van spreken over management hervormingen zich los 
van politiek-bestuurlijke contexten hebben verplaatst. Vergelijking 
van nationale, officiële beleidsdocumenten over agentschappen 
maakt het mogelijk onderzoek te doen naar de mate waarin er 
werkelijk sprake is geweest van convergerende hervormingspraat 
ten aanzien van publiek management. De rol van een internatio-
naal gedeeld verhaal, of van de cultureel-politieke en bestuurlijke 
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context, zoals die wordt weerspiegeld in te onderscheiden nationale 
stijlen van spreken over de hervorming van agentschappen, wordt 
ook onderzocht. Tegen de achtergrond van het convergentie debat 
kan de volgende centrale vraagstelling van dit onderzoek worden 
geponeerd: 
 
Hoe is de hervorming van agentschappen geconstrueerd in officiële verhandelin-
gen zoals deze in verschillende culturele en politiek-bestuurlijke contexten zijn 
gepresenteerd en waarom zijn er overeenkomsten en verschillen opgetreden in de 
verhandelingen? 
 
De empirische focus van het onderzoek was een internationale 
vergelijking van nationale, officiële beleidsdocumenten over de 
hervorming van agentschappen in Nederland, Zweden en Austra-
lië. 
  
De theorieën en het onderzoeksdesign  
Om te komen tot een onderzoek van overeenkomsten en verschil-
len in nationale, officiële verhandelingen over de vorming van 
agentschappen is in dit onderzoek een sociaal-constructivistische 
benadering gekozen. Centraal in deze benadering is het idee dat 
objecten zoals agentschappen niet worden begrepen als een ver-
schijnsel in de praktijk maar eerder als tot stand gekomen door wat 
er over hen wordt gezegd in een bepaalde context. Om het onder-
zoek te ondersteunen werden twee theorieën gekozen, de New 
Rhetoric en de Grid Group Cultural Theory (GGCT). Deze theo-
rieën passen in het sociaal constructivisme en maken het mogelijk 
te komen tot een beschouwing van de cultureel-politieke en be-
stuurlijke context en de eigenschappen van de verhalen die karak-
teristiek zijn voor officiële hervormingspraat. Ten eerste is de New 
Rhetoric van Perleman en Olbrechts-Tyteca (2003) gekozen om 
officiële beleidsdocumenten over vorming van agentschappen te 
analyseren. Deze theorie bood het gereedschap om retorische ei-
genschappen ofwel regels van het spreken over vorming van agent-
schappen te beschouwen. De retorische eigenschappen zijn onder-
scheiden door middel van het karakter van die spreken ofwel ethos 
in de verschillende politiek-bestuurlijke contexten, en hun manie-
ren om agentschappen te construeren (pathos, logos). Dit gaf de mo-
gelijkheid om verhalen die werden gebruikt voor de promotie van 
vorming van agentschappen te categoriseren en vergelijken. Zulke 
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concepten omvatten het idee van een universeel publiek, de manier 
waarop kwalitatieve en kwantitatieve loci werden gebruikt om het 
publiek in vervoering te brengen en de mate waarin argumentatie 
berustte op mathematische deductie, overtuiging of metafoor. Bij 
de beschouwing van ethos, ofwel de manier waarop de spreker het 
publiek construeert, was het gebruik van de New Rhetoric toepas-
selijk aangezien het onderscheid maakt tussen een universeel en 
een bepaald publiek. Dit gaf de mogelijkheid onderscheid te maken 
tussen een nationale stijlen van spreken zoals die in verband staat met 
een politiek-bestuurlijke context en de manieren van spreken ge-
richt tot een beperktere groep professionals of een beleidsnetwerk. 
Het idee van een nationale stijl van spreken gaf een verbinding met 
de categorieën van GGCT omdat deze naar verwachting overeen-
kwam met de meer algemene cultureel-politieke en bestuurlijke 
context.  
GGCT werd op twee manieren in dit onderzoek toegepast. Het 
werd gebuikt om de politiek-bestuurlijke contexten alsmede de cul-
turele kleur van de officiële beleidsdocumenten te karakteriseren. 
GGCT onderscheidt culturen op basis van de twee dimensies van 
het sociale, te weten raster (grid) en groep (group). Raster verwijst 
naar de mate waarin het leven van mensen wordt bepaald door re-
gels en conventies in de maatschappij, terwijl groep verwijst naar 
de mate waarin mensen verbonden zijn met elkaar als leden van 
een collectief. Samengenomen zijn deze dimensies gebruikt om 
vier ideaaltypen van sociale omgeving te maken die corresponde-
ren met de verschillende maten waarin raster (hoog of laag) en 
groep (hoog of laag) voorkomen. Deze vier manieren van leven 
hebben de volgende namen gekregen: hiërarchie (hoge groep, hoog 
raster), egalitarisme (hoge groep, laag raster), individualisme (lage 
groep, laag raster) en fatalisme (lage groep, hoog raster). Zij verte-
genwoordigen zowel structuur als cultuur, die elkaar bovendien 
ook versterken volgens deze theorie. Elk van de manieren van le-
ven en mogelijke combinaties ervan worden in verband gebracht 
met algemene eigenschappen die kunnen worden vergeleken met 
het functioneren van verschillende politiek-bestuurlijke systemen. 
Mamadouh (1997:23) heeft bijvoorbeeld gesteld dat sociale demo-
cratie of meer specifiek de moralistische politieke cultuur die ka-
rakteristiek is voor meerpartijenstelsels, gerichtheid op consensus 
en een gulle welvaartsstaat kunnen worden begrepen als een com-
binatie van egalitarisme en hiërarchie. Aan de andere kant kunnen 
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een ondernemende politieke cultuur karakteristiek voor twee par-
tijen stelsels, competitie en een beperkte overheid worden begre-
pen als een combinatie van individualisme en hiërarchie. Hood et 
al. (2004: 11) hebben gepoogd om GGCT categorieën ook toe te 
passen om bestuurlijke systemen. Er is enige onduidelijkheid over 
de schaal en de mate waarop de karakterisering van politieke cultu-
ren ook toepasbaar zijn op bestuurlijke culturen binnen een en 
hetzelfde politiek-bestuurlijke systeem (Thompson, 1998). In dit 
onderzoek heb ik de mogelijkheid open gehouden of van culturele 
mengvormen kan worden verwacht dat ze zich repliceren in de 
verschillende lagen van het systeem zoals het politieke en het be-
stuurlijke. 
Naast de toepassing van GGCT op de context waarin de offici-
ele beleidsdocumenten over agentschappen werden vormgegeven, 
is het ook gebruikt om, net als de New Rhetoric, de officiële be-
leidsdocumenten zelf te beschouwen. Hood (2003) heeft thema’s 
en argumenten in publiek management met gebruikmaking van de 
vier manier van leven gecategoriseerd. Dit geeft de mogelijkheid de 
verschillende culturele kleuren van verhalen die in de nationale be-
leidsdocumenten zijn opgenomen te identificeren. Hood heeft 
zelfs voorgesteld dat ethos, pathos en logos waarschijnlijk elk van 
de vier manier van leven karakteriseren. Door GGCT samen met 
de New Rhetoric toe te passen op nationale, officiële beleidsdo-
cumenten werd het mogelijk om de daadwerkelijke retorische ei-
genschappen van cultureel verschillend gekleurde verhalen te iden-
tificeren en deze met Hood’s voorspellingen te vergelijken. GGCT 
gaf ook een contextuele verklaring voor de culturele kleuren van 
nationale, officiële beleidsdocumenten omdat het idee van elkaar 
versterkende werking van sociale relaties en houdingen een over-
eenstemming veronderstelt tussen het culturele karakter van de po-
litiek-bestuurlijke context en de culturele kleur van de nationale be-
leidsdocumenten en nationale stijlen van spreken zoals toegepast. 
De redenering, dat van landen met een hoge groep kan worden 
verwacht dat ze hoge groep verhalen in hun beleidsdocumenten 
over de hervorming van agentschappen waarderen terwijl van lage 
groep landen kan worden verwacht dat ze lage groep verhalen 
waarderen, werd in dit onderzoek onder de loep genomen. Daar-
naast boden deze theorieën de mogelijkheid om achter de mate te 
komen waarin cultureel gelijke gekleurde verhalen en gelijksoortige 
regels van het spreken in verschillende landen kunnen worden waar-
 492
genomen. Dit zou aangeven dat bepaalde in de mode zijnde verha-
len, meer dan de context, in staat zijn geweest de nationale, officië-
le beleidsdocumenten vorm te geven.   
De casus en data selectie voor het onderzoek werden ingegeven 
door de genoemde theorieën, door empirische relevantie, en advies 
van nationale experts. Ten eerste werd een brede definitie van 
agentschap vastgesteld die de ruimte liet voor niet alleen de algemene 
inhoud van hervormingsvoorstellen, maar ook voor hun symboli-
sche herkenning in een bredere internationale discours met betrek-
king tot agentschappen. Ten tweede werd de selectie van landen 
ingegeven door de overeenkomsten en verschillen tussen de cultu-
reel-politiek context. In navolging van bestaande studies in GGCT 
en de politieke wetenschappen werden aan de ene kant twee gelij-
kende hoge groep - consensus contexten gekozen: Zweden en Ne-
derland (voornamelijk egalitair waarna hiërarchisch). Aan de ande-
re kant werd een context met lage groep - conflictmodel gekozen: 
Australië (voornamelijk individualistisch). Empirisch waren deze 
landen ook interessant omdat de beleidsdocumenten over hun 
agentschappen minder wetenschappelijke belangstelling in de En-
gelse taal hebben genoten dan vormingen van agentschappen in 
landen als het Verenigd Koninkrijk of Nieuw Zeeland. Daar komt 
bij dat de analyse van documenten uit deze landen speciale aan-
dacht mogelijk maakt voor de manier waarop schijnbaar gelijkende 
hervormingsideeën, vaak in het Engels verwoord in de internatio-
nale gemeenschap, worden vertaald en besproken in de verschil-
lende talen. Ten derde werd de selectie van officiële documenten 
in elk van de landen ingegeven door uitgebreid documentenonder-
zoek alsmede vragenlijsten die werden voorgelegd aan nationale 
experts of het gebied van management hervormingen. Dit leidde 
tot het kiezen van drie officiële beleidsdocumenten die de nationa-
le beleidsdocumenten over de vormingen van agentschappen in elk 
land over perioden van 7 tot 14 jaar weerspiegelden. 
 
Bevindingen 
Uit het onderzoek bleek dat, hoewel er enige convergentie was in 
de nationale, officiële beleidsdocumenten over agentschappen in 
de verschillende landen, de overeenkomsten beperkt waren. De 
verschillen in nationale beleidsdocumenten daarentegen waren 
duurzaam en van betekenis. Zowel de mate waarin gelijkende ver-
halen worden omarmd in de verschillende contexten als de natio-
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nale stijlen van spreken die werden waargenomen kunnen voor-
namelijk worden verklaard door het culturele karakter van de be-
studeerde politiek-bestuurlijke contexten. De rol van een gelijklui-
dend internationaal verhaal dat zich onafhankelijk van context ver-
plaatst gaf een slechts zeer gedeeltelijke verklaring voor nationale, 
officiële beleidsdocumenten over agentschappen. Hoewel de waar-
genomen convergentie sprekend was, werd deze altijd beperkt 
door een breder nationale politieke cultuur en de instituties en 
sprekers die gerechtigd waren binnen deze contexten te spreken.  
Patronen van overeenkomsten en verschillen in de nationale be-
leidsdocumenten over agentschappen geven aan dat er bepaalde 
nationale stijlen van spreken zou kunnen zijn die hoort bij hoge 
groep consensus culturen dan wel bij lage groep - conflictmodel 
culturen. Dit ondersteunt contextgebonden verklaringen voor na-
tionale, officiële beleidsdocumenten over agentschappen. In de 
hoge groep – consensus culturen, Zweden en Nederland, was het 
aanvoeren van wetenschappelijk bewijs belangrijk om geloof-
waardig te worden in de ogen van het publiek, net als het gebruik 
van politieke idealen. Quasi-logische argumentatie of formele re-
deneringen waren een duurzame eigenschap van de argumentatieve 
technieken die werden gebruikt, evenals controle metaforen zoals 
sturen en greep krijgen. Beleidsdocumenten in de hoge groep – con-
sensus culturen werden typisch naar voren gebracht door groepen 
van gespecialiseerde sprekers die op afstand stonden van de poli-
tieke macht. In tegenstelling, werd in het lage groep – conflictmo-
del van Australië geloofwaardigheid verkregen door het publiek op 
een meer informele, ongecompliceerde manier aan te spreken en 
persoonsgerichte waarden zoals klantenservice waren prominenter 
door de tijd heen. Argumenten gebaseerd op overtuiging, eerder 
dan quasi-logische argumenten, waren een duurzame eigenschap 
van de hervormingsteksten en zakelijke metaforen werden met re-
gelmaat toegepast. Beleidsdocumenten in de lage groep – con-
flictmodel cultuur werden typisch naar voren gebracht door indivi-
duele sprekers die zich dicht bij de macht bevonden.  
Zoals werd verwacht waren egalitaire en hiërarchische thema’s 
prominenter aanwezig in de hoge groep landen, terwijl individualis-
tische thema’s prominenter aanwezig waren in het lage groep land. 
Hiërarchische thema’s waren prominenter aanwezig in dan de ega-
litaire thema’s in de Nederlandse en Zweedse beleidsdocumenten 
over agentschappen. Dit was verrassend aangezien beide politieke 
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contexten meestal als egalitair worden beschouwd. Dit geeft aan 
dat de retorische situatie waarbinnen de beleidsdocumenten over 
agentschappen werden geproduceerd kon worden onderscheiden 
van de karaktertrekken van de bredere politieke cultuur. Het kon 
ook worden toegeschreven aan de grotere afstand tussen de spre-
kers en de politiek. Er werd daarentegen een grote overeenkomst 
gevonden tussen de voornamelijk individualistische politieke cul-
tuur in Australië en de culturele kleur van verhalen over agent-
schappen zoals weergegeven in officiële beleidsdocumenten. Dit 
werd toegeschreven aan de grotere nabijheid van de Australische 
sprekers tot de politiek.   
Er waren ook belangrijke verschillen in de culturele kleur van 
nationale beleidsdocumenten in de hoge groep landen Zweden en 
Nederland. Dit werd verklaard door verschillen in de cultureel-
politieke en bestuurlijke context omdat meer individualistische 
thema’s en argumenten in Nederland kunnen worden toegeschre-
ven aan een hogere mate van individualisme in vergelijking met 
Zweden. Het kan ook worden toegeschreven aan de grotere moge-
lijkheden voor financiële experts om in de Nederlandse situatie het 
vertellen over hervormingen van agentschappen te domineren. 
Zowel in Nederland als in Zweden waren individualistische verha-
len het prominentst aanwezig wanneer financiële actoren een be-
langrijke rol hadden gespeeld in de voorbereiding van officiële do-
cumenten over agentschappen. Deze actoren brachten gelijkende 
individualistische verhalen naar deze contexten. Omdat financiële 
dominantie vaker voorkwam in de Nederlandse politiek-
bestuurlijke context, bevatten zij door de tijd heen ook meer indi-
vidualistische thema’s. 
Convergentie in de nationale beleidsdocumenten over agent-
schappen tussen zowel hoge als lage groep landen werden vooral 
waargenomen in de individualistische verhalen die in de verschei-
dene landen werden opgenomen. Deze verhalen weerspiegelden 
gelijkende regels voor het spreken onafhankelijk van de context waarin 
zij weergegeven, wat aangeeft dat sommige verhalen de eigen-
schappen van nationale, officiële beleidsdocumenten kunnen ver-
klaren. De individualistische verhalen werden constant gekarakteri-
seerd door het argument van ongelimiteerde ontwikkeling, waar-
mee initiatieven van agentschappen werden weergegeven als conti-
nu verbeterbaar door de tijd, en door reis metaforen en metaforen 
van flexibiliteit. In Nederland en Australië werden beleidsdocu-
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menten gekarakteriseerd door de constructie van een publiek van 
adviseurs. Er was ook enige convergentie in de typen van pendule 
verschuivingen die in officiële beleidsdocumenten in hoge groep 
en lage groep culturen door de tijd plaatsvonden. In Zweden en 
Australië was bijvoorbeeld een beweging van individualistische 
verhalen naar meer groep verhalen waar te nemen samen met een 
grotere nadruk op het probleem van complexiteit en een toegeno-
men gebruik van de metafoor van het geheel. Deze nationale ver-
schuivingen in verhalen waren consistent met de veranderingen in 
het internationale verhaal van NPM naar governance. De mate 
waarin gelijkluidende verhalen werden omarmd blijkt te worden 
beperkt door het culturele karakter van de cultureel-politieke en 
bestuurlijke context. Individualistische verhalen werden in een gro-
tere mate omarmd in de lage groep – conflictmodel context, terwijl 
hiërarchische verhalen in een grotere mate werden omarmd in de 
hoge groep - consensus contexten. Het blijkt ook dat de verschui-
vingen in verhalen sneller plaatsvonden in de lage groep – con-
flictmodel cultuur dan in de hoge groep consensus culturen.  
Er konden ook enige meer algemene conclusies die uit het on-
derzoek van nationale beleidsdocumenten over de vorming van 
agentschappen in de landen worden getrokken. De waargenomen 
retoriek gaf bijvoorbeeld aanwijzingen over hoe hervormers van de 
publieke sector op een succesvolle wijze het publiek in de Neder-
landse, Zweedse en Australische politiek-bestuurlijke contexten 
kunnen overtuigen. Het bleek bijvoorbeeld dat quasi-logische ar-
gumentatie het meest werd gewaardeerd in Nederland en Zweden, 
terwijl argumenten gebaseerd op de structuur van de werkelijkheid 
eerder tot acceptatie zouden leiden in Australië. Op een vergelijk-
bare manier is de pathos van de onzekerheid (de bedreiging van de 
democratie) in Zweden, het unieke in Nederland en het moeilijke 
(de uitdaging) in Australië prominent in hun beleidsdocumenten. 
Dit doet vermoeden dat deze pathos en loci waarschijnlijk een gro-
tere geloofwaardigheid aan hervormingsinitiatieven geven in deze 
landen. Er werden ook grenzen van officiële verhalen geïdentifi-
ceerd, zoals het wijdverbreide vertrouwen in de mogelijkheid die 
de autoriteiten hebben om hervormingen te doen slagen (regels, 
politici en ministers) en het geloof dat prestatiesturing het juiste 
gedrag teweeg zouden brengen. Het werd duidelijk dat burgers en 
managers grotendeels het zwijgen wordt opgelegd in officiële be-
leidsdocumenten of alleen een stem worden gegeven ter legitimatie 
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van het officiële verhaal. Dit weerspreekt claims ten aanzien van 
het democratische karakter van hervormingen. Hoewel niet on-
derwerp van gerichte studie in dit proefschrift zou het beperkte 
begrip van publieke managers en hun werk in de officiële beleids-
documenten over agentschappen erop kunnen wijzen dat er een 
beduidende kloof is tussen het officiële verhaal over vorming van 
agentschappen en de praktijk ervan. 
De theoretische bijdragen van dit onderzoek tenslotte omvatten 
de verfijning van de GGCT typologie in de studie van publiek ma-
nagement en het constateren van enige beperkingen daarvan. De 
empirische bevindingen hebben aanwijzingen gegeven over de ty-
pen ethos, pathos en logos die waarschijnlijk met de beleids-
documenten over hervormingen samenvallen. Daarnaast zijn ar-
gumenten die nog niet door GGCT zijn gecategoriseerd aangestipt 
voor toekomstig debat. Deze omvatten argumenten over feedback 
verbanden tussen uitvoering en beleid en over de toewijzing van 
gezamenlijke budgetten. Het is aangetoond dat sommige retorische 
thema’s zoals democratie en ministeriële verantwoordelijkheid niet 
passen in de strikte toewijzing aan een van de vier typen. Het was 
eerder hun culturele ambiguïteit die ze aantrekkelijk maakte. Op 
eenzelfde manier waren ook de meer gefragmenteerde politiek-
bestuurlijke contexten van Nederland moeilijk een duidelijke plaats 
te geven in de GGCT matrix. Verder werden claims ten aanzien 
van de overname van dezelfde culturele mixen op verschillende 
schaalniveaus, zoals in de bestuurlijke en de politieke laag, in dit 
onderzoek niet bevestigd. Inzicht in verbanden tussen bestuurlijke 
en politieke culturen vereist vervolgonderzoek. Daarnaast gaf het 
concept universeel publiek uit de New Rhetoric de mogelijkheid van 
een meer genuanceerd begrip van cultuur. Zowel de nationale stij-
len van spreken als de theoretische bevindingen betreffende be-
perkte culturele manieren van spreken hebben aangegeven dat het 
onmogelijk is willekeurig welk hervormingsidee in elke context in 
te brengen. Voor zo’n kunststukje zou een Hercules van de reto-
riek nodig zijn. Dat type spreker is in dit onderzoek niet voorge-
komen. 
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